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HONOUR'S ROLE
IN THE INTERNATIONAL STATES' SYSTEM*
ALLEN Z. HERTZ*
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Studying the First World War's origins, James Joll (1918-1994), Professor of
International History at the University of London, offered this insight: "In the late
20th century we perhaps find it easier to conceive of foreign policy as being
motivated by domestic preoccupations and by economic interests than by...
considerations of prestige and glory. It does not necessarily follow that the men of
1914 thought in the same way as we do."' To recapture that age which ended
during the First World War, this essay analyzes the meaning of "honour" as a
staple of European political philosophy. The significance of the "word of honour"
is then located in the context of European courtly society, where a king's honour is
explored in relation to that of his country and in the "international of kings" that
was the European States' system until 1917-18. Attention is then directed to
discourse about "honour" and "interest" as rhetoric of British foreign policy. It is
suggested that the idea of honour was at that time consciously exploited for
political ends. Examples are used to show that countries actually fought for
honour, which is portrayed as one of the causes of the First World War, and
directly relevant to Great Britain's decision to confront Germany in 1914.
Thereafter, focus shifts to "national honour" as recognized by public international
law, breach of which then met the sanction of dishonour. Attention is paid to
wartime interest in a new legal paradigm and its reception by the governments in
London and Washington. This is followed by a description of the architecture of
the 1919 peace settlement, which embodied a new law-based order, antithetic to
both honour and aristocratic diplomacy. Finally, the shift from honour to law is
tested by looking at the discourse used at the League of Nations when Hitler
unilaterally denounced key treaty provisions.
A. What is Honour?
An answer comes from French magistrate, parliamentarian, historian and
* B.A. (McGill University); M.A., Ph.D. (Columbia University); LL.B. (University of Cambridge);
LL.M. (University of Toronto). Formerly with Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hertz is
now a Senior Advisor in Canada's Privy Council Office supporting the Prime Minister and the Federal
Cabinet.
1. JAMES JOLL, THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 240 (2nd ed., 1992).
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aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859):
(1) It first signifies the esteem, glory, or reverence that a man receives from his
fellow men; and in this sense a man is said 'to acquire honour' (conqu~rir de
l'honneur). (2) Honour signifies the aggregate of those rules by the aid of which
this esteem, glory, or reverence is obtained. Thus we say that 'a man has always
strictly obeyed the laws of honour'; or 'a man has violated his honour,.
2
According to German archivist and military historian Karl Demeter: "Honour
can be either a condition or a reflex, subjective or objective: it can be purely
personal or it can be collective." 3 Similarly, University of Chicago anthropologist
Julian Pitt-Rivers observed: "Honour is the value of a person in his own eyes, but
also in the eyes of his society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his claim to
pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognized
by society, his right to pride."4 Honour is a manifestation of what U.S. political
philosopher Francis Fukuyama describes when he points to man's desire for
recognition: "People believe that they have a certain worth, and when other people
treat them as though they are worth less than that, they experience the emotion of
anger. Conversely, when people fail to live up to their own sense of worth, they
feel shame, and when they are evaluated correctly in proportion to their worth,
they feel pride."5
Honour's significance is something the 21 st century grasps poorly, because as
honour, the concept is now virtually obsolete and the "vocabulary of honour has
acquired archaic overtones in modem English.",6  De Tocqueville shrewdly
perceived that honour's obsolescence parallels the eclipse of aristocracy: "The
dissimilarities and inequalities of men gave rise to the notion of honor; that notion
is weakened in proportion as these differences are obliterated, and with them it
would disappear."7  Thus, the shift from an aristocratic to a bourgeois culture
caused aristocratic honour to fade in favour of middle-class public opinion--the
latter perhaps featuring as frequently in modem political discourse as did the
former in previous times. 8 However, an important subset of what was once called
2. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 230 n.l (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry
Reeve & Francis Bowen trans., New York 1953).
3. KARL DEMETER, THE GERMAN OFFICER-CORPS IN SOCIETY AND STATE 1650-1945 Part 3:
Honour 111 (Angus Malcolm trans., London, 1965) [hereinafter GERMAN OFFICER-CORPS].
4. Julian Pitt-Rivers, Honour and Social Status, in HONOUR AND SHAME: THE VALUES OF
MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY 21 (J.G. Peristiany ed., London 1965) [hereinafter Honor and Social
Status]; for links to hierarchy and self-consciousness, see NORBERT ELIAS, THE GERMANS: POWER
STRUGGLES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HABITUS IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 96
(Michael Schroter ed., New York, 1996).
5. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN xvii (New York, 1992).
6. Julian Pitt-Rivers, Honor, in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 510
(David L. Sills ed. New York, 1968); Peter Berger, On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honour, in
LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 149-158 (Michael J. Sandel ed., New York, 1984).
7. DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 242, supra note 2.
8. See W. Phillips Davison, Public Opinion, in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 193; see also J.A.W. Gunn, Public Opinion, in POLITICAL INNOVATION AND
VOL. 31:2
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honour survives today in the narrower concept of prestige among States. 9 In a
detailed examination of the goals of foreign policy, French political scientist
Raymond Aron (1905-1983) argued: "Political units are in competition: the
satisfactions of amour-propre, victory or prestige, are no less real than the so-
called material satisfactions, such as the gain of a province or a population."'
l o
The Duke of Wellington probably never said "the battle of Waterloo was won
on the playing-fields of Eton," but dlite education in Europe specifically tried to
inculcate a cult of honour, in part to support the officer corps." Thus, honour was
identified as an essential component of "the genius for war" by Prussian soldier
and writer Carl von Clausewitz (1780-183 1):
Of all the noble feelings... in the exciting tumult of battle, none... are so
powerful and constant as the soul's thirst for honour and renown, which the
German language treats so unfairly... in the words Ehrgeiz (greed of honour) and
Ruhmsucht (hankering after glory) .... Has there ever been a great Commander
destitute of the love of honour, or is such a character even conceivable?12
But, Clausewitz caustically criticised courtly 18"h century generals so taken with
"the conception, Honour of Victory" that they failed to exploit their triumph by
vigorously pursuing the enemy.13
Proposing the Legion of Honour's creation, Napoleon remarked (May 4,
1802): "1 do not believe that the French people love liberty and equality. The
French are not changed by ten years of revolution. They are what the Gauls were,
proud and frivolous. They believe in one thing: Honor!"' 14  Similarly, Swiss
historian Jacob Christoph Burckhardt (1818-1897) observed that honour "has
become, in a far wider sense than is commonly believed, a decisive rule of conduct
CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 247-65 (Terence Ball et al. eds., Cambridge, 1989); Bemadotte E. Schmitt, The
Relation of Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs Before and During the First World War, in STUDIES IN
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY IN HONOUR OF G.P. GOOCH 322-30 (Arshag Ohan Sarkissian ed., London,
1961); for aristocratic honour's replacement by a bourgeois moral code, see Elias, supra note 4, at 96-
97; see also Jean Renoir's film La Grande Illusion (Home Vision Entertainment 1937).
9. See ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 30-34 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1981).
10. RAYMOND ARON, PEACE AND WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 91 (Richard
Howard and Annette Baker Fox trans., New York 1966).
11. See ELIZABETH LONGFORD, WELLINGTON: THE YEARS OF THE SWORD 16-17 (Harper & Row
1969); for British officers' honour at Waterloo, see JOHN KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE: A STUDY OF
AGINCOURT, WATERLOO AND THE SOMME 189-92 (The Viking Press 1976); for military honour, see
GERMAN OFFICER-CORPS, supra note 3, at 110-54; NORMAN DIXON, ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
MILITARY INCOMPETENCE 196-207 (Basic Books 1976); for dlite education, see GWYN HARRIES-
JENKINS, THE ARMY IN VICTORIAN SOCIETY 277-78 (Univ. of Toronto Press 1977); D. C. B. LIEVEN,
RUSSIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 83-86 (St. Martin's Press 1983) [hereinafter
Russia]; DOMINIC LIEvEN, THE ARISTOCRACY IN EUROPE, 1815-1914 161-64, 171-72, 177, 191-92,
195-96 (Macmillan 1992) [hereinafter ARISTOCRACY IN EUROPE]; HAROLD NICOLSON, SIR ARTHUR
NICOLSON, FIRST LORD CARNOCK: A STUDY IN THE OLD DIPLOMACY 7-8 (Constable & Co. 1930).
12. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR bk. I, ch. 3:146 (Anatol Rapoport ed. and J.J. Graham
trans., Penguin Books 1968).
13. Id. atbk. IV, ch. 12:352.
14. SANCHE DE GRAMONT, THE FRENCH PORTRAIT OF A PEOPLE 309 (Putnam 1969).
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for the cultivated Europeans of our own day, and many who still hold faithfully by
religion and morality are unconsciously guided by this feeling in the gravest
decisions." 15
The same bourgeois experience was recently described by Yale University
historian Peter Gay who indicts 19th century honour-fixated societies for spawning
hatred:
Touchiness on the great matter of honor was extreme. All significant aspects of
life--rites of passage, social intercourse, the choice of a mate, orders of rank and
precedence, even commercial transactions--were meticulously regulated and
subject to obsessively enforced rituals. Affronts, whether real or trumped up, had
to be avenged with the most extreme remedies at hand .... Men felt compelled to
display and continuously reaffirm their manhood from the time they were
striplings, to prove their hardihood, their sheer physical strength, and their
tenacious endurance of the bodily suffering that their risk-seeking lives
necessarily entailed. For societies living by heroic codes, prestige was the
cherished aim, pain the necessary test, disgrace a perpetual threat; autonomy was
sacrificed to the good opinion of others. 16
B. Was Honour a Staple of Political Philosophy?
"Honour" was until the 20th century a central construct in European socio-
political thought and a commonplace in works of law and political philosophy.
Niccol6 Machiavelli (1469-1527) was a Florentine public servant, diplomat and
political writer. Following a 14th century trail blazed by Petrarch, 17 Machiavelli
deplored Christianity's emphasis on humility and heaven. He instead urged
individual virtii (manliness, courage, pluck, fortitude, boldness, valour,
steadfastness, tenacity)' 8 to gain honour and glory-perhaps man's highest
pleasure. 19  Machiavelli's writings reveal honour's several faces which are
generally linked to virti. According to U.S. political theorist Leo Strauss (1899-
1973):
For Machiavelli, the honorable is that which gives a man distinction or which
makes him great and resplendent. Hence extraordinary virtue rather than ordinary
virtue is honorable. To possess extraordinary virtue and to be aware of one's
possessing it is more honorable than merely to possess it. To have a sense of
15. JACOB BURCKHARDT, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE RENAISSANCE IN ITALY 304 (S.G.C.
Middlemore trans. and Irene Gordon ed., Modem Library 1960).
16. PETER GAY, THE CULTIVATION OF HATRED 112 (W M Norton & Co. 1993).
17. See QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT; VOL. ONE:
THE RENAISSANCE 100 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1978).
18. Relevant 161 century meaning survives in 1 OSCAR BULLE & GIUSSEPE RIGUTINI,
DIZIONARIO ITALIANO-TEDESCO E TEDESCO-ITALIANO 905 (Leipzig-Milan, 1896); for Machiavelli,
vir was whatever qualities the prince needed "to keep his state," see, SKINNER supra, note 17, at vol.
1:138.
19. See LEO STRAUSS, THOUGHTS ON MACHIAVELLI 189, 291 (The Free Press 1958).
VOL. 31:2
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one's superior worth and to act in accordance with that sense is honorable. Hence
it is honorable to rely on oneself and to be frank when frankness is dangerous. To
show signs of weakness or to refuse to fight is dishonorable. To make open war
against a prince is more honorable than to conspire against him. To lose by
fighting is more honorable than to lose in any other way. To die fighting is more
honorable than to perish through famine.
20
Although Machiavelli was outstanding in stressing dissimulation and even
brutality, he was entirely with his contemporaries in seeing honour, glory and fame
as the prince's ultimate goal.2 '
The image of the "gentleman," including the cult of honour, was a
Renaissance icon.22 Italian historian and statesman Francesco Guicciardini (1483-
1540) included many references to honour, good name, reputation, dignity,
greatness, glory and fame in his celebrated Ricordi composed over the years from
1512 to 1530.23 The emphasis on honour was also natural for Emperor Charles V
who was steeped in chivalry as Grand Master of the Burgundian Order of the
Golden Fleece. When chided for failing to follow Julius Caesar in fully exploiting
victories, Charles replied: "The ancients had only one goal before their eyes,
honor. We Christians have two, honor and the salvation of the soul. '24 In
entrusting Spain to his son Philip II, Charles advised (1543) Philip "to take as
examples all those who have made good their want in age and experience by their
courage and zeal in the pursuit of honour" and to study as "the only means by
which you will gain honour and reputation.,
25
Some years later, French lawyer and political philosopher Jean Bodin (1530-
1596) divided social rewards into the profitable and the honourable, with a
preference for the latter: "For as a generous and noble minded man doth more
esteem honour than all the treasure of the world; so without doubt he will willingly
sacrifice his life and goods for the glory he expects-and the greater the honours
be, the more men there will be of merit and fame. 26 This was consistent with the
understanding of French magistrate and essayist, Michel de Montaigne (1533-
20. STRAUSS, supra note 19, at 235-236.
21. See SKINNER, supra note 17, at vol. 1:100-01, 118-21, 130-32.
22. See J. H. PLUMB, THE HoRIzON BOOK OF RENAISSANCE 313-19 (American Heritage
Publishing Co 1961); J. H. PLUMB, THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE: A CONCISE SURVEY OF ITS HISTORY
AND CULTURE 119-125 (Harper & Row 1965).
23. See FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI, RIcORDII (1st ser.) §§ 1, I1, 18-9, 34, 45, 57, 59-60, 69, 73,
87, 89, 105-6, 125, 137-38, 141, 149, 151, 164, 167-68, 174; 2nd ser., §§ 4, 15-17, 32, 42, 44, 72-3, 86,
104, 118, 133, 142, 150, 157-58, 179, 181, 192, 194, 202, 217, 219 (Ninian Hill Thomson trans., S. F.
Vanni 1949).
24. JACOB BURCKHARDT, ON HISTORY AND HISTORIANS 123 (Harry Zohn trans., Harper & Row
1965).
25. The full text of the 1543 Political Testaments are in KARL BRANDI, THE EMPEROR CHARLES
V: THE GROWTH AND DESTINY OF A MAN AND OF A WORLD-EMPIRE 486-87 (C.V. Wedgewood trans.,
Jonathan Cape 1965).
26. JEAN BODIN, V THE SIx BOOKES OF A COMMONWEALE: A FACSIMILE REPRINT OF THE
ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF 1606, CORRECTED AND SUPPLEMENTED IN THE LIGHT OF A NEW
COMPARISON WITH THE FRENCH AND LATIN TEXTS 585-86 (Kenneth Douglas McRae ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 1962).
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1592): "Of all the delusions in the world, the most fully accepted and most
universal is the seeking for fame and glory, which we espouse to the point of
giving up wealth, repose, life, and health, which are real and substantial goods, to
follow that airy phantom...27
In late 16th century England, Shakespeare's plays put relatively strong
emphasis on "honour., 28  And, in the same English context, Oxford University
Regius Professor of Civil Law, Alberico Gentili (1552-1608) included a chapter on
"conflict between what is honourable and expedient" in his Three Books on the
Law of War: "Honour (honestas) is so highly valued that it takes precedence over
what is lawful, and may even be sought at the expense of a certain amount of
injustice. For the sake of honour (honestatis caussa), says Augustine, we should
give up what is lawful but would be advantageous only to a part of mankind., 29 A
generation later, Dutch diplomat, lawyer and father of international law Hugo
Grotius (1583-1645) discussed, with reference to wartime, "with what meaning a
sense of honour (pudor) may be said to forbid what the law permits." 30
English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was preoccupied with
honour31 which he carefully defined:
The manifestation of the value we set on one another is that which is
called honoring and dishonoring. To value a man at a high rate is to
honor him, at a low rate is to dishonor him. But high and low, in this case,
is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man sets on
himself32
French lawyer, political philosopher and aristocrat Charles de Montesquieu
(1689-1755) identified honour as the key principle distinguishing monarchies,
from republics on the one hand, and from despotisms on the other.33 Honour was
27. Montaigne, Of Not Giving Away One's Glory, in I ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE bk. I, ch. 41:341
(George B. Ives trans., Cambridge, Mass., 1925).
28. See JOHN BARTLETT, A NEW AND COMPLETE CONCORDANCE OR VERBAL INDEX TO WORDS,
PHRASES AND PASSAGES IN THE DRAMATIC WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE WITH A SUPPLEMENTARY
CONCORDANCE TO THE POEMS (Macmillan and Co. 1896), e.g., in descending no. of cols. per entry:
"love," "loved," "lover" & "loving" (28.5); "king" & "kingdom" (17.3); "speak" (13); "time" (13);
"heart" (12); "true," "truly" & "truth" (11); "honour," "honourable" & "honoured" (10); "heaven" (9.2);
"life" (9); "fear" & "fearful" (8); "word" (8); "world" (7.2); "woman" (7); "grace" (6); "soul" (5.5);
"hope" (4.8); "desire" & "desired" (4.6); "wit" (4.6); "war" (4.5); "wisdom" & "wise" (4); "state" (4);
"tear" (4); "wrong" (4); "virtue" (3.6); "law" & "lawful" (3.5); "favour" (3); "home" (3); "spirit" (3);
"faith" (2.5); "fault" (2.5); "sorrow" (2.5); "swear" (2.5).
29. Alberico Gentili, On Conflict Between Honour and Expediency (Si utile cum honesto pugnet),
in DE JURE BELLI LIBRI TRES bk. 11I, ch. 12: vol. 1 at 572 (Latin); vol. 2 at 350 (English). (James Brown
Scott ed. Oxford 1933).
30. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES bk. III, ch. 10, § 1:716 (James Brown
Scott ed., New York, 1925).
31. See RICHARD PETERS, HOBBES 142 (2nd ed. Penguin Books 1967).
32. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN part 1, ch. 10:78-86, at 79 (Herbert W. Schneider ed., Prentice
Hall College Edition 1958).
33. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. III, chs. 6-8,
VOL. 31:2
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portrayed as monarchy's actuating spring because nobles serving the king, were
motivated by the quest for position and precedence. But, Montesquieu also saw
honour as a common code limiting the power and guiding the conduct of king and
noble alike: "There is nothing so strongly inculcated in monarchies, by the law, by
religion and honour as submission to the prince's will; but this very honour tells us
that the prince never ought to command a dishonourable action, because this would
render us incapable of serving him."
3 4
German philosopher and mathematician Christian Wolff (1679-1754)
provides rich evidence showing that the 18th century was incapable of describing
the international system without referring to honour's vocabulary. Setting out the
"duties of nations to themselves and the rights arising therefrom," his systematic
treatise includes substantive paragraphs on "the necessity of not bringing disgrace
on one's nation," "zeal for the reputation (fama) of one's nation," "what fame
(gloria) is," "the fame (gloria) of a nation," "the desire for fame (gloria)" and
"how far this applies to the ruler of the State.""
3
"Which man is insensible to the attractions of glory? It is the last passion of
the sage. Even the most austere philosophers cannot uproot it. What are
exhaustion, troubles and dangers in comparison with glory? It is a passion so mad
that I cannot at all conceive how it does not turn everyone's head."3 6 These were
the words of Prussia's King Frederick the Great (1712-1786) who believed:
A good prince's true merit is to have a sincere attachment to the public good, to
love his country and glory: I say 'glory' because the happy instinct which
animates men with the desire for a good reputation is the real principle of heroic
actions; it is the soul's nerve, awakening it from lethargy to carry it towards
useful, necessary and praiseworthy enterprises.
37
As early as 1790, British parliamentarian and political writer Edmund Burke
(1729-1797) denounced the French Revolution's "grim and bloody maxims" as
antithetical to a unique European notion of honour drawn from medieval chivalry.
For Burke, "the spirit of a gentleman" was fundamental to Europe's civilization:
It was this which, without confounding ranks, had produced a noble equality and
handed it down through all the gradations of social life. It was this opinion which
mitigated kings into companions and raised private men to be fellows with kings.
Without force or opposition, it subdued the fierceness of pride and power, it
10-11; bk. IV, ch. 2; bk. V, chs. 16-19; bk. VI, ch. 21; bk. VIII, ch. 9; bk. XII, ch. 27 (Thomas Nugent
trans., revised by J.V. Prichard Chicago 1952).
34. Id. at bk. IV, ch. 2.
35. CHRISTIAN WOLFF, Jus GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTUM ch. 1, §§ 45-5 1; vol.
1:17-19 (Latin); vol. 2:30-33 (English) (Otfried Nippold ed., Oxford 1934).
36. LES PLUS BELLES PAGES DE FREDERIC II 110-111 (Charles-Adolphe Cantacuz~ne ed. Paris,
1935).
37. Histoire de mon temps, avant-propos de 1775, in I MEMOIRES DE FREDERIC II, Rol DE
PRUSSE: ECRITS EN FRANCAIS PAR LUI-MEME 4-5 (E. Boutaric & E. Campardon eds., Paris, 1866)
[hereinafter MEMOIRES DE FREDERIC II]; Frederick to D'Alembert, Sep. 26, 1770, in 11 OEUVRES
POSTHUMES DE FREDERIC II, Roi DE PRUSSE 88 (Berlin 1788).
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obliged sovereigns to submit to the soft collar of social esteem, compelled stern
authority to submit to elegance, and gave a dominating vanquisher of laws to be
subdued by manners.
38
C. The "Word of Honour" and Courtly Society
Keeping a promise as "word of honour" was similar, but not identical to the
pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) of natural and canon law, which for
a long time were less effective than honour in encouraging treaty compliance by
successors. As long as there was a sense in which treaties remained the contracts
of kings, performance profited from dynastic honour as a recognized framework
for a son's feeling bound by his father's treaty. This consciousness of family
obligation alleviated difficulties about succession to natural law promises and
transcended the limitations of the oath, by which a king could imperil his own soul,
but not that of his son.
With honour, the context was neither natural nor canon law, but rather a
related socio-religious norm emerging from the ethical and aesthetic ideals of the
late Middle Ages, when-according to Dutch historian Johan Huizinga (1872-
1945)--the "thought of all those who lived in the circles of court or castle was
impregnated with the idea of chivalry" and "permeated by the fiction that chivalry
ruled the world. 39 Pertinent here is the emphasis which medieval chivalry had
placed on vows, steadfastness, "keeping faith" and "remaining true to one's
word.",40 This phenomenon was understood by De Tocqueville who perceptively
saw the link with the key medieval institution of allegiance: "Every man looked up
to an individual whom he was bound to obey; by that intermediate personage he
was connected with all the others. Thus, in feudal society, the whole system of the
commonwealth rested upon the sentiment of fidelity to the person of the lord; to
destroy that sentiment was to fall into anarchy."' Huizinga was understandably
surprised that Belgian lawyer Ernest Nys (1851-1920), after so much study of
international law's history,42 had missed the key contribution of chivalric
ideas-including "fidelity to one's given word., 43 Huizinga was convinced by
14th century sources that "the system of chivalric ideas as a noble game of rules of
38. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 86-90, at 87 (Thomas H.D.
Mahoney ed. MacMillan Publishing Co. 1955).
39. JOHAN HUIZINGA, THE WANING OF THE MIDDLE AGES: FORMS OF LIFE, THOUGHT AND ART
IN FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS IN THE XIVTH AND XVTH CENTURIES 67-107 (Doubleday 1954).
40. ROBERT PLUMER WARD, 2 AN ENQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATION AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
OF NATIONS FROM THE TIME OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS TO THE AGE OF GROTIUS 159, 161, 167,
174-88, 205 (London 1795); JAMES KENT, KENT'S COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL Law 26 (J.T.
Abdy ed., 2d. ed. rev., Cambridge 1878); ROBERT REDSLOB, HISTOIRE DES GRANDS PRINCIPES DU
DROIT DES GENS: DEPUIS L'ANTIQUITf JUSQU'A LA VEILLE DE LA GRANDE GUERRE 122 (Paris 1923).
41. DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 245-46, supra note 2.
42. See ERNEST NYs, LES ORIGNES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Brussels-Paris 1894).
43. Johan Huizinga, The Political and Military Significance of Chivalric Ideas in the Late Middle
Ages, in MEN AND IDEAS: HISTORY, THE MIDDLE AGES, THE RENAISSANCE 196-206, at 204 (James S.
Holmes & Hans van Marie trans., Meridian Books 1959).
VOL. 31:2
2002 HONOUR'S ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL STATES' SYSTEM 121
honor" was linked to international law: "The origins of the latter lay in antiquity
and in canon law, but chivalry was the ferment that made possible the development
of the laws of war. The notion of a law of nations was preceded and prepared for
by the chivalric ideal of honor and loyalty."
4 4
The enduring focus on honour was reflected in the European obsession with
reputation. For example, scrupulous treaty performance was seen as giving rise to
"true grandeur and solid glory" by Charles Rollin (1661-1741), classical historian
and former Rector of the University of Paris.4 5  The importance of keeping
promises was also affirmed by Francis Osborne, Duke of Leeds, who resigned
(April 21, 1791) as Foreign Secretary after parliamentary pressure prompted Prime
Minister William Pitt the younger to cancel planned naval demonstrations against
Russia. Because the help of the warships had already been promised to Prussia's
King Frederick William II, Leeds saw personal and national honour lost by
Britain's volte-face.46 In 1864, future Prime Minister Lord Salisbury (as MP Lord
Robert Cecil) emphasized: "One promise is as good as a hundred, and one
disregarded promise casts upon the escutcheon of a country disgrace which is only
increased in degree by multiplied repetitions. '47 Evidently, this was a sentiment
understood by U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice John Marshall Harlan (1833-
1911) who opined:
Aside from the duty imposed by the constitution to respect treaty stipulations
when they become the subject of judicial proceedings, the court cannot be
unmindful of the fact that the honor of the government and the people of the
United States is involved in every inquiry whether rights secured by such
stipulations shall be recognized and protected.
48
Lying for reasons of State was similarly condemned roundly by 18th century
diplomat Lord Malmesbury:
No occasion, no provocation, no anxiety to rebut an unjust accusation, no idea,
however tempting, of promoting the object you have in view, can need, much less
justify, a falsehood. Success obtained by one is a precarious and baseless success.
Detection would ruin, not only your own reputation forever, but deeply wound the
44. Id. at 203.
45. See M. Rollin, 2 DE LA MANIERE D'ENSEIGNER ET D'ETUDIER LES BELLES LETTRES, PAR
RAPPORT A L'ESPRIT & AU CEUR 55-56, 65, 70 (Paris, 1740).
46. Sending ships was "manly and consistent conduct" in conformity with "honour," the contrary
"disgraceful" exhibition of "caution bordering upon timidity," see THE POLITICAL MEMORANDA OF
FRANCIS, FIFTH DUKE OF LEEDS ix-x, 150-174 (Oscar Browning ed., Camden Society, new ser., no. 35,
London 1884); the reversal was arguably consistent with the explicitly defensive 1742 and 1788 Anglo-
Prussian treaties, see 36 THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES 498-503, and 50 THE CONSOLIDATED
TREATY SERIES 333-338, 354-358 (Clive Parry ed., Oceanna Publication 1969-1981) [hereinafter CTS];
FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY FROM PITT (1792) TO SALISBURY (1902) 1 (Harold
Temperley & Lillian M. Penson eds., Barnes & Noble 1966); for the "armament" against Russia, see
JEREMY BLACK, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS, 1783-1793 285-328
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1994).
47. Jul. 5, 1864, 176 PARL. DEB. (COMMONS) 851 (3rd ser.).
48. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 5 S.Ct. 255 at 256, 28 L.Ed 770 (1884).
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honour of your Court.49
This rhetoric exemplifies the imperative of honouring both truth and promises
that was a key ingredient of the chivalric archetype, perpetuated and transformed
by the "courtly-aristocratic" society, which held sway in Europe until mostly swept
away during the First World War.5
D. Was the King's Honour Nationalized?
By the 18th century, the very old notion of the king's honour had mingled
with the closely related idea of the honour of the State or nation.5' According to
De Tocqueville: "In some nations the monarch is regarded as a personification of
the country; and the fervor of patriotism being converted into the fervor of loyalty,
they take a sympathetic pride in his conquests, and glory in his power., 52 For
example, King George III explicitly identified his personal honour with that of
Britain-a sentiment seconded by the pseudonymous Junius: "The king's honour is
that of his people. Their real honour and real interest are the same. 53 This link
was no less compelling for soldier-diplomat and adventurer, Sir Robert Wilson
who (1826) urged Parliament "to uphold with a strong hand the honour and interest
49. Sir James Harris, 1st Earl of Malmesbury (1746-1820), quoted by Algernon Cecil, The
Foreign Office, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1783-1919 551 (Sir A.W.
Ward & G.P. Gooch eds., Cambridge 1923); "feelings of morality and honour" caused 2nd Earl of
Malmesbury, James Edward Harris (1778-1841) to resign as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs because national security forced him to lie about Britain's plans to seize the fleet of neutral
Denmark, see 3rd EARL OF MALMESBURY, JAMES HOWARD HARRIS (1807-1889), 1 MEMOIRS OF AN
Ex-MNISTER: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 1-2 (London 1884).
50. For the knight/courtier transition and courtly-aristocratic society's enduring impact, see
NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: THE HISTORY OF MANNERS AND STATE FORMATION AND
CIVILIZATION 168-78, 266-72 (Edmund Jephcott trans., Blackwell 1994); for chivalry's deep mark on
Western civilization, see GERMAN OFFICER-CORPS, supra note 3, at 115; for the pre-1914 "sumptuous
neo-absolutist court culture," see JOHN C.G. ROHL, THE KAISER AND HIS COURT: WILHELM 1I AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY 70-106 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1994); for 19th century chivalry and its
1914-18 death, see MARK A. GIROUARD, THE RETURN TO CAMELOT: CHIVALRY AND THE ENGLISH
GENTLEMAN 290 (Yale Univ. Press 1981).
51. See Norman Hampson, The French Revolution and the Nationalisation of Honour, in WAR
AND SOCIETY: HISTORICAL ESSAYS IN HONOUR AND MEMORY OF J.R. WESTERN 199-212 (M.R.D. Foot
ed., London 1973); GEOFFREY BEST, HONOUR AMONG MEN AND NATIONS: TRANSFORMATIONS OF AN
IDEA (Univ. of Toronto Press 1982); for the shift to "national honour" marking nationalism's rise, see
ALFRED VAGTS, A HISTORY OF MILITARISM: CIVILIAN AND MILITARY 442-50 (rev. ed. New York
1959); for "collective honour," see Honour andSocial Status, supra note 4, at 35-36.
52. DE TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 251, supra note 2; Hanna Fenichel Pitkin,
Representation, in POLITICAL INNOVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 132-154, at 138 (Terence Ball
et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press) ("It is a medieval and mystical conception: the king is not merely
the head of the national body, not merely the owner of the entire realm, but he is the crown, the realm,
the nation.").
53. Letters from George III to Lord Bute 1756-1766 (Romney Sedgwick ed., London 1939), No.
205, Oct. 22, 1762: 149; Letter to the Printer of the Public Advertiser, Jan. 30, 1771, No. 42, in 2 THE
LETTERS OF JUNIUS 55 (London, 1810); for information about the mysterious Junius, see STANLEY
AYLING, GEORGE THE THIRD (London, 1972), 164-167.
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of the Crown, which in this country are inseparable from the honour and interest of
the people. 54  Similarly, Lord Salisbury said on Prime Minister Benjamin
Disraeli's death: "The honour of the Crown and the honour of the country were in
his mind inseparable: and in comparison to them, questions of internal policy
occupied a secondary rank.""
Christian Wolff had already taught that "the ruler of a state ought to direct the
royal acts to the glory of his nation (gloria Gentis), consequently to do nothing to
diminish or destroy it."'56 For him, fame (gloria) meant "ein grosser Nahme" (a
great name): "Fame (gloria) is primarily and of itself attributed to the nation,
because it is considered as a single person, which has its own actions dependent
upon intellectual and moral virtues; but even more is it attributed to it, because the
renown (laus) of individuals is passed over to it on account of acts or deeds which
are considered as those of the individuals."5 7 Similarly, Charles Jenkinson (later
1st Lord Liverpool) was in 1758 comfortable declaiming: "Great and wise
governments have always been jealous of national glory: it is an active principle,
which properly cultivated, operates in virtuous actions through every member of
the State. To preserve this in its purity is the duty of everyone who loves his
country. ' 8
It was entirely natural for France's new National Assembly to speak (1792) of
"the offended dignity of the French people" and for British Foreign Secretary Lord
Grenville to defend "the dignity and honour of England." 59 Similarly, "the glory of
the French people" was rhetoric Napoleon used to encourage soldiers in the 1796
campaign in Italy. 60  After Allied victory at Waterloo (1815), the Duke of
Wellington and other British statesmen judged sparing France's "national honour"
to be a key consideration in framing peace terms.6' In the 19th century such
54. 16 PARL. DEB. (2d ser.) (1826) 336.
55. Letter to Queen Victoria, Apr. 25, 1881, 3 THE LETTERS OF QUEEN VICTORIA 216 (2nd ser.)
(George Earle Buckle ed., London 1926) [hereinafter LQV].
56. Wolff, supra note 35, at ch. 1, § 51, vol. 1: 19; vol. 2:33.
57. Wolff, supra note 35, at ch. 1, § 48, vol. 1:18; vol. 2:31-32.
58. CHARLES JENKINSON, A DISCOURSE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT
BRITAIN, IN RESPECT TO NEUTRAL NATIONS, DURING THE PRESENT WAR 7 (2d. ed., London 1759).
59. Statement of French Foreign Policy, Apr. 14, 1792, in DOCUMENTARY SURVEY OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 284 (John Hall Stewart ed., New York 1951) [hereinafter Documentary Survey];
Grenville to French Ambassador, Marquis de Chauvelin, Dec. 31, 1792, in TEMPERLEY, supra note 46,
at 5.
60. See Proclamation to the Army of Italy, Apr. 26, 1796, in DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, supra note
59 at 672-73.
61. See e.g., BRITISH DIPLOMACY 1813-1815: SELECT DOCUMENTS DEALING WITH THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE (C.K. Webster ed., G. Bell and Sons 1921). British Prime Minister
Robert Banks Jenkinson, 2nd Earl of Liverpool, to Foreign Secretary Viscount Castlereagh negotiating
peace in Paris, Jul. 15, 1815: "It is argued with much force that France will never forgive the
humiliation which she has already received that she will take the first convenient opportunity of
endeavouring to redeem her military glory," id. at 346; Liverpool to Castlereagh, Aug. 18, 1815: "An
arrangement on this principle would have nothing in it which could really be considered as humiliating
to France," id. at 368; Liverpool to Castlereagh, Aug. 23, 1815: "Such a stipulation need not, in our
judgment, mortify the pride of the French nation," id. at 369; Castlereagh to Liverpool, Aug. 24, 1815:
"...if you take part of old France and add it to Belgium, all France will, as a point of honour, be
2002
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references to national honour became increasingly common, especially in France,
Britain and the few other countries where control of foreign policy was gradually
shifting to a governing class which, according to British diplomat and historian
Harold Nicolson (1886-1968), developed a corresponding feeling that
"engagements entered into by the government pledged the honour of the class as a
whole." 62 Similarly, British historian A.J.P. Taylor (1906-1990) observed that pre-
1914 treaties were no longer simply between monarchs, but "absorbed by public
opinion" and therefore also between nations.
63
E. Honour in the International of Kings
During the 18th century, dynastic ties had been so important that mutual
courtesies persisted even during wartime, when contending rulers exchanged
letters of congratulation and condolence. 64  Such monarchical solidarity was
fortified by the challenge of the French Revolution. After France's King and
Queen were arrested (June 21, 1791) at Varennes, Marie Antoinette's brother,
Habsburg Emperor Leopold II wrote to his fellow rulers that the detention violated
"the honor of all sovereigns and the security of all governments. 65 In fact, 19th
century European rulers were an interrelated family, mostly of German descent.
According to British historian Eric Hobsbawm, these kings had "more in common
with the other members of the international princes' trade union ... than with their
own subjects., 66 Similarly, Nicolson portrayed the post-1815 Concert of Europe as
a system of trust operating via the creation of confidence and the acquisition of
credit in an International of Monarchs--a freemasonry of kings.67 Accordingly, he
saw 19th century international relations as resting on "a tacit understanding
between the five Great Powers that there were certain common standards of
dignity, humanity and good faith which should govern the conduct of these powers
in their relations with each other and in their dealings with less potent or less
civilized communities., 68  Nicolson's nostalgia matches the authoritative
contemporary view of longtime Austrian Chancellor Clemens von Metternich
anxious to regain it," id. at 371; British peace negotiator, the Duke of Wellington to Castlereagh, Paris,
Aug. 31, 1815: ".... the measure would afford to France ajust pretence for war, and all the means which
injured national pride could give for carrying it on," id. at 374; Castlereagh to Liverpool, Sep. 4, 1815:
"...for objects that France may any day reclaim from the particular States that hold them, without
pushing her demands beyond what she would contend was due to her own honour," id. at 376.
62. HAROLDNICOLSON, DIPLOMACY 90-91 (3'ded. MacMillan 1963).
63. A.J.P. Taylor, International Relations, in THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, VOLUME
11: MATERIAL PROGRESS AND WORLD-WIDE PROBLEMS 1870-1898 552 (F.H. Hinsley ed. Cambridge
Univ. Press 1967).
64. See Andrew Lossky, International Relations in Europe, in THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN
HISTORY, VOLUME 6: THE RISE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA, 1688-1715/25 168-169 (J. S. Bromley
ed. Cambridge 1970).
65. Padua Circular, Jul. 5, 1791, in DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, supra note 59, at 221-222; Adam
Wandruszka, 2 LEOPOLD 11 360-369 (Vienna 1965).
66. Eric J. Hobsbawn, THE AGE OF EMPIRE 1875-1914 149 (London 1987).
67. See Nicolson, supra note 62, at 66-67, 245.
68. Nicolson, supra note 62, at 72.
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whose philosophy of international relations was simply the principle of reciprocity
in a community of States displaying bon proc~ds, i.e. "mutual consideration and
honourable conduct. 69
From the vantage point of the First World War, British international lawyer
Coleman Phillipson reflected that the Concert had functioned tolerably well as
long as governments continued to prize "honour, fidelity and good report" and
have a strong "desire to stand well with their fellows. 7 ° Consonant with these
values was the dictum of former Foreign Secretary and future Prime Minister Lord
Grenville (1802): "Loss of territory might be regained, commerce might be
revived, and industry encouraged and invigorated; but honour and faith, once
forfeited, could never [sic] be repaired but imperfectly." 71 In the same vein, the
future Lord Salisbury, as MP Lord Robert Cecil, insisted (1864) that "loss of
dignity and honour is not a sentiment; it is a loss of power., 72 Avoiding stain of
dishonour was thus a key incentive promoting conformity with the rules making up
a common code.
19th century monarchs and statesmen displayed real anxiety about peer
judgment and frequently appealed to the standard of what would be honourable "in
the eyes of Europe. 73 For example, Queen Victoria facilitated British foreign
69. Prince Clemens Lothar Wenzel von Metternich-Winneburg, I MEMOIRS OF PRINCE
METTERNICH 1773-1815 37 (Prince Richard Clemens Lothar von Mettemich-Winneburg ed. and
Robina Napier trans., New York, 1880).
70. COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GREAT WAR 50-51 (T. Fisher Unwin,
1915).
71. May 4, 1802, LORDS, 36 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803 588 (London, 1820).
72. Jul. 5, 1864, 176 PARt,. DEB. H.C. (3d ser.). 851.
73.See Letter to Prime Minister Lord John Russell, Jul. 28, 1850, 2 LQV 306 (1st ser.) (Arthur
Christopher Benson & Viscount Esher eds., London 1907) ("expose herself to insults of other nations");
Letter from Duke of Cambridge, Apr. 28, 1854, LQV, 1st ser., vol. 3:31 ("such position being highly
honourable and advantageous to us in the eyes of Europe"); Letter to Foreign Secretary Lord
Clarendon, Jan. 15, 1856, 3 LQV 207 (1st ser.) ("The Queen... cannot be for peace now, for she is
convinced that this country would not stand in the eyes of Europe as she ought"); Letter to Foreign
Secretary Lord John Russell, Apr. 26, 1860, 3 LQV 505 (1st ser.) ("The Queen... must say that she
would consider it the deepest degradation of this country if she was compelled to appear at the
Emperor's [Napoleon III] Congress"); Letter from Foreign Secretary Lord Granville, Jul. 10, 1870, 2
LQV 24 (2nd ser.) ("the goodwill of Europe"); Letter from Foreign Secretary Lord Derby, May 5, 1875,
2 LQV 389-90 (2nd ser.) ("No French Government would be insane enough to put itself in the wrong in
the eyes of all Europe," and "Moral force goes for much in these days, and the sympathy of nations is
always with the attacked party. In the last war, France was the aggressor, and the opinion of Europe
went with Germany"); Letter from German Crown Princess, Dec. 19, 1877, 2 LQV 578 (2nd ser.)
("Ridicule and contempt England can very well stand, and laugh at the ignorance of the benighted
people that know no better; but England cannot, or rather ought not to, afford to lose her position in
Europe"); Letter from the Prince of Wales, Dec. 23, 1877, 2 LQV 580 (2nd ser.) ("We shall never again
be able to hold up our head in the eyes of the world"); Queen's Priv. Secretary Sir Henry Ponsonby to
Viscount Halifax, Jan. 5, 1878, 2 LQV 590 (2nd ser.) ("maintaining the high position which our nation
holds in the world... the spectacle of indecision and weakness which lowers her in the esteem of the
world"); Letter to Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, Jan. 16,1878, 2 LQV 595 (2nd ser.) ("We shall
become the laughing-stock of Europe and the world!!"); Letter from Grand Duchess of Hesse, Mar. 1,
1878, 2 LQV 605 ( 2nd ser.) ("Is [Foreign Secretary] Lord Derby really going to remain? He it is who
shakes the confidence of all the world in England's policy").
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policy by assiduously exploiting her private correspondence and family reunions to
gather intelligence and cultivate influence in the exalted circle constituted by her
royal relatives abroad.74  Reminding her Prime Minister of "the importance of
keeping our foreign policy beyond reproach," she said: "Public opinion is
recognised as a ruling power in our domestic affairs; it is not of less importance in
the society of Europe with reference to the conduct of an individual state. To
possess the confidence of Europe is of the utmost importance to this country.,
75
Victoria insisted that "the honour of England" touched her "more nearly than
anyone else." 76 She explained: "What my Ambassador does, he does in my name,
and I feel myself bound in honour thereby, but also placed under an obligation to
take upon myself the consequences. '7 7 Moreover, the Queen claimed to have
"public and personal obligations towards those Sovereigns with whom she
professes to be on terms of peace and amity. 78
At the beginning of the 20th century, King Edward VII was closely involved
in British diplomacy, which ostentatiously exploited his encounters with other
rulers, including the Habsburg, Hohenzollern and Romanov Emperors. Aimed at
ending the old Anglo-French antagonism, his 1903 Paris visit was then seen as
proof of his major role in foreign affairs. 79 However, the resulting Anglo-French
Entente Cordiale (1904), by resolving some bilateral differences, pointed to
Europe's fateful split into two hostile camps-Germany and Austria-Hungary on
the one side, and Britain, France and Russia on the other.80 By then, the traditional
pan-monarchic trust and confidence had waned, mainly because the balance among
the European Powers had shifted so radically in Germany's favour.8' Yet, kings
kept their keen sense of personal and professional honour and pretended that
diplomacy was still tied to their person, until they almost all lost their thrones
during the First World War.82
74. See DR. F. GOSSES, THE MANAGEMENT OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE THE FIRST
WORLD WAR, ESPECIALLY DURING THE PERIOD 1880-1914 102-04 (E.C. Van Der Gaaf trans., Leiden
1948).
75. Letter to Prime Minister Lord John Russell, Oct. 18, 1847, 2 LQV 156 (1st ser.).
76. Letter to Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell, Feb. 15, 1864, 1 LQV 158 (2nd set.).
77. Letter to King of Prussia, Mar. 17, 1854, 3 LQV 21 (1st ser.).
78. Letter to Prime Minister Lord John Russell, Nov. 20, 1851, 2 LQV 397 (1st ser.).
79. See KEITH MIDDLEMASs, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF EDWARD VII 152-183 (Doubleday & Co
1972); SIMON HEFFER, POWER AND PLACE: THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF KING EDWARD VII
(Phoenix Giant 1998).
80. On Apr. 8, 1904, France and Great Britain concluded in London three agreements comprising
the Entente Cordiale, see CTS 195, Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco, 198-204; Convention
respecting Newfoundland and West and Central Africa, 205-12; Declaration concerning Siam,
Madagascar and the New Hebrides, 214-16.
81. See F. H. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE
HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES 270 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1963); PAUL KENNEDY, THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 to
2000 215 (Random House 1988).
82. See NICOLSON, supra note 62, at 64; LAMAR CECIL, THE GERMAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE,
1871-1914 191 (Princeton Univ. Press 1976); ROHL, supra note 50, at 3-4, 71, 106, 115-120, 122-123,
127-128; THE TIMES SURVEY OF FOREIGN MINISTRIES OF THE WORLD 11 (Zara Steiner ed., Times
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F. "Honour" and "Interest" as Rhetoric of British Foreign Policy
Compelling linguistic evidence shows that, at least until 1914-18, honour was
one of the key categories for British thinking about foreign policy. Specifically,
talk about international relations almost invariably involved doublets in which one
element points to prestige (honour, glory, dignity, reputation, pride, position,
standing) and another to a political assessment (interest, advantage, security,
safety, victory, defeat, injury). This striking duplex featured in almost every
foreign-policy debate in Parliament, and in a wide variety of State papers and
political writing.
Burke's Letters on a Regicide Peace supported augmenting "national glory"
and "public interest," and opposed sacrificing "national dignity" and "national
acquisitions.'8 3 Examples abound in the debate on the 1801 preliminaries of peace
with Napoleon. King George III approvingly said "substantial interests of this
country, and honourable to the British character" and "advantage and honour."
"To maintain the honour and preserve the security of the British Empire" were the
words of Prime Minister Henry Addington. Sir Edmund Hartopp used "beneficial
to our interests and reputation." Foreign Secretary Lord Hawkesbury, Viscount
Limerick, and naval heroes Earl St. Vincent and Lord Nelson said "honourable and
advantageous." William Pitt the younger employed "strength to our security and
lustre to our national character;" "to protect England's honour and maintain her
interests;" and "sources of justifiable pride, but grounds of solid security." Charles
James Fox offered "safe and honourable" and "defence of our honour and our
independence." Thomas Grenville protested "neither safe nor honourable." Earl
Temple warned "dangerous to safety, and degrading to honour." Sir William
Windham reproved with "degrading and injurious." William Elliot and Richard
Ellison deplored losing "our honour and interests." "Dishonourable and insecure"
was Earl Carnarvon's verdict.1
4
Debating whether to aid Portugal (1826), future Lord Chancellor Henry
Brougham offered "security or honour" and "credit and safety." 85 For foreign
affairs, identical or similar doublets were favoured by Queen Victoria who got
back the same from her Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries. 6 These doublets
Books 1982).
83. EDMUND BURKE, 2 THE WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 265 (New York 1859).
84. 36 Parliamentary History of England 3 (King George); 16 (Addington); 30 (Hartopp); 39, 48
(Hawkesbury); 159 (Limerick); 184 (St. Vincent); 186 (Nelson); 58, 70-71 (Pitt); 72, 74 (Fox); 51-52
(Grenville); 54-55 (Temple); 130 (Windham); 146 (Elliot); 154 (Ellison); 187 (Camarvon).
85. 16 PARL. DEB. (2d ser.) (1826) 383, 388.
86. For Victoria, see THE QUEEN AND MR. GLADSTONE: 1880-1898 (Philip Guedalla ed. Hodder
& Stoughton 1933), ("dignity & honour as well as the safety of her British & Foreign Empire," id. at
353; "honour and welfare of her great Empire," id. at 437); see also LQV: 1st ser., vol. 2:235
("character and honour of England" and "the peace of Europe"); 1st ser., vol. 2:397 ("interests of her
people, honour and dignity of her Crown"); 1st ser., vol. 3:237 ("honour and interests of this country");
1st ser., vol. 3:395 ('honour, power, and peace of this country"); Ist ser., vol. 3:429-430 ("security of
my dominions and honour of my Crown"); 2nd ser., vol. 1:158 ("imaginary interests" and "a supposed
point of honour"); 2nd ser., vol. 1:231 ("safety and dignity of this country"); 2nd ser., vol. 1:419
("every consideration of honour and every consideration of interest"); 2nd ser., vol. 1:592
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were also exchanged in the impassioned speeches sparked by the 1864 Austro-
Prussian attack on Denmark.87 And, finally, Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith
and Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey joined other MPs in repeatedly referring to
Britain's "interest and honour" in the fateful August 1914 deliberations on war
with Germany.
88
G. Was Honour Cultivated for Political Ends?
Still the centre of Western civilization, pre-1914 Europe had experienced a
curious "persistence of the old regime. ' 89 This antediluvian age was marked by
the enduring social supremacy of court aristocracies, the presence of lesser
nobilities, and the co-optation of the upper middle classes which-in significant
social, cultural and political respects-still aped the conduct and discourse of their
"betters." 90 Because so much of the social and political role of king, court and
aristocracy survived beyond 1900, perpetuated too was a matching ideology. For
example, English literature in the two generations before 1914 often displayed a
special rhetoric-a high, romantic diction that was "essentially feudal language"
("England... prepared to maintain the obligation of Treaties, wherever her honour or her interest may
call"); 2nd ser., vol. 2:501 ("honour and interests of her great Empire"); 2nd ser., vol. 2:580 ("honour
and interests of this country"); 2nd ser., vol. 2:605 ("this country's position reasserted, her vital interests
secured"); 2nd ser., vol. 3:50 ("honour and safety of the country,); 2nd ser., vol. 3:126-127 ("honour,
dignity and safety of the Indian Empire [of her great Indian Empire]"); 2nd ser., vol. 3:464 ("lasting
danger and disgrace to this country"). For Victoria's Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries, see LQV:
Letter from Viscount Palmerston, I st set., vol. 1:203 ("honour of your Majesty's Crown and interests of
your Majesty's dominions"), 2nd ser., vol. 1:140 ("promote the interests of his country and uphold the
honour of your Majesty's Crown"); Letter from Lord Russell, 1st ser., vol. 1:327 ("honour or interests
of the country"), 1st ser., vol. 3:472 ("English interest" and "English honour"); 2nd ser., vol. 1:158
("interests and dignity of your Majesty and the country"); Letter from Edward Geoffrey, Lord Stanley
(later 14th Earl of Derby), 1st set., vol. 1: 552 ("highly honourable to your Majesty and advantageous to
this country" and "glorious to British Arms, and so important to British interests"); Letter to Lord
Clarendon Ist ser., vol. 3: 234 ("unwise and undignified"), 2nd ser., vol. 1:315 ("neither English honour
nor English interests"); Letter from Lord Granville, 2nd ser., vol. 2:581 ("honour or interest of your
Majesty").
87. See 176 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1864) (Disraeli: "honourable and intelligible course," id. at 731,
"honour of England and the peace of Europe," id. at 748, "honour or independence of England," id. at
750; Chancellor of the Exchequer Gladstone: "an object dearer to England than her interest-namely...
her honour and duty," id. at 764, "dignity, independence and strength of her [i.e. Russia's] position," id.
at 767-68, "our honour and interests," id.; former and future War Secretary Jonathan Peel: "peace and
honour of the country," id. at 799-800; future Foreign Secretary Edward Henry, Lord Stanley (later 15th
Earl of Derby): "influence, power, and honour of England" id. at 811, "a safe, respected, and
honourable position," id. at 813).
88. See 65 PARL. DEB., H.C., (5th ser.) (1914) 1810, 1816-17, 1819-23, 1825 (Grey); Aug. 6,
1914: 2074, 2077,2079-80, 2083 (Asquith).
89. See generally ARNO J. MAYER, THE PERSISTENCE OF THE OLD REGIME: EUROPE TO THE
GREAT WAR (Pantheon Books 1981). The economic aspects of Mayer's thesis were rejected by LIEVEN.
See ARISTOCRACY IN EUROPE, supra note 11, at 243-244; see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 5, at 265.
90. See KEVIN MCALEER, DUELING: THE CULT OF HONOR IN FN-DE-SIECLE GERMANY 197-99,
203-04 (Princeton Univ. Press 1994); Gay, supra note 16, at 15, 17, 33, 113.
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for preparing young males for self-control, sacrifice, defence and aggression. 9'
"The mid-Victorian cult of retrenchment, economy, rationality and utilitarianism"
had by the 1890's fully given way to an exaggerated love of pomp and show,
including the invention of "traditional" ceremonies.92  Were these early 20th
century societies seeking to popularize king and country by systematically
cultivating an "archaic ethos of heroism, glory and honour"?
93
Individual battlefield bravery could still be credibly characterized as glorious,
honourable, and courageous, until heroism became largely irrelevant amidst the
horrific mechanization of 1914-18 trench warfare-including barbed wire,
machine guns, artillery barrages, poison gas, and tanks.94 By contrast, U.S. foreign
relations scholar George F. Kennan referred to the halcyon pre-war decades which
still cherished "the romantic-chivalric concept of military conflict: the notion that
whether you won or lost depended only on your bravery, your determination, your
sense of righteousness, and your skill." He said warfare was viewed as "a test of
young manhood, a demonstration of courage and virility, a proving-ground for
virtue, for love of country, for national quality." 95 This dovetails with the 1880
view of Chief of the Great German General Staff, Count Helmuth von Moltke
(1800-1891):
Perpetual peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream. War is an element of
the world order established by God. In war develop mankind's most noble
virtues: courage and self-denial, loyalty to duty and the spirit of sacrifice--the
soldier gives his life. Without war, the world would stagnate and lose itself in
materialism.
96
Similarly, Queen Victoria rhapsodized: "To die for one's country and Sovereign in
the discharge of duty is a worthy and noble end to this earthly life for a soldier. 97
91. See PAUL FUSSELL, THE GREAT WAR AND MODERN MEMORY 21-23 (Oxford Univ. Press
1975). For Lord Curzon's "elaborate, Latinate style of rhetoric," see DAVID CANNADINE, ASPECTS OF
ARISTOCRACY: GRANDEUR AND DECLINE IN MODERN BRITAIN 81-82 (New Haven-London, 1994).
92. See CANNADINE, supra note 91, at 89-92.
93. See MAYER, supra note 89, at 91; for Germany see, ROHL, supra note 50, at 104; for Russia
see, GEORGE F. KENNAN, THE DECLINE OF BISMARCK'S EUROPEAN ORDER: FRANCO-RUSSIAN
RELATIONS 1875-1890 417-19 (Princeton Univ. Press 1979); Eric J. Hobsbawn, Mass Producing
Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914, in THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 263-307 at 281-83 (Eric J.
Hobsbawn & Terence Ranger eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1983).
94. See FUSSELL, supra note 91, at 21; GIROUARD, supro note 50, at 290; cinematographic
expressions include Lewis Milestone, All Quiet on the Western Front (Universal Studios 1930); Stanley
Kubrick, Paths of Glory (MGM/UA Studios 1957); Peter Weir, Gallipoli (Paramount Studios 1981).
95. KENNAN, supra note 93, at 423-424.
96. Berlin, Dec. 11, 1880, Les lois de la guerre sur terre: Lettres de M. le comte de Molike et de
M Bluntschli, in REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE, TOME XIII 80
(1881); for "war as culture," see MODRIS EKSTEINS, RITES OF SPRING: THE GREAT WAR AND THE
BIRTH OF THE MODERN AGE 90-94 (London-New York, 1989).
97. See Letter to India Viceroy, Lord Lytton, Dec. 6, 1878, 2 LQV 651 (2nd ser.).
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H. War as Duel: Did Countries Fight for Honour?
In Europe, honour continued to hold an astonishingly strong grip on
individual imagination and conduct, as evidenced by persistence into the 20th
century of duelling--an dlite practice sustained by several honour-related ideas,
including the premium on readiness to risk life in a rite affirming masculinity,
courage and character. 98 An early juridical treatment of the well-known link
between honour and duelling is afforded by Bologna University's Giovanni da
Legnano who argued (1360) that duels are fought for one or more of three
reasons--hatred, an accusation's compurgation, or glory (propter gloriam). In the
last case, the duellist seeks the joy of victory, i.e. "to win public glory by the
strength of the body" and "from the disgrace of his fellow and neighbour." 99 This
assessment was confirmed by Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who was a scientist,
philosopher, Gray's Inn barrister, and ultimately Lord Chancellor of England:
"Honour that is gained and broken upon another hath the quickest reflexion, like
diamonds cut with facets."' °  His perception is particularly relevant because,
turning to the international realm, Bacon specifically understood war as trial by
combat. lO
The same metaphor caused Italian philosopher of law and cultural history,
Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) to observe that the moral theologians'
understanding of war's external justice was based on the custom of duelling
observed by individuals in their private affairs. Through the fortune of arms, divine
providence was said to legitimate the victor's conquests. 0 2 Similarly, Clausewitz
began his classic study On War by defining conflict between States as "nothing but
a duel on an extensive scale."'
0 3
Travers Twiss (1809-1897) was Professor of International Law at King's
College, London. Using purum piumque duellum (unstained and upright duel) for
war as international law's ultimate sanction, he insisted that the metaphor was "not
a fiction of Jurists, but a stem reality of International Life" as "the ruins of
98. See VICTOR GORDON KIERNAN, THE DUEL IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: HONOUR AND THE REIGN
OF ARISTOCRACY (Oxford Univ. Press 1988); ROBERT A. NYE, MASCULINITY AND MALE CODES OF
HONOR IN MODERN FRANCE (Oxford Univ. Press 1993); MCALEER, supra note 90; ARISTOCRACY IN
EUROPE, supra note 11 at 195, 199; RUSSIA, supra note 11 at 86; ISTVAN DEAK, BEYOND
NATIONALISM: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE HABSBURG OFFICER CORPS, 1848-1918
126-38 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992).
99. GIOVANNI DA LEGNANO, TRACTATUS DE BELLO, DE REPRESALIIS ET DE DUELLO §§ 169-
174:331-341, at 332, 337 (Thomas Erskine Holland ed. and J.L. Brierly trans., Oxford 1917).
100. Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral, § 55: Of Honour and Reputation, in I THE WORKS OF
FRANCIS BACON, BARON OF VERULAM, VISCOUNT ST. ALBAN AND LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF
ENGLAND 505-06 (James Spedding et al. eds., London 1858-1874).
101. See Certain Observations Made Upon a Libel Published This Present Year, 1592, in 8 WORKS
OF FRANCIS BACON 146; for a late reference to wars as "suits of appeal to the tribunal of God's justice,"
see Considerations Touching a War with Spain, 1624, in 14 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 470.
102. See IV THE NEW SCIENCE OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO ch. 2, § 964,356 (Thomas Goddard Bergin
& Max Harold Fisch trans., Ithaca-London 1968).
103. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 12, at bk. 1, ch. 1, § 2:101.
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Sebastopol bear convincing testimony."'1 4 The duel was also the metaphor for
Edward Creasy (1812-1878) who was a Lincoln's Inn barrister, judge and
historian. He asserted a country's "right to repel and to exact redress for injuries to
its honour" as a "right of self-preservation," because "among nations, as among
individuals, those who tamely submit to insult, will be sure to have insults and
outrages heaped upon them."
05
French prelate and writer Frangois Fdnelon (1651-1715) was a bitter critic of
France's foreign policy. He pointed to Louis XIV's desire for glory as one of the
two causes of the Dutch War (1672-1678) said to have triggered a chain of
conflicts impoverishing France. 10 6 Even a shrewd Realpolitiker like Frederick the
Great believed that some wars were fought for glory, reputation and honour.
Frederick said seeking glory was partly his motive for beginning (1740) the War of
the Austrian Succession and that of the Habsburg Emperor Joseph II for the 1778
War of the Bavarian Succession. 10 7  Experience taught Frederick that respect
accorded by fellow rulers was proportional to success on the battlefield.'0 8 He
classified countries as primarily seeking either "glory" or "wealth." He said States
preferring glory tended towards France, but those preferring wealth towards
England. Differentiating interest from glory, he judged that for France to fight for
the Rhine frontier was a matter of genuine interest, but for France to fight to be
Europe's arbiter sheer vanity.10 9
Avenging insults and defending England's honour was demanded by the
"hard-hating, elegant polemicist" Junius who derided King George III for failing to
fight Spain to enforce Britain's claim to the Falkland Islands:
To depart, in the minutest article, from the nicety and strictness of
punctilio, is as dangerous to national honour, as it is to female virtue. The
woman who admits of one familiarity, seldom knows where to stop, or
104. SIR TRAVERS TwISS, THE LAW OF NATIONS CONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT POLITICAL
COMMUNITIES: ON THE RIGHT AND DUTIES OF NATIONS IN TIME OF PEACE vi, ix (Oxford 1861).
105. SIR EDWARD SHEPARD CREASY, FIRST PLATFORM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 153 (London
1876).
106. Letter to Louis XIV, in 7 OEUVRES COMPLETES DE FENELON, ARCHEVEQUE DE CAMBRAI 510
(Paris, 1850). This "anonymous letter" circulated from around Dec. 1693 and then went to the King's
mistress, Frangoise de Maintenon. See JEAN-CHRISTIAN PETITFILS, LOUIS XIV 536-539 (Paris, 1995).
Saying gloire was one of the main "values behind decision making" does not mean that policy was not
also aimed at enhancing France's security. See John A. Lynn, A Quest for Glory: The Formation of
Strategy under Louis XJV, in THE MAKING OF STRATEGY: RULERS, STATES AND WAR 178-204
(Williamson Murray et al. eds., Cambridge 1994); Ragnhild M. Hatton, Louis XIV and his Fellow
Monarchs, in LOUIS XIV AND EUROPE 16-59 (Hatton ed. London 1976); JOHN B. WOLF, Louis XIV
214 (New York 1968); ARON, supra note 10, at 74.
107. See MEMOIRES DE FREDERIC II, supra note 37, at I Histoire de mon temps 75-77; Mimoires
de 1775 6 1778, in vol. 2: 443; Mimoires de la guerre de 1778, in vol. 2:469.
108. Id. at 1 Histoire de la guerre de sept ans 450.
109. See FRIEDRICH MEINECKE, MACHIAVELLIANISM: THE DOCTRINE OF RAISON D'ETAT AND ITS
PLACE IN MODERN HISTORY 316 (Douglas Scott trans., London 1957); SIR HAROLD NICOLSON, GOOD
BEHAVIOUR: A STUDY OF CERTAIN TYPES OF CIVILITY 107 (London 1955) ("The idea of glory for
glory's sake never pushed deep roots into the thick soil of the English character. Yet in France such
words as 'gloire' and 'panache 'possess even today a certain sentimental value.").
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what to refuse; and when the counsels of a great country give way in a
single instance, when they are once inclined to submission, every step
accelerates the rapidity of their descent. '0
Otherwise pacific, Charles James Fox likewise believed: "Among individuals,
and much more among nations, honour is the most essential means of safety, as it
is the first, and I had almost said the only legitimate ground of war." ''
Showing Napoleon III and William I with foils, Punch portrayed the "point of
honour" and the duel as the metaphor for the war which France began against
Prussia in July 1870.12 Prussia's Chancellor Otto von Bismarck took lifelong
pride in having won twenty-five student duels." 3 This fact must be recalled in
connection with the famous Ems telegram which he edited so as to produce the
abrupt tone which was-according to the then prevailing code of honour
(Ritterkodex)-tantamount to declaring war.' 1 4  With precisely this in mind,
Britain's Foreign Secretary Lord Granville said it was "inconceivable that, in the
present state of civilisation, hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen should be hurled




Also with reference to the Franco-Prussian War, Granville said: "It is sometimes
useful to compare the action of nations and that of individuals, and very often the
conduct of a high-spirited nation and of an honourable man is very much the
same.""16 This discourse of honour was continued by the German Crown Prince
Frederick: "It would surely be no shame to France that has fought bravely, to
confess at last that she has been beaten by an Army equal to hers. No one would
accuse France of cowardice, or believe that her military honour had not had justice
doneto it.,
117
The duel metaphor was also used by Prime Minister Disraeli to portray
Foreign Secretary Granville's conduct at the 1870-71 London Conference revising
the 1856 Paris Treaty's Black Sea clauses:
Why, the noble Lord went there to vindicate the honour and the interests of his
country; and if the Russian Ambassador had refused the compensation which he
demanded it would have been the noble Lord's duty to coerce the Power which
had first outraged England, and then refused to do the only act which the noble
110. Letter to the Printer of the Public Advertiser, Jan. 30, 1771, No. 42, see 2 THE LETrERS OF
JUNIUS 48, supra note 53; characterized by AYLING, supra note 53, at 164.
111. Nov. 3, 1801, Commons, 36 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 72.
112. See A Duel to the Death, in 59 Punch 37 (Jul. 23, 1870) (France to Britannia: "Pray stand
back, Madam. You mean well; but this is an old family quarrel, and we mustfight it out!").
113. See GAY, supra note 16, at 258.
114. See GOLO MANN, DEUTSCHE GESCHICHTE DES 19. UND 20. JAHRHUNDERTS 379 (Frankfurt
am Main 1958); KOPPEL S. PINSON, MODERN GERMANY: ITS HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION 144-46, and
589 n.31 (New York 1955).
115. Letter from Granville to Queen Victoria, Jul. 15, 1870, 2 LQV 35 (2nd ser.).
116. 203 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1870) 1754.
117. German Crown Prince to Queen Victoria, Jan. 3, 1871, 2 LQV 101-02 (2nd ser.).
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Lord could devise in order to remove that stain on her reputation.
11
8
In the Annual Message to Congress (1905), President Theodore Roosevelt
proved that honour's rhetoric was not limited to Europe: "This mighty and free
Republic should ever deal with all other States, great or small, on a basis of high
honor, respecting their rights as generously as it safeguards its own." He believed
that "if war is necessary and righteous then either the man or the nation shrinking
from it forfeits all title to self-respect." '"19 A year later, he told Congress that
"honorable men" and an "honorable nation" must choose to fight rather than buy
peace through "sacrifice of conscientious conviction or of national welfare." He
said "a beaten nation is not necessarily a disgraced nation; but the nation or man is
disgraced if the obligation to defend right is shirked."' 120 Referring to the 1898
Spanish-American War, Roosevelt in 1917 reflected: "I believe that war should
never be resorted to when or so long as it is honorably possible to avoid it. I
advocate preparation for war in order to avert war, and I should never advocate
war unless it were the only alternative to dishonor."'
12 1
"Nations and States can achieve no loftier consummation than to stake their
whole power on upholding their independence, their honour, and their
reputation."'122 With these words, German soldier, historian and diplomat Friedrich
von Bernhardi (1849-1930) argued that the State has both the right and the duty to
make war: "If sometimes between individuals the duel alone meets the sense of
justice, how much more impossible must a universal international law be in the
wide-reaching and complicated relations between nations and States!" He insisted
that: "Even if a comprehensive international code were drawn up, no self-
respecting nation would sacrifice its own conception of right to it. By so doing it
would renounce its highest ideals; it would allow its own sense of justice to be
violated by an injustice, and thus dishonour itself."' 123 Recalling Frederick the
Great, Bernhardi argued: "Cases may occur where war must be made simply as a
point of honour, although there is no prospect of success."1
24
118. 232 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1877) 725; Arts. 11 and 13, General Treaty for the Re-establishment
of Peace between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey, and Russia, Mar. 30,
1856, in 114CTS 414-15.
119. 5th Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 5, 1905, see A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1908 1150, 1152 (James D. Richardson ed., vol. 11, Bureau of
National Literature 1908) [hereinafter Messages and Paper]; SIR NORMAN ANGELL, THE GREAT
ILLUSION: A STUDY OF THE RELATION OF MILITARY POWER IN NATIONS TO THEIR ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL ADVANTAGE 139 (3d. ed., Toronto 1911) (quoting President Roosevelt at Stationers' Hall,
London, stating "We despise a nation just as we despise a man who submits to insult. What is true of a
man ought to be true of a nation.").
120. 6th Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 3, 1906, see I I MESSAGES AND PAPERS 1181-1228,
1223-24, supra note 119.
121. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, NATIONAL STRENGTH AND INTERNATIONAL DUTY 15 (Princeton
1917).
122. FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI, GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR 21 (Allen H. Powles trans.,
London 1913).
123. BERNHARDI, supra note 122, at 25.
124. Id. at46-47.
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Seeing the word honneur in the French text of the Preamble to the League of
Nations Covenant, Oxford University Professor of International Relations Alfred
Eckhard Zimmern (1879-1957) reflected: "Honneur suggests not 'fair play', with
its spacious tolerance and comfortable associations with the world of sport, but the
rigorous punctilio of the tournament and the duel."'' 2 5 Indeed, European foreign
policy before 1914 was frequently formulated and executed by individuals who
dueled or subscribed to the cult of dueling.126 According to Edinburgh University
History Professor Victor Kiernan: "Just as the duelist claimed exemption in his
chosen sphere from ordinary law, monarchs ... and almost equally the small
cliques in control of foreign policy.., set their 'honour' above the common
welfare of mankind." Statesmen and duellists shared an obsession with peer
standing that caused Kiernan to comment: "None of the diplomats and generals of
1914 could risk appearing the first to give way, any more than duellists could resist
the pressure of social opinion.' ' 127 It is difficult to escape the conclusion that,
before 1914, the State was personified as a nobleman with a sense of honour, and
that foreign relations were seen through the prism of the cult of honour accepted
among gentlemen.
I. Was Honour a Cause of the First World War?
Looking at power structures, German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920)
pointed to prestige as a factor influencing foreign policy: "Prestige of power, as
such, means in practice the glory of power over other communities; it means
expansion of power, though not always by way of incorporation or subjection."
He saw the Great Powers as large, status-seeking political communities naturally
challenging all other possible prestige bearers. On the eve of the First World War,
Weber wrote:
Experience teaches that claims to prestige have always played into the origins of
wars. Their part is difficult to gauge; it cannot be determined in general, but it is
very obvious. The realm of 'honor' which is comparable to the 'status order'
within a political structure, pertains also to the interrelations of political
structures. 128
Rejecting economic determinism, Fukuyama relies on interpretations of
German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) for the
proposition that the "motor of history" is man's desire for recognition, which along
with "the accompanying emotions of anger, shame, and pride, are parts of the
human personality critical to political life." Fukuyama's explanation of the
development of international politics points to what amounts to honour:
125. ALFRED ECKHARD ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 1918-1935
277 (2d. ed. London 1939).
126. See GAY, supra note 16 at 258; McALEER, supra note 90 at 34-35.
127. KIERNAN, supra note 98 at 316-17.
128. FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 159-161 (Hans H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans.
& ed., New York, 1958).
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The desire for recognition that led to the original bloody battle for
prestige between two individual combatants leads logically to imperialism
and world empire. The relationship of lordship and bondage on a
domestic level is naturally replicated on the level of states, where nations
as a whole seek recognition and enter into bloody battles for
supremacy. 1
29
Fukuyama sees the 1914-18 war as a battle for pure prestige. He invokes
Platonic thymos-the soul's spirited element offering courage, fierceness, and
indignation tied to a sense of honour-to dub the war, a classic thymotic
struggle. 130 Joining historians pointing to the mass exhilaration that greeted the
war's outbreak, Fukuyama diagnoses an honour-related syndrome, a megalothymia
(exuberance) of nations seeking "recognition of their worth and dignity" and of
individuals rebelling against the isothymia (boredom) of everyday life. 131 His focus
on thymos coincides with the many references to honour in August 1914.132 This
approach is particularly pertinent to the prestige orientation of both Austria-
Hungary and Russia, the States most directly responsible for the catastrophe.
"You see in me the last monarch of the old school," said eighty-year-old
Habsburg Emperor Francis Joseph to former U.S. President Roosevelt. 133 Indeed,
honour and duty were central themes in Francis Joseph's increasingly fatalistic
understanding of statecraft: 1
34
The honour of the Monarchy [i.e. Austria-Hungary] still held pride of
place in Franz Joseph's Weltanschauung. And in a sense his policy was
the same after 1866 [Austria's defeat by Prussia] as before--to defend his
position as long as possible, to do his duty, and if that failed, to go down
with honour. But it was nevertheless for the emperor to judge when the
honour of the Monarchy was being openly challenged. After 1866 he was
129. FUKUYAMA, supra note 5 at xvii, xx, 143-152; "poverty with prestige is better than affluent
with disgrace," see HOWARD K. BLOOM, THE LUCIFER PRINCIPLE: A SCIENTIFIC EXPEDITION INTO THE
FORCES OF HISTORY 250-257 (New York 1995).
130. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 5, at xvi-xvii; THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 63 (Francis MacDonald
Cornford, ed., Oxford 1941): "This term [thymosl covers a group of impulses manifested in anger and
pugnacity, in generous indignation allied to a sense of honour and in competitive ambition. Its virtue is
courage."
131. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 5, at 331-332; GAY, supra note 16, at 514-17; EKSTEINS, supra
note 96, at 55-64; ORLANDO FIGEs, A PEOPLE'S TRAGEDY: THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1891-1924 250-
51 (London 1996); JAMES BYSSE JOLL, EUROPE SINCE 1870: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 193-195
(2d. ed. Harmondsworth 1976).
132. See BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST 103, 117-18, 124, 132, 138, 140-41 (New
York 1963).
133. Friedrich Engel-Janosi, Der Monarch und seine Ratgeber, in PROBLEME DER FRANZISKO-
JOSEPHINISCHEN ZEIT 1848-1916 9-24, at 9 (Friedrich Engel-Janosi & Helmuth Rumpler eds., Vienna
1967).
134. Id.; Hugo Hantsch, Kaiser Franz Joseph und die Aufienpolitik, in PROBLEME DER FRANZISKO-
JOSEPHINISCHEN ZEIT 25-39; HEINRICH BENEDIKT, DIE MONARCHIE DES HAUSES OSTERREICH: EIN
HISTORISCHES ESSAY 124, 226, 229 (Vienna 1968); ADAM WANDRUSZKA, THE HOUSE OF HABSBURG
147-54 (Cathleen & Hans Epstein trans., New York 1964); I BRIEFE KAISER FRANZ JOSEPHS AN
KAISERIN ELISABETH 1859-1898 28, 32 (Georg Nostitz-Rieneck ed., Vienna 1966).
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simply more long-suffering and more reluctant to go to war than in his
earlier years. It was not until 1914 that he despaired of maintaining the
honour of the Monarchy by diplomatic means. 
3
After Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip killed the Habsburg heir apparent,
retaliation was endorsed by Francis Joseph who knew that resort to arms would
probably trigger a European war that might destroy Austria-Hungary.136 His ancien
regime logic he explained to General Staff Chief Conrad von Htitzendorf: "If the
Monarchy is already doomed, at least it ought to go down honourably
(anstaindig)."'137 The Sarajevo assassination caused Conrad to write in the same
vein: "It will be a hopeless struggle, but nevertheless it must be, because such an
ancient monarchy and such an ancient army cannot perish ingloriously."'' 38 After
Francis Joseph declared war on Serbia, he asked his peoples to make "sacrifices for
the honour, the majesty, the power of the Fatherland." Justifying recourse to force,
he explained: "The machinations of a hostile power, moved by hatred, compel me
after many long years of peace to take up the sword to preserve the honour of my
Monarchy....' 3 9 Similarly, German Emperor William II called on his people to
"stand, in resolute fidelity, by our ally," Austria-Hungary "which is battling for its
reputation as a great power, and with whose humiliation our power and honor, too,
would be lost.'
140
Prestige was also crucial to Russia, trying to regain standing among the Great
Powers after humiliating defeats in the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War and the 1908-
09 Bosnian annexation crisis. "We will not let ourselves be trampled upon," said
Russian Emperor Nicholas II in January 1914 to French Ambassador Th6ophile
Delcass. 14  Upholding national honour drove Russia to support Serbia said
British historian Dominic Lieven:
To understand why Russia went to war in 1914 it is... necessary to grasp the
135. F.R. BRIDGE, FROM SADOWA TO SARAJEWO: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY,
1866-1914 12 (London 1972).
136. See GEORGE R. MAREK, THE EAGLES DIE: FRANZ JOSEPH, ELISABETH AND THEIR AUSTRIA
441-42, 454-55 (New York 1974). Told Germany would be true even if Austria-Hungary's planned
attack on Serbia triggered "the big war" with France and Russia, Francis Joseph said "Now we can no
longer turn back. It will be a terrible war." See LUIGI ALBERTINI, 2 THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF 1914
142 (Isabella M. Massey trans., London 1953).
137. VIKTOR BIBL, 2 DER ZERFALL OSTERREICHS: VON REVOLUTION ZU REVOLUTION 498-99
(Vienna 1924); Francis Joseph repeated remarks circling around the words "to do one's duty and--if it
must be--to go down with honour [Ehre], see ENGEL-JANOSI, supra note 133, at 22; DEAK, supra note
98, at 75 ("The final responsibility for what happened... lay with Francis Joseph, who... sensing that
the monarchy was doomed, nevertheless consented to the issuing of an unacceptable ultimatum. He
signed the fatal mobilization order so as to preserve the dignity of the house.").
138. Jun. 28, 1914, see GUNTHER E. ROTHENBERG, THE ARMY OF FRANCIS JOSEPH 177 (West
Lafayette, Indiana 1976).
139. Wiener Zeitung, Jul. 29, 1914, see EDWARD CRANKSHAW, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF
HABSBURG 404 (New York 1963).
140. Appeal to the German People, Aug. 6, 1914, see GAY, supra note 16 at 515.
141. See FIGES, supra note 131 at 249.
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values and mentality of the Russian ruling dlites, including Nicholas II. In old
regime Europe the nobleman was brought up to defend his public reputation and
honour at all costs, if necessary with sword in hand. The ethic of the duel still
prevailed in aristocratic and, in particular, military circles. No crime was worse
than cowardice. Kings, aristocrats and generals were not used to being pushed
about or humiliated. In contemporary parlance, they had a short fuse.
On war's outbreak, Nicholas II proclaimed that it was imperative "to protect
the honour, dignity and safety of Russia and its position among the Great
Powers." 1
42
Honour was also targeted by its critics. For example, Norman Angell (1874-
1967) wrote (1910) The Great Illusion-an anti-war best seller deriding the idea of
national honour and deploring the survival of the code duello, then "maintained as
vigorously as ever in the relations of States."' 143  This critical current flowed in
Parliament on the eve of Britain's entry into the First World War. Labour Party
Leader James Ramsay Macdonald argued:
There has been no crime [i.e. going to war] committed by statesmen of
this character without those statesmen appealing to their nation's honour.
We fought the Crimean War because of our honour. We rushed to South
Africa because of our honour. The right hon. Gentleman [Foreign
Secretary Sir Edward Grey] is appealing to us today because of our
honour. 144
Exactly this view was echoed by Independent Labour Party Chairman James
Keir Hardie. 145 Similarly, Liberal MP Sir William Byles said:
It is not a war to defend our hearths and homes. If it were I could understand this
exultation. It is to defend our honour.... It is for honour that a German duellist
fights his fellow officer. Whether he kills his opponent or is killed by him, honour
is revenged. So it is to be now. We are to hire a number of men, a number of
soldiers, to go and blow out the brains of another number of men, to vindicate our
honour. 146
For Liberal MP John Annan Bryce, going to war was "a regular house that
Jack built" because "we have the French joining the Russians on a point of honour
and we are joining the French on a point of honour." 147
142. RusSIA, supra note 11, at 5, 7, 20-22, 65-68, 72, 86, 95-96, 100, 108, 111, 114-16, 123, 128,
131-33; see also DOMINIC LIEVEN, NICHOLAS II: TwILIGHT OF THE EMPIRE 174, 190, 200-01 (New
York 1993).
143. ANGELL, supra note 119, at 175-79.
144. 65 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1914) 1830.
145. See id. at 1841.
146. Id. at 1873.
147. 65 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5"h ser.) (1914) at 1876.
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J. Did Honour Require Britain to Fight in 1914?
Prime Minister Asquith told Parliament that Belgium had refused Germany's
August 2nd demand for "free passage through Belgian territory" as a "flagrant
violation of the law of nations,"'148 a phrase pointing to infringement of Belgian
sovereignty as a contravention of customary international law. This interpretation
coincided with German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg's astonishing
Reichstag admission that Germany's August 4th march into Belgium was an
Unrecht (wrong, tort, delinquency) which "violates the precepts of international
law."149 Treaty obligation aside, this customary law contravention was-according
to international law as it was in 1914--merely matter for a bilateral dispute
between Belgium and Germany. As for Britain's becoming a party to the dispute,
her locus standi arose from the invasion's being simultaneously a violation of the
neutrality guaranteed by the 1839 London agreements to which Britain was
party. 5 ° The fact that Britain's casus belli was breach of treaty understandably
provoked discussion about the nature of treaty obligation which was consistently
portrayed not as a matter of law, but of honour.' 5'
The consensus was that treaty obligation arose from a "good faith" promise,
of which fulfilment was a matter of national honour, abandonment a national
disgrace. A distinguished barrister, Asquith justified going to war to uphold the
1839 treaties:
If I am asked what we are fighting for I reply in two sentences. In the
first place, to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which,
if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary
concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of
law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have
repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle...
148. Id. at 1926.
149. Aug. 4, 1914, see MANN, supra note 114, at 577 ("Unsere Truppen haben Luxemburg besezt,
und vielleicht schon belgisches Gebiet. Das wiederspricht den Geboten des V61kerrechts .... Das
Unrecht, das wir damit tun, werden wir wieder gutmachen, sobald unseres militflrisches Ziel erreicht
ist.").
150. Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia guaranteed Belgium's neutrality in two
1839 treaties with the Netherlands and Belgium respectively, see 88 CTS 411-26; for 1870 and 1908
legal opinions, see 8 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR 1898-1914 371-79 (G. P.
Gooch & Harold Temperley eds., London, 1932).
151. The 1870 neutrality precedent and pacifism in the Liberal Party caused Cabinet to disagree
over aiding France, but the German invasion of Belgium tipped the scales, see PHILLIPSON, supra note
70, at 7-26; Keith M. Wilson, The Cabinet's Decision for War, 1914, in POLICY OF THE ENTENTE:
ESSAYS ON THE DETERMINANTS OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1904-1914 135-147 (Keith M. Wilson
ed., Cambridge 1985); TREVOR WILSON, THE MYRIAD FACES: BRITAIN AND THE GREAT WAR 28-35
(Oxford 1986); MICHAEL G. FRY, LLOYD GEORGE AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE EDUCATION OF A
STATESMAN, 1890-1916 183-213 (Montreal-London 1977); Britain would likely have opted for
neutrality and France for an early peace, had Germany held back in the West and attacked Russia
instead. See AJ.P. TAYLOR, THE STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY IN EUROPE: 1848-1918 549 n.l (Oxford
1954).
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that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international
good faith [i.e. pacta sunt servanda], by the arbitrary will of a strong and
overmastering Power.1
5 2
Asquith characterized as "infamous," "betrayal" and "dishonour of our
obligations" the proposal that Britain acquiesce in Germany's march through
Belgium.'
5 3
Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey had studied law at Oxford University. He
recalled the government's commitment that there would be "no secret
engagement" foisting "an obligation of honour upon the country."' 54 A clear
picture of treaty obligation emerges from his description of the Franco-Russian
alliance:
I can say this with the most absolute confidence--no Government and no
country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute between
Austria and Servia than the Government and country of France. They are
involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite
alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that
obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not
parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of
that Alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the
ground with regard to the question of obligation.1
55
Although the 1839 London Treaties guarantying Belgium's neutrality were
the crux of debate, a "legal" obligation to help Belgium was not mentioned.
Rather the issue was whether the treaties had engaged Britain's honour-posing
the terrible sanction of dishonour. Grey said: "If in a crisis like this, we run away
from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty... we
should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the
world."'5 6 This reasoning was supported by Conservative Opposition Leader
Andrew Bonar Law who spoke of "honour and security."'517 However, Labour
Party Leader Macdonald asked "whether the country is in danger." Ignoring
treaties, Macdonald said neutrality alone is "in the deepest parts of our hearts"
consistent with the honour of the country and of the Liberal Party.'58
On August 4, Grey told U.S. Ambassador Page: "England would be forever
contemptible if it should sit by and see this treaty violated. Its position would be
gone if Germany were thus permitted to dominate Europe."' 5 9 Grey's memoirs
repeated the theme of dishonour: "The real reason for going into the war was that,
152. 65 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1914) 2079.
153. Id. at 2076-77.
154. 65 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1914) 1810.
155. Id. at 1814-15.
156. Id. at 1823-25.
157. Id. at 1828.
158. Id. at 1830-31.
159. 1 THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF WALTER H. PAGE 314 (Burton J. Hendrick, ed., Doubleday,
Page & Co. 1922).
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if we did not.., stand up for Belgium against this aggression, we should be
isolated, discredited, and hated; and there would be before us nothing but a
miserable and ignoble future.' '16
Similarly, Britain's Ambassador in Berlin pointed to honour to explain why
England was willing to fight for the 1839 treaties:
In the same way, as he [Bethmann Hollweg] and [Foreign Minister] Herr
[Gottlieb] von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a
matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate her
neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of
'life and death' for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn
engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That
solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in
engagements given by Great Britain in the future?
161
The link between treaty performance and honour was not just an dlite
perception, but widespread among that generation of Englishmen.162 London
University Professor of French History, Alfred Cobban (1901-1968) said: "In 1914
there was still a general expectation that treaties would be kept until they were
formally denounced. It is difficult to think back now to a time when the German
disregard of Belgian neutrality was regarded as a shattering blow to normal
conventions of international behaviour." 63 Poet Rupert Brooke (1887-1915) then
thought Belgium "a thousand times enough" to fight for, and poet and writer
Robert Graves (1895-1985) later recalled having been "outraged to read of the
cynical violation of Belgian neutrality."' 64 Streaming to the colours, recruits
believed they were doing the right thing: "Few young English officers doubted that
Germany had broken the code of European nations and deserved to be
punished."' 165 This violation of the 1839 treaties was condemned by British public
opinion as a dishonourable breach of faith-a transgression helping religious
denominations portray the Allied cause as a 20th century crusade.
166
160. VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON, 2 TWENTY-FivE YEARS 1892-1916 15-16, 322-24 (The
Ryerson Press 1925).
161. Letter from Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, Berlin, Nos. 667 and 671, Aug. 4 and 6,
1914, 9 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR 1898-1914 347, 352 (London 1926); The
DIARY OF EDWARD GOSCHEN 1900-1914 50 (Royal Historical Society, 25 Camden, 4th ser.,
Christopher H.D. Howard ed., London 1980).
162. See Michael Howard, Europe on the Eve of the First World War, in THE LESSONS OF HISTORY
119-20 (New Haven-London 1991).
163. ALFRED COBBAN, 3 A HISTORY OF MODERN FRANCE 106 (Baltimore 1965).
164. Sep. 24, 1914, THE LETrERS OF RUPERT BROOKE 618 (Geoffrey Keynes ed., London 1968);
ROBERT GRAVES, GOODBYE TO ALL THAT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 99 (London 1929).
165. ROBERT WOHL, THE GENERATION OF 1914 93 (Harvard Univ. Press 1979).
166. See Lillian M. Penson, Obligations by Treaty: Their Place in British Foreign Policy, 1898-
1914, in STUDIES IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY IN HONOUR OF G.P. GOOCH 87
(Arshag Ohan Sarkissian ed., London 1961); ALBERT MARRIN, THE LAST CRUSADE: THE CHURCH OF
ENGLAND IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR 131-32, 221, 251 (Durham N.C., 1974); HUBERT GEBELE, DIE
PROBLEME VOM KRIEG UND FRIEDEN IN GROBBRITANNIEN WAHREND DES ERSTEN WELTKRIEGS:
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K. Was "National Honour" Recognized by International Law?
Although our ownfin de sicle finds appeals to honour pompous, affected and
even ridiculous, pre-1914 juridical discourse abounds with sincere references to
"honour" in speeches, diplomatic papers, private correspondence, books and
treaties. Such language was not merely rhetorical because customary international
law then recognized that a country had a "right to reputation," i.e. respect for its
moral and juristic personality, including "the right to demand satisfaction for an
offence against its honour."'' 67  Scottish advocate and Glasgow judge, James
Reddie (1773-1852) included among a nation's general permanent attributes its
"national honour" or "reputation" defined as:
the right of a nation to the maintenance of its honour, character, and reputation-a
right which is so difficult to define in the abstract; but which, in the concrete, and
in the particular case, is so easily understood and felt, and the maintenance of
which is so conducive to the security and prosperity of a nation.168
This "right to respect" was also described by Alphonse Pierre Octave Rivier
(1835-1898) who was a Swiss diplomat and Professor of International Law at
Brussels University: "The State's moral character, dignity, honour, credit, and
good reputation are as much elements of its personality as its physical, economic
and juridical condition. The State has the right to keep them intact against any
slur."' 169 Similarly, the British editor of the Commentary of U.S. jurist James Kent
(1763-1847) identified as the primary objects of international law, "the
independence of nations, the inviolability of their several territories, and the
maintenance of their honour."' 170 This kind of thinking helped 19th century States
justify using force to defend their honour. For example, national dignity was
offended by Venezuelan President de Castro's 1908 dismissal of Dutch Minister
Resident de Reuss. In reprisal, Dutch cruisers captured two Venezuelan public
ships which were held pending apology.'
7
'
Just as the aristocrat refused "to remit to the courts the settlement of his
affairs of honour," so national honour was generally regarded as a matter of
paramount concern beyond the bounds of arbitration.1 72 According to Argentine
international lawyer, diplomat and historian Carlos Calvo (1824-1906):
REGIERUNG, PARTEIEN UND OFFENTLICHE MEINUNG IN DER AUSEINANDERSETZUNG OBER KRIEGS-
UND FRIEDENSZIELE 46 (Frankfurt 1987).
167. JOHANN KASPAR BLUNTSCHLI, EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL CODIFICADO bk. I1, § 85 at 95
(Jos6 Diaz Covarrubias trans. Mexico City, 1871).
168. JAMES REDDIE, INQUIRIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 198 (2d. ed.
Edinburgh 1851).
169. ALPHONSE RIVIER, I PRINCIPES DU DROIT DES GENS 260 (Paris 1896).
170. See KENT, COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 3.
171. See LASSA FRANCIS LAWRENCE OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW § 34 at 40 and § 37 at 43
(2d. ed. London 1912).
172. See Honor and Social Status, supra note 4, at 30-3 1; KIERNAN, supra note 98, at 316: "What
the duel had been for gentlemen... war was now for rulers who were infecting their peoples with the
belief that it would be shameful to surrender 'national honour' to international laws or courts."
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
"Arbitration can settle every species of difference except those in which honor and
national dignity are directly in play and which arise from a personal sentiment
which no third state can properly judge, each nation being the sole judge of its
dignity and the rights which guarantee its safety."' 173  The International Law
Association's 1893 arbitration plan accordingly distinguished arbitrable disputes
from those involving national honour and independence.174 In 1896, British Prime
Minister Lord Salisbury weighed the possibility of "establishing a system of
international arbitration for the adjustment of disputes" with the United States.
Sending to Washington the outline of a stillborn arbitration treaty, Salisbury noted:
"Neither Government is willing to accept arbitration upon issues in which the
national honour or integrity is involved."'' 75 Hardly surprising, therefore, was the
inclusion in the 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes of a provision limiting fact-finding commissions to "disputes of an
international character involving neither honour nor vital interests."' 176 Referring to
the new Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, Britain and France made
(1903) an agreement excluding from compulsory arbitration, differences affecting
"the vital interests, the independence, or the honour of the two Contracting
States."' 177 Although the Anglo-French treaty was hardly the first to exclude
disputes affecting national honour, 78 the tripartite exception--or variations
thereof-was replicated in subsequent British and French treaties with other
countries, and adopted by the United States and other States for many of the
bilateral arbitration conventions signed before the First World War. 79
L. Was Dishonour International Law's Sanction?
Lincoln's Inn barrister Mountague Bernard (1820-1882) was Professor of
173. CHARLES CALVO, 3 LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL § 1756 (5th ed., Paris 1896); See JACKSON H.
RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO § 21 at 32 (Palo Alto-London
1929).
174. See HINSLEY, supra note 81, at 138.
175. Doc. No. 12, Letter from Lord Salisbury to British Ambassador at Washington, Mar. 5, 1896,
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PROGRAM OF THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE LAID BEFORE THE
CONFERENCE BY THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT 94 (Oxford 1921).
176. Art. 9, Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Jul. 29, 1899, in 187
CTS 415. The Article 9 "honour" exception originated with Russia, see 1 INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
AMERICAN DELEGATES TO THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND THEIR OFFICIAL REPORTS 306
(James Brown Scott ed. New York 1916) [hereinafter HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES].
177. Art. 1, Agreement between France and Great Britain for the Settlement by Arbitration of
Certain Classes of Questions which may arise between the two Governments, Oct. 14, 1903, in 194
CTS 194-95.
178. For example, disputes affecting "either the national honour or the national independence" are
excluded by Article I of the Arbitration Treaty between Mexico and Spain, Jan. 11, 1902, in 190 CTS
334.
179. Re this self-judging "honour" clause, see I HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 176 at
78 and 329; HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 7, 77; for the formula applied, see Article 1,
Arbitration Convention between France and Italy, Dec. 25, 1903, in 194 CTS 365; and 206 CTS,
Article I of U.S. treaties with Mexico (288-289), Italy (354), Britain (360), Norway (363-364), Portugal
(368-369), and Spain (418-419).
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International Law and Diplomacy at Oxford University. From the perspective of
19th century international law, he opined: "Honour-which in its higher sense
means self-respect, in its lower sense respect for the opinion of a particular
class-may and does help to supply, among nations as among individuals, the
absence of those sanctions which wait upon municipal law."'180 Similarly, Yale
University President Theodore Dwight Woolsey (1801-1889) included among
international law's sanctions each State's "moral sentiment" as "a considerable and
an increasing force... which comes into the recesses of palaces and cabinets; and
which sometimes speaks in threatening tones against gross wrongs."' 8' He
believed that a whole country's population could feel the sting of a national insult,
and sense "the loss of a good name upon intercourse with other states, as well upon
that self-respect which is an important element in national character.... Without
such a value set on reputation, fear of censure could not exist, which is one of the
ultimate bulwarks of international law."'182 Sounding a more positive note, Swiss
jurist Johann Kaspar Bluntschli (1808-1881) argued: "Any State--even the most
powerful--will appreciably gain in honour before God and man, if it is found to be
loyal and sincere in its respect for and compliance with the law of nations."1
83
In 1908, U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root told the American Society of
International Law that the conduct of States was judged by "the general opinion of
the world" and that governments "dread the moral isolation created by general
adverse opinion and unfriendly feeling." This, the principal sanction of
international law, he described through comparisons with his own domestic
society, which from today's perspective appears astonishingly preoccupied with
propriety and honour-in Root's words, "social esteem and standing, power and
high place." To deter against anti-social behaviour, he downplayed the role of
"sheriff and policeman" and highlighted reputation as "nearly everything for which
men strive in life." So, in international relations, Root deprecated the sanction of
war and focused on "the power of international opinion." In essence, he believed
that States are subject to "recognized rules of right conduct," violation of which
results in discredit and debilitating ostracism--"a nation which rests under the
world's condemnation is weak, however great its material power."1
8 4
M The Rise of the Legal Paradigm
Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently remarked: "World
War I started not because countries broke their treaties, but because they fulfilled
them to the letter." His critique is that "every country was concerned above all
180. MOUNTAGUE BERNARD, FOUR LECTURES ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH DIPLOMACY
(London 1868) LECTURE IV: THE OBLIGATION OF TREATIES, at 200.
181. THEODORE DWIGHT WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §
228, at 407 (6th ed., London 1888).
182. Id. at § 18 at 17; see also §§ 81-82 at123-25.
183. Bluntschli to Moltke, Heidelberg, Christmas 1880, in REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL,
supra note 96 at 84 ("Les lois de la guerre sur terre.").
184. Elihu Root, The Sanction of International Law, in 2 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 451-57 (1908).
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with living up to formal treaty obligations rather than to an overall concept of long-
range common interest."' 85 However, the 1914-18 generation's assessment was
entirely opposite. Contemporaries were certain that failure to observe treaty
obligations-or rather the absence of international machinery to compel treaty
performance-had been the States' system's cardinal defect. 186 They saw this as
the lacuna that enabled Bethmann Hollweg to say "scrap of paper" for the 1839
London Treaty guarantying Belgium's neutrality.
117
In repudiating the discredited honour-based diplomacy of kings, the 1914-18
generation had nowhere to turn but to a legal paradigm. This was a natural reflex
because of the fundamental polarity between cultures of honour and legality.188 No
longer willing to perpetuate the ancien regime, the middle class reached for the
nearby analogies of domestic law-a realm entirely comfortable because the
centuries-old legal profession had always had a bourgeois ethos. 8 9  This
borrowing was specifically advocated by France's Prime Minister Georges
Clemenceau. He expressed solidarity "with President Wilson who, by establishing
the foundations of the League of Nations, has had the honor of transferring the
essential principles of national law into international law."'190 Lawyers-including
Wilson, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Italian Prime Minister
Vittorio Emanuele Orlando-were prominent among the League's founding
fathers and a "legal, or rather legalistic, conception of international conflict" was
embodied in the Covenant.' 9'
185. HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 211 (Simon & Schuster 1994); for the alliance system's
ossification, see Klaus Hildebrand, The Crisis of 1914, in GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM BISMARCK
TO ADENAUER 90-93 (Louise Willmot trans., London 1989); Charles S. Maier, Wargames: 1914-1919,
in THE ORIGIN AND PREVENTION OF MAJOR WARS 254 (Robert I. Rotberg & Theodore K. Rabb eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) ("It ... was not the binding nature of the alliances, but the possibility for
defection, that proved more destabilizing. Vienna and St. Petersburg sought reassurances beyond the
letter of the texts, needed demonstrative state visits, and pursued pledges of support--and, in 1914,
extracted them because Paris and Berlin feared that they would seem indifferent.").
186. See TAYLOR, supra note 151, at 535-37. For adding international sanctions to the States'
system, see HIDEMI SUGANAMI, THE DOMESTIC ANALOGY AND WORLD ORDER PROPOSALS 79-93
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
187. Bethmann Hollweg said "Just for a word 'neutrality' a word which in wartime had so often
been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation
which desired nothing better than to be friends with her." See No. 671, Letter from Sir Edward Goschen
to Sir Edward Grey, Berlin, Aug. 6, 1914, 11 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR 351,
supra note 122; DIARY OF EDWARD GOSCHEN, APPENDIX B: 'A SCRAP OF PAPER', supra note 161, at
298-302.
188. See Honour and Social Status, supra note 4, at 30-31, 510; BERNHARDI, supra note 122, at 24-
28; McAleer, supra note 90, at 30; GERMAN OFFICER-CORPS, supra note 3, at 117-38; DEAK, supra
note 98, at 128-38.
189. The "non-clerical literate profession" dated from the 13th century, see J.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 133-50 (2d. ed. London, 1979).
190. 1 THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF FOUR (MAR. 24-JUN. 28, 1919): NOTES OF THE
OFFICIAL INTERPRETER PAUL MANTOUX, MEETING XXV 193 (Arthur S. Link trans. & ed. Princeton,
1992).
191. F.S. NORTHEDGE, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: ITS LIFE AND TIMES 1920-1946 58-59 (Leicester,
1986).
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Despite, or because of, Britain's complex global position, the Foreign Office
assumed "diplomacy could solve most problems that arose in world affairs."', 92 In
this context, pre-1914 British diplomacy was exceptionally committed to the
principle of dispute settlement via arbitration. Viewing international relations as
"consciously ruled by law," the Foreign Office had a marked "respect for
legality."' 193 This characteristically British attitude, as ultimately expressed in the
League of Nations as a war aim, reminded Cambridge University historian Herbert
Butterfield (1900-1979) of the declining Habsburg Monarchy in the age of
Metternich.' 94 The meaning of this unflattering comparison is elucidated by
Kissinger's reflection: "Because law is the expression of the status quo, Austria
stood for... the necessity of law and the sanctity of treaties."'' 9 5  Such a realist
critique sees peace treaties, like those of 1815 and 1919, as the codification of the
outcome of the last hegemonic war, when the paramount power won legitimacy for
its right to rule. 196 This observation by Princeton University's Robert Gilpin is
useful alongside A.J.P. Taylor's remark that the ideological exigencies of the First
World War gradually drove the Entente Powers, "rather against their will, to the
doctrine of an international order, based upon law instead of upon force." Fighting
for survival as a Great Power, Britain in particular moved ever closer to the
doctrine of "the rule of law" as a response to Germany's astonishing strength. 197
N. Was the United States Cooler to the Legal Paradigm?
Kissinger says the premise that the States' system should be governed by
international law is a deep-rooted U.S. idea tied to the belief that the same ethical
principles should regulate relations between countries and between individuals.'9"
However, official Washington was slower than London to abandon the rhetoric of
honour for that of law. This reluctance is explained by several considerations.
First, expanding the rule of law in international affairs was less urgent for the
United States as a rising power than for Britain in decline. 199 Second, the Wilson
administration came later to detailed thinking about war aims because the United
192. KENNEDY, supra note 81, at 231.
193. Clive Parry, Foreign Policy and International Law, in BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER SIR
EDWARD GREY 109-110 (F. H. Hinsley ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1977).
194. For the League of Nations as a Mettemichian "attempt to freeze the status quo," see HERBERT
BUTTERFIELD, CHRISTIANITY, DIPLOMACY AND WAR 115-116 (Abingdon-Cokesbury Press 1953).
195. HENRY A. KISSINGER, A WORLD RESTORED: THE POLITICS OF CONSERVATISM IN A
REVOLUTIONARY Age 7 (Grosset & Dunlap 1964).
196. See GILPIN, supra note 9, at 34; BERNHARDI, supra note 122, at 25-27.
197. See TAYLOR, supra note 151, at 535-537; KENNEDY, supra note 81, at 209-215, 231;
EKSTEINS, supra note 96, at xv ("Britain was, in fact, the major conservative power of the fin-de-sicle
world. First industrial nation, agent of the Pax Britannica, symbol of an ethic of enterprise and progress
based on parliament and law, Britain felt not only her pre-eminence in the world but her entire way of
life threatened by the thrusting energy and instability Germany was seen to typify.").
198. See KiSSINGER, supra note 185, at 18, 20, 22, 30, 32-34, 45-46, 52-53, 55, 161, 222-28, 234,
247, 415, 427,438,477, 544.
199. For the United States' geopolitical position, see, KISSINGER, supra note 185, at 18, 20, 30-39;
on Britain's decline, see id. at 38; GILPIN, supra note 9, at 194-97; KENNEDY, supra note 81, at 224-32;
WILSON, supra note 151, at 70-74.
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States was neutral until April 1917. Third, the Senate's constitutional role in treaty
making taught presidents that firm commitments are less easily ratified than
undertakings with broad exceptions, such as those referring to national honour.
20 0
Wilson himself was certain the Senate would reject any treaty committing the
United States to go to war pursuant to a decision by other countries or an
international body. 20 1 Finally, Wilson-perhaps due to his sad experience as an
Atlanta lawyer-was antipathetic to the practising profession and quick to reject
legalism. 20 2 He said lawyers "as a rule immediately tie their hands or powers up in
technical legal limitations. 20 3  He told the American Commission to Negotiate
Peace: "I don't want lawyers drafting this treaty."2°
Wilson's ambivalent attitude to law must also be seen in the light of U.S.
politics. On the one side was the focus on democracy and social justice of U.S.
"progressive internationalists" like Wilson who was a Democrat; on the other side,
the legalism of "conservative internationalists" like Elihu Root and ex-President
William Howard Taft who were Republicans.20 5 Believing law to be just one of
the tools for upholding morality and realizing human progress, Wilson still
"preferred to rely upon 'diplomatic adjustment' rather than 'strict legal justice' in
resolving international disputes., 20 6 Thus, his idea for a League of Nations focused
less on devising foolproof machinery for dispute settlement and collective security
and more on opening a permanent political forum for the expression and
coordination of world public opinior--the key Wilsonian concept. 20 7 His plans
were therefore developed with non-lawyer Colonel Edward Mandell House, rather
than with Secretary of State Robert Lansing, an international lawyer whose
200. Wilson described the Senate's "treaty-marring power" in Congressional Government (1885),
reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 38-39, 130-131 (Arthur S. Link ed., Princeton
1966-1994), [hereinafter PWWI; for the Senate's role, see BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOVE, IS
NAFTA CONSTITUTIONAL? (Harvard Univ. Press 1995).
201. Letter from Wilson to Edward Mandell House, Mar. 22, 1918, 47 PWW 105, supra note 200;
William H. Taft re: Mar. 28, 1918 meeting with Wilson, id. at 200-201; for Wilson's strenuous efforts
to portray the League Covenant as a "moral, not a legal, obligation," see Conversation with Members of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Conference at the White House, Aug. 19, 1919, 62 PWW 343,
350-35 1, supra note 200.
202. MICHAEL DUNNE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT, 1920-1935 21 (St. Martin's
Press 1988); for Wilson's legal practice, see ARTHUR WALWORTH, I WOODROW WILSON 23, 34-36 (3d.
ed. WW Norton & Co. 1978); AUGUST HECKSCHER, WOODROW WILSON 58-59 (Maxwell Macmillan
International 1991); ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & JULIETrE L. GEORGE, WOODROW WILSON AND
COLONEL HOUSE: A PERSONALITY STUDY 18-20 (2d. ed., Dover Publications 1964).
203. Wilson's late 1916 words to lawyer Samuel Thompson, in latter's Jan. 15, 1917 letter asking
for Federal Trade Commission appointment, see 40 PWW 490, supra note 200.
204. Jan. 8, 1919, quoted by U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing. See 54 PWW 4, supra note
200.
205. THOMAS J. KNOCK, To END ALL WARS: WOODROW WILSON AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW
WORLD ORDER 49-69, 267-268 (Princeton Univ. Press 1992).
206. DUNNE, supra note 202, at 21.
207. Conversation with Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Conference at the
White House, Aug.19, 1919, 62 PWW 363, 372, 388-89, supra note 200.
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"legalistic opinions" were distasteful to Wilson.2 °5
Although Wilson's speeches frequently referred to international law, he never
abandoned the discourse of honour. For example, in May 1916 Wilson talked
about a "new and more wholesome diplomacy" resting on "the same high code of
honour that we demand of individuals." 2 9 His April 1917 war message to
Congress twice referred to the future world organization as a "League of
Honour., 210 Honour also featured in his July 10, 1919 explanation of the League
Covenant: "There is no provision for military action except upon advice of the
[League] Council, advice given to the several governments. Of course it follows
that the several governments will take that advice or not, as they please, and it will
be a matter of honor with them whether they will or not. There is no legal
obligation."21' However, Wilson's yardstick for measuring national honour was
democratic public opinion rather than the ancien rigime's aristocratic values.
0. Was Honour No Longer Sufficient?
As early as August 1915, Sir Edward Grey wrote to Colonel House about a
"League of Nations that could be relied on to insist that disputes between any two
nations must be settled by arbitration, mediation, or conference of others." Grey
said: "International Law has hitherto had no sanction. The lesson of this war is that
the powers must bind themselves to give it a sanction. 212 A month later, he asked
House: "Would the President propose that there should be a League of Nations
binding themselves to side against any power which broke a treaty... or which
refused, in case of dispute, to adopt some other method of settlement than that of
war?
, , 2 1 3
Grey's successor as Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour asked: "If
existing Treaties are no more than scraps of paper, can fresh treaties help us?"
Relaying to Washington, British principles for peace, Balfour in January 1917
portrayed the pre-war "community of nations" as "plentifully supplied indeed with
international laws, but with no machinery for enforcing them." His three
conditions for a durable peace included ensuring treaty compliance: "Behind
International law and behind all Treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting
hostilities some form of International sanction should be devised which would give
208. ARTHUR WALWORTH, WILSON AND HIS PEACEMAKERS: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AT THE
PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 1919 8 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1986).
209. Address to League to Enforce Peace, May 27, 1916, 37 PWW 113, supra note 200; the League
of Nations was then seen by U.S. "progressive internationalists" like Wilson as arising from stalemate
and mediation, but by Sir Edward Grey and U.S. "conservative internationalists" as a war aim realizable
via Entente victory, see KNOCK, supra note 205, at 57-58; DAVID FRENCH, BRITISH STRATEGY AND
WAR AIMS 1914-1916 190-91 (Allen & Unwin 1986).
210. Address to Joint Session of Congress, Apr. 2, 1917, 41 PWW 524, supra note 200.
211. THE COMPLETE PRESS CONFERENCES 1913-1919 (Robert C. Hildebrand ed., Princeton 1985);
50 PWW 790, supra note 200.
212. Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House, London, Aug. 10, 1915, in 2 THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF
COLONEL HOUSE 87-88 (Charles Seymour ed., Boston-New York 1926).
213. Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House, supra note 212, at 89.
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pause to the hardiest aggressor. ' ,2 14 Re-establishing "the sanctity of treaties" was
also the first of Lloyd George's three conditions for "a just and lasting peace" in
his war aims speech to the Trades Union Congress on January 5, 1918.215
The contrast between the U.S. focus on honour and the British fixation on law
became explicit in June 1918. Sharing plans for a League of Nations, House
copied to Wilson a letter written to Lord Robert Cecil, then British Minister of
Blockade. With respect to treaty obligation, House's plan stayed within pre-war
thinking by relying on dishonour as the sanction for breach of treaty:
One of the most essential features of any league seems to me to be the installation
of a moral standard such as that maintained among individuals of honor. Even
before Germany smashed the international fabric, reprehensible conduct was
condoned under the broad cover of patriotism; actions which in individuals would
have been universally condemned and the perpetrators ostracised from society. I
believe that the most vital element in bringing about a world-wide reign of peace
is to have the same stigma rest upon the acts of nations as upon the acts of
individuals. When the people of a country are held up to the scorn and
condemnation of the world because of the dishonorable acts of their
representatives, they will no longer tolerate such acts. To bring this about will not
I think be so difficult as it would seem, and when this condition is realized, a
nation may be counted upon to guard its treaty obligations with the same fidelity
as an individual guards his honor.
216
Now Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with special
responsibility for planning a League of Nations, Cecil took issue with House's
emphasis on honour:
I notice that you propose that the components of the league should make a
profession of faith to the effect that they will abide by a code of honour. I think it
would be all to the good to have such a profession included in the instrument by
which the league of peace was constructed, but I am afraid I do not think that by
itself it could be relied upon.2 17 The example of Germany in this war shows that
under the pressure of false teaching and national danger there is no crime which a
civilized nation will not commit, and the same has been found true over and over
again in history. I am convinced that unless some form of coercion can be devised
which will work more or less automatically no league of peace will endure. You
refer to the history of the civilization of individuals; but surely the great
214. Jan. 16, 1917, British Ambassador Sir Cecil Arthur Spring Rice gave U.S. Secretary of State
Robert Lansing a message which Balfour had written (Jan.13) to Rice, see 40 PWW 499-503, supra
note 200.
215. Cabled to Woodrow Wilson on Jan. 5, 1918, see 45 PWW 486, supra note 200.
216. Edward Mandell House to Lord Robert Cecil, Magnolia, Massachusetts, Jun. 25, 1918, 48
PWW 424-26, supra note 200; honour also features prominently in "Suggestion for a Covenant of a
League of Nations" sent by House to Wilson on Jul. 16, 1918, see id. at 630-637; NORTHEDGE, supra
note 191, at 31-33.
217. An echo of House's draft survived in the reference to "open, just and honourable relations
between nations" in Preamble, Covenant of the League of Nations, Part 1, Treaty of Peace between
Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers, Jun. 28, 1919, in 225 CTS 195-205.
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instrument of law and order has been the establishment of the doctrine of the
supremacy of law. So long as codes of law were only, or mainly codes of honour
or good conduct they were always disobeyed by anyone who was sufficiently
powerful to do so.-8
P. Honour Replaced by Law in 1919
As a fading theme, discourse about "honour" survived the Paris Peace
Conference. For example, France's honour was said to have been at stake in the
June 1940 discussion about whether to abandon Great Britain and make a separate
peace with Germany. 219  But, after 1919-20 "honour" was largely vestigial,
because-as told to the German delegation at the Paris Peace Conference-"the
old era is to be left behind and nations as well as individuals are to be brought
beneath the reign of law., 220 The Covenant of the League of Nations became part
of each one of the 1919-20 peace treaties, which as a body established a new
international order abandoning the old chivalric archetype for the paradigm of
domestic law. Domestic legal systems were the model for the Covenant's four
interrelated innovations: "international peace and security"; a duty to seek peaceful
settlement of international disputes; efforts to make treaties legally binding; and
restraints on recourse to war.
First, Covenant provisions went a long way toward abrogating "privity of
conflict"-i.e. the customary rule that a non-belligerent third party had no right to
interfere (locus standi) in a bilateral international dispute.22' This was replaced by
an entirely new juridical concept called "international peace and security"-a
communitarian idea which insisted that "any war or threat of war, whether
immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared
a matter of concern to the whole League. 222  The "peace of Europe" and the
"general peace" had featured in earlier treaties.223 However, past references to
"peace" pointed principally to the literal absence of war, in connection with the
legal states of war and peace, then recognized by both international and domestic
law.224 By contrast, the Covenant envisaged "international peace" both literally as
218. Lord Robert Cecil to Edward Mandell House, London, Jul. 22, 1918, 49 PWW 226, supra
note 200.
219. WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE COLLAPSE OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FALL OF
FRANCE IN 1940 829, 831 (Simon and Schuster 1969).
220. Letter to the President of the German Delegation covering the Reply of the Allied and
Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace, Jun. 16,
1919, 112 BRITISH FOREIGN AND STATE PAPERS 248.
221. Elihu Root to Edward Mandell House, Clinton, New York, August 16, 1918, 49 PWW 269,
supra note 200, read by President Wilson on Aug. 18, 1918.
222. See Article 11, Covenant of the League of Nations.
223. For "the general Peace of Europe," see Preamble, Treaty between Great Britain and Prussia,
Jan. 16, 1756, in 40 CTS 293, and Preamble, Treaty between Great Britain and Prussia, Apr. 11, 1758,
in 41 CTS 18; "the General peace," Art. 1, Treaty of Alliance between Austria, Great Britain, Prussia
and Russia, Mar. 25, 1815, in 64 CTS 32; "the maintenance of the general peace," Preamble and Title I,
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224. Helmut Rumpf, The Concepts of Peace and War in International Law, in 27 GERMAN
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the absence of violence and figuratively as the name for the League of Nations'
new jurisdiction, consciously modeled on the "King's peace" of the early English
Common Law.225
Second, the Covenant placed strong emphasis on seeking peaceful settlement
of international disputes. There was to be the possibility of political settlement by
the League Council and Assembly, and of resolution of justiciable disputes by
binding third-party arbitration, including determinations by a new Permanent Court
of International Justice, which began operating in 1922.26 During the first decade
of its existence, this Court did important work which sustained an "element of
,,22'idealism about the role of third party dispute settlement processes.
Third, efforts to make treaties legally binding were encouraged by the
memory that Germany's 1914 invasion of Belgium had been a treaty
violation-for Great Britain the casus belli. Although former German Emperor
William II ultimately succeeded in staying in exile in Holland, the Versailles
Treaty created an important precedent by demanding that he personally stand trial
"for a supreme offence against the sanctity of treaties."228 Moreover, the Covenant
called for "scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations." Because President
Wilson wanted foreign relations democratized and subject to popular control, his
Fourteen Points decreed that diplomacy "must proceed always frankly and in the
public view." The treaties ending the war were to be "open covenants of peace,
openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings
of any kind. 22 9 Implementation was via the Covenant stipulation that no treaty
was to be "binding" unless registered with the Secretariat which had to publish a
comprehensive League of Nations Treaty Series.30 Wilson argued that this "open
diplomacy" would enable citizens to follow foreign affairs and monitor State
compliance with international law.2 3 ' Moreover, the 1920 Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice broke new ground by giving the treaty primacy
among the sources of international law-before custom, general principles of law,
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 429-43 (1984).
225. Parliamentary Papers, 1919, Cmd. 151, 12-19; FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND,
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Publ. 1973).
227. SHABTAI ROSENNE, BREACH OF TREATY 9 (Grotius Publ. Ltd. 1985).
228. Versailles Treaty, at art. 227; see also JAMES WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE
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judicial decisions, and the teachings of publicists. 23 2 As an international legal
device, the treaty had clearly risen since 1914, when Bethmann Hollweg had made
his disparaging remark about a "scrap of paper."
Fourth, the League sought to place some international disciplines on a State's
right to wage war, recourse to which had been largely unregulated by the
international law of 1914.233 The strong condemnation of Germany's "criminal"
behaviour was largely ex postfacto-more the cause of international law than its
result. 234 Launching the First World War was by 1919 retroactively judged to have
been a criminal act because of a visceral conviction rooted in the superadded
horrors of 20th century war: "In the view of the Allied and Associated Powers, the
war which began on August 1, 1914, was the greatest crime against humanity and
the freedom of peoples that any nation, calling itself civilised, has ever consciously
committed.",235 The Allies "regard this war as a crime deliberately plotted against
the life and liberties of the peoples of Europe. 236 King George V wrote about his
cousin William II: "I look upon him as the greatest criminal known for having
plunged the world into this ghastly war" and, in conversation with President
Wilson, the King referred to "that unspeakable Kaiser whose crimes have
scandalized the entire world. 237 Elihu Root said the Habsburg and Hohenzollern
rulers were "unrepentant professional criminals"; Supreme Allied Commander
Ferdinand Foch looked on the German military as "an army of scientific and
convinced hooligans"; and Wilson thought Germany an "outlaw nation."238
In a letter underlined by Wilson, Root specifically pointed to domestic
criminal law as the source for the new international order:
If I make a contract with you and you break it, it is no business of our neighbour.
You can sue me or submit, and he has nothing to say about it. On the other hand,
if I assault and batter you, every neighbour has an interest in having me arrested
and punished, because his own safety requires that violence shall be restrained. At
the basis of every community, lies the idea of organization to preserve the peace.
232. On the Article 38 hierarchy, SEE CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (Manchester Univ. Press 1965); SIR IAN M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
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234. Fritz Dickmann, Die Kriegsschuldfrage auf der Friedenskonferenz von Paris 1919, in 197
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FRAGE 1914 99-100 (Imanuel Geiss ed., Frankfurt 1967).
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Without that idea really active and controlling there can be no community of
individuals or of nations.
2 3 9
In this vein, the Covenant established machinery to help League Members
deal with wars of aggression. Moreover, State responsibility for the commission of
an offence was written into the leading article on "reparation" in the treaty with
each one of the defeated Central Powers. Germany, Austria, and Hungary were
compelled to "accept" that their "aggression" had "imposed" the war on the
Allies.2 40 Bulgaria and Turkey were made to recognize that they had joined a "war
of aggression which Germany and Austria-Hungary waged against the Allied and
Associated Powers.",2 41  The 1919-20 peace treaties thus began modem
international law's progressive stigmatization of the "war of aggression" which
was ultimately criminalized by the 1945 Charter of the Nuremberg International
Military Tribunal, which instituted individual responsibility for "crimes against
peace."
24 2
Q. League ofNations' Discourse on Hitler 's "Sports Palace" Diplomacy
The United Nations International Law Commission in the 1960s used
Sportpalast Diplomatie for German Chancellor Adolf Hitler's "repeated, flagrant,
and at times violent instances of deliberate breaches of treaty, not as a matter of
minor administrative failing or of unanticipated judicial pronouncement, but as a
matter of major politics conducted at the highest level and publicized through the
mass media., 2 43 As foreshadowed in his 1925 book Mein Kampf, Hitler sought to
break free of "the chains of the Versailles Treaty" and destroy the European order
erected at the Paris Peace Conference.2 4 4 Calculated acts toward this end were his
March 16, 1935 decree establishing universal military service to create a 550,000
man German army, and the March 7, 1936 German military occupation of the
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Rhineland-both measures violating the Versailles Treaty; the latter also contrary
to the 1925 Locarno Pact. 245 "Restoring the German people's honour" was Hitler's
246
oft-repeated theme for domestic consumption. However, there was no honour-
based argument in the very extensive League discussions about Germany's treaty
violations. In this League context, there were two tangential references to
"honour," both referring to the Rhineland. First, Hitler's favourite foreign policy
expert, Joachim von Ribbentrop justified the occupation before the Council with
long "legal and practical political" arguments. However, he celebrated the
"restoration of the sovereignty of the Reich over its whole territory," saying, "a
heavy moral and political burden has been removed from the German people,
which now at last. . . sees itself re-established in honour and freedom. 247 A sour
note on honour, by contrast, sounded from France's Prime Minister Ldon Blum
who assured the Assembly: "We have attacked the spirit of war, by which I mean
those age-old conceptions of policy, morality and collective honour which were the
justification of war."
248
Reacting to Germany's unilateral denunciation of the arms limitation
provisions of the Versailles Treaty, diplomats said nothing to the Council about
"honour" or "dishonour." Instead, they portrayed Germany's glaring treaty breach
as a legal violation within the context of the League system. For example,
France's Foreign Minister Pierre Laval said: "The peoples of the world know that
respect for plighted faith... is not only a moral principle but is the living law of
the League of Nations.,2 49 He affirmed France's devotion to the League which he
recognized as "the highest international authority" which has "declared that no
country can repudiate its international undertakings. and has envisaged a more
effective repression of such infractions of international law in the future."
250
Czechoslovakia's Foreign Minister Edvard Beneg said: "All organised and
civilised human society must be based on that most fundamental principle of
international law: pacta sunt servanda. Without this principle, the League of
Nations would cease to have any meaning, any foundations, or any possibility of
working normally."'25' After echoing these sentiments, Soviet Foreign Minister
245. Germany's military forces were limited to 100,000 men by Versailles Treaty, Article 163. The
Rhineland could be neither fortified nor occupied by German military forces by virtue of Versailles
Treaty, Articles 42-43, "collectively and severally" guaranteed by the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee
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Maxim Litvinov compared the international community to a town, and countries to
individual townsmen:
Let us suppose that in a certain town private citizens are allowed to carry arms.
Theoretically this right should be extended to all the inhabitants of such a town.
Should, however, any citizen publicly threaten his fellow-townsmen.., the
municipality is scarcely likely to hasten to issue to such a citizen a licence to carry
firearms, or quietly to tolerate his furnishing himself with such arms by illegal
252
means.
Using the same metaphor, Spain's Ambassador Salvador de Madariaga added:
"The important thing when a man in the street carries a revolver is not to know
what is its caliber or even if he has other weapons in his pocket, but to know
whether he is a policeman or a criminal." He believed that each country should
have "equality in the right to possess armaments" but also "in the duty of utilising
them in a legal, a juridical manner within the framework of a civilised society., 253
Reacting to Germany's unilateral remilitarization of the Rhineland, French
Foreign Minister Pierre-ttienne Flandin pleaded violations of the Versailles and
Locarno treaties and told the Council that "the law should be applied., 25 4 He
argued that "under international law, no one has the right to take the law into his
own hands" and offered to have the dispute "settled by the highest international
court--namely, the Permanent Court of International Justice, which is placed
under the highest authority of the League of Nations., 255 In the same vein, Prime
Minister Blum told the Assembly: "Two breaches of international law have been
committed--the breach of the Covenant and the breach of a solemn Treaty. Both
have resulted in a defacto situation that is contrary to law. 256 A similar juridical
vein marked British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's address to the Council:
A patent and incontestable breach of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles
relating to the demilitarised zone has been committed. [... ] The question before
us does not concern a few Powers only. It is of concern to all who value the
sanctity of treaty undertakings and the reign of law in international affairs.25 7
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CONCLUSION
The 1935-36 League of Nations' response to Hitler's unilateral denunciation
of key treaty provisions reminds us that, from 1919, discourse in the international
States' system occurred principally inside, a largely new, law-based matrix which
was consciously antithetic to aristocratic honour. The diplomacy of the preceding
centuries had imagined the State as a gentleman with a highly developed sense of
honour, readily vindicated on the battlefield. After the First World War, League of
Nations diplomacy tended to view the State as a middle-class citizen in a world
community, governed by law and committed to the peaceful settlement of
international disputes. This Wilsonian Weltanschauung may have appeared
somewhat naive from the standpoint of 1939, when there had to be amazement at
the prescient realism of Marshall Foch, who in 1919 had known that the Versailles
Treaty was just a twenty years' truce.15 Today, however, Woodrow Wilson seems
the greater prophet, because his compelling vision is consistent with long-term
historical trends showing victories for liberal democratic States which, by their
nature, do not wage war against each other.259 In this light, the abandonment of the
rhetoric of honour can be seen as a healthy step away from the warlike ethos of
aristocratic societies which, at very great cost, inordinately emphasized ideas of
greatness and glory.
258. See MANN, supra note 114, at 903.
259. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 5, at 262-265.

THE NEWLY EXPANDED AMERICAN DOCTRINE
OF PREEMPTION: CAN IT INCLUDE
ASSASSINATION?
LOUIS RENt BERES*
On September 20, 2002, President Bush issued the National Security Strategy of
the United States of America ("National Security Strategy").' Expanding this
country's right of preemption in foreign affairs - a right known formally as
"anticipatory self-defense" under international law2 - the new American doctrine
asserts, inter alia, that "[t]raditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a
terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of
innocents...."' The doctrine goes on: "We must adapt the concept of imminent
threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. ' 4 This "adaptation"
means nothing less than striking first where an emergent threat to the United States is
presumed to be unacceptable.5
Might the broadened right of preemption include assassination? Normally we
think of preemptive strikes in terms of military operations against enemy forces and/or
6infrastructures. Moreover, there are substantial prohibitions of assassination in
domestic and international law 7 that would seem prima facie to rule out this use of
* Professor of International Law, Department of Political Science, Purdue University. Ph. D., Princeton,
1971. This article by Professor Beres was completed shortly before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
1. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssl html [hereinafter National Security Strategy].
2. See Louis Rend Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel, Preemption and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13
Hous. J. INT'L L. 259, 262 (1991); Louis Rend Beres, Afier the SCUD Attacks: Israel, "Palestine, " and
Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 71,76 (1992); Louis Rend Beres, Israel and Anticipatory
Self-Defense, 8 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 89, 90 (1991); Louis Rend Beres, Preserving the Third Temple:
Israel's Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International Law, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 11, 115
(1993); and Louis Rend Beres, Striking "First": Israel's Post-Gulf War Options Under International Law,
14 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1,6 (1991).
3. National Security Strategy, supra note 1, at 15.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. See Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, S. 735, 104th Cong. § 201(4) (1995). "The
President should use all necessary means, including covert action and military force, to disrupt, dismantle
and destroy infrastructures used by international terrorists, including terrorist training facilities and safe
havens." Id.
7. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, international law forms part of the law of
the United States. This incorporation is reaffirmed and broadened by various Supreme Court decisions. See
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (Edwards, J., concurring) (dismissing the action, but making several
references to domestic jurisdiction over extraterritorial offenses), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Von
Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 (1985) (stating that the "concept of extraordinary judicial
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force as an expression of anticipatory self-defense. Yet, when we examine the issues
purposefully and dispassionately, it could well turn out that assassination would be the
most humane and useful form of preemption. If this is indeed the case, we must now
get beyond any deep-seated visceral objections to a reasoned and careful comparison
with all other preemption options. To be sure, assassination is not "nice," but neither
is full-scale war.
8
International law is not a suicide pact. The right of self defense by forestalling
an attack was already established by Hugo Grotius in Book II of The Law of War and
Peace in 1625. 9 Recognizing the need for present danger'l and threatening behavior
that is "imminent in point of time,"'"1 Grotius indicates that self defense is to be
permitted not only after an attack has already been suffered but also in advance, where
the deed may be anticipated.' 2 Or as he says a bit further on in the same chapter, "It is
permissible to kill him who is making ready to kill ....
We may recall also Samuel Von Pufendorf s argument in his On the Duty of
Man and Citizen According to Natural Law:
[W]here it is quite clear that the other is already planning an attack upon me, even
though he has not yet fully revealed his intentions, it will be permitted at once to
begin forcible self-defense, and to anticipate him who is preparing mischief,
provided there be no hope that, when admonished in a friendly spirit, he may put
off his hostile temper; or if such admonition be likely to injure our cause. Hence
he is to be regarded as the aggressor, who first conceived the wish to injure, and
prepared himself to carry it out. But the excuse of self-defense will be his, who by
quickness shall overpower his slower assailant. And for defense, it is not required
that one receive the first blow, or merely avoid and parry those aimed at him.14
But what particular strategies and tactics may be implemented as appropriate
instances of anticipatory self-defense? Might they even include assassination?
5
jurisdiction over acts in violation of significant international standards has also been embodied in the
principle of 'universal' violations of international law.").
8. Note: Ubi cessat remedium ordinarium, ibi decurritur ad extraordinarium: "Where the ordinary
remedy fails, recourse must be had to an extraordinary one." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1520 (6th ed.
1990).
9. HUGO GROTIUs, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press
1925) (1625).
10. See id. at 173.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 176.
14. SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW
32 (Frank Gardner Moore trans., Oxford University Press 1927) (1673).
15. Jurisprudentially, of course, it would also be reasonable to examine assassination as a possible
form of ordinary self-defense, i.e., as a forceful measure of self-help short of war that is undertaken after
an armed attack occurs. Tactically, however, there are at least two serious problems with such an
examination: (1) In view of the ongoing proliferation of extraordinarily destructive weapons technologies,
waiting to resort to ordinary self-defense could be very dangerous or even fatal; and (2) assassination,
while it may prove helpful in preventing an attack in the first place, is far less likely to be useful in
mitigating further harm once an attack has already been launched.
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Understood as tyrannicide, 16  assassination has sometimes been acceptable under
international law (e.g., Aristotle's Politics, Plutarch's Lives, and Cicero's De
Officiis).17  But we are concerned here not with the international law of human
rights,' 8 but rather with those equally peremptory rights' 9 of legitimate self-defense
20
16. Without appropriate criteria of differentiation, judgments concerning tyrannicide are inevitably
personal and subjective. The hero of Albert Camus' The Just Assassins, Ivan Kaliayev, a fictional
adaptation of the assassin of the Grand Duke Sergei, says that he threw bombs, not at humanity, but at
tyranny. How shall he be judged? Seneca is reputed to have said that no offering can be more agreeable to
God than the blood of a tyrant. But, who is to determine authoritatively that a particular leader is indeed a
tyrant? Dante confined the murderers of Julius Caesar to the very depths of hell, but the Renaissance
rescued them and the Enlightenment even made them heroes. In the 16th century, tyrannicide became a
primary issue in the writings of the Monarchomachs, a school of mainly French Protestant writers. The
best-known of their pamphlets was Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, published in 1579 under the pen name of
Junius Brutus, probably Duplessis Momay, who was a political advisor to the King ofNavarre.
The most well-known British works on tyrannicide are GEORGE BUCHANAN, DE JURE REGNI APUD
SCOTOS (1597) and EDWARD SExBY, KILLING No MURDER (1657). Juan de Mariana, in The King and the
Education of the King, says:
[Bloth the philosophers and theologians agree, that the prince who seizes the state with force and arms, and
with no legal right, no public, civic approval, may be killed by anyone and deprived of his life and position.
Since he is a public enemy and, afflicts his fatherland with every evil, since truly, and in a proper sense, he
is clothed with the title and character of tyrant, he may be removed by any means and gotten rid of by as
much violence as he used in seizing his power.
JUAN DE MARIANA, THE KING AND THE EDUCATION OF THE KING 147 (George Albert Moore trans.,
Country Dollar Press 1948) (1599).
17. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS BOOK V, PLUTARCH, LIVES VI, AND CICERO, DE OFFICIIS, reprinted in
THE TERRORISM READER: A HISTORICAL ANTHOLOGY 10-13, 16-19 (Water Laqueur ed., 1978).
18. See Universal Declarations of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(Ill), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th
plen. mtg. at 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights];
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S.
221; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (this Convention
should be read in conjunction with the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Dec. 16, 1966, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267); Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T.
1909, T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1961); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967); American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36 at !, O.A.S. Off. Rec.
OEA/Ser. LJV/1. 23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), 9 1.L.M. 673 (1970).
19. According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "[A] peremptory norm
of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 22, 1969, at art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), 8 1.L.M. 679.
20. The right of self-defense should not be confused with reprisal. Although both are commonly
known as measures of self-help short of war, an essential difference lies in their respective purpose.
Taking place after the harm has already been experienced; reprisals are punitive in character and cannot be
undertaken for protection. Self-defense, on the other hand, is by its very nature intended to mitigate harm.
The problem of reprisal as a rationale for the permissible use of force by states is identified in the U.N.
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States: "States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force." Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in
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and national self-protection.
ASSASSINATION WHERE NO STATE OF WAR EXISTS
Normally, of course, the authoritative presumption obtains that assassination of
officials in other states represents an incontrovertible violation of international law.2'
Where no state of war exists, such assassination would likely exhibit the crime of
aggression and/or the crime of terrorism. 22 Regarding aggression, Article 1 of the
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression defines this crime, inter alia, as "the use
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of
the United Nations, as set out in this Definition. 23
In view of the jus cogens norm of nonintervention 24 codified in the U.N. Charter
that would ordinarily be violated by transnational assassination, such killing would
generally qualify as aggression. Moreover, assuming that transnational assassination
constitutes an example of "armed force," the criminalization, as aggression, of such
activity, may also be extrapolated from Article 2 of the Definition of Aggression:
The First use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall
constitute primafacie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security Council
may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of
aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant
circumstances .... 25
Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) [hereinafter Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States]. For the most part, the prohibition of
reprisal can be deduced from the broad regulation of force found at Article 2(4), the obligation to settle
disputes peacefully at Article 2(3) and the general limiting of permissible force by states to self-defense.
21. See generally Bert Brandenburg, The Legality of Assassination as an Aspect of Foreign
Policy, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 655, 661 (1986) (discussing the international implications of the assassination
of a foreign leader).
22. Jordan J. Paust offers the rather novel argument that the assassination of a political official is not,
by itself, an act of terrorism, but becomes terroristic only where it is designed to "produce intense fear or
anxiety." See Jordan J. Paust, Aggression Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression Politicide and
Other Crimes Against Human Rights, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 283,299 (1986) [hereinafter Aggression
Against Authority]. See also Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism
and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSLI and the Act of State
Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 192-93 (1983) [hereinafter Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial
Acts]; Jordan J. Paust, Response to Terrorism: A Prologue to Decision Concerning Private Measures of
Sanction, 12 STAN. J. INT'L. STUD. 79,81 (1977) [Response to Terrorism].
23. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710 [hereinafter Resolution on the
Definition of Aggression].
24. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. See also Declaration on Principles of International Law
Conceming Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, supra note 20; Annex to United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of Oct. 24, 1970, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Annexes, Supp. No.
28., at 122-23, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131
(XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966).
25. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, supra note 23, at art. 2 (emphasis added). Strictly
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In the absence of belligerency, assassination of officials in one state upon the
orders of another state might also be considered as terrorism. 26 Although it never
entered into force because of a lack of sufficient ratifications, the Convention for the
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 27 warrants consideration and consultation.
28
Inasmuch as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 29 is normally taken as
a convention on terrorism, its particular prohibitions on assassination are also relevant
here. After defining "internationally protected person" at Article 1 of the Convention,
Article 2 identifies as a crime, inter alia, "The intentional commission of: (a) a
speaking, the language of Article 2 stipulates that where the first use of force by a State is not "in
contravention of the Charter" as determined by the Security Council, it could be construed as permissible
or even as law-enforcing. In principle, such a determination might even concern assassination, although -
as a practical matter - it is virtually inconceivable.
26. For current conventions in force concerning terrorism, see Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14,
1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 13 I.L.M. 43 (1974) [hereinafter Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents];
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500
U.N.T.S. 95; Convention on Offences and Certain Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft (Tokyo Convention), Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, 20 U.S.T. 2941; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641;
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal
Convention), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,
Dec. 17, 1979G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. G.A Off. Rec. 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46;
European Convention of the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90. On December 9,
1985, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution condemning all acts of terrorism as
"criminal." Never before had the General Assembly adopted such a comprehensive resolution on this
question. Yet, the issue of particular acts that actually constitute terrorism was left largely unaddressed,
except for acts such as hijacking hostage-taking and attacks on internationally protected persons that were
criminalized by previous custom and conventions. See United Nation Resolution on Terrorism, G.A. Res.
40/61, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 301, U.N. Doe. A/40/53 (1985).
27. See Louis Rend Beres, Assassinating Saddam: The View from International Law, at
http://www.tzemach.org/fyi/docs/beres/saddam.htm. In the 19th century, a principle of granting asylum
to those whose crimes were "political" was established in Europe and in Latin America. This principle is
known as the "political offense exception" to extradition. But a specific exemption from the protection of
the political offense exception-in effect, an exception to the exception-was made for the assassins of
heads of state and for attempted regicides. At the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Repression of
Terrorism, the murder of a head of state, or of any family member of a head of state, was formally
designated as a criminal act of terrorism. Id. (emphasis added).
The so-called attentat clause, which resulted from an attempt on the life of French Emperor Napoleon I11,
and later widened in response to the assassination of President James Garfield in the United States, limited
the political offense exception in international law to preserve social order. Murder of a head of state or
members of the head of state's family was thus designated as a common crime, and this designation has
been incorporated into Article 3 of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition. Yet, we are always
reminded of the fundamental and ancient right to tyrannicide, especially in the post-Holocaust/post-
Nuremberg world order. It follows that one could argue persuasively under international law that the right
to tyrannicide is still overriding and that the specific prohibitions in international treaties are not always
binding.
28. See 19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 23 (1938); League of Nations Doc. C.546() M.383(1) 1937 V
(1938).
29. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, supra note 26.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally
,,30protected person.
The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 31 reinforces the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons. According to Article l(c) of this Convention, one of the
constituent crimes of terror violence is "a serious offense involving an attack against
the life, physical integrity or liberty of internationally protected persons, including
,,32diplomatic agents. And, according to Article 1(e), another constituent terrorist
crime is "an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm
or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons. 33
ASSASSINATION WHERE STATE OF WAR EXISTS
When a condition of war exists between states, transnational assassination is
normally considered as a war crime under international law.34 According to Article
23(b) of the regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV of October 18, 1907,
respecting the laws and customs of war on land: "[I]t is especially forbidden.., to kill
or wound treacherously, individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army. '3 5 The
U.S. Army Field Manual, The Law of Land Warfare (1956), which has incorporated
this prohibition, authoritatively links Hague Article 23(b) to assassination at
Paragraph 31: "This article is construed as prohibiting assassination, proscription or
outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a
reward for an enemy 'dead or alive.' 36 Whether or not a particular state has followed
a comparable form of incorporation, it is certainly bound by the Hague codification
and by the 1945 Nuremberg judgment that the rules found in the Hague regulations
had entered into customary international law as of 193 9.37
30. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, supra note 26, at art. 2(l)(a).
31. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 10, 1976, T.S. No. 90, 15 I.L.M.
1272 (1976).
32. Id. at art. 1, para. c.
33. Id. at art. 1, para. e.
34. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land with Annex of Regulations, Oct.
18, 1907,36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, art. 23(b).
35. Id.
36. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, FIELD MANUAL No. 27-10,
at 17 (1956).
37. Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice describes international custom
as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law." U.N. CHARTER art. 38(1)(b). In this connection, the
essential significance of a norm's customary character under international law is that the norm binds even
those states that are not parties to the pertinent codifying instrument or convention. Indeed, with respect to
the bases of obligation under international law, even where a customary norm and a norm restated in treaty
form are apparently identical, the norms are treated as separate and discrete. During the merits phase of
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
stated that, "[E]ven if two norms belonging to two sources of international law appear identical in content,
and even if the States in question are bound by these rules both on the level of treaty-law and on that of
customary international law, these norms retain a separate existence." The Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 178 (1986).
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There is, however, a contrary argument. Here the position is offered that enemy
officials, as long as they are operating within the military chain of command, are
combatants and not enemies hors de combat.3 8  It follows, by this reasoning
(reasoning, incidentally, which was accepted widely with reference to the question of
assassinating Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War), that certain enemy officials
are lawful targets, and that assassination of enemy leaders is permissible so long as it
displays respect for the laws of war.3 9 As for the position codified at Article 23(b) of
Hague Convention IV, which is also part of customary international law, this contrary
argument, in practice, has simply paid it no attention.
In principle, adherents of the argument that assassination of enemy officials in
wartime may be permissible could offer two possible bases ofjurisprudential support:
(1) they could argue that such assassination does not evidence behavior designed "to
kill or wound treacherously" as defined at Hague Article 23(b); and/or (2) they could
argue that there is a "higher" or jus cogens obligation to assassinate in particular
circumstances that transcends and overrides pertinent treaty prohibitions. 4 ' "To argue
the first position would focus primarily on a 'linguistic' solution; to argue the second
would be to return to the historic natural law origins of international law.",
42
But even if one or both of these positions could be argued persuasively, the
conclusion would, by definition, have nothing to do with anticipatory self-defense.
Because assassination during wartime can not be a measure of self help short of war,
its "legality must be appraised solely according to the settled laws of war., 43  It
follows that any assassination of enemy officials in another state may be a lawful
instance of anticipatory self-defense only in those cases wherein the target person(s)
represents states with which there is no recognized belligerency.
44
Moreover, in many states, customary international law is binding and self-executing but an act of the
legislature is required to transform conventional law into internal law.
38. Louis Rend Beres, Iraqi Crimes and International Law: The Imperative to Punish, 21 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 335,354 (1992) (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 354-355.
41. Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
42. Id. The idea of natural law is based upon the acceptance of certain principles of right and justice
that prevail because of their own intrinsic merit. Eternal and immutable, they are external to all acts of
human will and interpenetrate all human reason. This idea and its attendant tradition of human civility runs
continuously from Mosaic Law and the ancient Greeks and Romans to the present day. For a
comprehensive and far-reaching assessment of the natural law origins of international law, see Louis Rend
Beres, Justice and Realpolitik: International Law and the Prevention of Genocide, 33 AM. J. JURJS. 123
(1988) [hereinafter Justice and Realpolitik]. This article was adapted from a presentation at the
International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide, Tel-Aviv, Israel, June 1982.
43. Louis Rend Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination During Peace and
War, 5 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 231, 237 (1992) [hereinafter Permissibility of State-Sponsored
Assassination].
44. Under international law, the generic question of whether or not a state of war actually exists
between states may be somewhat ambiguous. Traditionally, it was held that a formal declaration of war
was a necessary condition before "formal" war could be said to exist. Hugo Grotius, for example, divided
wars into declared wars, which were legal, and undeclared wars, which were not. See HUGO GROTIUs, 3
THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, at ch. iii, V and XI (The Legal Classics Library 1984) (1646). By the
beginning of the twentieth century, the position that war obtains only after a conclusive declaration of war
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ASSASSINATION AS LAW ENFORCEMENT AMONG STATES NOT AT WAR
The customary right of anticipatory self defense has its modem origins in the
Caroline incident, which concerned the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper
Canada against British rule (a rebellion that aroused sympathy and support in the
American border states).4  Following this case, "the serious threat of armed attack
has generally been taken to justify militarily defensive action., 46 "In an exchange of
diplomatic notes between the governments of the United States and Great Britain,
then U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self defense
which did not require an actual attack.' '47 "Here, military response to a threat was
judged permissible so long as the danger posed was 'instant, overwhelming, leaving
no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."4
8
"Today, some scholars argue that the [customary] right of anticipatory self
defense articulated by the Caroline has been overridden by the specific language of
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter."'49 In this view, Article 51 fashions a new, and far
more restrictive, statement of self defense, one that relies on the literal qualification
contained at Article 51 "if an armed attack occurs."' This interpretation ignores that
international law cannot compel a state to wait until it absorbs a devastating or even
lethal first strike before acting to protect itself.5 1 The argument against the restrictive
view of self defense is reinforced by the apparent weaknesses of the Security Council
in offering collective security against an aggressor, and, of course, by the National
Security Strategy.
Of course, whether or not assassination would qualify as law-enforcing
anticipatory self-defense in a particular instance could be a largely subjective
judgment, and may also be affected by municipal law.52 Moreover, before any state
by one of the parties, was codified by Hague Convention Ill. More precisely, this convention stipulated
that hostilities must not commence without "previous and explicit warning" in the form of a declaration of
war or an ultimatum. See Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities (Hague III), Oct. 18, 1907, art.
1, 36 Stat. 2259, 2271, 3 NRGT, 3 series, 437. Currently, of course, declaration of war may be tantamount
to declarations of international criminality (because of the criminalization of aggression by authoritative
international law), and it could be a jurisprudential absurdity to tie a state of war to formal declarations of
belligerency. It follows that a state of war may exist without formal declarations, but only if there is an
armed conflict between two or more states and/or at least one of these states considers itself at war.
45. The Caroline was an American steamboat accused of running arms to Canadian rebels. A
Canadian military force crossed over into the United States and set the ship ablaze, killing an American
citizen in the process. A Canadian was arrested in New York for the murder, and the British government
protested. See JOHN B. MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 409-14 (1906).
46. Louis Rend Beres, Implications of a Palestinian State for Israeli Security and Nuclear War: A
Jurisprudential Assessment, 17 DICK. 1. INT'L L. 229, 283 (1999) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
Implications of a Palestinian State].
47. Id.
48. 1d; Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox, April, 1841, in 29 British and Foreign State Papers 1129, 1138
(1840-41).
49. Implications of a Palestinian State, supra note 46, at 283.
50. Id.; U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
51. Implications of a Palestinian State, supra note 46, at 283.
52. Under U.S. law. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
(2002) ("Prohibition on Assassination: No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States
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could persuasively argue any future instances of anticipatory self defense under
international law, including assassination, a strong case would have to be made that it
had first sought to exhaust peaceful means of settlement. Even a broad view of the
doctrine of anticipatory self defense does not relieve a state of the obligations codified
at Article I and at Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter.
5 3
These obligations notwithstanding, we must return to the primary understanding
that international law is not a suicide pact, especially in an age of uniquely destructive
weaponry. The advent of the nuclear age may make it a form of suicide for a state to
wait for an actual act of aggression to occur. 4  Recognizing this, Wolfgang
Friedmann argued as follows long before today's growing threat of "rogue states" and
weapons of mass destruction:
The judgment as to when to resort to such [preemptive] measures now places an
almost unimaginable burden of responsibility upon the leaders of the major
Powers. But while this immensely increases the necessity for a reliable
international detection organisation and mechanism, in the absence of effective
international machinery the right of self-defence must probably now be extended
to the defence against a clearly imminent aggression, despite the apparently
contrary language of Article 51 of the Charter.
5
In somewhat similar fashion, Myres McDougal argued:
The more important limitations imposed by the general community upon this
customary right of self defense have been, in conformity with the overriding
policy it serves of minimizing coercion and violence across states lines, those of
necessity and proportionality. The conditions of necessity required to be shown
by the target state have never, however, been restricted to "actual armed attack";
imminence of attack of such high degree as to preclude effective resort by the
intended victim to non-violent modalities of response has always been regarded as
sufficient justification, and it is now generally recognized that a determination of
imminence requires an appraisal of the total impact of an initiating state's coercive
activities upon the target state's expectations about the costs of preserving its
territorial integrity and political independence. Even the highly restrictive
language of Secretary of State Webster in the Caroline case, specifying a
"necessity of self defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and
no moment for deliberation," did not require "actual armed attack," and the
understanding is now widespread that a test formulated in the previous century for
a controversy between two friendly states is hardly relevant to contemporary
controversies, involving high expectations of violence, between nuclear-armed
protagonists.
56
Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.").
53. U.N. CHARTER art. I and art. 2, para. 3.
54. Louis Ren6 Beres, In a Dark Time: The Expected Consequences of an India-Pakistan Nuclear
War, 14 Ai. U. INT'L L. REv. 497, 517 (1998).
55. WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 260 (1964),
cited by Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 933 (1980).
56. See Myres McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597,
598 (1963), cited in JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND
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But we are still left with the problem of demonstrating that assassination can be
construed, at least under certain very limited circumstances, as an appropriate instance
of anticipatory self-defense. To an extent, the enhanced permissibility of anticipatory
self-defense that follows generally from the growing destructiveness of current
weapons technologies in rogue hands may be paralleled by the enhanced
permissibility of assassination as a particular preemptive strategy. Indeed, where
assassination as anticipatory self-defense may actually prevent a nuclear or other
highly-destructive form of warfare, reasonableness dictates that it would represent
distinctly or even especially law-enforcing behavior.
Of course, for this to be the case, a number of particular conditions would need
to be satisfied. First, the assassination itself would have to be limited to the greatest
extent possible to those authoritative persons in the prospective attacking state.
Second, the assassination would have to conform to all of the settled rules of warfare
as they concern discrimination, proportionality and military necessity. Third, the
assassination would need to follow intelligence assessments that point, beyond a
reasonable doubt, to preparations for unconventional or other forms of highly
destructive warfare within the intended victim's state. And fourth, the assassination
would need to be founded upon carefully-calculated judgments that it would in fact
prevent the intended aggression, and that it would do so with substantially less harm
to civilian populations than would the alternative forms of anticipatory self-defense.
At first glance, this argument may appear both manipulative and dangerous,
permitting states to engage in what is normally illegal behavior under the pretext of
anticipatory self-defense. A closer look, however, reveals that a blanket prohibition of
assassination under international law could produce even greater harm, compelling
states to resort to large-scale warfare that could otherwise be avoided. Although it
would surely be the best of all possible worlds if international legal norms could
always be upheld without resort to assassination as anticipatory self-defense, the
dynamics of a decentralized system of international law may sometimes require such
extraordinary methods of law-enforcement.
Let us be even more specific. Suppose, for example, that a particular state
determines that another state is planning a nuclear or chemical surprise attack upon its
population centers. Suppose, also, that carefully-constructed intelligence assessments
reveal that the assassination of selected key figures (or perhaps just one leadership
figure) would prevent such an attack altogether. Balancing the expected harms of the
principal alternative courses of action (assassination/no surprise attack versus no
assassination/surprise attack), the selection of preemptive assassination could prove
manifestly reasonable and cost-effective.
What of another, more common form of anticipatory self-defense? Might a
conventional military strike against the prospective attacker's nuclear or chemical
weapons launchers and/or storage sites prove even more reasonable and cost-
effective? The answer to this question, in the abstract, can only be "perhaps." As an
answer, it is inevitably contingent upon the particular tactical and strategic
circumstances of the moment and the precise way in which these circumstances are
MATERIALS 1460-61 (The Foundation Press 3d ed. 1988).
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configured. But it is entirely conceivable that conventional forms of preemption
would generate far greater harms than assassination, and possibly with no greater
defensive benefit, than assassination. This suggests, unambiguously, that
assassination should not be dismissed out of hand in all circumstances as a permissible
form of anticipatory self-defense under international law.
Now, what of circumstances where the threat to particular states does not involve
higher-order military attacks? Could assassination represent a permissible form of
anticipatory self-defense under these circumstances? Subject to the above-stated
conditions, the answer might still be "yes." The threat of chemical or nuclear attack
may surely enhance the legality of assassination as preemption, but is by no means an
essential precondition. A conventional military attack might still, after all, be
enormously destructive. Moreover, it could be followed, in certain circumstances, by
later unconventional attacks.
ASSASSINATION AS ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORISM
Another threat to be considered within our argument is terrorism. More
precisely, it is important to ask the following question: "To what extent, if any, might
assassination represent a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense as a strategy of
counter-terrorism? ''57 Here, the answer may be contingent upon whether the intended
victim represents (1) leaders of a state that sponsors or supports terrorism against the
state considering assassination; and/or (2) a terrorist group.
Before any answer can be offered, however, an antecedent question must be
addressed - a question that still baffles and confuses students of international relations
and international law: "When is the 'private' use of force lawful and when is it
terrorism?"
International law has consistently proscribed particular acts of international
58terrorism. At the same time, however, it codifies the right of insurgents to use
57. There is, of course, a certain ironic quality to this question. This is due to the argument, offered
earlier here, that assassination may be a form of terrorism in certain instances. For discussions of
assassination as terrorism, see generally, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 5, 57, 85-86, 125, 296, 329 (Yonah Alexander ed., 1976); LEGAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 411-12, 605 (Alona E. Evans & John F. Murphy eds., 1978); TERRORISM:
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 7-10, 12, 32-36, 50-51, 66-67, 83, 94-98, 101, 111, 188, 248, 292
(Yonah Alexander & Seymour Newell Finger eds., 1977); Aggression Against Authority, supra note 22, at
298-99.
58. In the United States, these proscriptions are reinforced by implementing legislation. The
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 implements the International Convention Against the Taking
of Hostages and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). Other pertinent treaty-implementing legislation includes: An
Act to Implement the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, and
for Other Purposes, Pub. Law No. 91449, 84 Stat. 921 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 49 U.S.C.); An Act to Amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to Implement the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; To Provide a More Effective Program to Prevent Aircraft
Piracy; and For Other Purposes, Pub. Law No. 93-366, 88 Stat 409 (1974) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Act for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
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certain levels and types of force when fundamental human rights are repressed and
where non-violent methods of redress are unavailable. 59 Inhabiting a sovereignty-
centered system6° wherein the normative rules of the human rights regime are
normally not enforceable by central global institutions, the individual victims of
human rights abuse must seek relief in appropriate forms of humanitarian assistance
or intervention by sympathetic states and/or in approved forms of rebellion. Indeed,
without such self-help remedies, the extant protection of human rights in a
decentralized legal setting would be entirely a fiction, assuring little more than the
primacy of Realpolitik.
The origins of the current human rights regime - which is highlighted by the
Protected Persons, Pub. Law No. 94-467, 90 Stat. 1997 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C.); and Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Implementation Act of 1982,
Pub. Law No. 97-351, 96 Stat. 1663 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). For
full texts of these legislative acts, see International Terrorism: A Compilation of Major Laws, Treaties,
Agreements, and Executive Documents, prepared for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 100th
Cong. 125-50 (Comm. Print 1987). Other pertinent U.S. legislation implemented to control terrorism
includes: Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States Pub. Law No.
92-539, 86 Stat. 1070 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); National
Emergencies Act, Pub. Law No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976); Federal Income Tax Forgiveness for U.S.
Military and Civilian Employees Killed Overseas, Pub. Law No. 98-259, 98 Stat. 142 (1984) (codified as
amended in 26 U.S.C. 692); Achille Lauro Hijackers and Other Terrorists: Demand for Apprehension,
Prosecution and Punishment, Pub. Law No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985); and Continuing Appropriations
for Fiscal Year 1987 § 301-02, Pub. Law No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341 (1986). For full texts of these acts see
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF MAJOR LAWS, TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND
EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS, Report Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of
Representatives by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.,
153-65 (1987).
59. Although specially-constituted U.N. committees and the U.N. General Assembly have repeatedly
condemned acts of international terrorism, they exempt those activities that derive from "the inalienable
right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other
forms of alien domination and the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national
liberation movements, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the relevant
resolutions of the organs of the United Nations." Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International
Terrorism, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973). This exemption is
corroborated by Article 7 of the General Assembly's 1974 Definition of Aggression. Resolution of the
Definition of Aggression, supra note 23, at art. 7. Article 7 refers to the October 24, 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, see G.A.
Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970). For a
comprehensive and authoritative inventory of sources of international law concerning the right to use force
on behalf of self-determination, see Aureliu Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and
Current Development on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev. 1
(1981).
60. This system raises issues of "subjects of international law." On such subjects - that is, entities with
legal personality - see generally, IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed.
1990); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 74-104 (1986); JAMES CRAWFORD,
THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL Law (1979); INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED
PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 487 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed. 1975); DANIEL PATRICK O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1970); CHARLES ROUSSEAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1968); GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (3d ed. 1957); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
(3d ed. 1991); DR. J.H.W. VERZUL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1969); Oliver J.
Lissitzyn, Territorial Entities Other Than Independent States in the Law of Treaties, 125 RECUEIL DES
COuRS 5 (1968).
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U.N. Charter;61 the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948);62 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976);63 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976) 64 - lie in ancient Greece
and Rome. From Greek Stoicism and Roman law to the present, thejus gentium (law
of nations) and modem international law have accepted the right of individuals to
overthrow tyrants and to oppose, forcefully if necessary, tyrannical regimes.65 This
acceptance can be found primarily in international custom, the general principles of
law recognized by nations, U.N. General Assembly resolutions, various judicial
decisions, specific compacts and documents (e.g., the Magna Carta, 1215; the Petition
of Right, 1628; the English Bill of Rights, 1689; the Declaration of Independence,
1776; the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789), the writings of
highly-qualified publicists (e.g., Cicero; Francisco de Vitoria; Hugo Grotius; and
Emmerich de Vattel) and, by extrapolation, from the convergence of human rights law
with the absence of effective, authoritative institutions in world politics.
This brings us to the first jurisprudential standard for differentiating between
lawful insurgency and terrorism, one commonly known as "just cause."66  Where
individual states prevent the exercise of human rights, insurgency may express law-
enforcing reactions under international law.67 For this to be the case, however, the
means used in that insurgency must be consistent with the second jurisprudential
standard, commonly known as "just means."68
61. See generally U.N. CHARTER.
62. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 18, at 71.
63. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
64. Id. at 49.
65. Louis Rend Beres, On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
1, 36 (1994) [hereinafter On International Law]; Permissibility ofState-Sponsored Assassination, supra
note 43, at 249.
66. The standard of "just cause" maintains that an insurgency may exercise law-enforcing measures
under international law. This argument is deducible from the existence of an authoritative human rights
regime in intemational law and from the corollary absence of a central enforcement mechanism for this
regime. It is codified, inter alia, at Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, supra note
62; see also, Resolution of the Definition of Aggression, supra note 23, at art. 7. Article 7 refers to the
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States, supra note 18.
67. On International Law, supra note 65, at 7; Louis Rend Beres, The United States and Nuclear
Terrorism in a Changing World: A Jurisprudential View, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 327, 334 (1994)
[hereinafter The United States and Nuclear Terrorism].
68. On International Law, supra note 65, at 7; The United States and Nuclear Terrorism, supra
note 67, at 334. On the principle of "just means," see Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, October 18, 1907, T.S. No. 539, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
Aug. 12, 1949. 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949. 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions]. The "more complete
code" referred to in the Hague Regulations became available with the adoption of the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions referred to above. These agreements contain a common article (3) under which the
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In deciding whether a particular insurgency is an instance of terrorism or law-
enforcement, therefore, states must base their evaluations, in part, on judgments
concerning discrimination, proportionality and military necessity.69  Once force is
applied broadly to any segment of human population, blurring the distinction between
combatants and noncombatants,7 ° terrorism is taking place. Similarly, once force is
applied to the fullest possible extent, restrained only by the limits of available
weaponry, terrorism is underway. 7' For example, the consistently barbaric use of force
by Palestinian insurgents against Israeli noncombatants is incontestably terroristic.
There is no cause that can ever justify the fully premeditated murder of women and
children.72
The legitimacy of a certain cause does not legitimize the use of certain forms of
violence. Under international law, "[t]he ends not justify the means. ' 73 "As in the
convention provisions become applicable in non-international armed conflicts. Still, the 1949 Geneva
Diplomatic Conference rejected the idea that all of the laws of war should apply to internal conflicts and in
1970 the U.N. Secretary General requested that additional rules relating to non-international armed
conflicts be adopted in the form of a protocol or a separate convention. These rules were codified on June
8, 1977 when the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts adopted two protocols additional to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, U.N. Doe.
A/32/144 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
69. On International Law, supra note 65, at 7; The United States and Nuclear Terrorism, supra
note 67, at 334.
70. On International Law, supra note 65, at 7; The United States and Nuclear Terrorism, supra
note 67, at 335. Criteria for distinguishing between combatant and noncombatant populations were
introduced for the first time at the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. Multilateral Protection of War
Victims Civilian Persons, August 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516.
71. On International Law, supra note 65, at 7; The United States and Nuclear Terrorism, supra
note 67, at 335.
72. Regarding Palestinian claims of "just cause," these, too, are flawed. For the Palestinian Authority,
acceptance of a "Two-State Solution" is merely part of a broader strategy of annihilating the State of Israel.
This strategy is essentially undisguised; for example, the official "Map of Palestine" at the PLO website
includes all of Israel. Official Website of the PLO, at http//www.khamorim.com (last visited Feb. 13,
2003). The total elimination of Israel has doctrinal roots in the PLO's "Phased Plan" of June 9, 1974, created
in its 12th Session. The PLO's highest body, the Palestinian National Council, reiterated the PLO's aim to
achieve "their rights to return and to self-determination on the whole of their homeland." PLO's Phased
Plan, Adopted at the 12th Session of the Palestinian National Council, at httpJ/www.iris.org.il/plophase.htm
(last visited Feb. 13, 2003). However, departing from its previous strategy which had called for the
immediate elimination of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state over all of "Palestine," the Phased
Plan was adopted as follows:
FIRST, to establish a combatant national authority over every part of Palestinian territory
that is liberated [Art. 2]; SECOND, to use that territory to continue the fight against
Israel [Art. 4]; and THIRD, to start a pan-Arab War to complete the liberation of all
Palestinian territory, i.e., to eliminate Israel [Art. 81.
PLO's Phased Plan, Adopted at the 12th Session of the Palestinian National Council, at
http/www.iris.org.il/plophase.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
73. Louis Rend Beres, International Law Requires Prosecution, Not Celebration, of Arafat, 71 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 569, 577 (1994) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Prosecution, Not Celebration]; On
International Law, supra note 65, at 8 (emphasis added); Louis Rend Beres, The Oslo Agreements in
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case of war between states, every use of force by insurgents must be judged twice;
once with regard to the justness of the objective, and once with regard to the justness
of the means used in pursuit of that objective. 74
"The explicit application of codified restrictions of the laws of war to non-
international armed conflicts dates back only as far as the four Geneva Conventions of
1949.,,75 However, recalling that the laws of war, like the whole of international law,
are comprised of more than treaties and conventions, "it is clear that the obligations of
jus in bello (justice in war) comprise part of 'the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations"' 76 and are binding upon all categories of belligerents.77 Indeed,
the Hague Convention (No. IV) of 1907 declared "in broad terms that in the absence
of a precisely published set of guidelines in humanitarian international law concerning
'unforeseen cases,"' all belligerency is governed by all of the pre-conventional
sources of international law78 :
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under
the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity,
and the dictates of public conscience.79
This "'more complete code' became available with the adoption of the four 1949
International Law, Natural Law, and World Politics, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 715, 723 (1997)
[hereinafter The Oslo Agreements].
74. Prosecution, Not Celebration, of Arafat, supra note 73, at 577 (emphasis added); On
International Law, supra note 65, at 8 (emphasis added); The Oslo Agreements, supra note 73, at 723.
75. Louis Rend Beres, Israel After Fifty: The Oslo Agreements, International Law and National
Survival, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 27, 35 (1999) [hereinafter Israel After Fifty]; The Oslo Agreements,
supra note 73, at 723; see Geneva Conventions, supra note 68.
76. Israel After Fifty, supra note 75, at 35 (referring to the sources of international law cited in the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, ch. II, art. 38 1(c)). These nations also have a codified
obligation to cooperate on matters of counterterrorism and related crimes. See, e.g., Resolution on Principles
of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30 at 78, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (1973); Resolution on the Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who
Have Committed Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2840, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29 at 88,
U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); Resolution on the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 96, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 55th
mtg. at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1947). See also Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 8 I.L.M. 68, openedfor signature Dec. 16, 1968.
77. Israel After Fifty, supra note 75, at 35.
78. Id. (citing the Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18,
1907, Hague Convention IV, 36 Stat. 2277, 2279, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV]).
79. Hague Convention V, supra note 78, at 2279-80. This "Martens Clause, named after the
Russian delegate to the First Hague Conferences, is included in the Preamble of the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions," and "is designated a higher status" in the 1977 Protocol I, where "it is included in the main
text of Article I." In Protocol HI, however, "the Martens Clause was again moved to the Preamble." Louis
Rend Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism--Jurisprudential and Definitional Clarifications, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 245 n.19 (1995). See Helmut Strebel, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 326-27 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1997) (Martens Clause). The Martens Clause purposefully extends the Law
of Armed Conflict (standards of"just means") to all types ofinsurgencies and "liberation wars." Id.
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Geneva Conventions. ' 8° These agreements contained "a common article (Article 3)
under which the convention provisions become applicable to non-international armed
conflicts." 81 Nevertheless, "the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference rejected the idea
that all of the laws of war should apply to internal conflicts, and in 1970 the [U.N.]
Secretary General requested that additional rules relating to non-international armed
conflicts be adopted in the form of a protocol or a separate convention.
82
In 1974 the Swiss government convened in Geneva the Diplomatic Conference
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable
in Armed Conflicts. 3 On 8 June 1977 the Conference formally adopted two protocols
additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.84 Protocol II relates to the
protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts and develops and
supplements common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions. 85 Although, in the fashion
of common Article 3 and Article 19 of the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention,
Protocol II does "not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots [and] isolated and sporadic acts of violence, 86 it does apply to all armed
conflicts:
[W]hich take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under
responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable
them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this
Protocol. 7
Geneva Protocol 1 also constrains insurgent uses of force in "armed conflicts in
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination."'88 Thus,
even where the peremptory rights to self-determination are being exercised, insurgent
forces must resort to lawful means of combat. According to Article 35, which
reaffirms longstanding norms of international law: "In any armed conflict, the right of
80. See supra note 75. See also Louis Rend Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-
Defense: The Case of Israel, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 321, 331, n.38 (1991) [hereinafter On
Assassination].
81. Id. at 340, n.38; see Geneva Conventions, supra note 68, at 2279-80. For additional
discussion of common Article 3, see, e.g., Sylvie Junod, Additional Protocol I1: History and Scope, 33
AM. U.L. REv. 29 (1983); Charles Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol I1, and Its Relation to Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Other Human Rights Instruments, 33 Am. U.L. REv. 9
(1983); Richard C. Schneider, Jr., ASIL Insight: Geneva Conventions, Protocol Il: The Confrontation of
Sovereignty and International Law, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. NEWSL. (1995).
82. On Assassination, supra note 80, at 340, n.38.
83. See Junod, supra note 81, at 32.
84. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 16 I.L.M.
1391, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 [hereinafter Protocol I] and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Protocol 11].
85. Junod, Additional Protocol I: History and Scope, supra note 81, at 29.
86. Protocol II, supra note 84, Part 1, art. 1, para. 2.
87. Protocol II, supra note 84, Part 1, art. 1, para. 1.
88. Protocol 1, supra note 84, Part 1, art.I, para. 4.
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the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. ' 9
States also have an obligation to treat captured insurgents in conformity with the
basic dictates of international law. Although this obligation does not normally
interfere with a state's right to regard as common or ordinary criminals those persons
not engaged in armed conflict (that is, persons involved merely in internal
disturbances, riots, isolated and specific acts of violence, or other acts of a similar
nature), it does mean that all other captives (according to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949) "remain under the protection and authority of the principles of
humanity and from the dictates of dictates of public conscience." 9
In cases where captive persons are engaged in armed conflict, it may mean an
additional obligation of states to extend the privileged status of prisoner of war (POW)
to such persons. This additional obligation is unaffected by insurgent respect for the
laws of war of international law. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, violations of these rules do not
automatically deprive an insurgent combatant of his right to protection equivalent in
all respects to that accorded to prisoners of war. This right, codified by the Geneva
Conventions, is now complemented and enlarged by the two protocols to those
conventions. 9'
These norms notwithstanding, we return again to the essential principle that
international law is not a suicide pact,92 and that the jus cogens right to ward off
annihilation may countenance assassination in certain residual instances as
permissible anticipatory self-defense against terrorism. Just as states may have the
right to resort to assassination as a method of preempting overwhelming harm
threatened by other states, so may they reserve this right when confronted with the
serious threat of international terrorism. Of course, such reservation will become even
more reasonable to the extent that the expected threat of terrorism is of a WMD (e.g.,
chemical/nuclear/biological) nature. Recognizing this, the National Security Strategy
affirms clearly: "Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations
of global reach and attack their command, control, and communications; material
support; and finances. 93
In assessing assassination as a permissible form of preemption against terrorism,
we must recognize that the prospective target of assassination may be not only
terrorists themselves, but also officials of states that support terrorism. 94 From the
point of view of international law, we must now ask, "Is there a difference?" Are
89. Protocol 1, supra note 84, Part III, sec. 1, art. 35, para. 1.
90. On International Law, supra note 65, at 12 (referencing the Martens Clause). See also note 79
and accompanying text, supra.
91. On International Law, supra note 65, at 12 (emphasis added). In this connection, and in
particular reference to Geneva Protocol 1, insurgent combatants captured after launching direct attacks
upon innocent civilians should continue to be treated as prisoners of war, but should be prosecuted for the
commission of war crimes.
92. A paraphrase of Justice Arthur Goldberg's statement, "[T]he Constitution... is not a suicide
pact," in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1996). See Harold Hungju Koh, The Spirit
of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 23, 24 (2002).
93. National Security Strategy, supra note 1.
94. See, e.g., On Assassination, supra note 80, at 328.
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individual officials of states that sponsor or sustain terrorism against other states
legitimate objects of transnational assassination? For example, can we assassinate
Saddam Hussein?
This question, of course, is exceedingly complex, involving, among other
difficult issues, the matter of the lawfulness of the particular insurgency.95 Although
state sponsorship of insurgencies in other states may be lawful as an indispensable
corrective to gross violations of human rights, such sponsorship is patently unlawful
whenever its rationale lies in presumptions of geopolitical advantage. 96 "Today the
long-standing customary prohibition against foreign support for lawless insurgencies
is codified in the U.N. Charter and in the authoritative interpretation of that
multilateral treaty at article 1 and article 3(g) of the General Assembly's Definition of
Aggression (1974). "97
The legal systems embodied in the constitutions of individual states are an
interest that all states must normally defend against aggression.98 This peremptory
principle was expressed by Hersch Lauterpacht. According to Lauterpacht, the
following rule concerns the scope of state responsibility for preventing acts of
insurgency or terrorism against other states:
International law imposes upon the State the duty of restraining persons within
its territory from engaging in such revolutionary activities against friendly States as
amount to organized acts of force in the form of hostile expeditions against the
territory of those States. It also obliges the States to repress and discourage activities
in which attempts against the life of political opponents are regarded as a proper
means of revolutionary action. 99
Lauterpacht's rule reaffirms the Resolution on the Rights and Duties of Foreign
Powers as Regards the Established and Recognized Governments in Case of
95. On Assassination, supra note 80, at 331. See also Louis Rend Beres, Why and How Saddam
Must be Punished: A Jurisprudential/Philosophic Explanation, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 667, 673-75,
678-80; Frits Kalshoven, "Guerilla" and "Terrorism" in Internal Armed Conflict, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 67
(1983).
96. SeeNicaraguav. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, at paras. 239-45 (1983).
97. On International Law, supra note 65, at 10. See generally U.N. CHARTER. United Nations
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression: Draft Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res.
3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/L.46 (1974), 13
I.L.M. 710.
98. In this connection, international law is founded upon the presumption of solidarity between all
states in the struggle against criminality in all forms. It is mentioned in a number of the classics. JUsTINIAN,
CoRPus Juis CiviLis (533 C.E.); HuGO GROTIUs, 2 DE JuRE BELLI AC PACis LIBR TREs ch. 20 (Francis
W. Kesey trans., Clarendon Pres 1925) (1690); EMMERICH DE VATIEL, I LE DROIT DES GENs ch. 19
(1758). The case for universal jurisdiction, which stems from the principle of solidarity, is codified, inter
alia, at the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. These Conventions impose upon the High
Contracting Parties the obligation to punish certain "Grave Breaches" of their rules, regardless of where the
infraction occurred or the nationality of the perpetrators. These Breaches are defined at Art. 147 of Geneva
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516, signed on
Aug. 12, 1949, at Geneva, Switzerland.
99. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LAW OF PEACE, Parts 2-6, 274 (Eli
Lauterpacht ed., 1977).
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Insurrection adopted by the Institute of International Law in 1900.0' His rule,
however, stops short of the prescription offered by Emmerich de Vattel. According to
Vattel's The Law of Nations, states that support terrorism directed at other states
become the lawful prey of the world community:
If there should be found a restless and unprincipled nation, ever ready to do harm
to others, to thwart their purposes, and to stir up civil strife among their citizens, there
is no doubt that all others would have the right to united together to subdue such a
nation, to discipline it, and even to disable it from doing further harm. 10'
But what, precisely, are the proper jurisprudential boundaries of this "right?" Do
they include assassination? And if they do, would the resort to assassination be a
permissible instance of anticipatory self-defense?
Significantly, as we have already noted, the right of tyrannicide is well-
established in political philosophy and international law. 1 2 Indeed, this right may
extend even to state-sponsored tyrannicide or transnational assassination as a form of
humanitarian intervention. 10 3 This is the case, for example, where such use of force is
not directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state,
but rather to assure peremptory human rights and/or self-determination within such a
state.
Recalling that an individual state's right to self-defense is also peremptory under
international law, 104 it would appear that where assassination is not undertaken against
the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, but only to further its
own self-defense, it may be permissible. Of course, where we are concerned with
anticipatory self-defense in particular, assassination would have to be consistent, in
part, with the tests set forth by the Caroline and in part by the broadened criteria
identified in 2002 by the National Security Strategy. Moreover, it would have to
follow a determination that assassination was the least generally injurious form of
anticipatory self-defense and the exhaustion of all possible peaceful means of
settlement.
CONCLUSION
In his Utopia, published in 1516, Thomas More offered a curious juxtaposition
of foreign policy strategems and objectives.'° 5 Although the Utopians are expected to
be generous toward other states, they also offer rewards for the assassination of enemy
leaders (Book II).106 This is not because More wished to be gratuitously barbarous,
100. On International Law, supra note 65, at 11.
101. EMERICH DE VATTEL, 3 THE LAW OF NATIONS: OR THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE
135 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758).
102. Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination, supra note 43, at 248.
103. Id.
104. See Louis Rent Beres, Israel, Lebanon, and Hizbullah: A Jurisprudential Assessment, 14
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 141, 149 (1997).
105. See generally THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA (Paul Turner trans., 1965) (1516).
106. See id. at I11.
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but rather because he was a most realistic utopian. 0 7  Sharing with St. Augustine
(whose City of God had been the subject of his lectures in 1501) a fundamentally dark
assessment of human political arrangements, More constructed a "lesser evil"
philosophy that favored a pragmatic form of morality.l°8
Looking over the current landscape of world power processes, it appears that
Utopia still has a great deal to offer contemporary international legal theory. A fusion
of Stocism and Epicureanism, Utopian ethics recognize that intranational values
(including what we now call human rights) require international security
arrangements and that such arrangements must be based on realistic assessments of
other states' (what More calls "commonwealths") intentions.'0 9 Or to put it in the
language of another, more modem expounder of St. Augustine - Reinhold Niebuhr -
states must operate on the understanding of "moral man and immoral society."' 11
In the fashion of Niebuhr and St. Augustine, Sir Thomas More was aware that
the tragic element of the political situation is constituted of conscious choices of evil
for the sake of good." With regard to our current inquiry, this suggests that
assassination must always be disagreeable in the best of all possible worlds (for
example, the Leibnizian world satirized by Voltaire in Candide), but that it may be a
necessary expedient"l2 of international law in a world that remains distressingly
imperfect.1 3 As we have seen, this assuredly does not mean that assassination should
now be embraced generally with enthusiasm instead of revulsion, but it does imply
107. Permissibility ofState-Sponsored Assassination, supra note 43, at 249.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See generally REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY (1932).
111. Permissibility ofState-Sponsored Assassination, supra note 43, at 249.
112. This brings to mind the idea of utilitarian calculations. The utilitarian view is that human actions
should be appraised in light of their consequences, and that only such a consequentialist approach will enable
us to deal with complex moral and legal issues in a purposeful fashion. The principle of utility, which has its
origins in Jeremy Bentham's philosophy, is "that principle which approves or disapproves of every action
whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the
party whose interest is in question .... to promote or to oppose that happiness." See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 125 (W. Harrison ed., 1960) (1780).
Technically, of course, we are not speaking precisely of "happiness" when we consider outcomes of
anticipatory self-defense, but considerations of national security and survival are surely preconditions of
happiness. Moreover, utilitarians argue forcefully against those who would base approval or disapproval of
particular actions upon a non-comparative, visceral-type reaction. Utilitarian thinking would dismiss those
who claim that assassination is always impermissible simply because it arouses antipathy:
not on account of their tending to augment the happiness of the party whose interest is in question, but
merely because a man finds himself disposed to approve or disapprove of them: holding up that approbation
or disapprobation as a sufficient reason for itself, and disclaiming the necessity of looking out for any
extrinsic ground.
Id. at 138-39.
113. Grotius cites to Cicero's observation (from the latter's Defense of Milo) that "[tihe act [of
assassination] is not only just, but even necessary, when it represents the repulsion of violence by means of
violence." COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY 67 (G.L. Williams trans., 1964) (1604). See
HUGO GROTIUs, DE JURE PRADEDAE COMMENTARIEIUS, in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 67
(James Brown Scott ed., Oxford 1950) (1983). Cicero's speech was in defense of Titus Annius Milo, leader
of Lanuvium. See CICERO, THE SPEECH OF M.T. CICERO IN DEFENSE OF TITUS ANNIUs MILO, in SELECT
ORATIONS OF M.T. CICERO 208 (C.D. Yonge trans., 1882).
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that assassination as a form of anticipatory self-defense may sometimes offer the best
available remedy to aggression and terrorism in world law.' 1
4
114. There are circumstances, of course, where anticipatory self-defense may not have to be expressed
by any use of force whatsoever, and wherein judicial actions against individuals could be presumed
adequately defensive. In such circumstances, U.S. federal courts could be the appropriate venue for
international law enforcement U.S. competence in these circumstances can be found in federal law, which
confers jurisdiction of general court martial "to try any person who, by the law of war, is subject to trial by a
military tribunal...." 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1988) (emphasis added). In addition, federal law grants jurisdiction
to the federal district courts for all offenses against the laws of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1988).
Since its founding, the United States has reserved the right to enforce international law within its own courts.
The U.S. Constitution confers on Congress the power "to define and punish piracies and felonies committed
on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Pursuant to this
Constitutional prerogative, the first Congress, in 1789, passed the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1993). This statute authorizes the U.S. federal courts to hear those civil claims by aliens alleging acts
committed "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States" when the alleged wrongdoers
can be found in the United States. Understood in terms of American national obligations to prosecute
terrorists, or to bring terrorists into American judicial venues as civil proceedings, this means that such
terrorists, when found in U.S. territory, can be brought into this country's courts for civil remediation of
terrorist crimes.

AN ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN SALES





Located in Geneva, Switzerland, the World Trade Organization' is comprised
of over 140 members.2 Since its inception in 1994, 3 the WTO has provided its
members a forum for trade negotiations and disputes.4 Through the use of this
dispute resolution process, the WTO's ultimate goal is to ensure free trade and fair
pricing throughout the world.5
Disputes in the WTO currently range from the European Communities'
dispute with India over anti-dumping violations6 to violations of Chilean alcohol
taxation.7 One dispute currently before the WTO is particularly important because
it involves over four billion dollars in compensatory measures
In a dispute entitled the "United States: Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales
Corporations," 9 the European Communities allege that the Unites States is illegally
" James Joseph Shallue, Northwestern University- School of LAw - LL.M. IN TAXATION (2003),
University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law- Juris Doctor (2002), University of Wisconsin-
Madison- Bachelor of Arts (1997). The author would like to thank Michelle Arnopol Cecil at the
University of Missouri-Columbia and Robert J. Peroni at Northwestern University for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts, and his wife Ann for all of her love and support.
1. In this article, the World Trade Organization will be referred to as the WTO. See WTO,
Welcome to the WTO website, at http//www.wto.org (last visited June 23, 2003).
2. As of January 1, 2002, the WTO was comprised of 146 countries. See WTO, About the
Organization, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto-e.htm (last visited June 23, 2003).
3. See Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, (Apr. 15, 1994), available at WTO, Legal Texts, UR: The Final Act,
http://www.wto.org/wto/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/eol/e/wto0l/wtol_34.htm [hereinafter Uruguay
Round Agreement].
4. See WTO, WTO: Main Functions, at http://www.wto.org/wto/english/thewtoe/
whatis e/eol/e/wto0l/wtolI l.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
5. See id.
6. WTO Doc. WT/DSI41/R (Mar. 1, 2001). All WTO documents, unless specified otherwise,
are found Disputes and Dispute Settlement, either at All the Panel Reports or All the Appellate Body
Reports, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispu-status-e.htm.
7. WTO Doc. WT/DS87/R (June 15, 1999).
8. See Paul Meller, Europeans Seek $4 Billion in Trade Sanctions Against US., N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2000, at C 1.
9. See WTO Doc. WT/DSI08/RW (Aug. 20, 2001).
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subsidizing exporters through the use of the Internal Revenue Code,'0 in violation
of its WTO obligations." The United States counters that the Code's provisions
are not subsidies, and that its tax legislation is currently meeting all WTO
obligations. 12
This dispute is the culmination of a long and heated battle between the United
States and the European Communities over the exact definition of the term
subsidy. A subsidy can generally be defined as a "non-tariff measures utilized by
governments either to inhibit imports (so-called 'domestic subsidies') or to enhance
exports (so-called 'export subsidies'). Subsidies typically constitute direct or indirect
economic benefits granted by governments to an industry or group of industries."' 3
The United States and the European Communities, however, vehemently disagree
over an exact defimition of the term subsidy.
This disagreement, currently in its fourth decade, began in 1971 with the
advent of Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISCs). "4  At the time,
American corporations were losing the export battle because double taxation and
value added taxation caused their prices to be much higher than those of their
foreign competition. 15 In order to be competitive abroad, DISCs were developed
so that American exporters could lower their overall prices. This was
accomplished by deferring part of their tax liability through the use of a tax-free
commission. Because exporters had lower tax liabilities through the use of DISCs,
they could lower their prices and still maintain the same profit margins. These
lower prices on exports eventually translated into a more competitive environment
between American and foreign corporations.
Foreign countries affected by DISCs, however, felt that they were an illegal
subsidy rather than a tax deferral. The United States argued that because DISCs
mirrored territorial and value added taxation systems, they could not be considered
subsidies. Eventually, under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
6
DISCs were held to be subsidies.
In 1984, because DISCs could no longer be used as intended, the United States
implemented the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) as a vehicle to increase
10. In this article, the term Code will refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended,
unless otherwise noted.
11. See generally WTO Doc. WT/DSI08/RW Annex A-] (Aug. 20, 2001), First Written
Submission of the European Communities.
12. See generally WTO Doc. WTIDS108/RW Annex A-2 (Aug. 20, 2001), First Written
Submission of the United States.
13. Rosendo Lopez-Mata, Income Taxation, International Competitiveness and the World Trade
Organization's Rules on Subsidies: Lessons to the U.S. and to the World From the FSC Dispute, 54
TAX LAW. 577, 580 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
14. For a discussion of DISCs, see infra notes 129-153 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of double taxation and value added taxation, see infra notes 107-121 and
accompanying text.
16. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- 1l, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. As a note, all WTO legal documents (except for the Tokyo Round
Subsidies Code, see infra note 74) can be found at WTO, Legal Texts - The WTO Agreements, at
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal e/legal e.htm.
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competition between American and foreign corporations. 17 Unlike a DISC, a FSC
was designed to be a foreign corporation that operated on a dividend-basis with its
domestic parent corporation. The United States felt that FSCs complied with GATT,
and were not an illegal subsidy because they mirrored territorial and value added
taxation systems used by others in Europe and throughout the world.
Many foreign countries, however, argued that FSCs, like DISCs before them,
were an illegal subsidy under GATT and other international trade agreements,
including the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 18 and the
Agreement on Agriculture.' 9 These foreign countries, now formally known as the
European Communities, again argued that FSCs provided an illegal subsidy rather
than a tax deferral. They also argued that because FSCs were export-contingent, they
were also an illegal subsidy under various other WTO agreements. The newly
formed WTO agreed, effectively terminating the FSC method of taxation.2 °
Still in need of a vehicle to facilitate competition between American and foreign
corporations, the United States enacted its current method of taxation called
Extraterritorial Income (ETI) in 2000.21 Unlike the previous methods of taxation,
ETI allows both domestic and foreign corporations to take advantage of its tax
benefits. This distinction between ETI and FSCs, the United States feels, should
placate the European Communities' previous arguments regarding illegal subsidies
because this system is not export-contingent.
Unfortunately, the WTO disagreed. On August 20, 2001, the WTO held that
ETI was in violation of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
and the Agreement on Agriculture because it was, in fact, export-contingent. 2
This ruling was recently upheld by the WTO's Appellate Body. 23 In addition to these
rulings, the WTO also allowed the European Communities to commence with four
billion dollars in retaliation against the United States, equal to the savings afforded
American exporters under FSCs.
2 1
This ruling, however, does not mean that there is a consensus on the exact
definition of the term subsidy. The United States, being consistent with its
argument throughout, feels that if the exact definition of a subsidy is simply a
deferral of taxation, as the European Communities argue, then many other
countries are also illegally subsidizing their exporters.25 These other countries
17. For a discussion on FSCs, see infra notes 154-213 and accompanying text.
18. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, available at http://www.wto.org/ english/
docs e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf.
19. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex IA, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/14-ag.pdf.
20. For a discussion on the WTO decision, see infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion on ETI, see infra notes 214-294 and accompanying text.
22. See WTO Doc. WT/DS I 08/RW, at 9.1 (a).
23. See WTO Doc. WTIDS I 08/AB/RW at 256(a).
24. See Extraterritorial Income: EC Plans $4 Billion Sanctions Against U.S., Will Fight Appeal of
WTO Rulings on FSCs, 161 DAILY TAX REP., Aug. 21, 2001, at GG-I. For a discussion on the tax
savings of FSCs, see infra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
25. In fact, the Bush administration is considering bringing a dispute against the European
2002
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forego taxation on income by using value added taxation, a territorial taxation
system, or a combination of those systems. The WTO and the European
Communities argue that a subsidy is present when a country foregoes taxation on
26income because of the income's export nature.
To understand this lack of consensus on an exact definition of a subsidy, this
article will first provide background into various aspects of the international trade
community and how these aspects affect the current dispute over the term.
Specifically, Part II of this article will analyze the mechanics of the WTO dispute
resolution process, and how countries settle trade issues. Part III will then discuss
the evolution of GATT, the WTO, and various agreements signed by the United
States defining subsidies. Part IV will compare and contrast the different methods
of taxation in Europe and the United States. Next, this article will examine the
heart of the current disagreement over the term subsidy. Part V will look at the
evolution of American taxation methods from the advent of Subpart F2 7 to the FSC
Repeal Act and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000 (ETI). 28 It will also
analyze the arguments made by the European Communities and United States to
the WTO on each taxation method. Part VI will discuss the different options for
the United States regarding compliance with its WTO obligations. Finally, Part
VII will analyze the disparity between the world's tax systems and international
obligations in general. This article will conclude that it is necessary to have
meetings with European Communities and WTO representatives to address future
United States tax legislation specifically, and determine whether this future
legislation will be WTO compliant.
II. WTO AND THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS2 9
As previously stated, the WTO attempts to enable free trade through the use
of its dispute resolution process.3 0 Governed by the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,3 this process is divided into
Communities and their use of VAT taxation. See Aldonas Says US to Seek WTO Review of Vat
Deductions EU Allows for Exports, 82 DAILY TAX REP., Apr. 29, 2003, at G-4. For a discussion on the
VAT tax and why it is similar to ETI, see infra, notes 108-119 and accompanying text. See also notes
179 and 229-30 and accompanying text.
26. See "but for" analysis of FSCs, infra at notes 197-198, and ETI, infra at note 257 and
accompanying text.
27. See Keith Engel, Tax Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the Right, Stuck
in the Middle with Subpart F, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1525, 1527-28 (2001) (stating that the original Subpart F
proposal was in 1961 under the Kennedy Administration).
28. FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. Law No. 106-519, 114
Stat. 2423 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
29. This article discusses specifically the Dispute Resolution Process and its general affect on
complaints brought by WTO members. For a discussion on the WTO's Dispute Resolution Process and
its affects on investments and foreign policy, see generally Kevin C. Kennedy, Foreign Direct
Investment and Competition Policy at the World Trade Organization, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
585(2001).
30. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
31. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex Two, available at
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five parts, culminating in a binding obligation between the WTO and its
members.3 If the country in violation of WTO agreements cannot comply, or
refuses to comply, with this binding obligation, the process allows for
compensatory and retaliatory measures against the non-complying country. Each
of the five parts of the dispute resolution process is discussed below.
A. Procedures for Resolving Trade Disputes
The first step in settling a trade dispute between members of the WTO is a
formal consultation.33 The purpose of this consultation is to set the groundwork
for a conclusion to the disagreement. Usually lasting two to three hours, 34 it allows
for confidential discussions about the trade dispute." If the countries are having
difficulty reaching an agreement, they can request a WTO mediator to facilitate the
discussion.36
The majority of disputes that reach the consultation stage are resolved within
a couple of months. 37  Some are settled for practical reasons, while others are
settled on the merits of the case.38 If the parties cannot settle the disagreement
within sixty days of the consultation, the complaining party has the right to request
a Panel from the Dispute Settlement Body to resolve the dispute.39
The Panel is comprised of three to five experts in the field of the dispute.40
Independent from the countries in disagreement, the Panel's members are well-
qualified government and/or non-government individuals. Many of these individuals
have taught or published in the field of international trade law or policy, or served as
senior trade policy officials for a WTO member.4'
The Panel first hears the dispute between the disagreeing countries, making an
objective assessment of the matter before it.42 This includes receiving briefs from
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/28-dsu.pdf [hereinafter DSU]. See also supra note 3.
32. These parts include: 1) formal consultations; 2) hearings before a Panel; 3) passage or failure
of the Panel's recommendations by the Dispute Settlement Body; 4) appeal of the Dispute Settlement
Body's holding; and 5) implementation of the Dispute Settlement Body's decision. See WTO, Trading
into the Future, Settling Disputes, The Panel Process, at http://www.wto.orglenglish/
thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/disp2_e.htm.
33. See DSU, supra note 31, at art. 4.
34. See Mark Clough, The WTO Dispute Settlement System-A Practitioner Perspective, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 252, 254 (2000).
35. See DSU, supra note 3129, at art. 4(6) (stating that consultations shall be confidential, and
without prejudice to the rights of any member in any further proceeding).
36. See generally id. at art. 5.
37. See Clough, supra note 34, at 264.
38. See id.
39. See DSU, supra note 31, at art. 4(7). The Dispute Settlement Body is comprised of all WTO
members, and enforces all decisions made under the auspices of the DSU. See id at art. 2(1).
40. See id. at art. 8(5). The disputing parties do not pick these Panel members; rather they are
appointed by the Secretariat of the Dispute Settlement Body. See id. at art. 8(4).
41. See id. at art. 8(1).
42. See DSU, supra note 31, at art. 11:
The function of a panel is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this
Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an
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each party, and also hearing oral arguments, similar to opponents in an American
court. The Panel concludes its debate, and issues a preliminary report within six
months.
43
The Panel then files its preliminary report with findings and recommendations
with the Dispute Settlement Body for approval. 44 This report is privately circulated
among the body's members for review.45 Eventually, the Panel will publicly release
its report. In the interim period between private circulation and public release, the
Panel does have the right to reconsider its findings and decision on the matter.46
Once the report is made public, the report is given to the Dispute Settlement
Body for approval. After a brief discussion, the body then votes on the Panel's
recommendations by a one-member, one-vote format.47  The Dispute Settlement
Body in the past has always accepted the decision of the Panel because the only way
to override the Panel's recommendation is by majority vote. 4' This means that in
order to override the Panel's decision, the losing party has to persuade one-half of the
members of the body, or seventy-three other countries, to agree with its argument.
This is a nearly impossible task, considering the diverse views and backgrounds of
the body's members.
Once the Dispute Settlement Body has placed its approval on the Panel's
recommendation, it is binding on the losing party.49 The losing party, however, does
have the right to appeal this decision to a higher authority: the Appellate Body.50
B. Appeal and Compliance by the Losing Party
As previously stated, the losing party does have the right to appeal the Panel's
decision. In fact, the majority of the disputes that have reached the Panel have
been appealed.5  Made up of seven members,52 the Appellate Body is charged
with addressing each of the Panel's findings, and may uphold, modify or reverse
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the
facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered
agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate
opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.
43. See id. at art. 12(8).
44. See Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Toward a More
Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 335, 336 (2000).
45. See Scott McBride, Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Backbone of the Global Trading System
or Delegation ofAwesome Power?, 32 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 643, 647 (2001).
46. This is a moot point, though, because no Panel has ever reversed itself during the interim period.
See Extraterritorial Income: WTO Issues Final Ruling Maintaining Interim Findings Against U.S.
FSC/ETI, 141 DAILY TAX REP., July 24, 2001 at GG-1.
47. See Pauwelyn, supra note 44, at 336.
48. See DSU, supra note 31, at art. 16(4).
49. See Clough, supra note 34, at 259.
50. See DSU, supra note 31, at art. 16(4).
51. See Clough, supra note 34, at 264.
52. See DSU, supra note 31, at art. 17(1).
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any of the legal findings and conclusions of the Panel. 53 The Dispute Settlement
Body will adopt the Appellate Body's ultimate conclusion, absent consensus to the
contrary.54
Once the Appellate Body adopts the Panel's report, the losing party has to
inform the Dispute Settlement Body of its plan of implementation. 55 If the losing
party cannot immediately comply, a reasonable time period will be established for
compliance. This is determined by a time period (a) approved by the Dispute
Settlement Body; (b) approved by the parties in dispute within forty-five days; or
(c) approved by an arbitrator within ninety days from the adoption of the Panel's
recommendation by the Dispute Settlement Body.56 The DSU also states that a
reasonable time cannot exceed eighteen months.5 7
If the losing party does not implement a plan to cure the violation, the
complaining party has the right to request compensation twenty days after the end
of a reasonable time period.5" Generally, compensation involves the lifting of
trade barriers by the losing party. This may include tariff reductions or increases
in the losing party's import quotas.59 It is generally understood that compensation
is to be offered to all WTO members.60
This compensation can also come in the form of retaliation. Unlike general
compensation, "[r]etaliatory measures are directed primarily at concessions or
other obligations applicable to the same sector as that in which the Panel or
Appellate Body found an infringement."'', This in essence means that retaliation is
more specific than general compensation. The Dispute Settlement Body will
authorize this retaliation unless there is a consensus against it. 62 The losing party
does have the opportunity to dispute the amount of retaliation or compensation by
requesting an arbitrator.63
To protect the Panel's decision, the Dispute Settlement Body continuously
monitors the implementation process used by the losing party.64 If the body and
the losing party disagree on whether it is implementing a process to cure the
violation, the losing party has the right to remand the disagreement back to the
Panel for verification of its implementation process.65
53. See id. at art. 17(13).
54. See id. at art. 17(14).
55. See id. at art. 21(3). The DSU specifically calls for prompt implementation and compliance
with the body's decision. See id. at art. 21(1).
56. Seeid. at art. 21(3).
57. See id. at art. 21(4). This eighteen month time period is important because current legislation
will replace ETI over a five-year phase-in period. For a discussion on H.R. 1769, see infra, notes 314-
332 and accompanying text.
58. See id at art. 22(2).
59. See Pauwelyn, supra note 44, at 337.
60. See id.
61. Clough, supra note 3432, at 262.
62. See DSU, supra note 31, at art. 22(6).
63. See DSU, supra note 31, at art. 22(6).
64. See id. at art. 21(6).
65. See DSU, supra note 31, at art. 21(5). For a flow chart of the entire WTO dispute resolution
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Ill. GATT, THE WTO, AND THE DEFINITION OF SUBSIDY
By way of background, this section will discuss the evolution of the WTO as an
international organization. Because this article focuses specifically on a dispute
between the European Communities and the United States regarding the definition of
a subsidy, this section will also examine specific WTO agreements signed by the
United States that define the term subsidy within the context of trade matters.
A. GA7T: 1947
Established in 1947, and ratified in 1948, GATT was essentially a series of
multilateral trade concession agreements, written to help regulate an expanding
international marketplace.66 Signed by a majority of the leading industrial powers at
67 6the time, it was the framework used in building what is now the WTO.65
In order to aid the regulation of international trade, GATT's drafters included
various articles specifically regulating certain business practices. Ranging from
Cinematographic Films69 to Exchange Arrangements,70 these articles helped to
define GATT members' obligations to one another. In their complaint against the
United States, the European Communities base some of their argument on Article
XVI of GATT, dealing with subsidies.
Specifically, Article XVI prohibits export subsidies of non-agricultural products
because they hinder the objectives of GATT and affect international trade in
general. 7' This means that a GATT member cannot cause the sale of an export
process, see WTO, Trading into the Future, Settling Disputes, The Panel Process, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/disp2 e.htm.
66. See Ricardo Corona, The Continuing Viability of the Banking and Financial DISC: A Tool
Sheltering Export Finance Income, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 361, 366 (1995).
67. These nations included the United States, France, Australia, Canada and Great Britain. For a
complete list of signatories, see GATT, supra note 16, at preamble.
68. In the establishment of the WTO, the final act of the Uruguay Round was to make binding on
all WTO members all prior GAIT agreements and legal instruments. See Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex IA, at preface,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
Final Act], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/06-gattpdf. See also Corona, supra
note 66, at 366 n.27.
69. See GATT, supra note 16, at art. IV.
70. See id. at art. XV.
71. See GATT, supra note 16, at art. XVI, Section A - Subsidies in General:
1. If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of
income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any
product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory, it shall notify the
CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the
estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected product or products
imported into or exported from its territory and of the circumstances making the
subsidization necessary. In any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to
the interests of any other contracting party is caused or threatened by any such
subsidization, the contracting party granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with
the other contracting party or parties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the
possibility of limiting the subsidization.
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product to be made at a lower price than that charged for a similar product in the
domestic market because it violates GATT obligations.72 These types of subsidies
can affect international trade in two respects.
First, hypothetically, if the United States is subsidizing its exports, this subsidy
reduces the price of export goods by foregoing taxation on international transactions.
This allows the American exporter to lower the price of its goods due to less tax
liability to the United States. In a hypothetical export transaction in France, if this
tax liability is less than the tax liability of a French company, the American exporter
can sell a widget in France at a lower price than the domestic producer.
Due to lower taxes on the American exporter, other foreign exporters will be
discouraged from competing with the United States in France's widget market.73
This is because the foreign producer is in fact paying more taxes on its widget than
the American exporter. The foreign exporter's government may be forcing its
exporters to pay taxes on the sale, whereas the United States is foregoing the tax due
on the transaction.
Second, because the American widget is cheaper than the French widget, and
there is no foreign competition in the French widget market, sales for the American
widget will rise.74 This is basic economics: barring any outside factors such as
quality or advertising, if the American widget is the cheapest on the French widget
market, it should sell more rapidly than any other country's widget.
Article XVI's basic assumption is that it is illegal to subsidize exports to foreign
markets. There is a problem though, because the term subsidy is not specifically
defined within GATT.75
B. The Tokyo Subsidies Code of 198076
To alleviate some of the confusion regarding the exact definition of subsidy, the
Tokyo Subsidies Code first restated GATT's rule prohibiting the subsidizing of
2. The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a contracting party of a subsidy
on the export of any product may have harmful effects for other contracting parties, both
importing and exporting, may cause undue disturbance to their normal commercial
interests, and may hinder the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement.
72. See id. at art. XVI, Section B - Additional Provisions on Export Subsidies:
4. Further, as from I January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter, contracting
parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on the export
of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results in the sale of such
product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like
product to buyers in the domestic market. Until 31 December 1957 no contracting party
shall extend the scope of any such subsidization beyond that existing on 1 January 1955
by the introduction of new, or the extension of existing, subsidies. (emphasis added).
73. See Phillip L. Jelsma, The Making of a Subsidy, 1984: The Tax and International Trade
Implications of the Foreign Sales Corporation Legislation, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1327, 1329 (1986).
74. See id.
75. See generally, GATT, supra note 16, at art. XVI.
76. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/
tokyoround/subsidiescode.pdf [hereinafter Tokyo Round Subsidies Code].
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exports." It then added an illustrative list of practices that GATT considered to
constitute subsidizing activities.78
Within this illustrative list, paragraph (e) prohibited subsidies that were in
essence tax deferral regimes, unless they charged interest on the deferral. In its text,
paragraph (e) states that "the full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral
specifically related to exports. . ." is considered a subsidy.79 This is very important
because if the United States would chose to use a deferral method of taxation, it
would need to charge interest to be in agreement with its GATT obligations, or make
sure that the deferral is not export contingent.8s As is the case with the original
GATT-1947 agreement, the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code did not specifically
define subsidy; it simply provided a list of activities that were considered by GATT
to be subsidies.
C. The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986-1994)
The main focus of the Uruguay Round was to create the WTO as an
international organization .8  This, in effect, created binding legal obligations
between its members to adhere to WTO rules, and bound members to the dispute
resolution process, previous GATT agreements, and any future WTO agreements.82
The United States accepted the terms of this agreement in 1994.3
One of these WTO agreements was the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures. 4 Part of the Uruguay Round, this agreement actually
defined the term subsidy and expanded on the concept of a prohibited subsidy.
According to this agreement, a subsidy must satisfy a two-part test. The first part of
the test, deemed the subsidy existence test,85 states that a subsidy exists where there
is a financial contribution by a government.8 6 This financial contribution can come
77. See id. at art. 19(1).
78. See id. at Annex.
79. Id. at Annex, para. (e) (emphasis added).
80. For a discussion of the DISC regime, see infra notes 129-153 and accompanying text.
81. See generally Uruguay Round Agreement, supra note 3.
82. See McBride, supra note 45, at 644.
83. See generally Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act, Pub. Law 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
84. See supra note 18.
85. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 582.
86. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 18, at art. 1 - Definition
of a Subsidy:
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the
territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as "government"), i.e. where:
a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity
infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees);
government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal
incentives such as tax credits);
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or
purchases goods;
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a
private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii)
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from a variety of sources, including a government foregoing taxation on certain
87transactions. An example of this would be the United States foregoing taxation on
FSCs.88 This was done by allowing a FSC to defer tax liability on a portion of its
income.
The second part of the test, deemed the specificity test,8 9 states that a subsidy
exists only when a certain portion of an enterprise or industry can meet it.90 Under
this test, remedies are "only available against specific subsidies."9' An example of
above which would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real
sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments; or
(a)(2)there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of
GATT 1994; and
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.
87. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 18, at art. 1.
88. For a complete discussion on FSCs and the foregoing of taxation, see infra notes 151-209 and
accompanying text.
89. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 582.
90. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 18, at art. 2
Specificity:
2.1 In order to determine whether a subsidy, as defined in paragraph I of Article 1, is
specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (referred to in
this Agreement as "certain enterprises") within the jurisdiction of the granting authority,
the following principles shall apply:
a) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the
granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain
enterprises, such subsidy shall be specific.
b) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the
granting authority operates, establishes objective criteria or conditions90.
governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall
not exist, provided that the eligibility is automatic and that such criteria and
conditions are strictly adhered to. The criteria or conditions must be clearly
spelled out in law, regulation, or other official document, so as to be capable
of verification.
c) If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the
application of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are
reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors may
be considered. Such factors are: use of a subsidy programme by a limited
number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain enterprises, the
granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises,
and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting
authority in the decision to grant a subsidy. In applying this subparagraph,
account shall be taken of the extent of diversification of economic activities
within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as of the length of
time during which the subsidy programme has been in operation.
2.2 A subsidy which is limited to certain enterprises located within a designated
geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority shall be specific. It
is understood that the setting or change of generally applicable tax rates by all levels of
government entitled to do so shall not be deemed to be a specific subsidy for the
purposes of this Agreement.
2.3 Any subsidy falling under the provisions of Article 3 shall be deemed to be specific.
2.4 Any determination of specificity under the provisions of this Article shall be clearly
substantiated on the basis of positive evidence.
91. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 582 (emphasis added).
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this would be ETI because the United States agreed to forego taxation because the
transaction was export-related.92
As this test insinuates, the next step, once a subsidy is found, is to characterize it
as either a prohibited, actionable, or non-actionable subsidy. Prohibited subsidies, as
defined in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, are those that
are "contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of
domestic over imported goods. ' ' 93 This means that a country is somehow granting a
subsidy to a domestic producer to lower the cost of its goods, making them cheaper
than imported equivalents.
Actionable subsidies are those "that cause injury to the domestic industry of
another member, a detriment to benefits pertaining to another member under GATT-
1994, or serious prejudice to the interests of another member." 94  This type of
subsidy can be considered export-contingent because, due to the subsidy, the
exporter can charge a lower price than a target country's domestic producers.
Finally, non-actionable subsidies are those that are not serious enough to be
considered actionable, but still meet the requirements of the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, Article 8.1.95 A non-actionable subsidy cannot be
referred to the Dispute Settlement Body for consideration.
96
These three terms define subsidies generally. In order to clarify the use of
subsidies in different industries, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, like the Tokyo Round before it, added an annex with footnote examples of
subsidies in various capacities.97 Under Annex I, paragraph (e), the agreement
described an export subsidy as "the full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral
specifically related to exports, of direct taxes or social welfare charges paid or
payable by industrial or commercial enterprises. 98
To clarify further the meaning of an export subsidy, Footnote 59 to paragraph
(e) goes on to state that "the members reaffirm the principle that prices for goods in
transactions between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under their or under
the same control should for tax purposes be the prices which would be charges
between independent enterprises acting at arm's length. 99 This definition and
clarification of paragraph (e) are central components of the disagreement between the
United States and the European Communities. The European Communities state that
the United States tax legislation fits within the meaning of Footnote 59 because its
92. For a complete discussion on ETI and their export nature, see infra notes 214-294 and
accompanying text.
93. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 18, at art. 3(l)(b).
94. Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 583.
95. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 18, at art. 8.
96. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 583.
97. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 18, at Annex 1.
98. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 18, at Annex 1, para. (e).
Within this description of an export subsidy, direct taxes means "taxes on wages, profits, interests, rents,
royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property." Id. at Annex 1,
para. (e) n.58.
99. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 18, Annex 1, para. (e) n.59.
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legislation is a deferral of taxation specifically related to exports. 100 The United
States counters that its legislation fit within the arm's length language of Footnote
59101
The views of the two members are very different in the interpretation of
subsidy, partly because of their fundamental beliefs of taxation. Part IV will discuss
the different systems of taxation throughout the world, and outline the taxation of
individuals versus territories.
IV. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TAXATION SYSTEMS
Within international trade, there are two very different types of taxation: a
worldwide system that bases taxation on individual citizens wherever they earn their
income, and a territorial system that bases taxation on individuals and entities that
earn income within the taxing entity's physical territory. This is important because
the worldwide system can lead to double taxation on an overseas transaction without
governmental assistance, while the territorial system only taxes the overseas
transaction once.
The following sections will explain the differences between the two systems,
and apply them to a hypothetical situation involving the United States (a worldwide
tax system) and France (a territorial tax system). This hypothetical situation will
conclude that in order to compete on the international market, worldwide systems of
taxation should be allowed some sort of governmental assistance to compete with
territorial taxation system exporters in order to avoid double taxation that is inherent
in a worldwide taxation system.
A. The Worldwide System of Taxation
The United States is the leading country that uses a worldwide system of
taxation. This system is deemed worldwide because the United States taxes its
citizens on all of their income, irrespective of where they earn it. By focusing
taxation on the individual, this means that the worldwide income of its citizens
becomes subject to United States income tax, even when the income was not
earned in the United States.10 2 Relating this theory to export taxation, this means
that a corporation must include the income or losses of a foreign branch on its tax
return.'0 3
Because the United States places tax liability on income regardless of where it
is earned, it leads to double taxation of export goods. For example, by exporting
widgets to France, a territorial taxation system, an American manufacturer pays tax
to the United States on the sale because of the worldwide taxation system. As
100. See generally infra notes 186-187 and accompanying text.
101. See generally id.
102. See Cecelia B. Skeen, Knick-Knack Paddy Whack Leave the FSC Alone: An Analysis of the
WTO Panel Ruling that the US. Foreign Sales Corporation Program is an Illegal Export Subsidy under
GAIT, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 69,97 (2000).
103. See Engel, supra note 27, at 1529.
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discussed below, it also pays French tax on the sale because it is earning income
within French territory. This makes competition difficult for the American
manufacturer because with more expenses involved in the sale of the widget, in the
form of higher taxes, the American product will be more expensive than that of the
French competitor.
In order to overcome this double taxation problem, the United States offers
various tax relief mechanisms to ease the tax burden on exports. These
mechanisms include tax credits, tax exemptions, tax reductions, or specific
methods of calculating income.' n In other words, an American corporation can
use these to offset any income tax liability on the foreign subsidiary's income from
the sale of widgets. 105
The point of these mechanisms is to relieve some of the income tax burden on
American exporters, and place them on equal footing with other international
exporters. The United States has also attempted to do this through various methods
of taxation, including Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISCs), Foreign
Sales Corporations (FSCs), and Extraterritorial Income (ETI). These tax methods
are at the heart of the European Communities' argument stating that the United
States is illegally subsidizing its exports.1
0 6
B. Territorial System of Taxation
Unlike the worldwide system of taxation, a territorial system of taxation only
taxes income earned within its physical territory. This means that a territorial tax
country is asserting tax jurisdiction only over the domestic source income earned
by its citizens and residents. 0 7 Examples of countries using this type of taxation
are Hong Kong, South Africa, and France.'"
Because these countries only tax domestic income, there is no risk of double
taxation because they do not tax foreign source income.' 0 9 For example, if France
is exporting widgets to Hong Kong, the French taxation system does not require
the French exporter to pay taxes on the sale. This is because the income earned on
the transaction is outside of France's physical territory. The exporter may have to
pay tax to the foreign country where the sale took place, but that depends on the
taxation system used in that country. Here, because Hong Kong uses a territorial
taxation system, the French exporter would owe tax to Hong Kong on the income
earned from the sale of the widget there.
Along with using a territorial taxation system, many European countries also
base their taxation on consumption rather than on income. This taxation method,
104. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 586.
105. See Engel, supra note 27, at 1529.
106. The United States also uses other theories of taxation. It should also be pointed out that
American taxation is income-based, and not consumption-based. See id. This is very different than
European taxation, which allows the rebate of the value added tax upon exportation.
107. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 585-86.
108. See id. at 585 n.33, 35.
109. See id. at 586.
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known as value added taxation, is usually applied to all goods and services."' In
the production of taxable goods, the value added tax is usually applied at a flat rate
to the value added to the good at each stage of production."' On average, this rate
is approximately twenty percent of the value of the good. " 2
For example, in making a television, a value added tax of twenty-percent
would be imposed on the market value of all electrical components made by
Company I. This would, for analysis purposes, be a tax of twenty dollars on
Company 1 ($100 value of the electrical components times twenty percent).
Company 1 then sells the electrical components to Company 2. Company 2 places
the components inside its housing for assembly. A different value added tax is
added at this step in the television process. Company 2, for argument's sake,
would be responsible for a forty dollar tax on the item (value of the television is
now $200 (electrical components plus the television housing and assembly) times
twenty-percent). This type of value added tax is present throughout the assembly
process until the television is in the hands of the consumer.
In this scenario, double taxation is avoided by allowing each subsequent seller
a credit in the amount of the value added tax previously paid." 3  In this
hypothetical, this means that Company 2 would be able to take a twenty dollar
credit because Company 1 already paid twenty dollars on the value of the
television at the time that Company 2 received the electrical components.
There are also products that are completely exempt from the value added tax.
Goods that are basic or essential are not taxed by the value added tax. These are
considered true exemptions. 
1 4
Another type of exemption is the zero-rate exemption. Zero-rate exemptions
apply "to articles on which the value added tax is collected and allows the seller a
credit for the tax the seller previously paid."'" 5 Thus, a company can receive a
credit for all value added tax that it has paid throughout the manufacturing process.
In terms of exportation, this potentially means that value added tax goods are
cheaper than non-value added tax goods because exports are considered zero-rate
exemptions." 6 In essence, the company under a value added tax regime receives a
credit for all taxes previously paid on the good, requiring it to only pay territorial
income tax to the foreign country, if applicable.
In general, the value added tax has been considered an indirect tax by
GATT.' 17 This is because the price of the good "remains constant because the tax
110. An exception is made for basic or essential goods such as food, children's clothing, and rent.
See Hunter R. Clark et. al., The WTO Ruling on Foreign Sales Corporations: Costliest Battle Yet in an
Escalating Trade War Between the United States and the European Union?, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 291, 311 (2001).
111. See Skeen, supra note 102, at 98.
112. See Clark, supra note 110, at 312.
113. SeeClark, supranote 110 at311.
114. Seeid.
115. Id.
116. See Clark, supra note 110, at 312.
117. See Skeen, supra note 102, at 99.
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
is really only paid when the consumer purchases the product.""'  GATT also
supports the value added tax method because it does not distinguish between
domestic and export goods and their ultimate price to consumers." 9
Accordingly, countries with this type of tax are allowed broader exemptions
on exports than non-value added tax countries. These exemptions amount to a full
rebate of taxes paid on the goods up to the time that the goods are exported.'
20
Once exported, exporters are only liable for any tax incurred on the actual sale of
the goods. Because this system allows value added tax countries a distinct
advantage on the sale of exports, the United States argues that it is an illegal
subsidy under the reasoning of the WTO in its conclusions regarding United States
tax methods. '
2 i
For example, assume that both the United States and France are exporting
widgets to Hong Kong, a territorial tax country. Also assume that Hong Kong has
a ten-percent territorial tax on any transactions within its physical territory. Both
widgets cost $100 to manufacture. Both companies want to make a twenty-percent
profit, so both will theoretically charge the Hong Kong consumer $120 (($100
times twenty-percent) plus $100).
Due to the value added tax, the French company has to pay a twenty-percent
tax on the $100 widget before export, which equals a twenty dollar tax ($100 times
twenty-percent). Remember, however, that because the widget is an exported
good, the value added tax is credited to the French company because it is
considered a zero-rate tax exemption due to its export status. This essentially
means that the French company has yet to pay taxes on the widget. The American
company also has not paid taxes on the widget because it does not have a value
added tax; rather it bases taxation on income from the sale of the widget, not on its
production.
Now that the goods are in Hong Kong, the consumer can purchase each
widget for $120. Because this income is earned in Hong Kong's physical territory,
both companies will have to pay the additional ten-percent territorial income tax on
the sale to Hong Kong. This requires a twelve-dollar tax from each company
($120 sale times ten-percent tax on the sale).
In addition to the tax due to Hong Kong, remember that the American
company must also pay taxes to the American government on the sale (barring any
credit or tax deferral) because it is subject to worldwide taxation on its income as a
company residing in the United States. If the tax is also ten-percent, the American
company will be charged twenty-four dollars in taxes (twelve dollars to Hong
Kong and twelve dollars to the United States). The French company, on the other
hand, is not subject to French taxation because the sale took place outside the
French taxing jurisdiction. Therefore the company is only required to pay Hong
118. Skeen, supra note 102, at 99.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 100.
121. For a discussion on the value added tax as an illegal subsidy, see infra notes 175-182 and
accompanying text.
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Kong tax of twelve dollars.
Because both companies want to maintain a twenty-percent profit margin on
the cost of goods sold, the French company will add its tax liability, or twelve
dollars, to its base price. The American company will also add its tax liability to
its base price. Because of the increased tax liability on the American company, it
will be required to raise its price twenty-four dollars, rather than twelve dollars, to
maintain its profit margin. Barring any other outside factors, the French widget
will be twelve dollars cheaper than the American widget, giving the French
company an advantage in the Hong Kong widget market.
In order to combat this inequitable tax treatment on its exporters, the United
States has implemented various tax-saving methods throughout the decades. The
European Communities have argued that these tax methods are subsidies under
various GATT and WTO agreements. The following section will analyze these tax-
saving methods, examine the validity of the European Communities' arguments,
and conclude with the WTO's judgments in each case.
V. EVOLUTION OF THE FSC
Starting in the Kennedy administration, 122 the United States attempted to level
the playing field for American exporters by implementing various tax-saving
mechanisms. All of these methods, in one way or another, allowed the deferral of
any tax incurred in foreign transactions, sometimes for an indefinite period of time.
The following sections will introduce three of these tax methods: Domestic
International Sales Corporations (DISCs), Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs), and
Extra Territorial Income (ETI). It will then analyze their structures and how they
affected international trade. Finally, it will discuss the WTO's stance on the
method, and how the United States allegedly violated its WTO obligations by
using these tax mechanisms.
A. Pre-DISC
Prior to the 1960's, foreign source income was not treated in the same fashion
as it was in the previous hypothetical. In fact, the only way a corporation would be
taxed on exports prior to 1960 was if it repatriated the foreign source income back
to the United States.123 Due to this indefinite deferral of income, many exporters
started to move their operations overseas to take advantage of this tax haven.
124
This move allowed domestic exporters to earn unlimited tax-free income overseas.
The only tax liability on this income occurred when it was repatriated to the United
States, usually done on an as needed basis by the exporter.
To combat this movement overseas, the Kennedy Administration introduced
legislation to tax foreign source income while still in the hands of a foreign
122. See generally Engel, supra note 27, at 1527.
123. See id.
124. See Engel, supra note 27, at 1527.
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subsidiary. Entitled Subpart F, this legislation taxed certain transactions between a
foreign subsidiary, known as a Controlled Foreign Corporation, 25 and its parent
company, a United States corporation. 26 Subpart F taxed the CFC's foreign-based
income, and attributed this tax to the domestic parent company. 27 In other words,
shareholders of CFCs were now required to include as income any pro rata portion
of CFC's undistributed income, thus removing any tax benefits of owning a
foreign-based company.12
8
Subpart F worked to equalize taxation between domestic parent companies
and their foreign subsidiaries. By doing this, however, the United States now
subjected the domestic parent corporations to double taxation, similar to the
previous hypothetical. In order to allow American exporters to compete in foreign
markets, and to avoid double taxation, the United States implemented various tax
methods to allow exporters to avoid this harsh double taxation. One of these
methods was the DISC.
B. Domestic International Sales Corporations
Adopted in 197 1,129 Congress enacted the DISC to enhance the
competitiveness of American exporters. 30 DISCs were intended to produce tax
effects similar to tax methods used in Europe.' 3' Specifically tailored to emulate
territorial tax systems, DISCs only taxed income produced by the domestic parent
corporation, similar to a territorial tax system.
As in the previous hypothetical, a French company that sold a widget in
France would have tax liability because the sale took place within France's
physical boundaries. Similarly, if the French company sold the same widget in
Hong Kong, it would not have any French tax liability on the sale because the sale
took place outside France's physical territory. 32  The United States felt that
American exporters should receive the same tax treatment as foreign corporations.
This emulation of a territorial tax system by a DISC had a two-fold effect: it
enabled exporters to lower their prices due to the reduction of their domestic tax
125. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 589-90. In this article, the Controlled Foreign Corporation
will be referred to as the CFC.
126. As defined, a CFC is a foreign corporation whose majority stockholder is an American
shareholder. See I.R.C. § 957(a) (1962).
127. See I.R.C. § 954(d) (1962).
128. See Clark et. al., supra note 110, at 307. As with other taxation methods, there were ways that
a domestic parent company could avoid paying taxes on its foreign subsidiary's income. These
methods included tax credits, tax exemptions, tax reductions, or specific methods of calculating income.
See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 586. Essentially, a domestic parent company could offset any income
tax due on its foreign subsidiary's income by using one of these credits or exemptions.
129. DISC was included in § 501of the Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497
(1971) (codified as amended in I.R.C. §§ 991-997 (1971)).
130. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 590.
131. See Skeen, supra note 102, at 72.
132. Since Hong Kong is also a territorial tax system, it would be able to tax the transaction. This
point is ignored here for argument's sake.
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burden, and increased the profitability of exporting. 133 This, in turn, drew a greater
number of American exporters into the exportation market.134
Regarding the actual taxation effects of the legislation, DISCs were
engineered to provide partial relief from Subpart F treatment. 35 In order to be
qualified as a DISC, a company had to be incorporated in any State, and have:
A. 95 percent or more of their gross receipts were qualified export receipts;
B. the adjusted basis of the qualified export assets of the corporation equals
or exceeds 95 percent of all assets of the corporation at the close of the
taxable year;
C. the corporation does not have more than one class of stock and the par
or stated value of its outstanding stock is at least $2,500 on each day of
the taxable year; and
D. the corporation has made an election to be treated as a DISC.
136
In this system, a DISC was established to do all exportation on behalf of the
parent company. Without any further legislation, however, the parent corporation
would still be liable for any income earned by the DISC due to Subpart F
treatment. 1
37
To avoid this treatment, the DISC was allowed to take a commission on any
foreign sales it made on behalf of the parent corporation. These commissions were
treated as 100% deductible to the parent corporation, and partially deductible to the
DISC. 138 In other words, the DISC would sell the widgets on behalf of the parent
corporation. At certain times of the year, it would repatriate the income to the
parent corporation. The parent would then pay the DISC its commission. 
39
133. See Clark et. al., supra note 110, at 298.
134. See id. at 298.
135. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 591.
136. I.R.C. § 992 (1971). In general, export receipts are "gross receipts from the sale, exchange, or
other disposition of export property." I.R.C. § 993(a) (1971).
137. For a discussion on the different systems of taxation, see supra notes 107-121 and
accompanying text.
138. See Jelsma, supra note 7371, at 1332.
139. To calculate the amount of the commission, the DISC used one of three methods stated in
I.R.C. § 994 (1971):
1) 4 percent of the qualified export receipts on the sale of such property by the
DISC plus 10 percent of the export promotion expenses of such DISC
attributable to such receipts,
2) 50 percent of the combined taxable income of such DISC and such person
which is attributable to the qualified export receipts on such property derived
as the result of a sale by the DISC plus 10 percent of the export promotion
expenses of such DISC attributable to such receipts, or
3) taxable income based upon the sale price actually charged (but subject to the
rules provided in section 482)
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After the commission was distributed, both the parent corporation and the
DISC owed tax on the commission. For the DISC, 57.5% of its export profits were
considered income attributable to the DISC for the current year.' 40 Regarding the
other 42.5%, it could be deferred until the DISC's profits were distributed or the
DISC ceased to exist.' 41 Because actual distributions were rarely necessary, this
42.5% profit could be deferred indefinitely, thus saving millions of dollars in
yearly taxation for American exporters.
42
This method of taxation gave a distinct advantage to DISCs on the
international exportation market. As expected, many European GATT members
felt that the United States was illegally subsidizing DISCs. Specifically, France,
Belgium, and the Netherlands, all of which were members of GATT, stated that
DISCs violated GATT Article XVI:4. 43  Essentially, these European countries
argued that DISCs resulted "in the sale of such product for export at a price lower
than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic
market."' 44 This was a clear violation of GATT Article XVI.
The United States countered this argument by stating that DISCs were similar to
territorial taxation used throughout Europe. 45 The Unites States argued that, by
taxing only income earned by the parent in the domestic market, DISCs were in
effect a type of territorial taxation system. Because GATT implicitly endorsed
territorial taxation, it should also endorse DISCs.
To settle this dispute, GATT established a Panel to examine the effects of
DISCs on United States taxation. 46 The GATT Panel concluded its study by
stating that this lack of taxation on DISCs was not a mere deferral on income, but
instead constituted "remissions or exemptions."' 147 In reaching its conclusion, the
Panel looked to the fact that the United States did not charge interest on the
deferred income,1 48 and also to the fact that the United States could not state when
the deferred 42.5% profit would ever be subjected to income tax. 149  This
conclusion meant that the United States was not in accord with its GATT
obligations under Article XVI.
The United States vehemently denied that it was in violation of Article XVI,
and restated its position that the DISCs were similar to territorial taxation systems.
The United States also criticized the GATT Panel because it did not establish the
140. See Jelsma, supra note 73, at 1333 (citing Treas. Reg. §1.861-8 and I.R.C. § 995(b) (1971)).
141. See I.R.C. § 995 (1971).
142. See Jelsma, supra note 73, at 1333.
143. For discussion on GATT Art. XVI, see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
144. GATT, supra note 16, at art. XVI(4).
145. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 592.
146. Although similar, remember that this dispute took place within GATT dispute resolution
procedure, not WTO.
147. Jelsma, supra note 73, at 1333 (citing Report on United States Tax Legislation (DISC), 23
BISD (Supp. 1977)).
148. This requirement was not officially codified under GATT until the Tokyo Round. See Tokyo
Round Subsidies Code, supra note 74, at Annex, para. (e).
149. See Jelsma, supra note 73, at 1334 n.47.
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exact meaning of a subsidy,' 50 nor did it discuss which parts of DISCs the Panel
considered to be a subsidy. '
In the end, after increasing pressures from GATT and its European members,
the United States complied with the Panel's decisions on DISCs by implementing
an interest charge on the deferred 42.5% of income."52 By doing this, the United
States felt that it had appeased one of their arguments against DISCs. The United
States also adopted new tax legislation that created an entity that would overcome
any future GATT arguments: the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC). 153
C. Foreign Sales Corporations
Enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,154 FSCs were designed
to provide American exporters with a substitute for DISCs. At the time of its
enactment, Congress felt that FSCs would be compliant with GATT obligations,
and would appease any European argument that they could be considered an illegal
subsidy. 155
Unlike DISCs, FSCs were incorporated outside the United States,
156
specifically in a jurisdiction considered to be a tax haven. 157  This allowed a
foreign subsidiary to pay minimal tax on any income earned in that country.
Besides the requirement of international incorporation, a FSC also had to have (1)
no more than twenty-five shareholders; (2) no preferred class of stock; and (3)
economic substance. 158
In addition to meeting all of these requirements, a FSC also had to meet the
"foreign management and economic process test." 159 This test required FSCs (1)
to have all board of director meetings outside the United States; (2) to maintain
their principal bank account outside the United States; and (3) to disburse all
dividends, legal and accounting fees, and salaries of officers and directors from a
bank account outside the United States. 60 The point of the test was to ensure that
150. The exact definition of a subsidy was not codified until the Uruguay Round in 1994 under the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, a full 16 years after this decision. Even today,
there is dispute as to the exact definition of a subsidy. For discussion on the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures and its definition of a subsidy, see supra notes 84-100 and accompanying
text.
151. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 593.
152. See I.R.C. § 995(l)(1) (1984).
153. This does not mean that DISCs dissolved entirely. DISCs are still used today, but with much
less tax savings due to the interest charge on deferred income. In fact, DISCs are used solely as a tax
incentive for small exporters. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 596.
154. Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984). The parts relating to FSCs were codified in I.R.C. §§
921-927 (1984).
155. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 595, 598.
156. See id. at 597.
157. A tax haven is a country that has a nominal tax rate. Well-known examples of tax havens are
the U.S. Virgin Islands, Barbados, and Guam. See Clough, supra note 34, at 265.
158. See I.R.C. § 922 (Supp. 1985).
159. See Corona, supra note 66, at 369.
160. Id.
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FSCs were, in fact, international corporations. 161
Similar to DISCs in practice, FSCs were foreign subsidiaries of an American
parent corporation that operated on a commission. Basically, the FSC would
purchase goods from the domestic parent corporation, resell them abroad, and then
repatriate a portion of this earned income back to the domestic parent corporation
through the use of a dividend.162 This dividend was then subject to a one hundred-
percent dividends-received deduction by the parent corporation.' 63 The income not
returned to the parent (the FSCs commission) was treated as foreign trade
income. 64 Because foreign trade income was treated as foreign source income not
effectively connected to the parent corporation, it was not subjected to United
States taxation. 1
65
The export sales commission retained by the FSC was determined by using
one of two different methods. The first was arm's length pricing under Section
482 of the Code.' 66 In practice, this meant that thirty-two percent of the FSC's
income could be withheld for taxation purposes. 167 The other way to determine
taxation was by using an administrative price method. 68  This method limited
taxation to the greater of 1.83% of the foreign trade gross receipts 69 from the
transaction, or twenty-three percent of the combined taxable income of the
transaction. These methods, in conjunction with Section 951(e) of the Code,
allowed the FSC to use a different method of taxation than its parent corporation.
This different method was used in order to avoid Subpart F treatment, thereby
161. This will become important because in fact, FSCs were not international corporations. See
infra note 203-204 and accompanying text.
162. See I.R.C. § 245(c) (Supp. 1985).
163. See id. See also Jelsma, supra note 73, at 1341.
164. See I.R.C. § 245(c) (Supp. 1985).
165. See I.R.C. § 882 (Supp. 1985).
166. See I.R.C. § 482 (1985).
167. See Jelsma, supra note 73, at 1342.
168. See I.R.C. § 925 (Supp. 1985).
169. For a definition of Foreign Trading Gross Receipts, see I.R.C. § 924 (Supp. 1985):
(a) In general-Except as otherwise provided in this section, for purposes of this subpart,
the term 'foreign trading gross receipts' means the gross receipts of any FSC which are-
1. from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of export property,
2. from the lease or rental of export property for use by the lessee outside the
United States,
3. for services which are related and subsidiary to-
(A) any sale, exchange, or other disposition of export property by such
corporation, or
(B) any lease or rental of export property described in paragraph (2) by such
corporation,
4. for engineering or architectural services for construction projects located (or
proposed for location) outside the United States, or
5. for the performance of managerial services for an unrelated FSC or DISC in
furtherance of the production of foreign trading gross receipts described in
paragraph (1), (2), or (3). Paragraph (5) shall not apply to a FSC for any
taxable year unless at least 50 percent of its gross receipts for such taxable
year is derived from activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
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avoiding double taxation.1
70
The FSC was different from a DISC because it was internationally based, not
a domestic corporation. By making it an international entity, the FSC moved
closer to a territorial taxation system because the United States was not taxing any
income earned by an American corporation overseas. As compared to the previous
hypothetical, France used its territorial taxation system to tax French corporations
only on income earned within France's physical boundaries. FSCs were
effectively doing the same thing.
FSCs were very successful with American corporations that exported many of
their goods internationally. It was estimated that 6,000 American corporations
benefited from FSC tax breaks, including such businesses as Boeing, General
Electric, and Motorola. 171 In 1998, Boeing alone saved approximately $130
million, or twelve percent of its earnings for the year, in U.S. taxes as a result of its
FSC. 17 2 This success was not limited to industrial giants. It was estimated that
small and medium-sized manufacturers saved on average $124,000 annually due to
FSC benefits. 7 3 Overall, it was estimated that FSCs provided over four billion
dollars per year in tax breaks to domestic corporations.
74
Although this tax method seemed very similar to territorial taxation, the
European Communities still argued that the FSC constituted an illegal subsidy
under GATT.' 75 In general, the European Communities felt that because FSC
benefits were available only to American exporters, they amounted to a subsidy. 
7 6
This subsidy, it argued, put European businesses at a distinct disadvantage
because, through the use of FSCs, American exporters could lower the price of
their goods in comparison to their European competition.1
77
The United States countered this argument by stating that FSCs were being
treated similarly to exporters under European territorial taxation systems. 178 In
comparing FSCs to territorial taxation systems, the United States stated that both
methods of taxation provided the domestic parent corporation with a partial
exemption for income attributable to a foreign subsidiary. 179  Both of these
methods resulted in reductions in tax from a domestic corporation's export
activities. 80 The United States further argued that if the FSC was considered a tax
170. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 598.
171. See Extraterritorial Income: WTO Panel Issues Preliminary Ruling Against United States in
FSC Dispute-US. Businesses Look Ahead, 121 DAILY TAX REP., June 25, 2001, at GG-1.
172. See id.
173. See Diplomacy Along With Tax Law Change Needed to Resolve Dispute With European Union
Over US. Export Tax Breaks, 130 DAILY TAX REP., July 9, 2001, at J-1.
174. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Economic Law, U.S. Position on Foreign Sales Corporation, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 531 (2000).
175. See Skeen, supra note 102, at 75.
176. See id.
177. See Clark et. al., supra note 110, at 308.
178. See WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/R, at para. 4.336.
179. See WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/R, at para. 4.336.
180. See id.
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subsidy, so too was the European territorial taxation system.18 As previously stated,
the FSC deferred tax due on export income, very similar to the territorial taxation
system prevalent in Europe. Because both systems exempted export taxation in one
way or another, and the FSC was somewhat based on a territorial taxation idea, both
tax systems should be held to the same standard of subsidization. 1
8 2
To clarify their argument, the European Communities specifically stated that
they considered the FSC an illegal subsidy under the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures and the Agreement on Agriculture.' 83  The European
Communities first argued that FSC legislation violated the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, Article 1:1 because the United States was foregoing
taxes owed by the FSC.18 4 This illegal deferral of taxation was done by granting
tax subsidies specifically contingent upon the exportation of goods.
85
The European Communities also argued that FSCs violated the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Footnote 59 to paragraph (e), because
FSCs were a deferral of direct taxes related to exports.' 8 6 As paragraph (e) states, a
subsidy is prohibited if it gives "(1) exemptions (2) specifically related to exports
(3) of direct taxes (4) payable by industrial or commercial enterprises."'18 7
Finally, the European Communities argued that FSCs violated the Agreement
on Agriculture Article 111:3188 by providing subsidies in excess of their reduction
commitments. 8 9 This meant that the United States was granting agricultural tax
subsidies in excess of the levels it committed to by endorsing the Agreement on
Agriculture.' 90
The United States attacked these arguments, stating that FSCs were consistent
with the language of Footnote 59 because "income generated from economic
activity outside the territory of the taxing authority need not be taxed, and that a
decision not to tax such income is not a prohibited subsidy."' 9' Specifically,
Footnote 59's second sentence insinuated that a WTO member had the right not to
tax a domestic corporation's foreign subsidiary as it saw fit.' 92 The second
181. Seeid. atpara. 4.310.
182. See id. at paras. 4.320, 4.32 1.
183. Seeid. at para. 3.2.
184. See WTO Doc. WT/DSI08/R, at para. 4.275.
185. See id. at para. 4.277. See also Julie Elizabeth McGuire, World Trade Organization Find US.
Foreign Sales Corporation Violates EU Trade Agreements, 2 LAW. J. 5 (2000).
186. See WTO Doc. WT/DS108/R, at para. 4.307.
187. See id. at para. 4.302.
188. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 19, at art. 3(3) - Incorporation of Concessions and
Commitments:
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2(b) and 4 of Article 9, a Member shall not provide export
subsidies listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9 in respect of the agricultural products or groups of products
specified in Section II of Part IV of its Schedule in excess of the budgetary outlay and quantity
commitment levels specified therein and shall not provide such subsidies in respect of any agricultural
product not specified in that Section of its Schedule.
189. See WTO Doc. WT/DS108/R, at para. 4.1332.
190. See McGuire, supra note 183, at 5.
191. See WTO Doc. WT/DS108/R, at para. 4.352.
192. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 601.
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sentence states that "the Members reaffirm the principle that prices for goods in
transactions between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under their or under
the same control should for tax purposes be the prices which would be charged
between independent enterprises acting at arm's length."'' 9 3 This meant that because
this tax exemption did not violate Article III:1(a) of the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures and Footnote 59 to paragraph (e), FSCs did not
violate any United States obligations to GATT and the WTO. 194
Eventually, the European Communities and the United States placed this
disagreement before a WTO Panel. The Panel, chaired by Crawford Falconer (New
Zealand), and assisted by Seung Wha Chang (South Korea) and Didier Chambovey
(Switzerland), 195 agreed with the European Communities, and ruled against the
United States.' 96
The Panel first looked at the specific language of a FSC to determine whether it
was a subsidy. In doing so, it used a "but for" test, and explained that if the scheme
did not exist, and revenue would be due but for the scheme, the scheme should be
considered a subsidy. 197  The Panel added weight to this reasoning because the
United States also uses a "but for" test to determine whether a subsidy exists. 198
It also found that a FSC was a subsidy under the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, Article 111:1. The Panel first looked at Section 924 of the
Code for the definition of export property. Applying this definition, the Panel
concluded that because the subsidy was contingent upon export performance, and not
available to domestic performers, it was an illegal subsidy.' 99
Regarding the Agreement on Agriculture violations, the Panel felt that because
the agreement did not have an official definition of subsidy, both parties must have
relied on the definition used in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures.2 00 Because the Panel already found that the FSC was an illegal subsidy
under this agreement, it therefore must also be a subsidy under the Agreement on
193. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 18, at Annex 1, para. (e)
n.59.
194. See WTO Doc. WTIDSI08/R, at para. 4.352.
195. See Extraterritorial Income: Third Parties Line Up Against U.S. in WTO FSC Replacement
Hearings, 51 DAILY TAx REP., Mar. 15, 2001 at G-3.
196. See WTO Doc. WT/DSI08/R, at para. 8.1. Regarding this or any other decision made by a
WTO Panel, it will be very difficult for the United States to overcome any decision by the WTO,
specifically those made by the Panel and the Appellate Body. As previously stated, the Dispute Settlement
Body will accept their holdings absent consensus to the contrary. This means that unless the United States
can persuade seventy-one other countries to agree with its argument, it has to abide by the WTO's decision.
197. See id. at para. 7.45.
198. See id. at para. 7.47. The United States Department of Commerce uses a "but for" test to
identify and determine countervailable subsidies. As stated in 19 C.F.R. § 351.509:
Benefit
(1) Exemption or remission of taxes. In the case of a program that provides for a full or partial
exemption or remission of a direct tax (e.g., an income tax), or a reduction in the base used to calculate
a direct tax, a benefit exists to the extent that the tax paid by a firm as a result of the program is less
than the tax the firm would have paid in the absence of the program.
199. See WTO Doc. WT/DSI08/R, at para. 7.108.
200. See WTO Doc. WT/DS108/R, at para. 7.149.
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Agriculture. The Panel also found that the FSC was a subsidy to reduce the costs
.of marketing exports of agricultural products under the Agreement on Agriculture
Article IX:l(d).20 ' Because FSC subsidies reduced an exporter's income tax
liability with respect to marketing activities, the Panel held that they effectively
reduced the cost of marketing agricultural products.20 2
Finally, the Panel stated that, although named as a foreign corporation, FSCs
were not foreign in practice. In fact, over seventy-four percent of FSCs were located
in American possessions, with the U.S. Virgin Islands accounting for sixty-six
percent of FSC locations.20 3 The Panel also looked to the fact that citizens of the
U.S. Virgin Islands were considered United States citizens for taxation purposes, yet
FSCs located there were not.2t 4
After the Panel's final decision, the European Communities threatened the
United States with countermeasures aimed at American exports. These
countermeasures would impose an additional one hundred-percent ad valorem duty
above the duty already paid.20 5 This would translate into the price of American
exports suddenly doubling overnight, which obviously would hurt American
exporters in European markets.
Before the European Communities were able to implement these
countermeasures, the United States appealed the Panel's decision to the WTO's
Appellate Body. Its primary argument was that the original Panel did not read the
meaning of Footnote 59 in conjunction with the rest of the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures.20 6 This led the Panel to misinterpret the meaning of
subsidy within this agreement, thus wrongly ruling against the United States.
The Appellate Body disagreed, stating that the Panel correctly applied the "but
for" analysis of the American export taxation system.20 7 It found that, to determine
the definition of subsidy, the Panel did not need to read Footnote 59 in conjunction
with the rest of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 208
Therefore, on February 24, 2000, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's ruling that a
FSC was a subsidy under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
201. See id. at para. 7.159.
202. See id. at para. 7.155.
203. See WTO Doc. WT/DS108/R, at para. 4.199.
204. See 1.R.C. § 932 (1986) - Coordination of United States and Virgin Islands income taxes:
(B)(3) Extent of income tax liability. In the case of an individual to whom this subsection applies in a
taxable year for purposes of so much of this title (other than this section and section 7654) as relates to
the taxes imposed by this chapter, the United States shall be treated as including the Virgin Islands.
205. See WTO, Communication from the Permanent Delegation of the European Commission,
WT/DSI08/13 (Nov. 17, 2000). The Annex of this communication also listed American industries and
products that would be targeted.
206. See generally, WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DSI08/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000), at
Section III A: Claims of the United States-Appellant [hereinafter Report of the Appellate Body]. See
also WTO, Report of the Panel, WT/DS14I/R (Oct. 30, 2000), at Annex 3-3: Third-Party Submission
of the United States.
207. See Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 206, at para. 91.
208. See Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 206, at paras. 93-94.
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Article 111: 1.209 Regarding the actual taxation of export income, the Appellate Body
stated that the United States could not carve out any exemptions that were export
contingent.2 10 This, by nature, would be a violation of its Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures obligations.2 '
The Appellate Body, however, did reverse part of the Panel's decision.212 It
stated that the United States was acting consistently with its obligations under
Agreement on Agriculture because FSC taxation did not relate to the marketing of
an export product.
213
The WTO's final decision on FSCs dealt a serious blow to American exporters.
Because of the WTO decision, exporters could no longer take advantage of the FSC,
and thus reverted back to the harsh tax treatment of Subpart F. This reversion would
weigh heavily on their opportunities in European markets because they would again
be subjected to double taxation.
To remedy this situation, Congress enacted a new tax mechanism that applied to
both domestic and export corporations. Because it was not export contingent,
Congress felt that it should be WTO compliant. The next section of this article will
analyze this new method of taxation, and discuss the WTO problems involved with
its implementation.
D. Extraterritorial Income
In order to appease the European Communities' and WTO's concerns, Congress
enacted legislation that was not export contingent, yet allowed for certain tax benefits
for corporations to compete with the Europeans. Entitled the FSC Repeal and
Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000,214 it was considered the newest
American taxation scheme in the long battle between the United States and the
European Communities.
As the name insinuates, the FSC Repeal Act terminated all FSC legislation,
and replaced it with Extraterritorial Income.21 5 Codified in Section 114 of the
Code, ETI is defined as "the gross income of the taxpayer attributable to foreign
trading gross receipts 216 of the taxpayer." 217  Any income considered ETI is
209. See id. at para. 121.
210. See id. at para. 153.
211. See id. at para. 154.
212. See id. Specifically, the Appellate Body only reversed the Panel's discussion on the
Agreement on Agriculture Art. IX:I (d).
213. See Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 206, at para. I11.
214. FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-519, 114 Stat.
2423 (codified in scattered sections of the Code). In this article, this Act will be referred to as ETI.
215. This is different than the transition between DISCs and FSCs. DISCs still exist, but the
deferred income now has an interest charge in place. See supra note 153. As this act states, FSCs are
no longer in existence.
216. ETI replaced FSC, which made I.R.C. §§ 921-927 void. Originally, foreign trade gross
receipts were defined in I.R.C. § 924 (Supp. 1985). This section was replaced by I.R.C. § 942 (2000).
The only language that was different between the sections was "gross receipts of any FSC which are"
was changed to "gross receipts of the taxpayer which are."
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excluded from gross income, thus avoiding United States taxation.2 18
Foreign trading gross receipts are based on the sale of qualified foreign trade
property.2 19 As defined, qualified foreign trade property is property that can be (1)
manufactured within or outside the United States; 220 (2) held primarily for sale
outside the United States; 22' and (3) not more than fifty percent of the fair market
value can be attributable to foreign content.22 This means that American exporters
are no longer required to set-up foreign subsidiaries such as FSCs to route their
exports for sale. By doing this, Congress hoped to avoid any subsidization
arguments from the WTO.223
Another principle feature of ETI is that it is an exclusionary taxation method,
and not a deferral taxation method, like FSC.224 In other words, unlike previous
taxation methods, ETI does not count at all towards gross income. Instead, its
income is characterized separately.
There are two ways of characterizing ETI income: qualifying foreign trade
income and non-qualifying foreign trade income.225 Qualifying foreign trade
income means the amount of gross income which, if excluded, will result in a
reduction of the taxable income of the taxpayer from such transaction "equal to the
greatest of: (A) thirty-percent of the foreign sale and leasing income .. . ; (B) 1.2
percent of the foreign trading gross receipts ... ; or (C) fifteen-percent of the
foreign trade income . *...,,226 "Non-qualifying foreign trade income is not
excludable from gross income. 227
By making ETI a taxation exclusion method, and making sure that it was not
export-contingent, Congress felt that it should be fully compliant with the WTO
decision on FSCs. As stated by one United States official, "our proposal directly
addresses the WTO Panel decision and it is both in fact and in law WTO
compatible." 228
Remembering the past three decades of debate over the issue, United States
officials anticipated a negative reaction from the European Communities over the
ETI. In public remarks, United States officials preempted this reaction by openly
criticizing the European Communities' previous information given to the United
States. In one instance, the United States Legal Counselor in Geneva, Daniel
217. I.R.C. § 114(e) (2000).
218. See I.R.C. § 114(a) (2000).
219. See I.R.C. § 942(a)(1)(A) (2000).
220. See I.R.C. § 943(a)(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
221. See I.R.C. § 943(a)(1)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
222. See §943(a)(1)(C). See also Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 604.
223. See I.R.C. § 942 (2000). See generally Lopez-Mata, supra note 13. Instead of being export-
contingent (FSC), ETI allows both domestic and foreign manufacturers to take advantage of this
method of taxation.
224. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 603 (citing I.R.C. § 114).
225. See id. at 604.
226. See I.R.C. § 941 (2000).
227. See Lopez-Mata, supra note 13, at 604.
228. Murphy, supra note 174, at 533 (quoting comments made by Department of the Treasury
Deputy Secretary Stuart E. Eisenstat).
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Brinza, accused the European Communities of failing to offer any views on what
precise steps the United States could make to satisfy their concerns. 229 This lack of
precise information, he stated, led to the past disagreements over the FSC, now
being drawn out into its third decade.230
Brinza also criticized the European Communities and the WTO for not seeing
the similarities between European territorial taxation and American attempts to
mimic this system. In an interview, Brinza stated that "the European Union
refuses to recognize the indisputable fact that tax treatment of exports under the
FSC Replacement Act is similar to the tax treatment of exports under existing
European territorial systems.,, 231 This criticism seems justified because both the
United States and the European Communities use non-taxation of exports to gain
an advantage in pricing their exports. In fact, the European Communities have
admitted to American officials that "exempting foreign income from taxation is a
widely accepted tax practice that does not constitute a prohibited export
subsidy. 232
As expected, the European Communities nevertheless filed a grievance
against the United States, claiming that ETI constituted an illegal subsidy because
it was export-contingent, similar to its previous grievance with FSCs. 23 3 Because
ETI legislation states that property has to be held primarily for sale outside the
United States, 234 the European Communities argued that qualified foreign trade
property was export-contingent. This would become the primary focus in the
European Communities' argument that the United States was still illegally
subsidizing its exports.2
35
In fact, some European Communities officials publicly stated that ETI is even
worse than FSCs. At one point, the European Commission 236 declared that the law
"not only maintains the violations found by the WTO in the FSC case, but may
even aggravate them. 237  The Commission went on to state that "the new
legislation continues to provide a significant illegal export subsidy to more than
229. See FSCs: U.S. Defends FSC Replacement at WTO, Advances Points of Agreement With EU,
246 DAILY TAX REP., Dec. 2 I, 2000 at G-4 [hereinafter U.S. Defends FSCI.
230. See id.
231. U.S. Defends FSC, supra note 229.
232. Id.
233. See generally WTO Doe. WT/DSI08/RW.
234. See I.R.C. § 943 (2000) (emphasis added).
235. For a discussion of the European Communities' arguments, see infra notes 239-248 and
accompanying text.
236. The European Commission is not the same entity as the European Communities. The
European Communities, synonymous with the European Union, is a formal group of countries bound by
treatises and agreements. For more information on the European Communities, see generally
http://www.europa.eu.intfindexen.htm. The European Commission, on the other hand, is actually a
commission within the European Union, preparing legislation and representing the EU on various
international issues. For more information on the European Commission, see generally
http://www.europa.eu.int/commlindexen.htm.
237. Extraterritorial Income: WTO Panel Issues Preliminary Ruling Against United States in FSC
Dispute, 121 DAILY TAX REP., June 25, 2001 at GG-I.
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half of total American exports, to the direct detriment of European companies.
Similar to the original FSC dispute, the European Communities argued that
the FSC Replacement Act (ETI) resulted in the foregoing of tax revenue that is
otherwise due. 239 This is because ETI is a tax exemption scheme, and but for the
scheme, the United States would be taxing this income.240 It argued that by
foregoing this taxation of income, the United States gave exporters a financial
contribution, in direct violation of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, Article 1: 1 .24' As previously discussed, qualified foreign trade property
is held for sale outside the United States. 242  This seems to make the subsidy
export-contingent. In fact, the Panel even noted that according to the European
Communities, "there would no longer be a prohibited subsidy within the meaning
of Article III of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures if the
United States eliminated the requirements that the property be held for use outside
the United States and the fifty percent foreign content limitation. 243
To expand the breadth of their argument, the European Communities also
argued that ETI violated the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
Article III:l(a) "because it is only applicable to profits arising from export
transactions." 2 " Therefore, because the ETI is conditioned upon exportation, the
European Communities asserted that the subsidy is export-contingent in respect to
American-produced goods.245
The European Communities also argued that ETI accords more favorable
treatment to American domestic products than imported foreign products. 246 They
claimed that because qualified foreign trade property's fair market value cannot
contain more than fifty-percent foreign content, ETI is not available to foreign
corporations whose goods have one hundred percent foreign content.247 In
essence, the European Communities argued that by discriminating against products
with foreign content, ETI afforded domestic products favorable treatment, thus
violating GATT-1994, Article 111:4.248
238. See id.
239. See WTO Doc. WTIDSI08/14/Corr.1.
240. See WTO Doc. WT/DS 108/RW, at para. 8.43.
241. See WTO Doc. WT/DSI08/RW, at para. 8.30.
242. For a discussion on qualified foreign trade property, see supra notes 219-223 and
accompanying text.
243. WTO Doc. WTIDSI08/RW, at para. 8.1.
244. See id. at para. 8.50.
245. See id. at paras. 8.59-60.
246. See id. at para. 3.1(e).
247. See WTO Doc. WT/DSI08/RW, at para. 8.160.
248. See GATT, supra note 16, at art. III - National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded
to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or
use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential
internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of
the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product
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As previously discussed, the United States countered by stating that ETI is not
export-contingent, and is in complete accord with the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures and other WTO obligations.249 Because Section 114 of
the Code is available to both domestic and foreign manufacturers, the United
States argued that by definition, it could not be considered export-contingent under
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Article 1: 1.25°
In addition, the United States commented that ETI "does not require the use
of domestic rather than imported goods." '251 Within the language of ETI, the
United States stated that goods could meet the foreign articles and labor limitation
imposed by GATT Article 111:4 "even if one hundred percent of the fair market
value of their inputs is foreign. 252 Because ETI did not violate Article 111:4 on its
face, the United States argued that it did not constitute an illegal export subsidy.
Finally, the United States asserted that if legislation provided that "gross
income does not include income generated from export activities," as ETI does, the
ordinary meaning of Article I:l(a) suggests that there would not be a financial
contribution within the meaning of the Article.253 This is because the "tax revenue
on export activities would not be 'otherwise due' under the law of the Member,
which is the normative benchmark for an Article I analysis. 25 4
Along with filing a grievance in the WTO, the European Communities
criticized the United States defenses in the matter. European Communities
officials publicly stated that the United States appeared to be basing its defense on
a narrow definition of subsidy "that assumes that whatever is not specifically
prohibited by the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures is
permitted."' 55  This defensive strategy, they argued, was very similar to the
original strategy in the FSC debate.
On August 20, 2001, the Panel decided against the United States, and found
that the ETI is in fact an illegal subsidy.25 6 In looking at both arguments, the Panel
first addressed whether ETI is export-contingent. Applying a "but for" analysis,
similar to the reasoning in its FSC decision, the Panel concluded that the ETI
exclusion foregoes revenue that is otherwise due within the meaning of
Article 1: 1.257 This conclusion meant that only exporters are entitled to take the
exemption, and thus, the United States government is not taxing income that it
would normally tax but for the exemption.
The Panel also found that the United States was in violation of the Agreement
249. See GATT, supra note 16, at para. 3.3.
250. See GATT, supra note 16, at para. 8.51.
251. Id. at para. 8.125.
252. Id. (emphasis added).
253. Id. at para. 8.39.
254. Id.
255. Extraterritorial Income: US. Outlines FSC Replacement Defense, Urges WTO to Reject EU's
Argument, 50 DAILY TAx REP., Mar. 14, 2001 at G-5.
256. See generally, WTO Doc. WT/DS108/RW. As a note, the ETI Panel was the same as in the
original FSC dispute.
257. See id. at para. 8.37.
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on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article III:l(a). Because qualifying
foreign trade property had to be held a for ultimate use outside the United States,
ETI is therefore only available in respect of income derived from transactions
relating to that property. 258 This meant that ETI was export-contingent because
only exports could take advantage of the exemption, in clear violation of Article
III:1 (a).
Finally, the Panel found that ETI also violated GATT Article 111:4 because
American products would be more likely to take advantage of the exclusion than
imported products.259 Although Section 114 of the Code states that products may
be manufactured inside or outside the United States, the Panel concluded that an
illegal subsidy existed even if only a small percentage of corporations using the
exemptions had one hundred percent American content products. 260 This meant
that there was no possible way for foreign products to take advantage of ETI, thus
violating Article 111:4 by providing less favorable treatment to imported products.
This decision seemed to puzzle many American trade experts. For example,
Fred Murray, Vice President for Tax Policy of the National Foreign Trade Council,
Inc., told reporters that "the Panel's decisions appears to ignore the fact that the
United States fundamentally alters its tax system specifically to comply with the
WTO's rules and to move the United States system closer to territorial tax systems
that are common in Europe and around the world.",26 1 This sentiment echoed the
United States' argument throughout the disagreement: DISCs, FSCs and ETI all, in
one way or another, deferred or exempted export income, just like territorial
taxation systems in Europe. Unfortunately, the WTO did not analyze these tax
methods in the same manner.
On October 15, 2001, the United States filed an appeal of ETI Panel's
decision with the WTO Appellate Body.262 This was done in part because of
pressure placed on United States Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick, by various
congressmen. In a letter dated September 6, 2001, eleven House Democrats, led
by Representatives Charles Rangel of New York and Sander Levin of Michigan,
urged Zoellick to appeal the ETI decision because it was "deeply flawed. 263
President Bush received pressures from the private sector as well. In a letter
dated August 8, 2001, chief executives of seventy-four leading American
companies wrote him, urging an appeal of the ETI decision.264  These chief
executives stated that an appeal "could serve to clarify the meaning of WTO rules
and provide greater certainty about what needs to be done to resolve this 'volatile
258. See WTO Doc. WT/DSI08/RW, at para. 8.74.
259. See WTO Doc. WT/DS108/RW, at para. 8.158.
260. See id. at para. 8.123.
261. Extraterritorial Income: WTO Panel Issues Preliminary Ruling Against United States in FSC
Dispute, 246 DAILY TAX REP., Dec. 21, 2000, at G-4. See also supra note 227.
262. See International Taxes: US. Files Notice of Appeal of WTO Ruling on Extraterritorial
Income, 201 DAILY TAx REp., Oct. 19, 2001, at G-6.
263. Extraterritorial Income: EU Presses US. to Announce Decision on Whether it Will Appeal
FSC Ruling, 193 DAILY TAx REP., Oct. 9, 2001, at G-6 [hereinafter EUPresses U.S.].
264. See id.
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conflict." 265
On November 26, 2001, the United States' appeal was argued by Deputy
Treasury Secretary Kenneth Dam. 266 By having a high-ranking official take part,
the Bush administration hoped that the WTO would realize how serious the United
States was taking the appeal.267 While before the Appellate Body, Dam argued
that ETI is not export-contingent because both foreign and domestic corporations
can take advantage of its tax benefits.268
Dam also stated that the Panel's decision on ETI was so broad and subjective
that it "calls into question measures incorporated in the tax systems of every
(WTO) member., 269 This decision, he continued, not only undermined ETI, but
"could place at risk other tax systems in Europe and the rest of the world. 2 70 In
order to emphasize this point, Dam cited specific examples of European countries
that give incentives to their exporters, similar to the United States and its use of
ETI. These examples, particularly tax systems in Belgium, France, Germany, and
Italy, exclude resident corporations from paying corporate tax on foreign income
or are not taxed on foreign source dividend income. These examples are so similar
to ETI that they can be considered one in the same.27 '
In its appeal, the United States seems to be rehashing the same argument that
has been the focus of American policy since the advent of DISCs in 1971: the
system is not export-contingent, and therefore is not an illegal subsidy. As
previously stated, Section 114 of the Code specifically provides that qualified
foreign trade property must be sold outside the United States. This was one of the
main points of the Panel's decision.
On January 14, 2002, the WTO's Appellate Body enforced this main point by
affirming the Panel's decision on ETI.272 As with previous decisions, this decision
held that the United States was illegally subsidizing its exporters through the use of
ETI. Specifically, the Appellate Body looked to previous decisions and their
interpretation of "contingent." As stated in the Canada-Aircraft decision in 1999,
contingent means "'conditional' or 'dependent' for its existence upon something
else. 273 In other words, the grant of a subsidy must be conditional or dependent
upon export performance.
The Appellate Body then applied this definition to ETI. Because ETI requires
qualified foreign trade property to be sold outside the United States, it is export
265. See id.
266. See Extraterritorial Income: Deputy Treasury Secretary Dam to Make Opening Argument in
FSC Appeal at WTO, 213 DAILY TAX REP., Nov. 6,2001, at G-1.
267. See id.
268. See Extraterritorial Income: World's Tax Systems "At Risk" Because of WTO Ruling, U.S.




272. See generally WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/RW.
273. Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R
(Aug. 2, 1999), at para. 166.
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contingent even though foreign-based corporations can take advantage of its
provisions. 274 The Appellate Body concluded that just because the "subsidies
granted [to foreign-based corporations] might not be export contingent, [it] does
not dissolve the export contingency arising in the first set of circumstances."
' 75
The Appellate Body also looked to the fact that the United States was
foregoing taxation due on the overseas transactions.276 As stated in SCM Article
1. 1 (a)(1)(ii), "the normative benchmark for determining whether revenue foregone
is otherwise due must allow a comparison of the fiscal treatment of comparable
income, in the hands of taxpayers in similar situations. 277
Examining the Code, the Appellate Body first looked to Section 61(a), where
gross income means "all income from whatever source derived. 278 In determining
a taxpayer's tax liability, gross income is then reduced by a credit, subject to
limitations, with the amount of foreign taxes paid or deemed to have been paid by
that taxpayer. 279 These rules on the taxation of gross income, however, do not
apply to any income received on the sale of qualified foreign trade property.
This income, known as qualified foreign trade income, is excluded from
taxation altogether.28 0 Because of this, "the amount of tax paid by the taxpayer
will very likely be less than the tax which the taxpayer would have paid, on that
income, under the rules "otherwise" applicable to foreign-source income, if the
taxpayer did not elect to use the ETI measure.281
The Appellate Body concluded, "This, too, confirms that the United States
will forego revenue under the ETI measure that would be 'otherwise due',"
violating SCM Article I. I (a)(1)(ii). 282
Unlike previous decisions by a WTO dispute resolution body, this part of the
Appellate Body's decision was actually applauded by some United States officials.
For example, Linnett Deily, the United States Ambassador to the WTO, applauded
this part of the decision by stating that the Appellate Body "clarified the normative
benchmark for determining whether revenue foregone is otherwise due.' 283 This,
he went on to say, "has made its standard clearer and more understandable. 28 4
Like previous WTO decisions, Deily stated that the majority of the opinion
lacks guidance, making it difficult for WTO members to avail themselves of a
WTO subsidy exemption. 285 This vagueness in WTO opinions, it seems, is making
274. See WTO Doc. WT/DSI08/ABIRW, at para. 119.
275. WTO Doc. WT/DS 108/AB/RW, supra note 274, at para. 119
276. See id. at paras. 81-107.
277. Id. at para. 98.
278. Id. at para. 99.
279. See id. at para. 100.
280. See id. at para. 102.
281. Id. at para. 104.
282. Id.
283. Extraterritorial Income: U.S. Official Cites 'Encouraging' Findings in WTO Appellate Body's
Ruling on ETIAct, 20 DAILY TAX REP., Jan. 30, 2002, at G-3 [hereinafter Extraterritorial Income].
284. Id.
285. See Extraterritorial Income, supra note 283.
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it difficult for the United States to comply with its WTO obligations.
The European Communities, on the other hand, appear content with the
Appellate Body's decision. At the time of the decision, it was unclear what the
European Communities would do: they could have requested sanctions against
American products, request direct retaliation against American exporters, or
simply wait and see what the American Congress would do about ETI.
After waiting for fifteen months, 286 the European Communities finally asked
the WTO for over four billion-dollars in direct retaliation against American
exporters and their goods.287 This retaliation is against everything from meatmeant
and vegetables to paper and cotton.288  In essence, the American products
mentioned in the retaliation would be slapped with additional duties of up to 100
percent ad valorem above bound customs duties.28 9
Currently, there is no timeline when the European Communities will
implement these sanctions. European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, however,
has said that the EU "will hold off imposing the sanctions as long as Congress
appears to be making a good-faith effort to bring U.S. law into compliance with
WTO rules. 290  Previously, though, he stated that "if there is 'no sign that
compliance is on the way' by this fall, the Commission will begin the 'legislative
procedure' leading to the adoption of retaliatory trade measures by January 1,
2004."29I
Some officials in the U.S. have taken the pending retaliation as an escalation
to the already-heightened tension between the U.S. and the European
Communities. As stated by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Charles E.
Grassley, "[s]anctions would needlessly elevate bilateral trade tensions in the
targeted areas and derail our efforts to resolve this issue in a timely way." 292 He
went on to say that "[s]anctions could also lead to a deeper economic slowdown
when we need to do all we can to expand world trade and economic growth. 293
Other officials, however, seem to look at the Appellate Body's decision and
the following European Communities' retaliation as the U.S. being caught with its
hand in the cookie jar. As stated by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman
William Thomas:
We're in violation [of our GATT responsibilities]... [s]ome of these people who
make these uppity comments about why can't people give us a little bit of time-
286. The original Appeals decision was on January 14, 2002. For reference, see WTO Doc.
WT/DS I 08/AB/RW.
287. See WTO Doc. WTO/DS108/26 (April 25, 2003).
288. See id.
289. See id. See also EU Threatens to Impose Sanctions If NoNoif no U.S. Progress on
Compliance by Fall, 89 DAILY TAx REP., May 8, 2003, at G-10.
290. Thomas May Post-Pone International Tax Bill; Crane-Rangel Measure Gets 100 Co-
Sponsors, 108 DAILY TAX REP., June 5, 2003, at G-10.
291. Id.
292. EU Threatens to Impose Sanctions If No US. Progress on Compliance by Fall, 89 DAILY TAX
RE'., May 8, 2003, at G-10. As a note, Senator Grassley is a Republican from Iowa.
293, Id.
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this was the fourth WTO decision against us. I know that the rest of the world is
unfair to us but, at some point, when we're wrong and, if we are the major
importer and exporter in the world, we have to look at our responsibility to
maintain the world trading order. Frankly, we have won far more cases than we
have lost using that structure.2
94
Due to the previous decision against the U.S., ETI is currently considered an
illegal subsidy by the WTO. The following section will look at what the United
States should do to become WTO-compliant. Specifically, it will discuss
revamping the American taxation system, as well as diplomatic pressures the
United States could exert over the European Communities.
VI. REMEDYING THE EXPORT SUBSIDIES PROBLEM
In order to become WTO-compliant, the United States could change the focus
of its tax system to a territorial system. In doing this, it should not try to introduce
legislation similar to the FSC or ETI. The previous three decades of struggle
between the United States and the European Communities should be enough of an
incentive not to repeat prior mistakes. As echoed by House Ways and Means
Committee Chairman Thomas, "We should accept the message of the WTO ruling,
roll up our sleeves, and get down to work immediately to design a tax system that
will make Americans competitive both at home and as they trade abroad. 295
One way to do this is to move the United States toward a value added tax-
based system, reimbursing corporations throughout the manufacturing process.
This would allow American exporters to take advantage of value added tax
exemptions on taxation. Value added tax in the United States would also be WTO-
compliant because, as stated previously, GATT has endorsed the value added tax
as being compliant with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
and other GATT agreements. 296 In fact, consumption-based taxes such as the
value added tax are followed by a majority of nations, including all members of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development, except for the United
States.297 Because the rest of the world uses a value added tax, there has been a
major congressional effort to turn the American system of taxation from a
worldwide system to one based on consumption, particularly one based on the
value added tax.298
As previously discussed, consumption-based tax methods on exports such as
294. Thomas Says He Soon Will Introduce ETI Bill, Criticizes Crane-Rangel Approach, 90 DAILY
TAX REP., May 9, 2003, at G-10. As a note, Congressman Thomas is a Republican from California.
295. Extraterritorial income: WTO Issues Final Ruling Maintaining Interim Findings Against US
FSC/ET1, 141 DAILY TAX REP., July 24, 2001 at GG- I.
296. See supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text.
297. See Laura Dale, The Economic Impact of Replacing the Federal Income Tax with a Federal
Consumption Tax: Leveling the International Playing Field, 9 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 47, 47
(2000).
298. For a discussion on these congressional efforts, see infra notes 299-310 and accompanying
text.
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value added taxation allow a domestic corporation to sell its exports free of
domestic taxes. This is allowed because under value added taxation, exports are
considered zero-rate exemptions. 299 By the United States changing to a value
added taxation system, American corporations, like the rest of the world, could use
these exemptions to sell their exports free of domestic tax, thus lowering their
overall prices and allowing them to be competitive in the international exportation
market.t5
In fact, there have been several proposals to implement various value added
taxation systems in the United States. One of these proposals, introduced in 1994
by Congressman Sam Gibbons, repealed both the individual and corporate income
tax, and replaced them with a value added tax.30 1 This proposal was introduced
because "[wie cannot afford the current system. It costs too much to operate. It
destroys Americans' confidence in their government and it hurts our economy by
exporting American job opportunities. ' °  Commonly referred to as the "business
transfer tax, 30 3 the bill placed a twenty-percent value added tax on all stages of
production, 3 04 similar to value added taxes in Europe. The bill, however, died in
the House Committee on Ways and Means, and was never re-introduced.
Other proposals have added a value added tax on top of already existing
income tax liabilities. Introduced by Senator Ernest Hollings and Representative
John Dingell, their proposal added a five-percent value added tax to each taxable
transaction. 0 5 This tax would be used to fund a national health care system. As
with European value added taxes, food, housing and medical care were considered
zero-rate exemptions. Both bills died in committee and were never re-introduced.
These bills were either outright denounced or never re-introduced because of
the intense congressional distaste for value added taxes. In fact, in 1994, a number
of congressmen joined an anti-VAT caucus to combat proposals that introduced
any form of value added taxation. 306  This distaste was due to the enormous
administrative pressure placed on governments that imposed forms of value added
299. See supra notes 114-119 and accompanying text.
300. For a discussion on the repercussions of changing from a worldwide taxation system to one
based on consumption, see generally Dale, supra note 297.
301. HR. 4050, 104th Cong. § 101 (1996). As a note, Congressman Gibbons is a Democrat from
Florida.
302. Introductory Statement and Technical Description of Bill (H.R. 4050) by Rep. Sam Gibbons
(D-Fla) for Single-Rate Subtraction-Method Value-Added Tax, Introduced September 11, 1996, 177
DAILY TAX REP., Sept. 12, 1996, at D-45.
303. See Charles E. McClure, Jr., The U.S. Debate on Consumption-Based Taxes: Implications for
the Americas, 29 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 143, 149 (2000).
304. See H.R. 4050, 104th Cong. § 10001 (1996).
305. See H.R. 16, 106th Cong. § 3901 (1999) (the Dingell bill to finance health care); S. 237, 104th
Cong. § 101 (1995) (the Hollings bill to finance national health care and to fund reductions in the
national debt). As a note, Senator Hollings is a Democrat from South Carolina and Representative
Dingell is Democrat from Michigan. See also Alan Schenk, Radical Tax Reform for the 21st Century:
The Role for a Consumption Tax, 2 CHAP. L. REv. 133, 139 n.39 (1999).
306. See Tax Policy: White House Has no Plans to Move Towards Value-Added Tax, Bentsen Says,
207 DAILY TAX REP., Oct. 28, 1994 at D-10. At the time, the anti-VAT caucus consisted of 17 Senators
and 111 House members.
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taxation. Many experts, including Daniel Mitchell, McKenna Senior Fellow in
Political Economy at the Heritage Foundation, warn that a value added tax will
increase the size and cost of government. 30 7 He came to this conclusion because
countries with value added taxation have on average a forty-percent heavier tax
burden than those without value added taxation. 30 8 These countries also consume
about forty-two percent more national economic output to implement the tax than
non-value added taxation countries.30 9
Moreover, replacing the Code with a value added tax system would be an
enormous congressional task. In order to implement a value added tax, Congress
would have to re-work the entire Code with respect to all relevant parts of taxation
dealing with exports and their inclusion in gross income. Congress would also
have to debate whether the value added tax would apply only to exports, or to all
individuals and corporations under the Code. In the event that the value added tax
would apply only to corporations, specifically those engaged in exportation, the
United States would risk the possibility that the WTO would consider this system
an illegal subsidy because of its export nature, thus in violation of GATT and other
WTO obligations.
Finally, a value added tax would move away from a fundamental of American
taxation; namely that the Code allows taxpayers to customize tax liabilities to their
individual needs. As previously discussed, the Code allows taxpayers incentives
such as tax credits and deduction to avoid tax liabilities. These incentives, in turn,
allow the taxpayer to tailor their business practices to obtain the most beneficial
tax status. A value added taxation system, on the other hand, places a flat rate on
all products during the production stage. 30 This obviously does not allow for the
same amount of tax planning as does a system with tax incentives.
Another way to become WTO-compliant is through the use of a pure
territorial tax on foreign branches of domestic corporations. This could be
achieved by not taxing any income earned outside the United States, exactly like
the European Communities taxation system. This would allow American exporters
to avoid double taxation because, unlike before, exporters are now only paying
foreign tax in the country where the sale took place. It would also signal to the
WTO that the United States is serious about becoming WTO-compliant and is
ready, willing and able to work with the rest of the world on difficult and intricate
problems.
This option, however, could possibly result in the mass exodus of American
manufacturers overseas to low tax jurisdictions. 31! This would be very similar to
307. See VAT VAT Option in OMB Memo Denounced; Candidates Urged to Join Anti-VAT
Caucus, 206 DAILY TAx REP., Oct. 27, 1994 at D-5.
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. Some systems allow exemptions for needed items such as food (true exemption) and others
allow items to be taxed at zero percent (zero-rate exemptions). For a discussion on true and zero-rate
exemptions within value added taxation, see supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
311. For a discussion on territorial taxation and American corporate decisions, see generally
Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Where Will They Go If We Go Territorial? Dividend Exemption
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the problem present in the 1950's, the pre-DISC era discussed above. This was the
whole point behind the advent of Subpart F under the Kennedy Administration.
Therefore, this too seems to be an implausible option to American lawmakers.
A large-scale change to the Code, however, seems very improbable because
such a change "will take more than six months-well beyond the end-of-April date
when the European [Communities] will be authorized to retaliate against the
United States over the dispute. ,312  Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max
Baucus, echoed this sentiment by stating that the Bush administration should seek
a resolution to the dispute "other than a major overhaul of the United States tax
code. 313
Currently, there is legislation being generated to replace ETI with a deduction
for American manufacturers. 1 4 Sponsored by Reps. Philip Crane and Charles
Rangel, H.R. 1769 is intended to "help U.S. manufacturers and their workers
maintain their international competitiveness., 31 5 This proposal currently has both
widespread Congressional3 16 and manufacturing 17 support.
If passed in its current form, H.R. 1769 would repeal ETI.31 In its place, a
newly-created Code Section 250 would allow a deduction of ten percent for
"qualified production activities income." 319  As currently defined, qualified
production activities income is "(1) the portion of the modified taxable income of
the taxpayer which is attributable to domestic production activities, and (2) the
domestic/foreign fraction. 320 In essence, this means that a domestic manufacturer
will receive a deduction against itstheir gross income for making itsthere products
domestically rather than abroad. This deduction, however, is further reduced by
multiplying the deduction by a fraction. 32' Because a fraction is used to determine
the final deduction allowed, some officials in the current administration think that
and the Location Decisions of US. Multinational Corporations, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 787 (2001).
312. Extraterritorial Income: Complying With WTO Tax Ruling Will Take Over Six Month, Thomas
Says, 27 DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 8, 2002 at G-8, citing comments made by House Ways and Means
Committee Chairman Bill Thomas, a Republican from California.
313. Id. (citing 26 DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 7, 2002 at G-7). As a note, Senator Baucus is a Democrat
from Montana.
314. See generally H.R. 1769, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003). Currently, there is a Senate companion bill
to H.R. 1769 that was introduced May 1, 2003. See generally S.B. 970, 108,h Cong. (2003).
315. Rangel, Crane Introduce Export Tax Bill With Domestic Manufacturers Rate Deduction, 71
DAILY TAX REP., Apr. 14, 2003 at G-9. As a note, Congressman Crane is a Republican from Illinois,
and Congressman Rangel is a Democrat from New York.
316. Currently, there are 100 co-sponsors of the bill. See Thomas May Post-Pone International Tax
Bill; Crane-Rangel Measure Gets 100 Co-Sponsors, 108 TAX REP., June 5, 2003 at G-10.
317. Some of the American companies in support of H.R. 1769 are Microsoft, Boeing, and
Caterpillar. See EU Threatens to Impose Sanctions if no US Progress on Compliance by Fall, 89 TAX
REP., May 8, 2003 at G-10.
318. H.R. 1769, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).
319. See idat § 3(a).
320. Id.
321. See id. Within newly-created § 250(g), the ten percent deduction is multiplied by the value of
domestic production/the value of worldwide production. Because the value of the worldwide
production may be higher than the domestic production, it will then reduce the deduction allowed.
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
a newly-created Section 250 may be too difficult to administer. 2
Although intended to replace ETI, the current legislation does not offer
American exporters the same economic incentive to help off-set double taxation
abroad. In the current ETI legislation, almost any American exporter can take
advantage of the exclusion of extraterritorial income from gross income.323  So
long as the income is classified as extraterritorial income under Section 114, it is
an exclusion from gross income. Under the current version of H.R. 1769, only a
certain percent is deducted from gross income.324 This percentage is further
reduced to almost zero if the corporation does a significant portion of itstheir
325manufacturing overseas.
Similarly, ETI can be used by both manufacturers and service-providers. 6
Under H.R. 1769, only domestic manufacturers can take advantage of the
deduction. 7 As stated by an anonymous staffer close to the current legislation,
"[albout 25 percent of the companies that now benefit from ETI are service
corporations, which get no relief at all under the Crane-Rangel [H.R. 1769]
approach.328
Finally, many legislators feel the bill in its current form should pass WTO
scrutiny under the previous three decades of debate.3 2 9 This is because H.R. 1769
does not differentiate between exporters and domestic corporations, unlike ETI,
322. See Domestic Manufacturing ETI Replacement Raises Equity, Complexity Issues, Olson Says,
97 TAx REP., May 20, 2003 at G-8, citing comments made by Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax
Policy Pamela Olson. This fraction may be difficult to administer because the corporation needs to
clearly document all domestic production, including gross receipts, deductions and income attributable
to domestic production. For reference, see H.R. 1769, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003), specifically newly-
created §250(d).
323. See § 114, referring to § 942(a)(1), defining foreign trading gross receipts as receipts which
are:
(A) from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of qualifying foreign trade property
(B) from the lease or rental of qualifying foreign trade property for use by the lessee
outside the United States,
(C) for services which are related and subsidiary to-
(i) any sale, exchange, or other disposition of qualifying foreign trade property by such
taxpayer, or
(ii) any lease or rental of qualifying foreign trade property described in subparagraph (B)
by such taxpayer,
(D) for engineering or architectural services for construction projects located (or
proposed for location) outside the United States, or
(E) for the performance of managerial services for a person other than a related person in
furtherance of the production of foreign trading gross receipts described in subparagraph
(A), (B), or (C).
324. See H.R. 1769, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).
325. See id. at § 3.
326. See supra, note 323
327. Id.
328. Crane, Rangel Urge Lawmakers to Support Domestic Manufacturing ETI Replacement, 94
TAx REP., May 15, 2003 at G-4.
329. See Thomas Says He Soon Will Introduce ETI Bill, Criticizes Crane-Rangel Approach, 90
TAx REP., May 8, 2003 at G-10, citing a legal analysis written by the Democratic Staff to the Senate
Finance Committee.
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FSC and the DISC regimes.
It will fail WTO scrutiny, however, on other grounds. Under the DSU, the
losing party must comply with the Panel/Appellate Body's decision within
eighteen months of the decision.330 Currently, H.R. 1769 phases in over a five-
year period,33' in clear violation of the DSU's requirements. As stated by EC
spokeswoman Arancha Gonzales, "EU legal experts believe the five-year transition
period proposed in H.R. 1769 'is clearly WTO-incompatible and therefore
unacceptable."332
As with any piece of legislation, what currently exists will not necessarily be
the final result. In its current form, H.R. 1769 does not offer the same benefits to
exporters as ETI, and should not be viewed as its replacement. Rather, H.R. 1769
should be viewed as an economic stimulus package to bring jobs back into the U.S.
during a time of economic recession, and not as a means to help exporters. If that
were the case, all exporters, including service providers, would be able to take
advantage of the deduction offered in H.R. 1769. Similarly, the deduction would
not be reduced by a fraction, and would generate roughly the same after-tax
savings as ETI.
Instead of making changes to the Code or the United States system of
taxation, there are other ways to combat this disagreement. As stated throughout
this article, the United States has argued that FSCs and ETI are very similar to the
European Communities' taxation systems because they both either defer or exempt
export income from taxation. To settle this debate, the United States could bring
an action against the European Communities, claiming that their taxation systems
are illegally subsidizing their exports.
In bringing this action, the United States could argue that because value added
taxation allows a zero-rate exemption for exports, these systems are in violation of
GATT and WTO obligations because they are export contingent. Like the
European Communities arguments against FSCs and ETI, the United States could
argue that because value added taxation defers tax liability specifically related to
exports, it fits within the meaning of Footnote 59 to the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures. Because of this, value added taxation is an illegal
subsidy.
This may not be the best approach, however, because of the reaction by the
European Communities and a possible favorable WTO holding in the action. In
bringing an action, the United States' actions may be viewed as vindictive rather than
as an attempt to resolve the disagreement. The European Communities may interpret
this action as a slap in the face, and that the United States is unwilling to progress
towards a peaceful end to the thirty-year debate. Similarly, they could also see the
action as an escalation to the disagreement, making future consultations more hostile
than previous meetings.
330. See supra, note 57 and accompanying text.
331. See H.R. 1769, 108th Cong. at § 3 (2003).
332. See Thomas Says He Soon Will Introduce ETI Bill, Criticizes Crane-Rangel Approach, 90
TAX Rap., May 8, 2003 at G-10
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Bringing the action may not solve the disagreement because the WTO Panel,
even if it finds in favor of the United States, may not clarify the situation. In its
decisions on DISCs, FSCs, and ETI, the United States complained that the Panel's
holding did not give any meaningful direction to the United States. These holdings
did not explain which parts of the tax method were considered to be subsidies, nor
did it identify how the United States could change its method of taxation to become
compliant with its WTO obligations. Such a holding in an action against the
European Communities would frustrate further the relations between Europe and the
United States, making future cooperation very difficult.
In the end, the best way for the United States to become WTO-compliant is to
continue meeting with representatives from both the European Communities and the
WTO. These meetings should be cooperative in nature, and very specific as to how
the United States can become WTO-compliant. In this way, the United States can
better understand what the WTO is looking for in compliance, and how territorial
and value added taxation are not in violation of GATT and WTO obligations.
Although they are not occurring on a worldwide basis, there are some meetings
already taking place between representatives of the United States and the European
Cormmunities. In early January, 2002, with the Appellate Body's decision on ETI on
the near horizon, United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick began to meet
with the European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy. These meetings, as
characterized by Zoellick, were "a good faith effort to try to resolve the issue fairly
and to put it to rest.
' 333
These meetings, however, need to include the WTO and other nations such as
India, Australia, and Japan.334 In order to end the current subsidies debate properly,
the United States needs to present its argument to all WTO members, not just to a
WTO Panel or Appellate Body. These organizations by definition do not change or
make trade policy; they simply enforce them. By not including other nations in the
discussions, the United States is only going to get half of the picture. It will only
receive advice on how future legislative changes to the Code are WTO-compliant in
the eyes of the European Communities; not in the eyes of who matters most: the
WTO.
To present its argument, I suggest that the United States request that the WTO
include the current debate over subsidies on its calendar for the next Ministerial
Conference, held in Mexico in 2003. 3 15 This will give the United States enough time
to garner international support for its arguments. It will also allow the United States
to consider its next move to become WTO-compliant. This Conference, known as
the Fifth Ministerial Conference, will be similar to the Fourth Ministerial
333. Extraterritorial Income: U.S. Vows to Comply With WTO Tax Ruling, Sets Plan For Working
With Congress and EU, 18 DAILY TAX REP., Jan. 28, 2002 at G-6.
334. These nations were involved in the ETI decision as third-party participants. See generally
WTO Doc. WT/DSI08/AB/RW.
335. This conference will take place in Cancun, Mexico on Sept. 10-14, 2003. See WTO, Current
Negotiations and Implementation, Doha Development Agenda, http://www.wto.org/English/ tratop e/
dda_eldda_e.htm.
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Conference, held last November in Doha, Qatar. 6 At the Fourth Conference, WTO
members discussed the admission of two bitter rivals to the WTO: Taiwan and
mainland China.337 By admitting such members to the organization, the WTO's
current members proved that they can work together on a very difficult issue. Such
cooperation will be imperative to end the current subsidies debate.
Such a Conference would also provide the opportunity for the United States to
present its ideas on value added taxation and GATT agreements in a non-adversarial
manner. It can present ideas on future legislation, and obtain input from the
European Communities and the WTO. It could even ask the WTO for a preliminary
holding on whether the proposed method of taxation is WTO-compliant.
Finally, such a Conference would also provide the United States a forum to
request change from the WTO and GATT. Specifically, it could ask to amend the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures so ETI could be included,
making it compliant with WTO obligations. If this tactic does not work, the United
States could try to garner international support for amending the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures from a majority of WTO member nations.
VII. CONCLUSION
The European Communities and the United States are entering their fourth
decade of debate over the exact definition of the term subsidy. This disagreement
has led the United States to implement various methods of taxation in order to
allow its exporters to compete with foreign exporters. In abiding by its goal of fair
and equitable trade between countries, the WTO has held each of these methods of
taxation to be in violation of various WTO and GATT agreements.
These WTO decisions have led to mass confusion regarding the exact
definition of the term subsidy. To clarify this confusion, the United States, along
with the European Communities and the WTO, should enter into formal
consultations to clarify the situation. Doing so will not only clarify exactly how
the United States subsidizes its exports, but also explain how territorial taxation
does not. This should give the United States a blueprint for successful completion
of their WTO obligations, and still allow American exporters to compete in the
international market.
336. For more information on the Doha Conference, see Current Negotiations and Implementation,
Doha Development Agenda, supra note 335.
337. See generally id.
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CONGRESS AND THE TREATY POWER:
AN ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT AGAINST UNILATERAL
PRESIDENTIAL TERMINATION OF THE ABM TREATY*
Christopher C. Sabis**
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite over 200 years of American legal jurisprudence and political
precedent, the vital question of how the United States can legally terminate
international treaties under the Constitution remains undecided. The Constitution
of the United States is silent on this issue. Historically, the executive and
legislative branches have each been inconsistent at best in their approaches to
treaty termination. The Supreme Court balked in 1979 when given the opportunity
to settle the issue, splitting badly and issuing no majority opinion. Academics
have written widely on the topic, but with diverse approaches, considerations, and
conclusions.
With this history of indecision and confusion, what proponents of legislative
power might consider a worst-case scenario has unfolded. A president elected
without a majority of the popular vote has pulled the United States out of a major
nuclear arms control treaty that has been in force since 1972. To further
complicate the scenario, the pullout occurred in the wake of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. While the popularity that traditionally accompanies an
American president during wartime has minimized the domestic political dissent
surrounding the withdrawal, the legal questions remain.
* The author dedicates this paper to the memory of his beloved grandfather Edward Ciarleglio (1915-
2002). "[H]e was an orphan...He was a strong-willed man, yet a gentle man... He was intelligent and
smart, not school smart but self-taught. His mind was a sponge that eagerly soaked up every written
word. Only when his eyes could no longer see did he lay down his books... He was a Marine who
enlisted when others were called to serve... He was an intricate man who in some ways was difficult to
know... I pray that you have found peace in the hands of God. May he bless you and keep you
forever." Joyce E. Sabis, Eulogy for Edward Ciarleglio (Aug. 26, 2002). Edward, you personified an
lnvictus-like spirit. May the lessons you tried to teach enlighten the happy few who had the privilege of
your company, counsel, and love.
"" J.D., Georgetown University Law Center 2003. Chris would like to thank Professor David Koplow
for suggesting this topic and commenting on multiple drafts. Chris would also like to thank the
attorneys representing the members of Congress in Kucinich v. Bush for allowing him to help in a very
small way with their preparation of that case, especially John Burroughs, Esq., Peter Weiss, Esq., and
Professor Bruce Ackerman, Esq. Finally, Chris would like to acknowledge the Congressman who filed
suit on this issue, showing political courage during an important period in our nation's history.
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The purpose of this paper is to add a new perspective to the debate over the
power to terminate treaties in the United States. Following this introduction, the
second section of this paper will provide background and a much abbreviated
policy analysis of the treaty at issue. This paper's third section will summarize the
current law governing treaty withdrawal, including the seminal case of Goldwater
v. Carter,' and illustrate why this law does not effectively support the proposition
that a President can terminate a treaty without Congressional action.
Once this analysis is completed, the fourth section of this paper provides
originalist arguments for and against a legislative role in treaty termination, and a
conclusion consistent with both policy considerations and intent of the Framers of
the Constitution. While the majority and dissent in Goldwater v. Carter, and past
academic works on the issue, have made practically every textual and policy
argument feasible, this paper will analyze both direct and indirect originalist
evidence from sources such as The Federalist and The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787. The paper will also put these arguments in the present
context and illustrate why the policy concerns of the Framers are still relevant
today. In its final section, the paper analyzes the options Congress had in
addressing the termination of the ABM Treaty, and has in looking ahead to the
potential termination of future treaties, and recommends a course of action based
on the current legal and political climate.
In summary, this paper argues that terminating an international treaty is too
important to world stability and to the national character of the United States to
leave in the hands of a single individual (or party). If the Constitution were to
permit the executive branch to terminate a treaty, it would allow one individual to
destroy legally binding multilateral agreements on a whim, or in a moment of
intense pressure. The termination of a treaty would be no different from that of an
executive agreement. Such a construction of the Constitution would also eliminate
the formal dialogue and debates that provide a check against the impetuousness of
the party in power. Requiring an Act of Congress to terminate a treaty makes
sense on legal, historical, policy, and political levels.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The ABM Treaty and its History
On October 3, 1972, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems (hereinafter "ABM Treaty") went into force.2 The parties agreed to limit
themselves to two ABM deployment areas, and further agreed that these areas
would be located so that they could not provide a full national defense, nor the
1. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
2. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, Oct. 3, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435
[hereinafter ABM Treaty].
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basis for developing one.3 The treaty went on to prescribe the possible locations
4for the two systems and the quantity of missiles that could be present at each one.
The general idea behind these limitations was to maintain the doctrine of "mutual
assured destruction" and, consequently, the balance of power.5 If one nation
developed a defensive system that would render the other nation's nuclear arsenal
useless, the theory held, that nation would no longer fear retaliation upon
launching a first strike.
Two provisions of the ABM Treaty are of paramount importance. The first,
Article I, Paragraph 2, provides the limitation that prompted President George W.
Bush's desire to withdraw. The language reads, "Each Party undertakes not to
deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide
a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an
individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.",6
President Bush believes that this provision is fatal to his plans to develop a
National Missile Defense system (hereinafter, NMD), an idea with its roots in the
Reagan Administration's "Star Wars."7 Further discussion of this system and the
arguments for and against it follow in the next part of this section.
The second relevant section of the ABM treaty bears on the legality of United
States withdrawal. Paragraph II of Article XV reads:
Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw
from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter
of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its
decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such
notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party
regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 8
This Article raises several questions. Does this clause give the President of
the United States the legal authority to terminate the ABM Treaty unilaterally,
without any action from Congress?9 What are "extraordinary events?" What are a
nation's "supreme interests?" Did the Senate, in giving its consent to a treaty with
this escape clause, waive any rights it has under the Constitution to participate in
3. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 1, Ill.
4. See id. at art. Ill.
5. See, e.g., Jack Spencer, Editorial, ABM Treaty Exit Makes Us Safer, BALT. SUN, Dec. 28,
2001, at 15A.
6. ABM Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 1.
7. See Editorial, More Trouble For Star Wars, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 7, 2002, at A6.
8. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, at art. XV. It is common for modem treaties to contain such
termination provisions. Thus, the issue discussed in this paper is important, not just in this case, but for
future potential treaty termination procedures.
9. Some commentators have maintained that it does. See, e.g., Steven Mufson and Dana
Milbank, U.S. Sets Missile Treaty Pullout; Bush to Go Ahead With Defense Tests, WASH. POST, Dec.
14, 2001, at A01. While the Post provides no reason for this conclusion, the DC Circuit made a similar
argument in Goldwater v. Carter. See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text of this paper for
analysis and debunking of this argument.
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the decision to withdraw from the Treaty? ° Would such a waiver also apply to the
House of Representatives? These questions are all important to the analysis of the
issue of treaty termination as it applies to this particular agreement.
B. Termination of the ABM Treaty.
i. Facts
On December 13, 2001, at 4:30 a.m. ET, the United States Ambassador to
Moscow delivered formal word to Russia that President Bush was giving 6 months
notice of United States termination of the ABM Treaty, invoking Article XV of
that document. " While Bush did not formalize this decision until December 13, he
had been considering it long before that date. 12 Secretary of State Colin Powell,
throughout that year, had been in discussions with Russian President Vladimir
Putin in an attempt to convince him that the termination of the ABM Treaty was in
the best interests of both nations; these overtures failed.' 3 "This step was not a
surprise for us," President Putin reflected following Bush's announcement,
"However, we consider it a mistake."'
14
The notice of termination also came without the consent or concurrence of
either house of Congress.'" Bush maintained that the executive branch alone had
the power to terminate treaties between the United States and foreign powers.
However, many members of Congress expressed concern about the president's
decision,16 and some legal scholars questioned the legality of the withdrawal. '
7
2. Policy Arguments
While the policy arguments for and against adhering to the ABM Treaty are
not determinant of the legal issues of unilateral presidential termination, they do
provide a context in which to frame constitutional arguments for and against that
power.' 8 The fact that there are different positions on the issue provides a reason
to scrutinize the methods used to make a final decision on the termination of the
10. See Mufson, supra note 9.
11. See Barry Schweid, Associated Press, ABCNews.com Dec. 13, 2001, at http://abcnews.go.
com/sections/politics/DailyNews/bushabm01 1213.html (last visited Oct. 31,2002).
12. See Mufson, supra note 9.
13. See David E. Sanger and Elisabeth Bumiller, US. to Pull Out of ABM Treaty, Clearing Path
for Antimissile Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at Al.
14. America Withdraws From ABM Treaty, BBC News, Dec. 13, 2001, available at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid1707000/1707812.stm (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
15. See Susan Milligan, Bush Gives Notice US to Drop ABM Pact, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14,
2001, at A31.
16. See, e.g., Mufson, supra note 9.
17. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Opinion, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, at M5.
18. These arguments are not exhaustive of those presented in the debate over the ABM Treaty.
The positions mentioned are some of the major arguments and are included here simply to provide very
basic background information and context.
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Treaty, since the final decision will be binding and will affect the international
reputation of the United States.
a. Arguments for Termination
President Bush and those who support the decision to terminate the ABM
Treaty argue that it is a relic; it is an anachronism from a Cold War over a decade
past.' 9 This belief seemed to gain validity after the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. While these were not missile
strikes, supporters of the termination argue that no one knows what methods
terrorists may use in the future, and that there is a threat of a nuclear attack from
"rogue states.,,20 They maintain that developing nations like North Korea would
not tax their economies by making weapons that the United States could destroy
before they reach their targets.2' In this way, NMD will promote nonproliferation
and protect the United States from a missile attack from a rogue-state. "I have
concluded," said President Bush, "the ABM Treaty hinders our government's
ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue-state
missile attacks., 22 "It's a great move at a great time," believes Kenneth Adelman,
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under Ronald Reagan, "It
shows we are sensitive to the greatest terrorist threat to the country, which is
weapons of mass destruction on top of ballistic missiles. 23
When confronted with the fear that the destruction of the Treaty will lead to a
renewed arms race, particularly with Russian and China, proponents of the missile
defense system give different responses. Some maintain that the ABM Treaty did
not work as an arms reduction measure even when it was timely.24 They point to
the fact that, after the signing of the ABM Treaty, the Soviet ballistic missile
arsenal grew 10,000 missiles by 1990, while the number of U.S. missiles also
19. This is not a new argument. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Clinton Administration was
confronted with the question of whether the ABM Treaty was legally dissolved by the breakup, or
whether the Treaty applied to the new relationship between Russia and the United States. While the
Clinton Administration decided the Treaty was still valid, there are those who have argued that the
abrogation by President Bush is meaningless because the ABM Treaty is inapplicable. See George
Miron, Did the ABM Treaty of 1972 Remain in Force After the USSR Ceased to Exist in December
1991 and Did It Become a Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation?, 17 Am. U.
INT'L L. REV. 189 (2002); David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey, & Darin R. Bartram, The Collapse of the
Soviet Union and the End of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: A Memorandum of Law Prepared
for the Heritage Foundation, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. 1 (2000); see also Robert Stewart, ABM: No
PENALTY FOR EARLY WITHDRAWAL, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 31, 2001, (Editorial), at A9. But see,
SAMUEL B CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 423-25 (2d ed. John Byrne &
Company 1916).
20. See Peter Brown, Decision to Scrap ABM Treaty Recognizes Reality, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Dec. 21, 2001, (Editorial), at A21; see also Bill Nichols, Bush Confirms ABM Treaty Withdrawal, USA
TODAY, Dec. 14, 2001, at 7A; Milligan, supra note 15.
21. See Spencer, supra note 5.
22. America Withdraws From ABM Treaty, supra note 14.
23. Susan Milligan, supra note 15.
24. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 5.
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skyrocketed.25 Others simply maintain that the abrogation will not provide fuel for
an arms race in today's international environment and cite the tame reactions to the
termination of the ABM Treaty from Russia and China as evidence of this
assertion.26
Proponents of the termination also maintain that President Bush and Russian
President Putin have a close relationship-President Bush has often referred to him
as "my friend., 2 7 "The United States and Russia have developed a new, much
more hopeful and constructive relationship," Bush maintains.28 In fact, almost
immediately following Bush's announcement of the termination, President Putin
proposed that the United States and Russia reduce the size of their nuclear
stockpiles to between 1,500 and 2,200 warheads.2 9 Putin has conceded, in spite of
his opposition to the ABM Treaty termination, that it will not affect "the spirit of
partnership and even alliance" between the two nations.30
Proponents also believe that a renewed arms race with China is unlikely.
President Bush phoned China immediately following his announcement of
termination in an attempt to assure the Chinese that they should not interpret the
termination as an offensive move toward China. 3 1 Perhaps because of this gesture,
Ralph A. Cossa, writer for The Orlando Sentinel, insists that conversations
between Cossa and Chinese officials indicate that the Chinese are willing to talk
about improved Sino-U.S. relations.32 In light of recent tensions between the two
nations, this is a positive sign.33
b. Arguments Against Termination
Opponents of the termination counter President Bush's arguments on several
grounds. They contend that the missile defense system for which Bush has
abandoned the ABM Treaty is impractical and that the termination will cause
global instability and a renewed arms race. They further maintain that the
termination has increased the danger of weapons proliferation and that the
withdrawal has damaged the image and reputation of the United States among the
nations of the world. "Winning the peace and achieving stability in the 21st
century," write Robert McNamara and Thomas Graham, Jr., "is all about
international cooperation and strengthening international law, not about U.S.
25. See, Spencer, supra note 5.
26. See William Saire, Editorial, That Dog Won't Bark, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2002, at A27.
27. Milligan, supra note 15; see also Jackson Diehl, Editorial, Dynamic Duo of World Policy,
WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2001, atAI7.
28. Milligan, supra note 15; see also Diehl, supra note 27.
29. See Milligan, supra note 15. See also Mufson, supra note 9; Stewart, supra note 19.
30. Editorial, Putin on the ABM Treaty, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 20, 2001, at 32.
31. See Ralph A. Cossa, Editorial, A Blessing in Disguise for Sino-U.S. Ties?, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Jan. 14, 2002, at Al 1.
32. See id.
33. In recent months, the Chinese found 27 spying devices hidden in a Boeing 767 that it
purchased from the United States. Even after the United State mistakenly bombed the Chinese
Embassy in Belgrade, the Chinese said little upon finding the bugs. See Safire, supra note 26.
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unilateralism.
34
Individuals opposed to the termination maintain that the proposed missile
defense system will not work. On December 14, 2001, one day after the notice of
intent to withdraw, the Pentagon cancelled one of the U.S. Navy's missile-defense
development programs because of "poor performance."" While this is not the
only NMD program and many are still receiving funding with some measure of
progress, the Hartford Courant claims this is evidence that, "A missile-defense
system as conceived by military planners won't work, can never be foolproof, and
would be prohibitively expensive to deploy.' 36 The Denver Post, after a missile
defense test was delayed due to inclement weather, sarcastically lamented,
"[H]eaven help us if our enemies decide to attack during a rain storm. 37
Even assuming the United States could develop and deploy such a shield,
opponents argue it would not be worth the costs for the limited protection it would
provide. The National Intelligence Council estimates that by 2015, China will
have enough nuclear missiles to overwhelm any such shield; Russia already has
more than enough. 3' However, it is true that "rogue nations" like Iran, Iraq, and
North Korea will likely have long-range delivery systems by 2015,3 9 and Bush
maintains that it is these nations, and not China and Russia, for which the United
State should deploy NMD.
In response to this assertion, Australian diplomat and arms-control advocate
Richard Butler argues that, if confronted with NMD, these nations, as well as
Russia and China, will simply develop a better missile designed to penetrate
America's defense system.40 If nothing else, this would lead to a technological
arms race. Moreover, while there is terrorism, the CIA disagrees with President
Bush's claim that terrorists provide an incentive to develop a missile defense. The
CIA maintains that terrorists "are unlikely to employ long-range missiles,
preferring non-missile delivery systems such as suitcases, trucks or ships. 4 1
Termination supporters are quick to point out that the reactions to the
termination of the ABM Treaty, by Russia and China in particular, have been tame,
but opponents maintain that the ABM situation has increased tensions between the
world powers. There are indications that Bush's announcement has angered the
34. Robert S. McNamara and Thomas Graham, Jr., Op-Ed, Bush ABMStance Endangers America,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2002, at E 1i.
35. More Trouble for Star Wars, supra note 7.
36. Id.
37. Editorial, ABM Withdrawal Pains, DENVER POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at B6.
38. See Holger Jensen, China Might be Able to Overwhelm U.S. Missile Shield by 2015, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 12, 2002, (Local), at 4A. See also NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL AND
FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, CONFERENCE REPORT: CHINA AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, available at http://www.odci.gov/nic/pubs/conference
_reports/weapons massdestruction.html (last visited OcL 31, 2002).
39. Jenson, supra note 38. For a brief argument maintaining that a missile defense system does
not address the policy issues governing the U.S. relationship with any of these three countries see
McNamara, supra note 34.
40. See Vernon Loeb, Book World, Armed and Dangerous, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2002, at T5.
41. Jensen, supra note 38.
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Russian Government beyond the reserved response from President Putin. On
Wednesday, January 16, 2002, the lower house of Russia's parliament voted 326-3
for a resolution condemning the United States' withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty. 2 Termination opponents believe that President Bush might cause Putin to
lose face with military commanders who have supported him.43 While President
Bush and President Putin may appear to have a great relationship, the nations they
lead will interact long after their terms in office. A short-term muted response
does not forestall a medium or long-term negative response.
44
Symptoms of a potential rift have surfaced quickly.45 Even as the United
States and Russia discussed decreasing their nuclear stockpiles, Col. Gen. Yuri
Baluyevsky, the head of the Russian delegation, maintained that the American
termination of the ABM Treaty had damaged the atmosphere for the talks. 6 The
Bush Administration fostered this distrust with its decision to put nuclear warheads
into storage rather than destroy them as part of a U.S.-Russian agreement, a
position that angered Russia because it would allow the United States to
"unilaterally and rapidly reconstitute its arsenal of 6,000 strategic warheads." 47
Eventually, the two nations did reach an agreement on an arms reduction treaty
despite the Russian opposition to storage of warheads. 8 It is clear, however, that
the U.S.-Russian relationship is not without tension in light of Russian arms sales
to Iran. 49 Furthermore, Russia plans to form a new $40 billion economic pact with
Iraq even as the U.S. contemplates war against Saddam Hussein's dictatorship.50
Russia is not the only nation that seems uncomfortable. 5' China is concerned
about the possibility that an American missile shield will render its current arsenal
useless.52 On December 26, 2001, China announced that it would increase its
42. See Paul Richter, Foreign Desk, Russia, US. Arms Talks End on Chill Military, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2002, at A5.
43. See ABM Withdrawal Pains, supra note 37.
44. See McNamara, supra note 34; see also Mufson, supra note 9.
45. See McNamara, supra note 34.
46. See Richter, supra note 42.
47. McNamara, supra note 34; Robert Cottrell and Judy Dempsey, The Americas, US Plan to
Store Nuclear Weapons Vexes Russia, FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), Jan. I1, 2002, at 6; see also
Richter, supra note 42, Jensen, supra note 37.
48. See, e.g., James Gerstenzang, Bush and Putin Sign Nuclear Arms Treaty, L.A. TIMES, May 25,
2002 (Foreign Desk), at Al.
49. See, e.g., id.
50. See Peter Baker, Russia, Iraq Plan Economic Deal to Bolster Ties; Moscow's Aid Sought on
Energy, Infrastructure; Pact May Complicate U.S. Action Against Baghdad, WASH. POST, Aug. 18,
2002, at A09. Russia has also joined France in announcing it would veto any United Nations resolution
proposed by the United States that would authorize a war with Iraq. Elizabeth Neuffer and John
Donnelly, Confronting Iraq: US Support Lags; Vote Put Off Vetoes Vowed; Compromise on Iraq Eyed,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, March 11, 2003 at Al.
51. For further commentary on Russia's negative perceptions of U.S. intentions, see Howard Witt,
News, U.S. Throws Wrench into Russia Ties; ABM Disarmament Moves Irk Kremlin, CHI. TRiB., Jan.
17, 2002, at 3N.
52. See Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, Mainland to Increase Budget for the Military, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 27, 2001, at 1; see also McNamara, supra note 34.
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military spending this year."s While this alone may not be news, Beijing sources
indicated that China, "would like the news to serve as a warning to the United
States over its recent decision to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
5 4
Even Europe has shown anger toward the U.S. In what may have been an attempt
to maintain his relationship with Putin, Bush proposed to include Russia in
decision-making procedures of NATO.55 After criticism from Europe and
Washington, Bush and Putin shelved the proposal. 6
Ill. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. The ABM Treaty
1. The Nature of the Treaty
In Goldwater v. Carter, the majority in the D.C. Circuit, and Justice Brennan
at the Supreme Court level, maintained that the type of treaty involved could bear
on how the United States should terminate." However, the situation involving the
ABM Treaty does not contain the features of mutual defense or executive ability to
recognize foreign nations that were present in the Goldwater case. Termination of
the ABM Treaty does not change U.S. commitments to defending its allies, nor
does it invoke any specific executive powers already recognized by the Supreme
Court other than the president's authority in foreign affairs.58 Since the issue is
tangential to the issue of the ABM Treaty, this paper will note it, but, for the sake
of brevity, will not analyze it any further.
2. The Termination Clause
The termination clause of the ABM Treaty 9 provides that each party shall
have the right to terminate the Treaty on six months notice if "extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of [the] Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests."
For the purposes of this paper alone, the author concedes that the relatively new
53. See Chan, supra note 52.
54. Id. This agitation seems particularly undesirable in light of ongoing tension between the
United States and China due to U.S. strategic alliances in the region. See, e.g., Michael A. Lev,
Taiwan's Contradictory Behavior Toward China Raises Confusion, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 14,
2002, at A2 1; Craig Skehan, Howard Told To Confront Japanese PM On Whaling, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, May 1, 2002, at 4.
55. See Diehl, supra note 27.
56. See id.
57. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 707 (1979), vacated by 444 U.S. 996 (1979). This is
particularly apparent in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, where he maintained that President Carter
could terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan on the narrow grounds that, as a mutual
defense treaty, it was inexorably connected with his derecognition of Taiwan and recognition of
mainland China. See infra p. 252.
58. See infra p. 252.
59. See supra p. 227.
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
threat of rogue states developing ballistic missiles and the September 11, 2001
attacks were "extraordinary events related to the subject matter" of the Treaty, and
that they have jeopardized the "supreme interests" of the United States.60 Thus, the
prominent legal question for the purposes of this clause is whether a party has
properly terminated the ABM Treaty.
3. Does the ABM Language Support President Bush's Termination?
Proponents of terminating the ABM Treaty, naturally, maintain that it does.6 1
However, the language of the ABM Treaty dictates that a "Party" shall have the
power to terminate the Treaty.62 The Treaty Preamble defines the Parties as the
nations involved in the Treaty, not their executives; 63 thus, the United States is the
party to the Treaty, not George W. Bush or the office of the presidency. No
provision of the ABM Treaty provides for the executive having sole power to
terminate the Treaty.64
Since the ABM Treaty does not provide an answer to the question of what
branch of the United States government has the power to terminate, it is necessary
to turn to the Constitution to make this determination. After all, if the Senate
already had the constitutional authority to play a role in the termination of the
ABM Treaty during the ratification process, it would not need to reserve that right
when it gave its advice and consent. It follows that President Bush can terminate
the ABM Treaty only if he has the power to terminate treaties on behalf of the
United States under the U.S. Constitution.65
B. The Constitution of the United States: Relevant Provisions
The Constitution is silent on how the United States should terminate a treaty.
While it confers upon the President the power, "by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur," it does not elaborate any further on the treaty power.66 However,
the Constitution does proclaim that, ". . .all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
60. Bush's statement upon announcing the termination of the ABM Treaty lists these as the
predominant factors in the decision. See America Withdrawsfrom ABM Treaty, supra note 14 ("I have
concluded the ABM Treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people
from future terrorist or rogue-state missile attacks.").
61. See, e.g., Mufson, supra note 9. The Court of Appeals in the Goldwater case maintained that
a termination clause was important to its decision that President Carter could terminate the Mutual
Defense Treaty with Taiwan unilaterally because the Senate, when giving its advice and consent, did
not state that it wanted to maintain a say in termination of the treaty. Goldwater, 617 at 708, vacated by
444 U.S. 996 (1979). Therefore, there is some precedent for this position. However, the decision of the
Court of Appeals, having been vacated, it is not binding on any court. For further discussion of this
case, see infra text accompanying notes 125-155.
62. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, at art. XV, §2, 23 U.S.T. 3435.
63. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, at Preamble, 23 U.S.T. 3435.
64. See id.
65. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 699.
66. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
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under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby," thus associating treaties with the
Constitution and the laws of the United States. 67 While these are the only clauses
that specifically address treaties, the lack of a specific procedure for treaty
termination also makes the Necessary and Proper Clause of interest in resolving
this issue. The Constitution dictates that the U.S. Congress has the power, "To
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States or in any Department or Officer thereof."
61
C. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
1. The Restatement's Position
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 339
(1987) (hereinafter "Restatement") maintains that the President of the United
States has the power, amongst other things, "[T]o suspend or terminate an
agreement in accordance with its terms. 69 In reaching this conclusion, the drafters
of the Restatement relied largely on United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.70. 7 1 The following section examines this case in relation to treaty
termination.
2. Does the Restatement Support President Bush's Termination?
Restatements are not binding legal documents; they are attempts to
summarize the state of the law in the view of the majority of its authors. Thus, the
support the Restatement lends to President Bush's unilateral termination of the
ABM Treaty depends upon the strength of its argument and the sources from
which it draws its conclusion.
Curtiss-Wright involved a conspiracy on the part of the appellants to sell arms
to Bolivia during that nation's conflict in the Chaco.72 The United States asserted
that this violated both a Joint Resolution passed by Congress, which authorized
President Roosevelt to criminalize arms sales that would affect foreign conflicts,
and the subsequent proclamation issued by Roosevelt.73 The appellees challenged
the indictment, in relevant part, on the grounds that the Joint Resolution violated
67. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
68. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 339 cmt. a
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
70. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
71. RESTATEMENT § 339 at cmt. a. The Comment cites only Curtiss-Wright. While the Reporter's
Notes cite a couple of other cases, these cases (other than Goldwater) are tangential to the main issue
and are cited to support points not questioned in this paper.
72. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311.
73. See id. at 311.
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the Nondelegation Doctrine.74
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Sutherland, found that Congress had not
violated the Nondelegation Doctrine. 75 The Court, without deciding whether such
an order concerning domestic affairs would violate Nondelegation, held that there
was no delegation issue because of the president's traditional powers in foreign
affairs and the tradition of Congress passing such authorizing legislation in relation
to foreign affairs. Justice Sutherland wrote,
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority
vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an
authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations - a
power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but
which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in
subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. 76
The Restatement's use of Curtiss-Wright as the only support for the position
that the President can terminate a treaty unilaterally is weak. The actual issue had
nothing to do with the power to make or terminate treaties.77 While the Court used
broad-sounding dicta in discussing the power of the executive in foreign relations,
the real question was one of Congressional authority to delegate such power to the
President.78 If the Court hinted that the President would not have needed the Act
of Congress to take action, it did not directly say or hold SO. 7 9 Even if it had,
terminating a binding legal treaty between nations is different from criminalizing
an arms sale. In fact, Justice Sutherland only mentioned the treaty power as one
example of the President's responsibilities in the area of foreign affairs.80 Nothing
in the opinion that would support unilateral presidential termination of treaties is
binding legal precedent.81
74. See id. at 315. The Nondelegation Doctrine is the legal conception that Congress may not
make excessive delegations of its power to make laws to another branch of Government. See, e.g.,
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) ("Art. 1, § I of the U.S. Constitution
vests all legislative power in the Congress. Thus, when Congress confers decision-making authority it
must lay down an "intelligible principle.").
75. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 329.
76. Id. at 319-20.
77. See id. at 315. Furthermore, Justice Southerland's argument for nearly unilateral presidential
discretion in foreign affairs in general is questionable. Many scholars have offered strong critiques of
the Curtiss-Wright reasoning. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional
Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REv. 1, 102 (1999); Anthony Simones, The Reality of Curtiss-
Wright, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 411, 416 (1996); Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign
Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5, 11-16 (1988).
78. See id. at315.
79. See id.
80. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S at 319.
81. While many sources cite the Curtiss-Wright dicta for the proposition of expansive executive
authority in foreign relations, there are historical considerations that weigh against interpreting this case
too broadly. Curtiss-Wright was decided in 1936. At that time, Franklin D. Roosevelt received an
electoral mandate for his New Deal. The Supreme Court, since the 1930's had struggled with the
delegation powers to the Executive Branch essential to carrying out the New Deal. It is logical to
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D. Historical Precedents
In a case such as this, where the Constitutional language is unclear, the
methods of treaty termination the United States has used in the past may be
important in determining how the Court will rule. Unfortunately, the United States
has not developed a uniform method of treaty termination since its formation.
There have been many different methods used to terminate treaties. However, the
vast majority of these instances show that Congress has played an important role in
treaty termination.
1. The First U.S. Treaty Termination
Congress carried out the first treaty termination accomplished by the United
82States through an Act passed on July, 7 1798. In Hooper v. United States, the
court of claims validated the act. The case evolved from Congress' termination of
the first series of treaties with France. A French frigate sunk a registered schooner
from the United States. 83 Hooper, the administrator of an estate of one of the co-
owners of the schooner, claimed that the French Treaties of 1778 remained in force
and could be used as the basis of a spoliation claim against the U.S. Government
for the loss of the ship. a The Government maintained, however, that Congress
had terminated the treaties by its Act of July 7, 1798.5
In rendering its decision, the court of claims held Congress was the correct
U.S. authority to abrogate a treaty and had properly issued the terminating act,
apparently on the grounds that a treaty was the supreme law of the land and thus, a
legislative Act was needed for its termination.8 6 "The treaties therefore ceased to
be a supreme law of the land," the court maintained, "... The annulling act issued
from competent authority and was the official act of the government of the United
States. So far as it was within the power of one party to abrogate these treaties it
was undisputedly done by the Act of July 7, 1787. ' '87
While the facts of this case and that of the ABM Treaty are not identical, the
case is particularly relevant because both the termination and the case took place
soon after the Federal Convention of 1787.88 Courts have always viewed actions
taken in close proximity to the framing of the Constitution "as a contemporaneous
conclude that the Curtiss-Wright decision, being at heart a Nondelegation Doctrine decision, resulted in
part from this environment and a hope of the Court to appease, not only President Roosevelt, but also a
public that needed programs it had recently invalidated on Nondelegation grounds. See Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
393, 457 (1996); see also A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
82. Hooper v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408 (1887).
83. Id. at 409- 10.
84. Id. at 409-1I.
85. Id. at 411.
86. Id. at 418.
87. Hooper, 22 Ct. Cl. at 418.
88. Id.
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exposition of the highest authority."8 9 In Hooper, the Court of Claims clearly
stated that an Act of Congress, signed by the president, was the proper manner in
which the U.S. could terminate a treaty. 90
2. Subsequent Precedents
In 1979, Senator Barry Goldwater's attorney maintained that, "of 55 treaties
terminated by the United States, 52 were broken with congressional approval." 91
President Jimmy Carter, in contrast, pointed to thirteen instances where the
president, purportedly, had acted to terminate a treaty without Congress in an
attempt to justify his unilateral termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan. Upon closer examination of these cases, it is evident that they do not
provide precedent for unilateral presidential termination of a treaty.92
In nine of these instances the other party or parties to the treaty either no
longer existed, chose to terminate the treaty, violated the treaty, or the president at
the time merely took notice of these conditions.93 In one, Congress never
questioned the legality of the termination because the president had the approval of
several prominent Congressmen before the termination of a minor treaty with
Mexico, with whom U.S. relations in general had greatly deteriorated. In one other
case Carter pointed to, no termination ever actually took place. Finally, in two of
the occasions alluded to by Carter, Congress had already passed a law superceding
the treaty or implicitly authorizing its termination. 94  An example of such
Congressional authorization, as well as examples of explicit Presidential
acknowledgement of Congress' authority to terminate treaties, will provide a
foundation for the conclusion that historical precedent supports Congress'
authority in this field.
Carter claimed that President McKinley terminated the 1850 Convention of
Friendship, Commerce, and Extradition with Switzerland after negotiating a
89. See, e.g., Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 719 citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 300-01
(1930); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1960).
90. See Hooper, 22 Ct. Cl. at 416.
91. Lawrence Meyer, Suit on Taiwan a Political Issue, Bell Tells Court; Bell Says Taiwan Treaty
a Political Issue, WASH. POST, May 9, 1979, at Al. See also Walter C. Clemens, Jr., nho Terminates a
Treaty, BULL. ATOM. SCI., Nov./Dec., 2001, Vol. 57, No. 6. For more on Goldwater, see infra text
accompanying notes 125-155. For examples of treaties terminated by Acts of Joint Resolutions of
Congress, see, e.g., 37 Stat. 627 (1911) (Joint Resolution Providing for the termination of the treaty of
1832 between the United States and Russia); 22 Stat. 641 (1883) (Joint Resolution providing for the
termination of certain articles of the treaty between the United States of America and Her Britannic
Majesty); 13 Stat. 568 (1865) (Joint Resolution to terminate the Treaty of 1817, regulating the naval
Force on the Lakes).
92. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 727, citing Jonathan York Thomas, The Abuse of History: A Refutation
of the State Department Analysis of Alleged Instances of Independent Presidential Treaty Termination,
6 YALE J. STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 27, 79 (1979). See these sources for a full account of each
supposed termination.
93. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 727-32.
94. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 728-32.
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reciprocity agreement with France in the late Nineteenth Century.95 However, in
the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, Congress authorized the President to negotiate
such agreements.96 This Act conflicted with the 1850 Treaty and, since Congress
passed it after the ratification of the Treaty, it superceded the Treaty as the law of
the land.97 Thus, this was not a case of unilateral presidential treaty termination,
the President simply acknowledged the fact that the legislation superceded the
Treaty.
In fact, the executive branch has acknowledged Congress' power to terminate
treaties on multiple occasions. For example, President Polk recognized Congress'
authority in this area in relation to the Oregon Territory Treaty in 1846.98 After
President Polk had specifically asked Congress for its permission for him to
terminate the Treaty, Congress responded with a joint resolution authorizing Polk
to give notice to Great Britain.99 Thirty years later, President Grant, in the context
of the British Treaty of 1842, stated, "it is for the wisdom of Congress to determine
whether the article of the treaty ... relating to extradition is to be any longer
regarded as obligatory on the Government of the United States or as forming part
of the supreme law of the land."' l Grant went further, maintaining that, even if
Great Britain continued to act in counter to the spirit of the Treaty, he would not
extradite any person "without an expression of the wish of Congress."''1
In recent years, the United States has terminated few treaties. In 1985,
President Reagan announced he was terminating the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation Between the United States and Nicaragua.
m0 2
However, he did so under the emergency provisions of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, and, thus, with authorization from
Congress. m°3 Looking back from today to the first treaty terminated by the United
States, historical precedent establishes a congressional role in treaty termination.
95. Id. at 727
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 724.
99. See 9 Stat. 109-10 (1846) (Joint resolution concerning the Oregon Territory).
100. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 726 citing 9 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 4324, 4327 (1897). President Grant, during a June 20, 1876 message to Congress, asked if
he should regard the treaty's article on extradition as void on "account of certain acts of the British
government."
101. Id. at 726.
102. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Reagan's Power Wide Under Emergency Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
1985, at A10.
103. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, §202, 91 Stat. 1626 codified at 50 U.S.C.
1701 (1977). Congress specifically limited the Act to national emergencies in order to narrow the scope
of the authority it granted to the president. "The authorities granted to the President... may only be
exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency
has been declared for purposes of this title and may not be exercised for any other purpose. Any
exercise of such authorities to deal with any new threat shall be based on a new declaration of national
emergency which must be with respect to such threat."
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E. Other Supreme Court Precedents
Goldwater v. Carter is the primary Supreme Court precedent on this issue and
will be discussed in the next section. However, only Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion reached the merits. Judges in the lower courts considered other Supreme
Court cases relevant to the Goldwater case. It is important to consider these as
legal precedents in considering the ABM Treaty case.
1. Neely v. Henkel' 4
There is Supreme Court precedent that supports reading of the Necessary and
Proper Clause to give Congress the treaty termination power.' 0 5 In Neely v.
Henkel, Charles F.W. Neely was charged with embezzling funds in Cuba while the
United States occupied the country after the Spanish-American War.10 6 Neely
filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the June 6, 1900 Act under which he
was charged was unconstitutional on several grounds.1
0 7
One of the major questions before the Court in determining if the Act was
constitutional was whether the sections that gave effect to the provisions of the
Treaty of Paris between the United States and the Kingdom of Spain were valid.'
0 8
In concluding that the June 6, 1900 Act was valid, Justice Harlan wrote
The power of Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into
execution as well the powers enumerated in section 8 of article I of the
Constitution, as all others vested in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or the officers thereof, includes the power to enact such legislation as
is appropriate to give efficacy to any stipulations which it is competent for the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to insert in a treaty
with a foreign power.109
Justice Harlan used the Necessary and Proper Clause in reaching the decision
in this case. The issue here is one of implementation, and not of treaty termination
as in Hooper. However, since Bush's claim of authority comes, at least in part,
from the termination clause in the ABM Treaty, the two cases read together form a
strong argument for Congressional authority in the termination of the ABM
Treaty. 110
In Neely, the Supreme Court acknowledged Congress' power to enforce
clauses within ratified treaties.' In the ABM Treaty case, Bush claims he has the
104. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
105. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 718; see also Van Der Weyde v. Ocean Transport Co., 297 U.S.
114, 116-18 (1936) (holding valid an Act of Congress that "requested and directed" the President to
terminate treaty provisions inconsistent with the Seaman's Act of Mar. 4, 1915).
106. See Neely, 180 U.S. at 112-13.
107. Id. at 114.
108. Id. at 121.
109. Neely, 180 U.S at 121.
110. Accord Hooper, 22 Ct. Cl. at 418 with Neely, 180 U.S. at 121.
111. SeeNeely, 180 U.S. at 122.
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authority as president to affect the termination clause found in Article XV. This
claim of authority contradicts the outcome in Neely, since the Court, through
Justice Harlan, approved the Congress' claim of authority in executing treaty
provisions. Unless both the executive and legislative branches, independently,
have the power to enforce treaty provisions, a court reaching the merits would have
to overturn or distinguish Neely, as well as Hooper, in order to maintain that Bush
has the power to act under Article XV of the ABM Treaty.
2. Myers v. United States
' 2
In Myers, the Court decided a case involving the appointments clause of
Article II, which reads in a similar manner as the Treaty clause and maintains that
the president
... by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,... shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress
may be Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
The president removed Myers as a postmaster through an order from the
postmaster general." 4 Myers sued, maintaining that the President did not have the
power to remove him." 5 The Court, through Chief Justice Taft, held that, "In the
absence of any specific provision to the contrary, the power of appointment to
executive office carries with it, as a necessary incident, the power of removal." 6
Myers stands for the proposition that, unless a power granted to the executive
by the Constitution is specifically circumscribed, it belongs to that branch alone." 
7
Chief Justice Taft, in Myers, maintained that, "The fact that the executive power is
given in general terms strengthened by specific terms where emphasis is
appropriate, and limited by direct expressions where limitation is needed and that
no express limit is placed on the power of removal by the executive, is a
convincing indication that none was intended."" 8 If one reads the treaty clause in
light of Myers, it would appear that the only power the Congress has related to
treaties is the Senate's advice and consent power in creating them, since the
wording of the two powers is nearly identical.
The issue of treaty termination is different in nature from that of executive
112. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
113. U.S. Const. art. 11, § 2.
114. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 106.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 126.
117. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has narrowed this opinion somewhat through
its disposition in the case of Humphrey's Executor, Rathburn v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32
(1935).
118. Myers, 272 U.S. at 128.
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appointments.' 19 The executive can argue that it needs the power to remove its
own officials in order to manage its own internal bureaucracy. 2  This control
makes the president better able to carry out his duty to execute the laws of the
United States. In contrast, the power to terminate treaties affects, not only the
United States, but also the other nation(s) involved in the treaty.' 2' Furthermore,
the Congress has historical claims to a role in treaty termination.1
22
There is also a very concrete, textual difference between terminating a treaty
and dismissing an executive official. An executive official may help the president
execute a law and, thus, is important to the executive branch in executing the law
as it reads it. In contrast, a ratified treaty is part of the supreme law of the land. It
is one thing to change individuals that enforce the law, but another to change the
law itself.123 Changing the law itself looks more like a legislative duty for the
Congress.
Congress' function is to make laws, while the executive branch has the job of
enforcing them. Giving the president power over confirmed executive officials
furthers the president's capacity to perform the executive function of law
enforcement. In contrast, giving the president total control over treaty termination
extends the executive's power past this primary function. For this reason,
unilateral presidential treaty termination requires closer scrutiny than the Court
gave dismissal of executive appointees in Myers. Nevertheless, the judges in
Goldwater clashed about the relevancy and scope of the Myers decision in respect
to the treaty termination issue.
F. Goldwater v. Carter
1. The Case
The Supreme Court has faced the treaty termination power only once, in
Goldwater v. Carter.124 The Court issued no majority opinion and declined to
reach the merits. 25 However, the district and circuit courts did issue opinions on
the merits. 126 While the Supreme Court decision is paramount in considering the
issue of the ABM Treaty termination, a brief description of all of the opinions is
useful for bringing out the textual and policy arguments as background for this
119. See David J. Scheffer, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United States De-
Recognition of the Republic of China, 19 HARV. INT'L L. J. 931, 990 (1978); but see Randall H. Nelson,
The Termination of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the United States: Theory and Practice, 42
MINN. L. REv. 879, 887 (1958).
120. See Scheffer, supra note 120, at 990.
121. Id. at 990.
122. See supra pp. 241-55.
123. See Nelson, supra note 119, at 888.
124. Goldwater, 444 U.S 996 (1979).
125. Id.
126. See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (1979), reversed by Goldwater, 617 F.2d 697
(1979).
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paper's analysis of the intent of the Framers. 127
The District Court for the District of Columbia, in an opinion authored by
Judge Gasch, held that President Carter's notice of treaty termination needed to
receive approval from two-thirds of the Senate or a majority of both houses of
Congress in order to be effective under the Constitution of the United States. 128
Gasch ruled that the senators challenging Carter's termination of the Mutual
Defense Treaty with Taiwan had standing. 29 He also held that deciding the case
on the merits would not violate the Political Question Doctrine. 30  After
addressing these preliminary issues, Gasch ruled that, under Article VI, clause 2 of
the Constitution, treaties are part of the supreme law of the land that the president
is responsible to execute. 13  In order to repeal the supreme law of the land, the
president needs Congress. 32judge Gasch believed that the historical precedents, at
the least, supported some form of cooperative action.133 He also refused to apply
the Myers rational to treaty termination.134 As a matter of policy, the court was
concerned about providing the president with such a broad, unchecked power as
treaty termination.135 While the court decided that either two-thirds of the Senate
or a majority vote of both houses of Congress could legally approve the action,
Judge Gasch discussed only briefly, and somewhat unclearly, why he reached that
exact determination. 136
A divided DC Circuit Court reversed. Five of the judges wrote the per
curiam opinion of the court. 13 7 The majority agreed with Judge Gasch that the
appellees had standing,138 but reversed on the merits. 39 While they gave several
reasons for this decision, all of these, in some part, revolved around the President's
127. The facts of Goldwater are not very different from those at issue here. The two most relevant
differences are that the Mutual Defense Treaty at issue in Goldwater did not contain a supreme interests
clause within it termination provision and that President Carter terminated the Mutual Defense Treaty
incident to derecognizing Taiwan, the other party to the Treaty, and recognizing China. Justice
Brennan would have rendered an opinion on this narrow basis. For more details concerning the facts of
Goldwater, see, e.g., Daniel Horwitch, The Unresolved Question of Unilateral Treaty Terminations:
Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S.Ct. 533 (1979), 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L. L. REv. (1980).
128. See Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. at 965.
129. Id. at 955-56. The basic requirements for standing are "(1) that he has suffered injury in fact;
(2) that the interests being asserted are within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question; (3) that the injury is caused by the challenged action; and (4) that
the injury is capable of being redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 951.
130. Id. at 956-58.
131. Id. at 962.
132. Id.
133. Id. at960.
134. Id. at 960-61.
135. Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. at 963, citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton).
136. Id. at 965.
137. Two of the justices, Chief Judge Wright and Judge Tamm, concurred in the result but never
reached the merits because they believed that appellees lacked standing. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617
F.2d at 699-709 (1979). For the sake of brevity, discussion of this opinion is omitted.
138. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 708. The majority did not believe the Political Question Doctrine
applied because the issue before them, as they interpreted it, was extremely narrow.
139. Id. at 699.
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power in foreign affairs. The majority specifically noted its disagreement with
Judge Gasch on the Article VI issue, maintaining that by labeling treaties the
"supreme law of the land," the Framers were merely telling state judges that they
took precedence over state law. 140 The majority also noted that this was a narrow
decision, in light of the nature of the treaty and the fact that the Senate had ratified
it with a termination clause and had not placed any special conditions on a possible
future termination. 
41
Judge MacKinnon wrote a lengthy and vigorous dissent in which he would
have affirmed the District Court to the extent that its decision required a majority
of both houses of Congress to effect the termination of a treaty.14 2 MacKinnon
relied on Article VI, providing that treaties are the supreme law of the land, read in
conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause in reaching his decision.
MacKinnon saw treaty termination as "an implied power vested in the
government." Since the Constitution did not expressly grant the Government the
power to terminate treaties, it had to be implied under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 1
43
The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the DC Circuit and ordered the
case to be dismissed. Six justices agreed that the Court should vacate the decisions
below without reaching the merits, but only four agreed on the reasoning for the
move. Of the three justices who disagreed with the outcome, two would have set
the case for oral argument, and one would have affirmed the decision of the DC
Circuit on very narrow grounds. '
Then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and three other justices, invoked
the Political Question Doctrine. 145 Rehnquist concluded that, since there is no
constitutionally proscribed procedure for treaty termination and different types of
termination procedures might be appropriate for different types of treaties, the
issue should be decided by "political standards" rather than judicial ones. 14 6
Justice Powell provided the fifth and decisive vote to vacate the judgment below.
However, Justice Powell wrote that the issue was a matter of standing.147 Justice
Powell expressly disagreed with the idea that the issue presented a Political
Question that the Court could never address.' 48  Justice Brennan would have
affirmed the Court of Appeals on the very narrow grounds that the termination of
the treaty at issue was incidental to the power to recognize a nation, which belongs
to the executive branch. 49 The remaining justices would have scheduled the case
140. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 704.
141. Id. at 708.
142. Id. at 716-40.
143. Id. at 717 citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 18.
144. While Justice Marshall concurred in the result, he did not write an opinion expressing his
reasons, nor did he join the opinion of Justice Powell or that of Justice Rehnquist. See Goldwater, 444
U.S. at 996.
145. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998.
146. Id. at 1003 citing Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1302 (N.D. III. 1975) (three-judge court).
147. Id. at 996.
148. Id. at999.
149. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1006. It is interesting to note that Justice Brennan wrote the
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for oral argument.'so
2. Does The Court's Opinion Support Bush's Position?
Commentators often cite Goldwater as supporting the ability of the president
to terminate a treaty without Congress,' 5 ' but there was only one opinion on the
merits given on very narrow grounds and no opinion commanded a majority. The
Political Question Doctrine has fallen out of favor with the Supreme Court since it
decided Goldwater v. Carter.'5 2 Thus, then-Justice Rehnquist's position is on even
more questionable ground than it was in 1979, when it could not command a
majority of the Court.
Aside from the Political Question Doctrine, Justice Powell's opinion on
standing received no other support from the Court, and that of only two judges at
the appellate level.'13 Justice Brennan's opinion also stood alone. 54 The Goldwater
case provides clues to both sides to a potential litigation on what issues to argue
and how to argue them, as well as what Constitutional arguments may be
convincing. However, the case does not appear to provide any specific or binding,
legal support to either branch of the Federal Government on this issue, despite
Carter's ultimate success in terminating the Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty.
IV. AN ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT AGAINST UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL
TERMINATION
The arguments concerning treaty termination traditionally center around
policy. One can interpret the textual provisions like the majority of the Court of
Appeals in Goldwater, and say that the treaty power is an executive function under
the president's authority in foreign affairs. 5 5 In the alternative, one can interpret
the Necessary and Proper Clause, in conjunction with Article VI, section 2, to say
that the Congress must play a role in terminating treaties. 5 6 In either case, an
evaluation of the typical constitutional policies of checks and balances and
separation of powers drives the interpretation. Because of the need for this
interpretation, it is useful to attempt to understand how the Framers of the
Constitution balanced these considerations.
Supreme Courts opinion in Bakery. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the case in which the Court laid out the
modem-day criteria of the Political Question Doctrine. Brennan did not believe this case fell under the
test he annunciated in Baker.
150. Id. at 1006.
151. See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1132 (1992); Ronald A. Lehmann, Reinterpreting Advice and Consent: A
Congressional Fast Track for Arms Control Treaties, 98 YALE L. J. 885, 890 n.24 (1989).
152. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237 (2002).
153. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 709.
154. See Goldwater, 444 U. S. at 1006.
155. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 704.
156. See id, at 717 (MacKinnon, J. dissenting).
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A. The Difficulty in Determining the Intent of the Framers
As Judge Gasch said in his opinion in Goldwater, the intent of the Framers
concerning the termination of treaties is unclear.'57 However, at least one author
has formulated an argument that the Framers intended the Executive Branch to
predominate in the realm of treaties based on Originalist evidence. 158  The
remainder of this paper will present the opposite thesis. It will illustrate that the
Framers' desire for treaties to be part of the supreme law of the land, their fear of
the possibility that one faction or party might impose its views and positions on the
whole nation, and their desire for the treaty power to be executed in such a way as
to maintain the "national character" support a constitutional desire for a
Congressional check on the termination of international treaties.
Yet, in formulating an argument from Originalist sources, one must be careful
about what one takes as evidence of the intent of the Framers. The political
positions of the Founders motivated their post-ratification statements and positions.
Perhaps the best example is Thomas Jefferson, whom Judge MacKinnon cited as a
source of originalist evidence in his dissent in Goldwater. However, Jefferson's
position changed from 1793, when he was the Secretary of State in the Executive
Branch, to when he wrote A Manual of Parliamentary Practice for the Use of the
Senate of the United States as President of the Senate during the presidency of
John Adams.' 59 In 1793, six years after the framing of the Constitution, Secretary
of State Jefferson told M. Genet that the Constitution, "had made the President the
last appeal" concerning the termination of treaties, since the legislature was
supreme in "making the laws only."' 16 In contrast, in 1812, when Jefferson had a
vested interest in the powers of the legislative branch, Jefferson's manual reads,
"Treaties being declared... to be the supreme law of the land, it is understood that
an act of the legislature alone can declare them to be infringed and rescinded."'161
Statements by Madison and Hamilton present similar issues of credibility
when one tries to determine what the individual really thought at the time of the
framing before their political stations influenced their judgment. Both changed
positions on several issues, including the meaning of the text of the Constitution
and methods of constitutional interpretation during the debates over the Jay Treaty
in the first Congress. Both were attempting to gain political advantage for their
157. See Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. at 958.
158. See Frances Fitzgerald, Politics as Law? The Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation: Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the
Cold War, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 851, 899-901 (2001). For discussion of Fitzgerald's argument, see supra
p. 257-59.
159. See JOHN NORTON MOORE, FREDRICK S. TIPSON & ROBERT F. TURNER, NATIONAL SECURITY
LAw 798-99 (Carolina Academic Press 1990). Moore actually refers to the second edition of the
Manual, which was released in 1812. However, Jefferson was Adam's Vice President, and thus the
President of the Senate in 1801.
160. See MOORE, supra note 159, at 798 for a full excerpt of Jefferson's recollection of the
conversation.
161. Id. at 799.
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newly formed parties in the forthcoming election. 62 Madison, for example, argued
that the treaty-making provision of Article II was in conflict with Article 1. He
maintained that the President and the Senate, if not subject to House consent, could
use treaties to usurp the proper powers of the House to do things such as make the
US a party to a foreign war, furnish troops for overseas use, and keep a standing
army for mutual security projects. He argued for a construction of the Constitution
in light of the overall theme of Separation of Powers and, thus, the House should
have some power regarding the making of treaties.
63
This position, however, contradicted an argument Madison had made in 1793
under the pseudonym Helvidius.'64 In the Helvidius writings, he had maintained
that the President could not unilaterally pull out of a treaty, but that the consent of
the Senate served as a proxy for that of the House.165 Thus, while denying the
House any role in his earlier writing, he argued for giving the House a say in the
treaty power when he served in that body. This tension between these two
positions caused Madison to lose a great deal of respect from his fellow
representatives. 166
In the end, Judge Gasch was right. There is no defimitive originalist evidence
that directly states how the United States should terminate treaties. Despite these
difficulties, a wealth of indirect evidence indicates that unilateral presidential
termination flies in the face of what the Framers would have wanted. While
evidence from other sources is not rendered completely useless by post-ratification
politics, this paper focuses on The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 and
The Federalist, sources not as tainted by post-ratification politics, in analyzing the
intent of the Framers on this issue.
B. The Chronology of the Treaty Power in the Framing
The Federal Convention of 1787 opened on May 14, 1787.167 There was no
treaty power mentioned in the Virginia Plan, the first outline of a Constitution
proposed at the convention. 16  A Constitutional provision on treaties did not
appear in the work of the convention until the Committee on Detail conducted its
work, which started on June 19, 1787.169 According to Madison's papers, the final
draft of the Committee of Detail that the Convention received on August 6, 1787,
stated that, "The Senate of the United States shall have the power to make treaties,
and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the Supreme Court."'' 70 The product
162. See JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER
ORIGINAL INTENT 146 (1999).
163. Id. at 149.
164. Id. at 150.
165. Id.
166. See Lynch, supra note 162, at 157.
167. See MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, [hereinafter
RECORDS], Vol. 1, 1 (1966).
168. Id. at 20.
169. See RECORDS, Vol. II, 129, 132 (1966).
170. Id. at 183.
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gave no power concerning treaties to the Executive Branch.' 7' This was very
different from Alexander Hamilton's plan to put the treaty making power in the
President, with the Senate playing the role of advice and consent, which he had
proposed to the Convention.
172
The first mention of any form of Treaty power in the executive branch in any
proposal did not come until August 20, 1787. On that day, the Committee of the
Whole recommended to the Committee of Five that there be, "The Secretary of
Foreign Affairs who shall also be appointed by the President during pleasure- It
shall be his duty to correspond with all foreign ministers, prepare plans of Treaties,
and consider such as may be transmitted from abroad."'' 73 This proposal, however,
did not change the powers of the Senate. It is obvious that the Convention had
difficulty with the powers of the Senate in general, as it often tabled such
provisions until later in the Convention while it went through the other provisions
of the work of the Committee on Detail mostly in order.
174
The Convention seemed to determine it did not like the treaty clause as it
stood, giving sole power to the Senate, but did not know how to alter it. At the end
of August 23, it referred it to the Committee of Five. 175 On Tuesday, September 4,
1787, the Committee of Eleven reported to the House. This report included the
language, "The President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall
have the power to make treaties... But no Treaty except Treaties of Peace shall be
made without the consent of two thirds of the members present.' 76 While the
convention made other changes, the important alteration became permanent, and
the treaty power moved to the executive branch, "by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate."' 1
77
C. Arguments for Strong Presidential Authority in Treaties
Frances Fitzgerald argues that the evolution of the treaty power in the Federal
Convention of 1787 supports the idea that the executive branch should dominate
the treaty power. 178 She maintains that, when the form of the Senate changed
because of the Great Compromise, 179 the idea of investing the treaty power in the
Senate became distasteful to the Framers because it had less of an executive
nature. 180 To support this conclusion, she relied on some debates in the state
conventions, other anti-Senate moves by the Framers near the end of the
convention (such as taking away its role in electing the President) and a belief that
171. RECORDS, supra note 169, at 185-86.
172. See RECORDS, Vol. III, 624 (1966).
173. RECORDS, supra note 169, at 336.
174. Id. at 176-339.
175. Id. at 394.
176. RECORDS, supra note 169, at 495.
177. US CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
178. See Fitzgerald, supra note 159, at 883.
179. See generally MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
91 (1913) (explaining the Great Compromise),
180. See Fitzgerald, supra note 159, at 889, 898.
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Hamilton specifically felt the treaty power was inherently executive and that the
Senate was merely a "safeguard on executive power. ' ' 8s Fitzgerald also relied on
evidence of the traditional English treaty power, in which the Crown enjoyed a
monopoly over treaty making but only Parliament could change domestic law
related to the treaties. 82
Fitzgerald's position also receives some bolstering from Convention records
that she does not cite. Delegate Mercer maintained that, "[The treaty] power
belong[ed] to the Executive department,"'' 83 rather than the legislative.
Pennsylvania Delegate Morris expressed the same view, saying that the Senate
should have no power in relation to treaties.' 84 In spite of the statements of these
delegates, however, a closer examination of the Convention records and a thorough
analysis of The Federalist appear to create a more powerful argument for a
congressional role in terminating treaties. This is especially true when one views
the statements of these Framers in the context of the ABM Treaty controversy.
D. Arguments for a Check on Presidential Treaty Power
An assertion of a congressional role in treaty termination does not question
the President's critical role in negotiating the formation of treaties. The Framers
recognized the importance of the executive's ability to negotiate treaties for the
reasons stated by John Jay in Federalist 64.
It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that
perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite. There are cases
where the most usefull (sic) intelligence may be obtained, if the persons
possessing it can be relieved from apprehension of discovery. Those
apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by
mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both descriptions
who would rely on the secrecy of the President, but who would not confide in that
of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly. The convention
have done well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties that
although the President must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent of the
senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner
as prudence may suggest... Thus, we see that the Constitution provides that our
negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from
talents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the one hand, and
from secrecy and dispatch on the other.1
8 5
However, even while reinforcing the necessity of executive treaty making, Jay was
careful to include the role of the Senate. Furthermore, while Fitzgerald claims that
181. See Fitzgerald, supra note 159, at 889-93.
182. Id. at 887.
183. RECORDS, supra note 169, at 297. Though Mercer qualified his position to state that, when
domestic law was affected, the treaty would have to be ratified by law, which does not appear to apply
in the case of the ABM Treaty. This is also true of Morris' position in the next sentence.
184. Id., at 392.
185. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay).
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Hamilton believed in a purely executive treaty power, Hamilton's own words in
Federalist 75 prove that position an inaccurate one.
Though several writers on the subject of government place that power [treaties] in
the class of executive authorities, yet this is evidently an arbitrary disposition; for
if we attend carefully to its operation it will be found to partake more of the
legislative than the executive character, though it does not seem strictly to fall
within the definition of either of them. The essence of the legislative authority is
to enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of society;
while the execution of the laws and the employment of the common strength,
either for this purpose or for the common defense, seem to compromise all the
functions of the executive magistrate. The power of making treaties is, plainly,
neither the one nor the other. It relates neither to the execution of the subsisting
laws nor to thee action of new ones; and still less to an exertion of the common
strength. Its objects are contracts with foreign nations which have the force of
law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They are not rules prescribed
by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign.
The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct department and to belong
properly, neither to the legislative nor to the executive... However proper or safe
it may be in governments where the executive magistrate is an hereditary
monarch, to commit to him the entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly
unsafe and improper to intrust (sic) that power to an elective magistrate of four
year's duration. 186
Of course, all of these passages refer to the treaty making power; the Framers
never directly discussed the power to terminate treaties in the Federalist or in the
Convention. Thus, in attempting to determine how the Framers would have
reacted to the ABM Treaty termination, two questions are paramount. First, why
did the Framers put the treaty power in Article II of the Constitution? This is
important, not only in how we characterize the power, but also in determining how
persuasive the Myers rationale relating to the President's power to unilaterally
remove his appointments should be in construing the treaty clause of the
Constitution. The second question is what the Framers really intended concerning
treaty termination. In answer to this question, the available evidence indicates that
the Framers would have wanted a Congressional check on President Bush's ability
to terminate the ABM Treaty, though what type of Congressional action is unclear.
1. Why did the Framers Put the Treaty Power in the Executive Branch?
While Fitzgerald argues that the Framers intended the treaty power to be
predominantly executive, Hamilton's opinion in Federalist 75, and the majority of
the other evidence available from reliable originalist sources, contradicts this
theory. The Convention termed the treaty power as purely legislative until nearly
the end of the Convention; and, even when they did move it into Article II, they
maintained the role of the Senate in making treaties.'8 7 Furthermore, analysis of
186. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (italics added).
187. See RECORDS, supra note 167, at 495.
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the Convention records indicates that the Framers did not intend this last-minute
move to be a major change in policy. They moved the provision because of
concerns about how much cumulative power the Senate had, not because of a
sudden epiphany that the treaty power should be inherently executive. In addition,
throughout the Convention, even those who wanted the power placed in the
executive qualified that desire with a commitment to legislative checks on that
executive authority, especially when international treaties would have a direct
impact on existing domestic law.
8 8
Fitzgerald's argument also encounters difficulty in the reasons some of the
delegates expressed for not wanting the treaty power vested in the legislature. For
example, Delegate Mason expressed concern about giving the Senate power as
related to the budget because the Senate "could already sell the whole Country by
means of Treaties." 8 9 Mason later clarified that his concern was that the Senate
could sell territories through treaties without action from the full Congress. 190 This
expresses less of a concern that the Executive did not have enough power, as that
the Senate had too much. Changing the provision to share this power between the
two branches, rather than giving it solely to the Senate, likely satisfied this
concern. Putting the power to make (or terminate) a treaty solely in the hands of
the executive would have caused precisely the inverse problem to the one that the
Framers were attempting to remedy by moving the treaty provision to Article 11.
This also explains the concern of many anti-Federalists, cited by Fitzgerald,
that the Senate would become an aristocracy. 19' In fact, this had little to do with
the treaty power. On September 6, 1787, Delegate Wilson noted that, with all the
powers the Senate was to have, including the Treaty power, there was a concern
that an aristocracy would result. When Delegate Morris failed to understand this
view, Mr. Williamson clarified that it came from the Senate's role in selecting the
President, which would make the President beholden to the Senate.' 92  The
Convention, of course, subsequently eliminated this power. However, the
discussion shows that concerns about the treaty power in the Senate stemmed more
from the powers that had, to that point, been given to that particular body, not a
belief that the treaty power was executive more than legislative.
In fact, while Delegate Mason expressed concerns about giving the Senate
power over the budget and treaties, it is clear that he and Morris did not want the
president to have any power over treaties. This is evident from Madison's notes of
August 7, reporting that they did not want treaties to be subject to the Executive
veto.19 3 Though they seemed to disagree on how to accomplish this in the
language of the Constitution, both agreed on the desired result.' 94 Thus, while
there were members of the convention who felt the treaty power should be
188. See id., at 297.
189. See id.
190. Id. at 297.
191. See Fitzgerald, supra note 158 at 891.
192. See RECORDs, supra note 169 at 522-24.
193. Id. at 197.
194. Id. at 197.
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executive, there were clearly those who believed that many of the state
constitutions were correct in having the power vested in the legislature.' 95 The
final treaty making power appears to be exactly what it sounds like, a compromise.
Then why did the Convention place the power within the executive article of
the Constitution with so little debate? When the final draft came back, the only
real issue questioned was whether consent should require two-thirds of the Senate
or a majority. Perhaps the best answer to this comes from the foremost authority
on the records of the Convention, Max Farrand.
It was evident that the convention was growing tired. The committee had
recommended that the power of appointment and the making of treaties be taken
from the senate and vested in the president 'by and with the advice and consent of
the senate.' With surprising unanimity and surprisingly little debate, these
important changes were agreed to. The requirement of the concurrence of two-
thirds of the senate in treaties was amended at Madison's suggestion to except
treaties of peace. It was then adopted and the next day reconsidered and re-
adopted after striking out the exception of treaties of peace.
Farrand recognized that this debate would have been more heated if it had
come earlier in the Convention. However, given the lateness in the convention and
the amount of difficulty the convention had experienced with the powers of the
Senate in general, it is not surprising that, what to us now appears as a major
change went through with little debate. It was a compromise, and one that scholars
today should not view as an endorsement of exclusive executive power over
treaties.
In addition to the policy and textual critiques of using Myers to decide the
issue of treaty termination,'9" the condition of the convention at the time it adopted
the treaty provision argues against expanding Myers to this area of law. The idea
that limits on powers given to the executive under Article II should be construed as
narrowly as possible is not evident from the Constitution itself, but is a Court-
designed method of interpretation based on form, not substance. 99 While Article
II does contain express restrictions on the authority of the executive branch, the
treaty provision entered this Article late in the Convention as part of a
compromise. The absence of a termination clause is not an indication that the
Convention meant to delegate that power to the executive branch, but was a result
of exhaustion and an understandable lack of attention to detail and all possible
scenarios. Even if one accepts the Myers interpretation of Article II in general, it
would not be reasonable to apply this doctrine broadly to the treaty provision in
light of its history.
195. See Fitzgerald, supra note 158, at 888.
196. See FARRAND, supra note 178, at 17 1.
197. Id.
198. See infra pp. 247-8.
199. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 128 (discussed, infra pp. 24-25); see also Randall H. Nelson, The
Termination of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the United States: Theory and Practice, 42
MINN. L. REv. 879, 884-85 (1958).
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Despite the move of the clause to Article II, passages from The Federalist
indicate that the Framers still saw treaties as legislative in nature, though an
executive role in creating them was necessary.2°° Even if one dismisses The
Federalist, the provision itself still required the ascent of the legislative branch. It
is unlikely the Framers considered all the potential future interpretive implications
of the form it was using when it put a still-shared treaty power in Article II. Given
the evidence that the Framers did not see the treaty power as purely executive and
that its placement in Article II did not effect such a belief, it is prudent to back off
the Myers reasoning in the context of the treaty making power.
This reasoning gains support from the policy-oriented argument that U.S.
involvement in international treaties is different from a President's ability to
control his subordinates.20 ' It is important that the president be able to terminate
purely executive officials in order to fulfill his charge of executing the laws. But
even the Supreme Court recognized the limits to this broad executive power in the
case of Humphrey's Executor v. United States,20 2 where the Court held that this
unilateral power did not extend to officers whose duties were "quasi judicial or
203quasi legislative. However, if the treaty power were not a purely executive
function, using the Myers rational to resolve the issue of treaty termination would
actually defeat the intent of the Framers rather than affect it.
In sum, there is no direct evidence of why the Framers put the treaty power in
Article II. However, it happened far too quickly and suddenly near the end of the
Convention to think that it marked an abandonment of the consensus that the treaty
power, even if not purely legislative, required the legislature to play a substantial
role. While there is evidence that some delegates of the convention believed the
treaty making power was executive in nature, even these individuals desired
legislative checks on the president's authority. Furthermore, there were
individuals who believed the power was purely legislative. Hamilton's statement
above from Federalist 75 seems to indicate that the final decision was a
compromise. In any case, it only concerns making treaties. Determining who the
Framers intended to have the power to terminate treaties requires examining the
whole of The Federalist to find all allusions to treaties, and putting these
observations together to form coherent policy on international agreements.
200. For the quotation and discussion of these passages in THE FEDERALIST, see infra p. 271-74.
201. See, e.g., Scheffer, supra note 119.
202. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). In this case, the plaintiff, the
executor of an estate, filed suit against the Government for the deceased's salary from the time the
president relieved him of his duties as Federal Trade Commissioner until his death. The plaintiff
contended that the estate was entitled to the back pay because the president did not have the power to
remove the Commissioner of the FTC under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41. The
Court held that the president had violated the Act, and that the Act was constitutional.
203. See Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). See also Nelson, supra note 119, at 885.
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2. What was the Intent of the Framers Concerning Treaty Termination?
a. The Framers Wanted a Congressional Check
Some argue that a congressional check on unilateral presidential treaty
termination would not make sense because it would make it too difficult for the
United States to exit "international obligations. ,204  However, The Federalist
provides evidence that the Framers believed that, once the United States entered
into a treaty, it was important that it keep its bond and approach treaty issues with
2035the utmost seriousness. This was not only a consideration for the future, but was
important to the Framers as they wrote the Constitution.
The just causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violations of treaties or
from direct violence. America has already formed treaties with no less than six
foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able
to annoy and injure us. She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain,
and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance
of neighborhood to attend to. It is of high importance to the peace of America that
she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears
evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national
government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four
distinct confederacies."
206
204. See, e.g., Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 705.
205. The discussion that follows proves this point. However, Madison perhaps did the best job of
explaining the need for stability in the Federal government in general.
In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable government. The want of
confidence in the public councils damps every useful undertaking, the success and profit
of which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent
merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows not
but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer
or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular
cultivation or establishment when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors
and advances will not render him a victim to an inconsistent government? In a word, no
great improvement or laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of
a steady system of national policy. But the most deplorable effect of all is that
diminution of attachment and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people
towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so
many of their flattering hopes. No government, any more than an individual, will long
be respected without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable without possessing
a certain portion of order and stability.
THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison).
Proponents of the termination of the ABM Treaty will quickly respond that the United States has not
broken its bond, but has terminated the treaty in accordance with the termination clause in Article XV
of the Treaty. However, as stated previously and restated in the subsequent argument, if the
Constitution does not authorize the president to terminate a treaty, than Article XV has not been legally
invoked. Furthermore, the seriousness with which the Framers approached treaty obligation is
significant to how they should be terminated, as this paper argues in its subsequent analysis on pages
268-71.
206. THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay).
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The Framers discussed the treaty power mostly in the context of Federalism,
maintaining that one national government could better maintain treaties than 13
207individual states. However, the principles applied by the Framers in their
hypothetical discussions of Federalism are applicable to the unilateral presidential
termination of treaties today. The evidence of the intent of the Framers, coupled
with standard policy and textual arguments against presidential termination make a
strong case that the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty should be more difficult to
accomplish than through the unilateral action of George W. Bush or any other
chief executive.
i. Treaties Are Part of the Supreme Law of the Land
A Congressional role in terminating a treaty, of course, does not guarantee
that the United States will maintain all of its international obligations indefinitely.
This would not a desirable result, since many treaties reach a point where they
should be terminated. Furthermore, by providing a termination clause, the parties
to the ABM Treaty acknowledged that the Treaty might not have a perpetual
life. 20 8 However, because the United States is party to the treaty, the dictates of the
Constitution are paramount, and thus the intent of the Framers is a necessary
consideration.
John Jay expressed the Framers' belief that a treaty is binding compact
207. See, e.g. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
The treaties of the United States under the present Constitution are liable to the
infraction of the thirteen different legislatures, and as many different courts of final
jurisdiction, acting under the authority of those legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the
peace of the whole Union are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the
passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed. Is it possible that
foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a government? Is it possible that the
people of America will longer consent to trust their honor, their happiness, their safety,
on so precarious a foundation?
208. It is of interest that Hamilton likely would have thought this provision to be an invitation to
trouble. He believed that it was key that treaties leave nothing to future considerations.
There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between
independent nations for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty regulating all
the details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity, leaving nothing to future
discretion, and depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts of
this kind exist among all civilized nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and
war, of observance and nonobservance, as the interests or passions of the contracting
powers dictate. In the early part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in
Europe for this species of compacts, from which the politicians of the times fondly
hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view to establishing the
equilibrium of power and peace of that part of the world, all the resources of negotiations
were exhausted, and triple and quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely
formed before they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind
how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the
obligations of good faith, and which oppose general considerations of peace and justice
to the impulse of any immediate interest or passion.
THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton). However, the wisdom of the termination clause is not
the issue this paper addresses.
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between nations that the United States should not dismiss lightly.
Others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode proposed, are
averse to their being the supreme laws of the land. They insist, and profess to
believe, that treaties, like acts of assembly, should be repealable at pleasure. This
idea seems to be new and peculiar to this country, but new errors, and new truths,
often appear. These gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only
another name for a bargain, and that it would be impossible to find a nation who
would make any bargain with us, which should be binding on them absolutely, but
on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it. They who
make laws may, no doubt, amend or repeal them; and it will not be disputed that
they who make treaties may alter or cancel them; but still let us not forget that
treaties are made, not by only one of the contracting parties, but by both, and
consequently, that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first,
so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed Constitution,
therefore, has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties. They are just as
binding and just as far beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts now as they will
be at any future period, or under any form of government.
209
Proponents of the president's ability to terminate a treaty unilaterally will
immediately point to the fact that the ABM Treaty has a withdrawal clause that
authorizes both parties to terminate the Treaty at will with six months notice.210
Jay, obviously, did not contemplate such a clause in a treaty when he wrote this
passage. However, even if today's readers cannot read the passage literally in light
of the ABM Treaty withdrawal clause, especially the last sentence about treaties
being out of the reach of legislative acts, 21' it does serve as an illustration that the
Framers labeled treaties as the supreme law of the land for reasons other than
instructing judges that they were to supercede state law.212 Jay makes it clear that
the Framers made treaties the Supreme Law of the Land so that they could not be
"repealable at pleasure."2 '1 3
The situation concerning ABM Treaty termination justifies the fears
expressed by Jay. If the President Bush can terminate the ABM Treaty without a
congressional check, he is doing so at his pleasure. While he may or may not be
deciding to terminate the ABM Treaty on a "whim" in this particular instance, if
his legal interpretation of his powers is correct, there is no Constitutional
mechanism to prevent a president from making such a decision based more on
special or partisan interests than the merits of the treaty. 214 This is precisely what
209. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay).
210. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2.
211. It is likely that, with this phrase, Jay was really referring to state legislatures. This is
especially true in light of the actions of the first Congress in terminating a treaty as is recounted by the
Court of Claims in Hooper v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408 (1887), see supra note 82.
212. Compare Jay, supra note 210 with Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 704.
213. Jay, supra note 209.
214. The ABM Treaty termination clause maintains that termination must be in the nation's
"supreme interests." See ABM Treaty, supra note 2. However, not all treaties will necessarily contain
such a provision, this provision is not the issue addressed in this paper, and such a clause is open to
interpretation based on partisan perceptions and interests.
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Jay maintains the Framers wanted to avoid by making treaties part of the Supreme
Law of the Land.
Jay correctly points out that a treaty is a "bargain" or contract between
nations, and that our actions in terminating a treaty will reflect on the United States
and, in part, dictate whether other nations will continue to enter agreements with us
(and, if they do, if they will trust us to honor them and, thus, honor them
themselves). If one individual has to power to terminate a treaty, how will other
nations know with whom they are reaching an agreement? After all, making an
agreement with a nation is only a valuable undertaking if you can trust that nation
to maintain it.
A role for Congress does not preclude termination, but guarantees the
representation of all citizens, states, and parties of the Federal Government in a
considered deliberative process. Jay makes it clear that the Framers did not intend
treaties to be repealable at will in the way President Bush has done, but to be
repealed in a similar manner as other laws of the United States-with
congressional authorization. This proposition gains support from other passages in
the Federalist Papers.
ii. A Check on Treaty Termination Serves to Minimize the Impact of
Partisanship
Much of the evidence that the Framers did not want the president to have
unilateral treaty termination power stems from the basic conclusion long drawn
from the Federalist papers that the Constitution, in part, was meant to minimize the
impact of partisanship. Hamilton asked,
Is it not... the true interest of all nations to cultivate... benevolent and
philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has
it not, on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions, and
immediate interests, have a more active and imperious control over human
conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice?2 15
Madison and the rest of the Framers shared this fear of one party or faction
taking control over the course of the nation, and that that controlling faction would
routinely change, lending the nation to inconsistency and instability. Madison
wrote, "Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union,
none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and
control the violence of faction.., our governments are too unstable. 2t 6
While this fear of partisan control pervades the Federalist papers, only Jay
discussed its role in the treaty power. The Framers, as noted by Jay, recognized
that faction, if given an unchecked hand, could control foreign as well as domestic
policy. Jay wrote,
215. THE FEDERALIST No. 6 (Alexander Hamilton).
216. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
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But the safety of the people of America against dangers from foreign force
depends not only on their forbearing to give just causes of war to other nations,
but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to
invite hostility or insult; for it need not be observed that there are pretended as
well as just causes of war. It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human
nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of
getting anything by it; nay, that absolute monarchs will often make war when their
nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such
as a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private
compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or PARTISANS. These
and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often
lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of
his people. But, independent of these inducements to war, which are most
prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are
others which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on




This particular except speaks of war, but the paper dealt with foreign affairs in
general, including treaties.
Giving the President unilateral power to withdraw from a treaty gives
exclusive power to terminate treaties to a single ruling party, in President Bush's
case, the Republican Party that Bush leads. By requiring action from Congress to
terminate a treaty, this executive power is controlled, but not eliminated. At the
time of the ABM termination, for example, Bush would only need to convince one
Democrat in the Senate that termination of the ABM treaty is the proper course,
and maintain his party base, in order to affect his desire to terminate the ABM
Treaty. This hardly seems an unreasonable or insurmountable check on executive
power. If the Republicans controlled the Senate as well, Bush's task would be
even easier. There are, of course, instances in which one party will be in the
majority in each branch of the government.
Even in this situation, however, a legislative check would still bring the
debate to the forefront and allow all parties in the government a formal say in the
termination process. Legislative action is not warranted in order to prevent treaty
termination through gridlock, but to ensure that the Nation and its government
debate the issue thoroughly and that the Government makes its decision in the best
interests of the entire nation. Congressional action in treaty termination would not
preclude treaty termination, but it would recognize the Framers' desire that United
States not be able to dismiss treaties on a whim, as illustrated by Jay and in Article
VI.
Treaties should be harder to vacate than by the stroke of one individual's pen,
with or without a termination clause. If partisanship on any given issue is so great
that a president cannot get a simple majority in both houses of Congress or two-
thirds of the Senate, it is clear that there is no national consensus to terminate the
treaty in that case. The United States Constitution requires this procedure to repeal
its normal statutes and Congress passes bipartisan measures on a regular basis; it
217. THE FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay).
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makes sense to require it to repeal international treaties that are part of the
Supreme Law of the Land.
The Framers put checks and balances into the Constitution to avoid the
absolute power of parties, partisans, and individual branches of the Federal
Government. 215 Such checks were necessary concerning the treaties to accomplish
the Framers' goal of improving on the monarchical system of treaty power in the
British government. Hamilton, while discussing the treaty power, observed that
under the Constitution, "there is no comparison between the intended power of the
President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform
alone what the other can only do with the concurrence of a branch of the
legislature. 21 9 Since the British Parliament had control over treaties only as they
affected the law of the land, and not foreign relations, the Senate's role of advice
and consent added a foreign relations power the legislature's role in treaties. 220 It
is difficult to believe that the Framers would have endorsed eliminating such a
check in terminating treaties.
iii. A Congressional Role in Treaty Termination Will Help to Protect
the National Character and the United States' Reputation Amongst
Nations
Action by Congress in terminating a treaty is warranted, not only because of
the importance of checks and balances on executive and factional power that Jay
pointed to, or because of the desire to check the type of executive power exhibited
by the British monarchy, but because presidents serve a term of four years, and a
maximum of ten years.221 The Senate, in particular, but also Congress as a whole
today, is a more continuous body. Some individuals are there for decades and,
even when individuals leave, there are dozens of incumbents left behind within the
body. Providing Congress with a role in treaty termination would help to assure
that the character and image of the United States as perceived by foreign powers
endures over time. Madison recognized the importance of this "national character"
as a reason for giving the Senate such a prominent role in making treaties when he
wrote,
A fifth desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a due sense of
national character. Without a select and stable member of the government, the
esteem of foreign powers will not only be fortified by an unenlightened and
variable policy.., but the national councils will not possess that sensibility to the
opinion of the world which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit than it is
to obtain its respect and confidence. An attention to the judgment of other nations
218. Obviously, not everything should require a check. The Supreme Court in Myers and the
constitution itself both recognize this. However, the preponderance of the evidence, as well as the
binding and multilateral nature of international treaties, lends credence to the argument in this case.
219. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
220. See Fitzgerald, supra note 158, at 887.
221. A president would serve the maximum if he gained the office upon the death of a sitting
president and, won the next two presidential elections.
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is important to every government for two reasons: the one is that independently of
the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts,
that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable
policy; the second is that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national
councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the
presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can
be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign
nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the
justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried
by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of
mankind?
2 2
The case of unilateral executive treaty termination embodies these concerns of
the Framers about the character and image of the Nation at their zenith. Madison
points out that, without "a select and stable member of the government" involved
in making treaties, U.S. foreign policy will be inconsistent. He finds this
particularly important because it will affect the image of the United States among
other nations. Should a president have the power to terminate a treaty without
Congress, this potential for inconsistency reaches a zenith.
For example, if President Bush were to enter a similarly formatted treaty next
week and a Democrat who did not approve of the treaty was elected president in
the next election, there would be no legal impediment to that president terminating
that treaty. The idea that a president could unilaterally erase the ABM Treaty, a
fixture of nonproliferation and a supreme law of the land, violates the theory of
222. THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison). It is interesting to note that Hamilton also saw the
importance of this national character as it related to the Senate's role in appointing and relieving
advisors to the president.
It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the co-operation of
the Senate, in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the
administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to
appoint. A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or
so general a revolution in the officers of the government as might be expected if he were
the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station had given satisfactory evidence
of his fitness for it, a new President would be restrained from attempting a change in
favor of a person more agreeable to him by the apprehension that a discountenance of the
Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon himself.
Those who can best estimate the value of a steady administration will be most disposed
to prize a provision which connects the official existence of public men with the
approbation or disapprobation of that body which, from the greater permanency of its
own composition, will in all probability be less subject to inconsistency than any other
member of the government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton).
This seems to put the idea of applying the Myers rationale to the treaty power on even shakier ground,
since Myers is open to at least some measure of originalist criticism. Hamilton states that a Senate
check on the dismissal of executive officers would provide consistency and promote the national
character. He concludes that this, therefore, is a desirable characteristic of the Federal Government.
Myers maintains that this check is unnecessary in the interest of the president's power over his own
employees. If the Framers believed applying the Constitution's Congressional check on appointments
to dismissals as well, it makes no sense from an Originalist standpoint to extend the Myers rational to
the treaty provision.
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checks and balances on the power of partisans in the United States and presents an
opportunity for one man or party to damage the national character and image of the
United States the Framers hoped to promote through a legislative role in making
treaties.
Aside from these general concerns, which would apply in any case of
presidential treaty termination, there are specific reasons to be concerned about
Bush's termination of the ABM Treaty. The United States, as a superpower, will
always be subject to some criticism from other nations. The policy concerns the
Framers expressed would apply to any president's decision to terminate a treaty
unilaterally. However, in discussing the ABM Treaty Specifically, Bush's
reputation as a unilateralist appears to be having a serious effect on the reputation
of the United States in international affairs.223 While the specific criticisms vary,
most have something to do with a perceived U.S. unilateralism and a belief that the
U.S. has become "trigger-happy" since the September I I attacks.224
Even American commentators observe that, "Administration officials no
longer offer even the pretense that the U.S.-Russia relationship is a partnership of
equals. 225 Foreign commentators are less diplomatic. Many criticize the United
States by looking at President Bush's "unilateralist" moves as a representation of
the mood of the American people. For example, a commentator in Singapore
wr6te,
History will one day judge the United States' decision to withdraw from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile treaty in the same way it views today the US failure in 1919 to
join the League of Nations - as an abdication of responsibility, a betrayal of
humankind's best hopes, an act of folly... [T]he Bush administration has also
displayed a cynicism which will adversely affect the mood of cooperation that has
characterized international relations since the September I 1 attacks. It was not by
accident that the announcement came on the same day that the videotape of
Osama bin Laden, confirming his complicity in the attacks, was released. That
juxtaposition served at once to bury the ABM story, as well as provide missile
defense with an altogether spurious emotional justification to cover up its
intellectual and strategic nullity... President George W. Bush is doing well to
make the world safe from terrorism, but under the cover of that good fight, he has
223. See, e.g., US Nuclear Deception, THE STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), Jan. 21, 2002, 1; News
and Features, Star-Spangled President, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 19, 2002, at 32; Vincent J.
Schodolski, Blair Feeling Heat as U.S.-Europe Bridge; News, Critics Question Political Priorities,
CHIC. TRIB., Jan. 18, 2002, at 3N; Patrick E. Tyler, Russia Rejects U.S. Plan to Store Warheads, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at 8A; Elisabeth Bumiller and David E. Sanger, A Nation Challenged: Dealing
with the Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at Al; Martin Walker, Opinion, New Europe: Uneasy,
Necessary Ally, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 30, 2001, at G5; A Gentler America, Commentary,
THE STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), Dec. 20, 2001, at 16; Suzanne Daley, Foreign Desk, The War on
Terror Finds Wary Support in France, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2001, at A3.
224. See Michael Binyon, Overseas News, West Offers Putin Support As Criticism Grows in
Moscow, THE TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 25, 2002. Much of the criticism of the United States on the
international scene has been for not entering into multilateral treaties, such as the Kyoto Accords. The
ABM Treaty provides an example of the inverse of this common problem.
225. Witt, supra note 51.
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just made the world a far more dangerous place.226
Criticisms such as this one illustrate how a particular leader who makes a certain
series of moves can make America's international reputation better or worse at any
given time.
A Congressional role in treaty termination will not ensure that the United
States would never face international criticism. However, it would provide a
necessary safeguard to ensure that, when the United States does make itself
susceptible to criticism from the world community, it is doing so for the right
reasons and on behalf of a clear majority of its citizens and representatives. The
character and image of the United States in the ever-shrinking world we live in is
at least as important as a small domestic spending bill. Madison and the rest of the
Framers recognized this, and the evidence indicates they would be in favor of
requiring an Act of Congress to terminate a treaty.
b. What kind of Congressional Check?
The words of the Framers, combined with the other evidence and arguments
restated in this paper and those it cites, dictate that the President does not have the
constitutional power to terminate a treaty without congressional action. However,
this does not clarify what kind of congressional action the Constitution requires. In
the Goldwater case, Judge Gasch maintained that either the consent of two-thirds
of the Senate, or an Act of Congress passed by a majority of each houses of
Congress, would suffice. Judge MacKinnon disagreed, deciding that only an Act
of Congress could accomplish the termination of a treaty. Again, originalist
analysis provides no concrete answers. The necessary and proper clause and
Article VI, section 2, read in light of the Framers' statements about treaties being
the supreme law of the land, support Judge MacKinnon's position.
In ruling that two-thirds of the senate alone could authorize a termination,
Judge Gasch, though he never explicitly said so, appears to have reasoned that
giving that body power in making treaties also gave it power in terminating them.
However, a ratified treaty is very different from one under consideration. A
ratified treaty is binding, and under Article VI, section 2, is the supreme law of the
land. The Senate has no power to repeal any kind of law on its own. However,
Article I does grant Congress as a whole that power. Thus, by the terms of the
Constitution and differences between treaties under consideration and those
already made, MacKinnon has the better position on the question.
However, there is evidence that the Framers did not want the House of
Representatives involved in making treaties. During the Constitutional Convention,
the Pennsylvania Delegation moved unsuccessfully that the House of
227Representatives also be involved in the treaty-making process. The reason for
this failure seemed to be, at least in part, that the representatives served such short
226. American Betrayal, THE STRAITS TIMEs (SINGAPORE), Dec. 15, 2001, at 1.
227. See Lynch, supra note 162, at 144.
VOL. 3 1:2
CONGRESS AND THE TREATY POWER
terms. As Jay put it,
They who wish to commit the power under consideration to a popular assembly
composed of members constantly coming and going in quick succession seem not
to recollect that such a body must necessarily be inadequate to the attainment of
those great objects which require to be steadily contemplated in all their relations
and circumstances, and which can only be approached and achieved by measures
which not only talents, but also exact information, and often much time, are
necessary to concert and to execute. It was wise, therefore, in the convention, to
provide not only that power of making treaties should be committed to able and
honest men, but also that they should continue in place a sufficient time to become
perfectly acquainted with our national concerns, and to form and introduce a
system for the management of them."
228
Many of the framers also expressed concerns that including the larger House of
Representatives in treaty making would jeopardize the secrecy necessary in treaty
negotiations.
The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war,
peace, and commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with
such precautions, as will afford the highest security that it will be exercised by
menthe best qualified for the purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the
public good.
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These concerns are inadequate to deny the House of Representatives its role in
treaty termination. First, while the members of the House serve short terms, many
are there for many years in today's House, as modem politicians tend to be "career
politicians." Furthermore, the United States now elects senators by popular vote in
the same way it elects members of the House. 230 This eliminates the main feature
the Framers used to make the Senate a more secure, enlightened body than the
House. These practical, modem-day considerations, coupled with the textual
requirement that treaties be "considered as part of the law of the land, 231 validate
Judge MacKinnon's conclusion that an Act of Congress is the proper step the
United States should take in order to terminate a treaty.
V. WHAT SHOULD CONGRESS HAVE DONE?
This paper has put forth originalist evidence and argument to supplement
standard policy and textual arguments that President George W. Bush cannot
terminate the ABM Treaty without an Act of Congress. However, even after one
accepts this argument, the question before Congress at the beginning of 2002 was
what it could do to preserve its authority. This question is likely to resurface with
future treaty terminations.
228. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay).
229. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay).
230. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIt.
231. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
A. The ABM Treaty
As I see it, the members of Congress opposed to the termination of the ABM
Treaty had four avenues they could have pursued. First, the members could have
done nothing and allow the termination to take effect. While this would not have
any definitive legal impact on the issue, it would set another, arguably a first,
precedent of unilateral presidential termination of an international treaty.
A second option was that Congress pass legislation condemning President
Bush's action and declaring that the United States may not withdraw from the
ABM Treaty. This would have created the complete impasse between the
branches that Justice Powell's deciding opinion maintained was necessary for
members of Congress to have standing. 32 Once one considers political reality,
however, it becomes clear that it was impossible for opponents to the treaty
termination to accomplish this feat.
The third option was that both houses pass legislation authorizing the
termination of the ABM Treaty. It was feasible that the leadership in Congress
could have formed a coalition of Democrats and Republicans who believed in
legislative power in treaty termination. This would have prevented a precedent in
favor of sole executive branch authority with respect to this issue. Proponents of
multilateral international agreements and legislative power in foreign affairs, by
forming what might have been an unappetizing coalition to some, would have
prevented a dangerous precedent.
The fourth option was that a handful of members sue, as was the case in
Goldwater v. Carter. On June 11, 2002, a group of representatives filed a
complaint in United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a
declaratory judgment that President Bush's termination of the ABM Treaty was
unconstitutional. 3 On December 30, 2002, Judge John D. Bates signed a
memorandum opinion in Kucinich v. Bush dismissing the suit on both standing
and political question grounds.234 While the plaintiffs decided not to appeal the
case, Judge Bates' decision did acknowledge that Goldwater was not controlling
and hinted that the president's authority to terminate a treaty unilaterally is
justiciable, given the proper factual circumstances. 235
B. An Option for Future Treaties
Current authority indicates that the Senate has the power, in ratifying a treaty,
to do so with conditions.236 Presumably, the Senate could assent to a treaty on the
232. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 999 (1979).
233. Electronic copies of court documents in Kucinich v. Bush are available at
http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/ABMlawsuit/indexoflinks.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
234. Kucinich v. Bush, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24691 at *48 (D.D.C. 2002).
235. See Peter Weiss, Judge Bates'Decision In Kucinich v. Bush: Is the Glass Half Empty Or Half
Full?, available at http://www.lcnp.org/disarnament/ABMawsuit/BatesDecisionArticle.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2003.)
236. See RESTATEMENT § 303 at cmt. d.
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condition that, should the president wish to affect a termination clause in the
future, the executive would need the approval of the Congress (or a portion of the
Senate) in order to do so. Should the Senate make this a standard procedure, it
may avoid the constitutional question of treaty termination for future international
agreements.237
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, neither historical precedent, the current state of U.S. law, nor the
evidence of the Framers' intent lends any strong support President Bush's
unilateral termination of the ABM Treaty. With the ever-shrinking world and the
growing importance of multilateral agreements, it is more important than ever that
the United States take its international obligations seriously. This paper has put
forth evidence that unilateral presidential termination violates founding principles
of American government.
However, treaty termination is a matter of politics as well as law. With the
current political climate, President Bush was able to achieve his goal of
terminating the ABM Treaty. Given the highly political nature of international
treaties, the record of the judiciary branch not properly addressing the issue, and a
majority of scholars moving toward acceptance of unilateral presidential
termination 238 it is of vital importance that when the Senate ratifies future treaties it
requires congressional consent of some form in their termination. This is easier
than being forced into court by the executive and, at least for treaties not yet
ratified, will achieve the same ultimate result as the Supreme Court holding that
Congress has a role in treaty termination.
There will be occasions when terminating a treaty will be necessary.
However, the United State must recognize, as its Framers did, the importance on
international agreements. The United States requires an Act of Congress to nullify
its domestic laws. It is only fitting that it requires at least an equivalent procedure
to eliminate its international ones.
237. See David A. Gottenborg, Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers: The
Constitutional Controversy Continues in Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mem.), 9 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 239, 258 (1980). The issue of treaty termination, of course, could still come before
the courts in treaties that the Senate has already ratified.
238. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking. A Textual and Structural Defense of
Non-Self-Execution, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2218, 2242 (1999) ("...[Today most commentators, courts and
government entities accept that the president unilaterally may terminate treaties."); Michael J. Glennon,
1997 Survey of Books Relating to the Law: 1. Constitutional Law: Process Versus Policy in Foreign
Relations: Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1542, 1544 (1997)





DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
AND THE NEED FOR TRANSNATIONAL CONVERGENCE
Brent Wible°
INTRODUCTION
How should we feel about prosecuting Pinochet in Spain, Habre in Senegal,
or Sharon in Belgium? Ambivalent. Even those who look most favorably on
international criminal law and its potentially positive impact on human rights
suffer conflicting responses to universal jurisdiction. The idea that some acts are
so terrible as to compel international attention and an international solution
satisfies our sense of justice. At the same time, something seems amiss when a
defendant stands trial in country X for acts committed thousands of miles away.
Victims in the home country often resent that their history is put on trial abroad,'
and citizens of prosecuting states question why they should meddle in another
country's affairs.
These tensions subject national prosecutions for international crimes to great
scrutiny, opening the proceedings' legitimacy to question. The fact that these
national proceedings are often idiosyncratic raises even more questions. Many
international crimes are inadequately defined, leaving domestic courts leeway to
fill in details, and it is rarely clear which procedural rules apply. Which
punishments apply-those pertaining in the trial state or those of the state where
the crime was committed-also remains a contested issue.
Universal jurisdiction will never be perfect; neither will people ever feel
completely at ease with a borderless system of international criminal law. The
sense of inequity resulting from courts in the north sitting in judgment on leaders
from the south is most likely insurmountable in a world of asymmetrical power.
2
* J.D., Yale Law School 2003. Bernstein Fellow in International Human Rights, 2003-2004. I would
like to thank Professor Michael Reisman for his helpful comments and academic supervision.
1. For example, after Pinochet was indicted in Spain, Chile experienced a resurgence in
nationalism as a response to perceived recolonization. See Anthony Faiola, Spanish Firms Revive Latin
America Conquest, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2000, at AI; Sinikka Tarvainen, Straw Releases Spain from
Tight Straits, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Mar. 2, 2000.
2. Whatever one may think of this imbalance as a political or moral matter, the relative quality of
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The potential for states to use universal jurisdiction prosecutions as a political tool
of interstate conflict will remain. 3 Likewise, those who believe that "trials from
without" miss the point, by speaking to the wrong audience and failing to respond
sensitively to a country's political reality, will never be content with universal
jurisdiction.4
Despite these endemic concerns, work can be done! insofar as prosecutions
under universal jurisdiction suffer from a lack of authoritative legitimacy and
integrity as a legal matter. International mechanisms need to be put into place so
that its exercise will be firmly grounded in international process. Domestic courts
should incorporate as much international law, including both substantive and
procedural standards, as possible into prosecutions for international crimes. They
must engage in a structured international judicial dialogue along both vertical and
horizontal dimensions to insure the development of consistent practices. While
universal jurisdiction will never be perfect, it will be substantially better if
informed by well-developed international standards.
Some scholars suggest that since few states are willing to prosecute non-
nationals for atrocities committed abroad, a universal jurisdiction subject to
prudential concerns will over-deter prosecutions under international law., If it
appears legitimate and has integrity, however, states may be more likely to
exercise universal jurisdiction. As a stepjoward this goal, it is important to narrow
the gap between the theoretical application of universal norms and the variation
across jurisdictions that exists in practice. National prosecutions for international
crimes will have greater integrity and legitimacy, and the authority of international
criminal law will benefit from transnational convergence. The resultant growth of
international norms should increase accountability for terrible acts, deter the kind
of atrocities that marked the twentieth century, and contribute to a greater degree
of human dignity.
Part I of this article explores the difficulties that arise from application of
universal norms in domestic courts without a harmonizing structure. Part II argues
that the informal mechanisms that could influence exercise of universal jurisdiction
and deter the most divergent practices are ineffective. Part III examines some of
the costs of universal jurisdiction. The article concludes by suggesting some
approaches for structuring an international criminal system that would allow
domestic courts to play a central role without divesting universal norms of their
courts and judges in, for example, Spain as opposed to the Sudan suggests that there may be reason to
prefer this "sense of inequity" to the alternative. See Bruce Broomhall, Towards the Development of an
Effective System of Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes under International Law, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv.
399, 417 (2001). States that have the power to use universal jurisdiction generally have the most
independent judiciaries that ensure due process and respect the rule of law. Lack of abuse to date,
however, may only be a reflection of the fact that universal jurisdiction is only nascent. Madeline H.
Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 337,
354 & 357 (2001).
3. Morris, supra note 2, at 356.
4. See Jaime Malamud Goti, The Moral Dilemmas about Trying Pinochet in Spain, 32 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (2001).




I. The Peculiar Difficulties of Prosecuting International Crimes in Domestic
Courts
Many international crimes are loosely defined. Even where a convention has
been adopted, as in the case of genocide and torture, many of the details are left to
national jurisdictions.6 The applicable procedural rules are not mentioned in these
instruments, and the non-hierarchical assembly of international tribunals and
national courts applying this body of law reach different conclusions operating
under different procedures. 7  While some divergence among the jurisdictions
prosecuting these crimes is inevitable, is it desirable that states be allowed to
define procedures, and in large part, the crimes themselves? Is such proliferation
pathologic in a system based on international norms? The difficulty arriving at a
particularized set of rules in international criminal law became clear during the
Treaty of Rome negotiations.8
This section seeks to determine some limitations on the divergence of
substantive prohibitions and procedural rules across jurisdictions. In the extreme,
different procedural rules and judicial interpretations of definitions could so stretch
the substance of the law as to raise the ex post facto issue. Precision in criminal
prohibitions, like retroactivity, is a window onto the fairness and integrity of
international criminal proceedings. National divergence must be adequately
constrained so that prosecutions do not amount to and are not perceived as
"victors' justice."
Some scholars hint that the lack of precision in international criminal law was
6. The Genocide Convention broadly defines genocide as any of several enumerated acts
committed "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group."
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime Genocide, September 12, 1948, art. 2. The
burden of proof, defenses, evidentiary and procedural rules, and applicable penalties are left entirely to
the states parties. Id. at art. 5. The Convention Against Torture likewise enumerates acts amounting to
torture, but Article 4 leaves it to the contracting parties to "ensure that all acts of torture are offences
under its criminal law." Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, December 10, 1984, art. 4. Thus, even in the documents where international criminal
law is most clearly expressed, all but the most general elements of the crimes are to be defined by
national legislatures. See Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court:
An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665, 717 (1996) (arguing that the main problem with international
crimes is their lack of precision and the failure of international instruments to mention penalties, mens
rea, or defenses).
7. Wexler, supra note 6, at 717-718.
8. Some have criticized the ICC Statute for deliberately leaving the definitions of crimes to
national legislatures, a gap that could lead to prosecutorial abuse and make any ICC prosecution the
equivalent of a common law crime. See Alfred P. Rubin, The International Criminal Court:
Possibilities for Prosecutorial Abuse, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 158-59 (2001); Wexler, supra
note 7, at 717. (arguing that one of the most serious criticisms of international criminal justice is the
absence of a well-defined body of international criminal law); International Law Association, Report of
the Thirty-Fourth Conference (1927) 179-80 (comments of Dr. Emil de Nagy, M.P. (Hungary)
(questioning whether an international criminal code should precede the institution of an international
criminal court or whether the ICC should function as a common law court).
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consciously intended to deter a whole category of behavior rather than encouraging
actors to legalistically tailor their actions in compliance with the law.9 Regardless,
the argument does not go to the question of procedural protections and the
divergence of procedural rules that might lead to substantively different crimes
across jurisdictions.
A. Specificity in International Criminal Law: Analogy to the Common Law
Scholars argue that international criminal law cannot be precise.'0 Rather, it
develops necessarily like the common law, gradually applying the principles of
previous decisions to new situations."
The expectations of specificity in international criminal law cannot, however, be
the same as in national criminal legislation.... International law, like common
law, develops gradually on the basis of states' practices, conventions, and other
manifestations of customary law, which in some cases also include "general
principles of law."12
Analogizing international criminal law to the common law poses a number of
problems. The specificity question cannot be swept away by analogizing to a
highly contested category-the common law crime. Nonetheless, the analogy to
the common law raises interesting issues relating to precision that are unique to
international law.
Since international criminal law develops largely through conventions, which
tend to lack specificity, and cases, as the recent history of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 13 and International Criminal
Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) 14 indicate, does the non-hierarchical structure of
courts considering international criminal law pose any difficulties? Given a range
of prior decisions from different courts and tribunals, is it easy for a court to
disregard, distinguish, or rely only on cases it wants to?' 5 The notion of stare
decisis has historically been foreign to international law.' 6 In the traditional
9. M. CherifBassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity": The Needfor a Specialized Convention, 31
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457,473 (1994).
10. Id. at 470-471.
11. Id. at 470.
12. Id. at 470.
13. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 202 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. 1996).
14. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Annex, available at
http://www.ictr.orglwwwroot/ENGLISH/basicdocsstatute.html (last visited October 25, 2002).
15. The International Court of Justice [hereinafter "ICJ"], confronts divergent rulings in some
areas of its work, and its current president has expressed the need to impose harmonization. Gilbert
Guillaume, Speech by his Excellency Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of
Justice, to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations (October 2000), at
http://www.lawschool.comell.edu/library/cijwww/icjwww/ipresscom/ (last visited October 25, 2002).
16. Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute indicates that although ICJ decisions are not binding
precedent, the ICJ may use past decisions when determining current disputes. Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(d); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
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positivist framework, there could be no binding precedent because parties had to
submit to an international court's jurisdiction to hear a particular case. 7 While the
positivist understanding of international law is no longer as dominant as it once
was, international criminal law presents some novel problems in terms of
precedent.
With so many criminal tribunals, separated by space, time, and historical
context, precedent poses greater difficulties than at the ICJ, which has institutional
continuity at least. The potential for divergence increases when domestic courts
try defendants under universal jurisdiction. Limited attempts to impose hierarchy
on the international criminal system have been made. For example, the ICTY and
the ICTR share a common appeals chamber and theoretically apply consistent
law.18 Moreover, the ad hoc tribunal in Sierra Leone is required to follow ICTY
and ICTR precedent.' 9 There will be no common appeals chamber, however, and
no formal mechanism to ensure consistency.20
Harmonization could be imposed with common law crimes in a hierarchical
judicial system, but no such overarching authority exists in international law. The
provisions to encourage uniformity among the ad hoc tribunals will not effect
domestic prosecutions under universal jurisdiction. With domestic courts, the
informal mechanism of judicial globalization2' is the only thing akin to precedent
that currently encourages harmonization of international criminal procedure and
interpretations of the substantive law. At least one scholar considers the trend
toward harmonization of procedural and evidentiary rules to be robust.22 Leaving
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 103 cmt. b (1987) (noting the
"traditional view that there is no stare decisis in international law," but that decisions of international
tribunals adjudicating questions of international law are persuasive evidence of what the law is).
17. Alfred P. Rubin & Alison L. Forbes, Ethics and Authority in International Law, 22 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 335 (1998).
18. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 24, S.C. Res. 935, available at
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (last visited October 25, 2002); Statute
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 25, S.C. Res. 1411, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1411 (2002) available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm (last visited October 25,
2002).
19. Article 20(3) of the Statute of the Special Court directs the judges of the Special Court's
Appeals Chamber to be guided by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav and Rwandan
Tribunals. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 20(3) (2002), available at http://sierra-
leone.org/specialcourtstatute.htm. Article 14(1) of the Statute adopts the Rwanda Tribunal's rules of
procedure and evidence "mutatis mutandis." Id. at art. 14(1).
20. The U.N. Secretary General explicitly rejected a proposal to share the common Appeals
Chamber for the Rwandan and Yugoslav Tribunals with the Special Court for Sierra Leone. See Report
of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, at 8, U.N. Doc.
S/2000/915 (2000) (rejecting ajoint appeals chamber as "legally unsound and practically not feasible"),
available at http://www.daccess-ods.un.org/docUNDOC/GEN/NOO/661//77/PDF/N0066177.pdf?
OpenElement (last visited October 25, 2002).
21. The term describes the phenomenon whereby judges from different jurisdictions cite and
follow each others' reasoning.
22. Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AM.J.INT'L. L. 462, 463 (1998) (stating
that "the rules of procedure and evidence each Tribunal has adopted now form the vital core of an
international code of criminal procedure and evidence that will doubtless have an important impact on
the rules of the future international criminal court"). Others find evidence of increasing harmonization
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aside the question of whether or not a convention creating a system of binding
precedents is politically feasible, such a system would remain unenforceable in the
absence of a supranational adjudicative body with appellate criminal jurisdiction.
B. Dealing with Imprecision: Fair Trial Standards and Judicial Integrity
International law recognizes a number of fair trial standards.23 These
standards set a baseline of procedural fairness without confronting the subtler
questions of the specificity of international criminal law or the distinct nature of
prosecutions under it. Some scholars insist that international prosecutions require
a different set of governing principles than criminal proceedings in a municipal
setting. 24  Between these two poles-guaranteeing defendants certain rights in
every trial and recognizing the peculiarities of international criminal
prosecutions-the clarity and details of the crimes at issue keep slipping through
the cracks. 25 This important issue must be more fully explored. Five guidelines
are proposed below to introduce harmonization into domestic enforcement of
international criminal law and to encourage an international criminal system with
integrity.
First, a mechanism is required to ensure that domestic statutes that expand on
customary international law are not applied retroactively. While the war crimes
acts of most states are under-inclusive, failing to implement all of the Geneva
Conventions and their protocols, the statutes in some states go beyond the
26parameters of those instruments. The question is not simply whether the
at the supranational level, largely resulting from the regional human rights systems. Diane Marie
Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an International Context, 75
IND. L.J. 809, 810 (2000).
23. These fair trial standards have been expressed in Article 14 the ICCPR, the ICC Statute, the
Geneva Conventions, and a number of other international covenants. WARREN FREEDMAN, THE
INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL 342 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1993); Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, art. 67-68, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998); Geneva Convention (III)
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, art. 99-108, 6
U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 134.
24. While in absentia trials are unthinkable domestically, the rationales for that position may not
hold in the international context. Ruth Wedgwood, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Comments
on the International War Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 267, 268-69 (1994). Likewise, while
anonymous witness testimony in domestic prosecutions would violate the defendant's right to a fair
trial, such testimony may be appropriate in international trials, both because witnesses have more to fear
and because protection measures would be ineffectual. Arguing that the reasonable doubt burden is
designed to ensure that erroneous judgments will more often set guilty defendants free than send
innocent ones to prison, and judging that the social disutility of acquitting a guilty genocidaire is much
greater than of convicting an innocent defendant on false charges of genocide, some find that, in human
rights lawsuits, the prosecutor's burden of persuasion should be considerably less. Developments in the
Law--International Criminal Law, Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1982, 1989 (2001) [hereinafter Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal
Defense].
25. Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, supra note 24, at 1991.
26. For example, the Belgian statute takes the notion of war crimes beyond the traditional grave
breaches of the 1949 conventions. See Jacques Verhaegen et al., Commentaire de la loi du 16juin 1993
relative a la repression des infractions graves au droit international humanitaire, REVUE DE DROIT
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development is positive.27 Rather, the question is whether the particular domestic
institution has an international mandate to make innovations in international
criminal law. Domestic courts should refrain from judicial lawmaking in the
international criminal context. In the absence of an appellate court that could
harmonize divergent national decisions, that work is better left to international
tribunals, whose decisions will form part of the universal precedent upon which
domestic jurisdictions can draw.28 International tribunals take into account a
broader horizon of perspectives than would a domestic court, and their
jurisprudence has the advantage of being informed by a non-parochial set of
considerations. The International Court of Justice has adopted a similar position,
approving the prioritization of international tribunals over domestic exercise of
universal jurisdiction.29
Second, statutes of limitations should not apply for serious abuses of human
rights. ° In most jurisdictions, statutory limitations do not exist for murder and
PENAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 1114-1184 (1994); The Belgian statute extends the notion of war crimes
beyond international conflict to civil wars and allows for individual criminal liability for acts that were
"forbidden" but not explicitly criminal under the Geneva Conventions' common article 3. E. David, La
loi beige sur les crimes de guerre, REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 668-684 (1995/2). The
ICTR and the ICTY later found acts falling under that article to be prosecutable violations of customary
international law.
27. Wedgwood, supra note 24, at 272-73 (arguing that "grave breaches" should be interpreted to
include all the prohibited acts of common article 3, thus allowing universal jurisdiction, because these
acts are just as profoundly disturbing as others that are prosecutable under international law).
28. National courts must be able to make some innovations, since the international community has
proved willing in only limited circumstances to create ad hoc tribunals. M.O. Chibundu, Making
Customary International Law Through Municipal Adjudication: A Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J. INT'L L.
1069, 1148 (1999) ("if the international community of jurists is to create an enduring jurisprudence of
international human rights law, it will be because those norms conver e from adjudications in multiple
jurisdictions each reflecting the socio-political structures of its constitution, while seeking to conform
local practices to evolving international standards."). Without a structured international judicial
dialogue or authoritative hierarchy that can impose harmonization, however, domestic innovations may
permanently unsettle the content of international criminal law and render prosecutions under it open to
doubt.
29. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium) 441 I.L.M. 536 (2002) [hereinafter "Congo v. Belgium"] (holding that, while heads of state
are immune from prosecution in domestic courts, those same officials may be prosecuted at an
international criminal tribunal having jurisdiction).
30. Stephen Macedo, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, Principal 6, at
http://www.princeton.edu/-lapa/univejur.pdf (last visited October 25, 2002) [hereinafter PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES], states that "[sitatutes of limitations or other forms of prescription shall not apply to serious
crimes under international law .. " In 1968, the United Nations Convention on the Non-Applicability
of Statute of Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity was drafted, and in 1974, the
Council of Europe concluded a corresponding convention. Adopted by Resolution 2391 (XXIII) of the
United Nations General Assembly on Nov. 26, 1968, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 68 (1969);
European Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes against Humanity and
War Crimes, Jan. 25, 1974, E.T.S. No. 82, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 540 (1974). Relatively few states,
however, have signed and ratified these conventions. Even if the states' motivations for not ratifying
these instruments does not affect the principle of the imprescriptibility of war crimes, the
nonapplicability of statutory limitations does not emerge as a generally accepted principle of
international criminal law.
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other serious crimes.31 Such limitations should likewise not apply to acts that
violate international criminal law. 2 Although prosecutions often take place long
after the fact, increasing the risk that international fair trial rights will be violated
and raising issues about the availability of witnesses and evidence, among other
things, 33 these problems do not warrant the conclusion that prosecutions for acts
that took place many years ago are per se unfair. Determining whether a fair trial
is possible should remain the task of the prosecutor and the judge.34 In a well-
functioning domestic judiciary, there is no reason to believe that courts are unable
to perform this task. Domestic prosecutions under universal jurisdiction need not
apply statutes of limitations in order to protect the integrity of their judicial
proceedings.
Third, a threshold of similarity across jurisdictions as to the definition of
crimes and the mens rea required for conviction would be a positive
development.35 Although genocide has been little prosecuted, its legal contours
were settled after the ratification of the Genocide Convention of 1948.36 The
concept of crimes against humanity, on the other hand, has developed primarily
through custom and adjudication, and its elements are consequently less certain.37
31. See generally CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (Christine Van
den Wyngaert, et al eds., 1993).
32. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.
T.S. 155, art. 2. As long as the non-application of statutory limitations applies only to acts that were
considered criminal at the time committed, there is no retroactivity concern here. The Council of
Europe Convention was designed to overcome this hurdle by stipulating that it would only be applicable
to offences committed after its entry into force. Id. This rule, however, seems over-inclusive. It is not
clear why acts committed before its entry into force that were clearly criminal when committed should
be subject to a statute of limitations since there is no foreseeability issue in this context.
33. See A.T. Richardson, War Crimes Act 1991, MOD. L. REv. 73,74 (1992).
34. Leila Sadat Wexler, The French Experience, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
ENFORCEMENT 284 (2d ed., M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed. 1999).
35. Uncertainty as to the definitions of some international crimes remains. The most blatant
example is the "crime of aggression" in the ICC statute. Even more settled crimes, however, have
proved to be elastic. The Rome Statute's drafters intended, through the language of Article 10, to
encourage states to modify the Statute's definitions through domestic legislation. The framers foresaw
states adding to the list of protected groups under the Genocide Convention and expanding the
definition of crimes against humanity. Sadat, supra note 5, at 256-57. While these drafters seem to
have supported states' conflicting views of the content of international law out of something like
federalism concerns, this position is controversial. As states feel increasingly empowered to prosecute
under universal jurisdiction, if a prosecuting state applies idiosyncratic interpretations of international
law, that prosecution could violate the due process requirements of the criminal law and undermine
international criminal law in general. Morris, supra note 2, at 352.
36. The Genocide Convention requires the intentional destruction of a "national, ethnic, racial or
religious group." Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime Genocide, September 12,
1948, art. 2. Recent cases have challenged this definition in an effort to include systematic attacks on
political or cultural groups. William A. Schabas, Problems of International Codification--Were the
Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo Genocide?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 287 (2001); Harvard Law
Review, Defining Protected Groups under the Genocide Convention, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2007 (2001).
37. These crimes were defined differently in Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter, in art. 5 of the ICTY
Statute, and art. 3 of the ICTR Statute. See CONST. OF THE INT'L MIL. TRIB. Art. 6(c) [hereinafter
"IMT"]; see Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 5, S.C. Res. 1411,
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1411 (2002) available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm
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When international criminal law is enforced at the domestic level, a more rigorous
definition is required than in an international tribunal. Due to their international
character and particular historical contexts, the various international tribunals have
operated with differing definitions without great harm. In the absence of a strict
definition, however,_national courts and prosecutors have interpreted international
prohibitions in peculiar ways, undermining the notion that international criminal
law is a coherent body of universal norms. 38  For domestic prosecutions of
international crimes, it is important that a clear, internationally accepted definition
of those crimes be applied. Domestic prosecutions are not the proper fora for
judicial innovation. The innovation will likely be questioned by the international
community and the integrity of the proceedings thrown into question.
Fourth, it is not self-evident which source of law should designate the
punishment to be applied. The punishment could be provided by the trial state's
law, the law of the state where the crime was committed, the law of the victim's
home state, or the court could choose to apply the least severe penalty. According
to the ICTY Statute, the Yugoslav Tribunal should follow the practice of the
former Yugoslavia regarding sentences.3 9  The rule was established to avoid
retroactive sentencing in violation of the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine
lege.40 Ultimately, because Yugoslavia had imposed the death penalty, the ICTY
decided that it would review the legal practices of the former Yugoslavia but
(last visited October 25, 2002); see Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3, S.C. Res.
935, available at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (last visited October
25, 2002).; see Bassiouni, supra note 9 (arguing that, because of this ambiguity, crimes against
humanity should be codified in an international treaty); Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The
New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381,427 (2000) (examining the
definitions); see also Beth von Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the
Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 787, 792 (1999) ("Since its inception, the definition of
crimes against humanity has been plagued by incoherence."); Simon Chesterman, An Altogether
Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 307
(2000).
38. Wexler, supra note 6, at 710. Finding that a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group was not
targeted as a group for eradication, but rather a number of political opponents from different countries,
the French courts did not find Pinochet's acts to amount to genocide. Brigitte Stem, French Tribunal
de Grande Instance (Paris), 93 AM.J.INT'L. L. 696, 697-98 (1999). By contrast,_Spanish courts found
that the definition of genocide under international law was inadequate and failed to capture the concept.
Thus, the genocide charges for persecution of political opponents-stood. Morris, supra note 2, at 353.
In the French prosecution of Klaus Barbie for crimes against humanity, the Court of Cassation added an
element to the crime. The Court found that the perpetrator of a crime against humanity must have
carried out his crime on behalf of a "state practicing a hegemonic political ideology." This definition
remains unique to France, and the decision, which strikes at the universal nature of international
criminal law, undermines the integrity of national prosecutions of international crimes. See Wexler,
supra note 34, at 284.
39. Statute of the International Tribunal, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2
of S.C. Res. 808, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 4 8 d Sess., 3 1 75 h mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) Rule 101.
40. The Tribunal encountered difficulties, however, because the former Yugoslavia allowed for
the death penalty but not life imprisonment, while the ICTY may impose life imprisonment but not the
death penalty. See William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights
Approach, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 461,462(1997).
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would not be bound by them.4' If determining the source of punishments to be
applied by international tribunals is a delicate matter, the stakes are even higher
with national prosecutions. If trial states apply their own punishment, they
encourage forum-shopping, since those interested in prosecuting the crime would
seek the most favorable forum. From the standpoint of safeguarding the integrity
of the proceedings, it would be best to discourage a system where a defendant
could face the death penalty in one jurisdiction and life imprisonment in another.
Such divergence would seem arbitrary and undermine the notion of universality.42
As for applying the punishment of the state where the crime occurred, forum-
shopping would not be an issue. Although adequate Nnotice would exist and
sentencing would seem less arbitrary, this regime would present substantial
enforcement problems. European states would be reticent to apply another state's
death penalty in a universal jurisdiction case. The third proposition, that the
punishment of the victim's home state be applied, also might require imposition of
the death penalty. The punishment could raise ex post facto and notice issues as
well.
Although problematic, the "least severe penalty" rule-judging between the
trial state's law and the law of the state where the crime occurred-surpasses the
others.43 While it avoids both the notice and enforcement issues, it introduces
others. The Rwandan Tribunal confronted its difficulties." Those in leadership
positions who devised and organized genocide have escaped capital punishment,
while lower-ranking perpetrators appearing before Rwandan courts have been
subjected to the death sentence.4 5 This problem of "vertical inequity" is a serious
political and theoretical issue. In most cases of widespread violence, however, the
state's judiciary would be in disrepair and the state would be unwilling or unable to
carry out prosecutions at all, making the issue purely theoretical. Even where the
41. Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Int'l Crim. Trib. For the Former
Yugo., Trial Chamber, Sentencing Judgment (Nov. 29, 1996), at http://www.un.org/icty/
erdemovic/trialc/judgment/erd-tsj961129e.pdf (last visited October 25, 2002). Many of the cases before
the Human Rights Committee under Art. 15 of the ICCPR have concerned the retroactive imposition of
punishments, i.e., punishments that are more severe than those on the books when the crime was
committed. The ICTY approach comports with the standard enunciated in that instrument.
42. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965). A comparison to federal systems is useful.
While allowing states to develop and apply their own procedural rules for state crimes is inherent to the
federal system of government, so is giving federal courts and legislatures exclusive power over the
substantive and procedural laws relating to federal crimes.
43. Essentially, this rule would be a choice of law provision. The U.S. Supreme Court has
suggested that the purpose of the Erie doctrine is to avoid "forum shopping" and the "inequitable
administration of the laws." Id. at 460. At the international level, that purpose is best achieved by the
least severe penalty rule. As an example, the European Court of Justice, concerned by the divergent
application of EU law in national courts, requires that a national court's application of procedural rules
to an EU cause of action may not vitiate the substantive right nor render it impossible to exercise in
practice. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 214-15
(Oxford University Press Inc. 1998).
44. Rwandans party to the debates preceding the establishment of the ICTR expressed concern
that the Statute "establishes a disparity in sentences since it rules out capital punishment, which is




problem exists concretely, the "least severe penalty" rule is arguably justified if it
increases the integrity of prosecutions under international criminal law, has a
deterrent effect, and results in a general shift away from capital punishment in
domestic courts.
The subtext is that no significant group of states would approve an
international tribunal today with the power to impose capital punishment.46 Thus,
it would be odd for a national prosecution of an international crime to result in the
death penalty. On a case-by-case basis, the "extradition impact" may resolve this
problem, with many states refusing to comply with extradition requests from states
that plan to seek the death penalty.47 This informal regime is not perfect, however,
and it will not lend national prosecutions the same integrity as the "least severe
penalty" rule. States should reach an international agreement governing the
imposition of sentences in universal jurisdiction cases.
Finally, the accused require adequate procedural protections. While it has
been noted that the particular circumstances surrounding international criminal
trials militate against having the same procedural protections that municipal
criminal trials require,48 certain fundamental procedural protections like probative
standards, the burden of proof, and available defenses must not be compromised.4 9
Also, peculiar double jeopardy problems arise from national prosecutions under
international law, and efforts must be made to protect defendants from unfairness
through multiple domestic prosecutions.5" As for amnesties and immunities,
domestic courts prosecuting under universal jurisdiction have no authority to grant
them. 5' Considerable international consensus indicates that amnesties for serious
abuses of human rights are improper. 52 A foreign court-distanced from the social
46. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, Principle 10, states that a state may refuse to
entertain a request for extradition based on universal jurisdiction if the person sought is likely to face
the death penalty, to be subject to torture, or if international due process norms are likely to be violated.
Stephen Macedo, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, Principal 10, at
http://www.princeton.edu/-lapa/univejur.pdf (last visited October 25, 2002); See generally Ved P.
Nanda, Bases for Refusing International Extradition Requests-Capital Punishment and Torture, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1369 (2000).
47. The United States has entered into several bilateral treaties containing clauses assuring the
partner country that the death penalty will not be sought. See Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-
U.K., art. 4, 28 U.S.T. 227, 230; Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-Italy, art. 9, 35 U.S.T. 3023,
3031; U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty, Dec. 3, 1971, art. 6, 27 U.S.T. 983, 989. See infra discussion
Section 11(a).
48. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(l)(d); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §
103 cmt. b (1987).
49. Anthony D'Amato, National Prosecution for International Crimes, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENT (2d ed., M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed. 1999).
50. Id.
51. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations
of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2543-44 (1991) (finding that amnesties for human rights abuses
are per se illegitimate); Emily W. Schabacker, Reconciliation or Justice and Ashes: Amnesty
Commissions and the Duty to Punish Human Rights Offenses, 12 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 1, 53-54 (1999)
(arguing that amnesties are improper except in the context of a transition to democracy).
52. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, Principle 7, at 31 (stating that amnesties are
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and political context of the state where the crimes occurred-especially has no
authority to grant amnesties or immunities, enforcement difficulties aside.53
The proliferation of jurisdictions available to prosecute international crimes
presents new and interesting problems in criminal procedure. 54  The Lotus
paradigm continues to dominate this area of international law. 55  Under that
doctrine, each sovereign may apply its own law in a case unless there is a rule
prohibiting it from doing so, and international law has not yet developed a system
of conflict of laws to resolve the problem.56 Hardly enough attention has been paid
to which body of procedural law the forum state should refer when exercising
universal jurisdiction. At Nuremberg and in the first days of the ad hoc tribunals,
procedural rules received scant attention.57 The international tribunals have their
own rules of procedure that, while largely judge made, at least resulted from
international debate, taking into consideration the needs of international criminal
law. 58 Domestically, many nations have passed laws enabling local prosecution of
criminals from the Yugoslav or Rwandan conflicts found in their territories.59 In
some cases, a difference in procedural rules between the domestic system and the
international tribunal would be outcome determinative. The question then arises,
which rule of procedure should apply? Deferring to the national rule could lead to
war crime forum-shopping from a prosecutorial standpoint, with the prosecutor at
the international tribunal relinquishing jurisdiction and victims bringing cases as
inconsistent with the duty to punish serious abuses of human rights); Study on Amnesty Laws and their
Role in the Safeguard and Promotion of Human Rights, Prelim. Rept. By Louis Joinet, Special
Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 38h Session, Provisional Agenda Item 9(a),
at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/16; General Comment No. 20(44) (art. 7), General Comment
Adopted by the Human Rights Committee under Article 40, para. 4, of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.3, Oct. 3, 1992; Velasquez Rodriguez
Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Case 4, Inter-Am. C .H.R. (Ser. C) (1988) (holding that states have a
duty to investigate and punish serious abuses of human rights) available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/serie-c_4_ing.doc (last visited Oct. 22, 2002); Orentlicher, supra
note 51, at 2543; Schabacker, supra note 51, at 53.
53. For serious abuses of human rights, courts' power is asymmetrical. Universal jurisdiction is
meant to ensure that the victims will have justice. Courts vested with universal jurisdiction, while
having the authority to prosecute, do not have the power to grant amnesties or immunities.
54. Domestic procedural regimes to enforce international criminal law vary considerably from
state to state. A number of aspects of criminal procedure, including statutes of limitations, immunities,
pardons, penalties, and the rights of the defendant are local in character. As of yet, there is scant
relationship between national and international proceedings and virtually no integration of procedural
rules. Sadat, supra note 5, at 257-58.
55. S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. V. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Set. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
56. Sadat, supra note 5, at 257-58.
57. See, e.g., Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence:
Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725, 729-30 (1999).
58. See, e.g., Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, reprinted in VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, 2 AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 41-86 (1995) available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/ct-rules7.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002); Cristian DeFrancia, Due
Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure Matters, 87 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1390 (2001).
59. Many states enacted laws to incorporate the obligations imposed by Security Council
Resolution 827 establishing the international tribunal in Yugoslavia to prosecute accused persons
discovered on their soil.
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parties civiles60 in jurisdictions with procedural rules more favorable to their case.
A possible solution is that the international tribunal's rule would override domestic
rules. To assure integrity, however, adopting the rule most favorable to the
defendant would be the best choice.6' Since no equivalent to the international
debate producing the tribunals' procedural rules exists at the domestic level,
adopting the rule most favorable to the defendant, judging between the rules of an
international tribunal and a domestic court, would cast the best light on national
prosecutions for international crimes.
Situations inevitably will arise where international law provides no rule on a
problem and municipal law must apply. Some scholars suggest that municipal
rules should be modified in consideration of the crime's international nature,
drawing on the principles of private international law to inform criminal
procedures.62 For the moment, however, when prosecutions under universal
jurisdiction are regarded with great skepticism, relying on even these modified
national procedures in international prosecutions will result in a loss of integrity
and will undermine their universality. Judged against the procedural rules arrived
at after painstaking international debate, whether those from Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
or the ICC, the rule most favorable to the defendant should be applied. While this
solution may not be exact, and international law still might not provide any clear
answers, it is imperative that international standards set the baseline against which
domestic prosecutions for international crimes are judged.
11. The "Invisible Hand" Encouraging Transnational Harmonization
The possibility for variation among the laws of jurisdictions hearing
international criminal cases is vast. Procedural rules and sentences proliferate, as
do interpretations of the definitions and elements of crimes. In the absence of a
formal unifying structure, are there informal "checks and balances" in the
international system that introduce, at best, an element of harmonization or, at
least, some standards militating against the most divergent practices? Four
informal mechanisms have the potential to serve this function. First, the rules on
extradition could influence the fairness of national prosecutions for international
60. As explained by Judge Claude Jorda:
According to French law, any private individual or group of individuals may trigger a
criminal prosecution by introducing a claim in court. This is referred to as "la
constitution de parties-civiles" ("the formation of civil parties"). If anyone "se constitue
partie-civile" against somebody else, the court must prosecute that individual.
See CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [CPP] art. 721 (Fr.). Claude Jorda, The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Its Functioning and Future Prospects, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y
SYMP. 167, 202, n.53 (1999).
61. This rule would be consistent with the spirit of Article 15 of the ICCPR, which provides that a
heavier penalty may not be imposed if a lighter penalty was statutorily required at the time the act was
committed. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 19, 1966, art. 15. France
has adopted a similar rule for handling domestic prosecutions arising out of the Yugoslav conflict. See
Wexler, supra note 34, at 298 n. 157.
62. Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of
Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 363-66 (1994).
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crimes. Second, the fact that prosecuting states must rely on other states'
cooperation to gather evidence introduces the possibility of some checks. Third,
the emergence of a transnational judicial dialogue whereby decisions in one
jurisdiction gain authority by drawing on precedents from international tribunals
and foreign courts is promising. Fourth, world opinion could substantially impact
these prosecutions, although it is not clear whether the world's gaze is more likely
to encourage fair prosecutions, deter exercise of universal jurisdiction altogether,
or turn prosecutors into celebrities. An examination of these issues will reveal
whether the central problems of domestic prosecutions of international crimes can
be addressed through informal checks currently present in the international system.
Put differently, this section analyzes the possible affects of a "free market" of
jurisdictions for international criminal prosecutions. Might this jurisdictional
competition lead to a convergence of definitions and procedural rules, greater
divergence, or no change at all?63 Others have argued that forum-shopping can
materially benefit human rights law, leading to both greater vindication of victim's
rights and a clearer exposition of the law.64 The multiplicity of fora might even
encourage horizontal dialogue among jurists in different jurisdictions to both
elucidate and harmonize the legal norms of international criminal law.65 For the
moment, these predictions remain aspirational. Rather than heralding the growth
of national prosecutions as unambiguously positive, this section will explore
whether there is an "invisible hand" encouraging harmonization for national
prosecutions under international criminal law.
A. The "Extradition Impact"
A custodial state receiving an extradition request for an indicted suspect is not
required to comply.66 If it finds that the proceedings in the requesting state would
be unfair or that the punishment would be overly severe, it can refuse to
extradite.67  While such dialogue could influence the fairness of criminal
proceedings, there is little indication that states scrutinize requesting states'
procedures.68 Extradition treaties, negotiated with law enforcement in mind,
63. Theodor Meron has argued that the evolving rules of procedure and evidence in the ad hoc
tribunals will coalesce into a well-defined body of rules of international criminal procedure. Meron,
supra note 22, at 463.
64. Laurence R. Heifer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 285, 289-97
(1999) (arguing, in the context of treaty, regional, and international bodies, that forum-shopping
encourages development of human rights law that benefits victims and ensures adequate protections for
defendants)..
65. Id. at 293.
66. See Michael S. Topiel, The Doctrine of Non-Inquiry and the Preservation of Human Rights: Is
There Room for Reconciliation?, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 389, 406-8 (2001).
67. Id.
68. As a general rule, countries require only that the conduct is criminal in both the requesting and
sending states for an extradition to go forward. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Extradition: The United States
Model, 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 405 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986). Little attention is
given to procedural details, and, under the rule of non-inquiry, the existence of an extradition treaty
with the U.S. prevents courts from reviewing whether or not the trial would be fair in the requesting
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provide a presumption that the extradition should go forward. In practice, refusals
to extradite are made largely by European states opposed to the death penalty.69
Thus, extradition has limited impact on the application of international criminal
law.70
The broad powers of enforcement jurisdiction in American law further
debilitate the extradition regime as a check on international criminal proceedings.
After Alvarez-Machain, American law enforcement officials may contemplate
kidnapping as an alternative to requesting extradition even from a state with which
the U.S. has an extradition treaty.7' While the cost in political capital may deter
extra-territorial enforcement in most cases, the Alvarez-Machain rule militates
against a robust extradition principle as an international check on the substantive,
procedural, and penal aspects of national prosecutions for international crimes.
72
The "extradition impact" as a tool for encouraging international dialogue in
national prosecutions for international crimes is further weakened because, in
many cases, extradition is not an issue. If the defendant arrives on the soil of the
country that then seeks prosecution, the potential for transnational checks and
balances through extradition is irrelevant.
Finally, as former dictators and human rights abusers learn the great lesson of
the twentieth century, to forego travel or to travel only to those states where they
are assured refuge, the likelihood of extradition decreases. 73  Extradition from
rogue states is unlikely. Even if extradition were granted, it is unlikely that such
states would provide checks on the fairness of criminal proceedings in the
requesting state. The prospect of human rights abusers receiving refuge in rogue
states also raises the likelihood of Alvarez-Machain solutions. The U.S. would be
most likely to resort to kidnapping in cases where extradition would be justified
but impossible for geopolitical reasons. In practice, this result could bear little
positive for the development of a robust system of checks and balances through
extradition rules.
country. Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989
(1971); see Lynn Sellers Bickley, U.S. Resistance to the International Criminal Court: Is the Sword
Mightier than the Law?, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 213, 248 (2000). Of course, this rule depends on the
treaty's approval, where the procedural protections would presumably, though not necessarily, be
analyzed at the negotiation stage.
69. Generally, when the U.S. seeks to extradite a criminal from Europe, it undergoes formal
negotiations to assure that the criminal will not face the death penalty once extradited. Despite these
guarantees, European states remain ambivalent about extraditing to the U.S. In the wake of the events
of September 11, several European states have refused extradition. See Sam Dillon and Donald G.
McNeil, Jr., A Nation Challenged: The Legal Front; Spain Sets Hurdle for Extraditions, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2001, at Al. States also negotiate treaties stating that any suspect extradited to a requesting
state will not face the death penalty. See Topiel supra note 66, at 396-97.
70. Pinochet showed the world that extradition proceedings can be drawn out and political without
touching on the substantive legal issues. Broomhall, supra note 2, at 415.
71. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669-70 (1992).
72. Id at 666-67.
73. Broomhall, supra note 2, at 415.
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B. Mutual Legal Assistance
Because states prosecuting international crimes rely on mutual legal
assistance to gather evidence,74 officials in the country where the evidence is
located have a profound influence on the trial's shape. In this context, two
problems arise. First, evidence may be located in a state unwilling to cooperate
with the prosecuting state. That state may impede visits to sites and witnesses and
may prevent investigators from locating key documents. Second, where
investigators have access to documents, the court may have difficulty determining
their authenticity. Under the treaties governing mutual legal assistance, requested
states generally have broad discretion to refuse assistance on a number of
grounds.75
Experience at the ad hoc tribunals indicates that refusals to cooperate have
had a large practical impact on the proceedings.76 While refusal to grant mutual
legal assistance could perform a regulatory function on the proceedings in the
requesting state, its exercise depends largely on the character of the state that is
requested to cooperate. In many cases, a despotic regime will simply refuse to
cooperate whether or not the proceeding is just.77 The most likely result is a
rhetorical battle, where the prosecuting state seeks to discredit the requested state's
position. The proceedings' fairness will not be the focus in friction arising from
mutual legal assistance requests, and this form of extraterritorial influence is
unlikely to be a strong tool regulating national prosecutions for international
crimes.
C. Transjudicialism: The International Judicial Dialogue
The "international judicial dialogue," whereby domestic courts look to
international tribunals and foreign courts to inform their decisions, has aroused
scholarly interest.78 Some scholars see the ad hoc international tribunals, where
judges on one court often cite decisions from the other, as a harbinger of a more
wide-ranging judicial conversation about international criminal law. 79 To date,
however, this dialogue has primarily influenced the law of capital punishment,80
and a limited number of courts have opted to engage in the conversation." Not
74. Broomhall, supra note 2, at 412.
75. Id.
76. James Blount Griffin, A Predictive Framework for the Effectiveness of International Criminal
Tribunals, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 405, 441 (2001).
77. Id. at 441.
78. Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law-The International Judicial Dialogue:
When Domestic Constitutional Courts Join the Conversation, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2049, 2049-50 (2001)
[hereinafter International Judicial Dialogue]; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization,
40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1104-05 (2000).
79. International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 78 at 2049-50.
80. Id.
81. In the death penalty context, the Canadian and Jamaican Supreme Courts considered the
European Court of Human Rights' decision in Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1989). See Kindler v. Canada, 2 S.C.R. 779 (1991); Pratt v. Attorney-Gen. for Jam., 2 A.C. I (P.C.
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surprisingly, U.S. courts have been particularly unwilling to consider international
and foreign standards.
The possibilities for a fully international dialogue are narrow in the context of
national prosecutions for international crimes, given the rarity of such
prosecutions. Time will tell to what extent ICTY and ICTR precedents will impact
domestic decision-making. The fact remains that most states of the South, which
have been most receptive to judicial globalization, will not prosecute international
crimes in their national courts. These countries would face substantial costs in
terms of diplomatic and political capital, as well as the threat of informal economic
sanctions, if they exercised universal jurisdiction to try anyone but their own
former dictators.
This analysis suggests that the international judicial dialogue is a positive
development but a weak means of harmonizing criminal standards across
jurisdictions. Without a more formal mechanism encouraging transnational
judicial interdependence that engages the most prosecutorial states, there is little
evidence to suggest that the dialogue will prove to be robust. Some courts may
find it in their interest to invoke the decisions of international tribunals and foreign
jurisdictions as a means of legitimating their own rulings. Even courts sympathetic
to that rationale would be reticent to recognize a systematic dialogue contributing
to the development of a law that should, in order to maintain its integrity, retain its
essentially international characteristics when enforced in domestic courts. Thus, in
the absence of a more formal mechanism introducing a hierarchy of decision in
international criminal law, the international judicial dialogue will remain a weak
tool. It will not encourage the rigor and convergence that is needed if national
prosecutions for international crimes are to become fully legitimate in the eyes of
the international community.
D. World Opinion
Given the geopolitical context of national prosecutions for domestic crimes,
one might suppose that world opinion in general and the potential for costly
payouts of diplomatic capital 83 might encourage responsible prosecutions for
international crimes that fall closely in line with international standards of
fairness.84 While this may be true to some degree, the impact of world opinion will
most likely simply influence the number of prosecutions, leaving national
1993). The Indian Supreme Court considered foreign practice and scholarship in Bachan Singh v.
Punjab, 2 S.C.J. 475 (1980), as did the South African Constitutional Court in State v. Makwanyane,
1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC) reprinted in 16 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL 154 (1995).
82. See Goti, supra note 4.
83. See, e.g., The Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company (Belgium v. Spain) 1970 ICJ 3,
31.
84. NGOs could critically examine national prosecutions for international crimes. To date,
however, NGOs have tended to overlook the flaws in favor of developing a robust international
criminal system. See Amnesty International, News Release: Amnesty International Urges Investigation
of Ariel Sharon, Oct. 3, 2001, at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2001/begium10032001.html (last
visited October 22, 2002).
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85procedural rules and interpretations of international criminal prohibitions intact.
Whether this international gaze will encourage too many prosecutions or deter
national prosecutions for international crimes altogether is the crux of the problem.
Whether there are too few or too many prosecutions depends on the legal rules
determining who may prosecute and be prosecuted.
In a national jurisdiction where all criminal prosecutions must be brought by
the sovereign, we expect few prosecutions for international crimes.86 Few
prosecutors will expend judicial resources to prosecute defendants for crimes
committed on foreign soil, and the world has seen few zealous prosecutors of
international crimes. Baltasar Garzon is the exception that proves the rule.
8 7
Garzon's actions have led to serious national debate in Spain about whether states
should become involved in such cases. 88 The exception aside, evidence indicates
that prosecutions by the sovereign will tend toward too few national prosecutions
for international crimes.
Civil law systems often allow alternative means of bringing criminal
prosecutions. These states allow "civil parties" to institute proceedings,89 where
the civil party acts as a private prosecutor to plead cases that the state may
otherwise overlook. While this system provides a forum for plaintiffs to bring
suits against human rights abusers, a state could pay a high political price for
divesting itself of the sole authority to choose which defendants may be criminally
prosecuted in its courts. 90  While the civil party mechanism will increase the
85. Professor Harold Koh's transnational legal process could be characterized as the force of
world opinion changing the trajectory of the law or inducing compliance among states. As his
examination of the Alvarez-Machain case and its aftermath indicates, however, the transnational legal
process often does not reach holistic solutions. The United States now prohibits transborder
kidnappings in Mexico but not as a general tool of law enforcement. While in a particular case, world
opinion may achieve its goals, its ability to change the law in a systematic manner is unlikely. Harold
Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181,195-96 (1996).
86. David Scheffer, the former U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, has noted that
governments are almost universally determined not to use universal jurisdiction. David Scheffer,
Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities and Prospects, Opening Address Before the Universal
Jurisdiction Conference at the New England School of Law (Nov. 3, 2000), 35 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 233
(2001).
87. See Judge Garzon: Spain's Most Famous Investigator, BBC NEWS, Sept. 13, 2000 (examining
Judge Garzon's extraordinary political career as a prosecutor and the international notoriety that Garzon
gained from his role in the Pinochet affair) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/923083.stm
(last visited October 22, 2002).
88. See Tarvainen, supra note I (finding that Spain did not want to engage in intemational human
rights enforcement, but that "it was unexpectedly forced into that role when 'star judge' Baltasar
Garzon issued an arrest warrant against Pinochet in October 1998.").
89. See generally J.A. Jolowicz, Procedural Questions, 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, pt. II, ch. 13, at 3-15 (Andrd Tunc ed., 1986) (examining the operation of the civil
party system in civil law countries); Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to
American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?,
78 CAL. L. REV. 539, 613 (1990) (explaining the relationship between the French prosecutor's discretion
and the rights of victims who file criminal charges directly).
90. Under the Belgian universal jurisdiction statute, a number of criminal cases have been
instigated by civil parties against defendants like Fidel Castro, Saddam Hussein, Ariel Sharon, Yasser
Arafat, Pal Kagame, and Hissene Habre. The Sharon case has caused diplomatic stress, resulting in
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number of national prosecutions for international crimes, it might be so politically
problematic as to result in a rejection of such prosecutions altogether. 9'
No mechanism exists to encourage the optimal number of national
prosecutions. In the absence of a nexus between the prosecuting state and the
criminal, the victim, or the crime, such prosecutions will seem random, and no
clear standard for adjudicating cases has yet emerged that satisfies both human
rights and due process concerns. Perhaps the emergence of an international
criminal prosecution and defense bar, 92 as well as growth in the number of judges
with experience in the field, will help solve some of these problems. In the
meantime, it is unclear what steps may be taken to balance human rights concerns
with procedural fairness and perceived judicial integrity. The force of world
opinion is not a strong check on the procedural and fairness characteristics of
national prosecutions for international crimes. On the contrary, world opinion is
more likely to impact the number of such cases that are brought, and it is not a
strong element of the "invisible hand" that could regulate international
prosecutions.
E. Concluding Thoughts
Each of the informal mechanisms that could encourage transnational
convergence of international criminal substantive and procedural law is unlikely to
have much impact. A more formal means of harmonizing international criminal
law is necessary to ensure that universal jurisdiction is not altogether undermined
by idiosyncratic national prosecutions. The following section will highlight some
of the political costs that universal jurisdiction poses and discuss the impact of the
ICJ's recent decision in Congo v. Belgium-reviewing a prosecution under
Belgium's universal jurisdiction statute-on national prosecutions. The
concluding section will present some suggestions that should lend greater integrity
to international criminal prosecutions.
charges of Belgian anti-Semitism. See News Release: Amnesty International Urges Investigation of
Ariel Sharon, Oct. 3, 2001, at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2001/belgium10032001/html (last
visited October 22, 2002); Exiles Seek Castro's Indictment in Belgium, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2001, at
A32; Israeli Group to File Suit in Belgium against Arafat, Aug. 9, 2001, at
http://www.arabia.connews/article/englishl0,11827,61260,00.html (last visited October 22, 2002).
The political cost of opening its criminal system to private prosecutors has pushed some Belgians to
seek repeal of the universal jurisdiction statute. The Sharon case in particular has led the Belgian
parliament to consider amending its law, including temporary head of state immunity. Belgium's Legal
Trap for World Leaders, CNN.coM, Jan. 23, 2002, at http://europe.cnn.com/2001WORLD/
europe/07/05/belgium.sharon (last visited October 22, 2002); Tyrants Fear Long Arm of Belgian Law,
SUNDAY TIMEs, Aug. 5, 2001 at http://www.is.lk/times/010805/specrpt.html (last visited October 22,
2002).
91. Morris, supra note 2, at 357 (arguing that the power to prosecute under universal jurisdiction,
when not adequately controlled by government actors mindful of international relations, could bring
about quite harmful results).
92. See Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, supra note 24, at 1992.
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Ill. Some Costs of Universal Jurisdiction
While this article has assumed that universal jurisdiction will occupy an
increasingly prevalent space in international decision-making, it has not considered
explicitly the costs inherent in decisions that will have political implications. The
article has generally suggested that one way to limit these costs is by harmonizing
the procedural and substantive norms of international criminal law to minimize the
possibility of aberrant decisions. This section seeks to point out more concretely
some of the costs of universal jurisdiction. If universal jurisdiction is to become a
productive addition to the toolbox of human rights and international politics, the
costs acknowledged here must be taken into account.
A. Discounting Diplomacy and Interstate Relations
It would be imprudent to discuss universal jurisdiction without considering its
potential use as a political tool of interstate conflict. 93 Every prosecution using
universal jurisdiction is certain to have an "irreducible element of controversy. 94
One need not conjure hypotheticals presupposing destructive intent to recognize
the potential havoc aggressive prosecution could wreak on international order.
Those who pursue prosecutions because they believe it is the just thing to do could
jeopardize political negotiations that might lead to less human suffering. Pundits
and scholars alike have opined that the former ICTY Chief Prosecutor's efforts to
indict Slobodan Milosevic made political negotiation impossible.95 Faced with the
threat of indictment, Milosevic opted to continue the fighting that led to many
more deaths.
96
While Milosevic's indictment may have been a poor exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, this example should not be offered to justify jettisoning universal
jurisdiction altogether. Although successful negotiations may reduce suffering
more than criminal prosecutions in some instances, we should not prematurely
limit non-violent solutions to international problems. What would be the
advantage in restricting the toolbox so that, if negotiations fail, military
engagement is the next best option? Other practical concerns reinforce the
argument that universal jurisdiction, combined with a strong dose of prosecutorial
discretion and institutional checks, should remain an option. First, negotiations are
often used as a stalling tactic.97 Negotiations can send the wrong signal to those on
93. As Madeline Morris notes, "states may exercise universal jurisdiction as a means of gaining
advantage over their opponents in interstate conflicts by prosecuting nationals of those opponent
states .. " Morris, supra note 2, at 354.
94. Broomhall, supra note 2, at 419.
95. See, e.g., Michael Mandel, Politics and Human Rights in International Criminal Law: Our
Case Against NA TO and the Lessons to be Learned From It, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 95, 95-7 (2001).
96. See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 95, at 95-97; Mirko Klarin, Arbour's Pre-Emptive Strike, MOJO
WIRE, June 1, 1999, at http://www.motherjones.com/totalcoverage/kosovo/arbour.html (last visited
October 22, 2002).
97. Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, Address Before the
Human Rights Workshop, Yale Law School (March 1, 2002).
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the ground who may continue to participate in genocide, torture, or other inhumane
acts of violence. Without an affirmative signal-a condemnation that the acts are
contrary to law-violence may continue as negotiations proceed. 98 Moreover, the
history of American and international responses to genocide, widespread torture,
and war crimes indicates that negotiations will likely have little impact until after
the fact. 99 In many cases, there have been simply no negotiations at all until after
the damage was already done. Against this background, removing prosecution as
an option seems premature. Prosecutorial discretion and institutional checks are
not sufficient to minimize the costs of universal jurisdiction, however. Doctrines
like "head of state immunity" must be clearly conceived in order to avoid counter-
productive consequences arising from national prosecutions.
i. Head of State and Ministerial-Immunity
A number of doctrines, most importantly head of state immunity (a term
which this article will use loosely to cover other sovereign, ministerial
immunities), have historically been employed so that international political
processes are not subjected to proceedings in national courts. The doctrine is
rooted in the notion that one sovereign, of equal stature with all others, cannot sit
in judgment of another.100  Today, the strongest rationale for head of state
immunity is comity. Each state should respect the immunity of foreign heads of
states so that its leaders will be granted similar protection while abroad.' 0 '
The scope of head of state immunity, once absolute, has contracted over time,
and its contours have not yet settled. 0 2 In recent years, courts have carved an
exemption such that commercial transactions and other acts of a purely private
character are no longer covered by immunity.'0 3 Following this development,
courts have begun to recognize a distinction between a head of state's official and
unofficial conduct. 1 4  The distinction remains unclear, however, and this
jurisprudential ambiguity has been expanded by recent cases questioning whether
any act in violation of international law can ever be official.'0 5
The Pinochet case, in which the British Law Lords held that Augusto
Pinochet was not immune from prosecution as a former head of state for acts of
98. Power, supra note 97; see also Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International
Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (2001).
99. Power, supra note 97.
100. See Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of
Governments and Foreign Ministers, 247 RECUEIL DES COURS 19, 52 (1994).
101. See Shobha Varughese George, Head-of-State Immunity in the United States Courts: Still
Confused After All These Years, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1051, 1061 (1995).
102. See Jarrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity: The Defined
Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 169,179 (1986).
103. In Britain, for example, the State Immunity Act of 1978 curtailed the immunity of heads of
state with respect to proceedings dealing with private commercial transactions and torts. State
Immunity Act 1978, July 20, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1123.
104. Watts, supra note 100, at 55.
105. Gilbert Sison, A King No More: The Impact of the Pinochet Decision on the Doctrine of Head
of State Immunity, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1583, 1588 (2000).
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torture committed under his authority, suggests that "official conduct" may not
include acts criminal under international law. 10 6 While that case is susceptible to
both broad and narrow readings, 10 7 its sister Chilean case' 08 and other international
developments' 9 suggest that head of state immunity is not absolute in the
international criminal context. 110 Professor Wedgwood sees a familiar distinction
in the division between official and unofficial acts."' Analogizing to the
difference between a soldier who kills in the course of combat and a soldier who
commits a war crime, she discerns the parameters of what actions may fall within
the "permissible portfolio" of a head of state, suggesting that acts violating
international law do not constitute official conduct."12
In the recent case between Belgium and the Congo before the International
Court of Justice, ' 3 the distinction between official and unofficial acts again came
to the fore. The Congo contested the legality of a warrant issued under the Belgian
universal jurisdiction statute in April 2000 against its incumbent Foreign
Minister.' 4 The DRC originally challenged Belgium's claim to jurisdiction, but in
its final pleadings before the court it dropped those arguments, focusing instead on
obtaining "a finding by the Court that it has been the victim of an internationally
wrongful act," the basis of which was the violation of the Foreign Minister's
sovereign immunity." 5 Belgium acquiesced in this tactical shift. Both countries, it
seemed, feared losing on the universal jurisdiction issue.
Addressing the head of state immunity issue, the Court's opinion employed
three primary analytical foci, distinguishing among incumbent ministers, former
ministers, and the special rules applying in international tribunals as opposed to
106. Mary Margaret Penrose, It's Good to be the King!: Prosecuting Heads of State and Former
Heads of State Under International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 193,203 (2000).
107. While a broad reading of the decision would classify acts criminal at international law as
unofficial acts for which immunity is not available, the decision could be narrowly interpreted to apply
only to the terms of the Torture Convention. Sison, supra note 105, at 1601; see also Ruth Wedgwood,
International Criminal Law and Augusto Pinochet, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 829, 841 (2000) (arguing that
"It]he reliance on the Torture Convention to parry official acts immunity narrows the reach of the
Pinochet opinion...").
108. In August of 2000, the Chilean Supreme Court seconded the Pinochet precedent by holding
that Pinochet's senatorial "immunity for life" did not protect him from prosecution for human rights
violations. Pinochet Loses Immunity in Chile Ruling, Reuters, Aug. 8, 2000.
109. Wedgwood, supra note 107, at 844 (pointing out that the Rome Treaty expressly proscribes
official status as a head of state as a defense against criminal liability, but that the issue has not been
briefed to many signatory governments for fear that many would refuse to sign).
110. Lord Steyn, one of the Law Lords in Pinochet, left his imprint on this area of the law:
[S]ome acts of a Head of State may fall beyond even the most enlarged meaning of official acts
performed in the exercise of the functions of a Head of State .... The normative principles of
international law do not require that such high crimes should be classified as acts performed in the
exercise of the functions of a Head of State.
Ex parte Pinochet [1998] 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L.) (25 November 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. at 1337,
1338.
111. Wedgwood, supra note 107, at 839.
112. Wedgwood, supra note 107, at 841.
113. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 29.
114. Id. at para. 1.
115. ld. at para. 42.
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national courts. 16 As for incumbent foreign ministers, the Court held that they
have absolute immunity from criminal, and by implication, civil suits while in
office."17 The Court offered a functional argument for disregarding any distinction
between acts taken in "official" capacity and in a "private" capacity." 8 Allowing
anything less than absolute immunity would deter ministers from traveling and
have other, negative chilling effects on the performance of their official
functions." 9 Making the point about absolute immunity perfectly clear, the court
noted that:
[i]t has been unable to deduce from this practice that there exists under customary
international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from
criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs,
where thee &are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against
humanity.
Under the Court's holding, former ministers benefit from a more limited
immunity.
Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one State may
try a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts
committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect
of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity.121
The decision is unclear as to the distinction between official and private acts,
or what can be classified as a "portfolio duty." The Court left open the possibility,
however, that national courts, provided that they have jurisdiction, could pursue
cases against former ministers for violations of international human rights law
committed during term of office.
In these rulings, the Court largely restated pre-existing jurisprudence. 122 The
Court made a new and important distinction, however, between national courts and
international criminal tribunals. Finding that an incumbent or former minister may
be subject to criminal proceedings before an international criminal court having
jurisdiction, 23 the Court noted that the exceptions to absolute immunity in those
international tribunals has no bearing on the existence of such an exception in
national courts. 
24
116. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 29, at para. 42.
117. Id. at para. 51.
118. Id. at para. 55.
119. Id. at para. 55.
120. Id. at para. 58.
121. Id. at para. 61.
122. Courts had frequently interpreted head of state immunity to be absolute with respect to
proceedings initiated in foreign courts and former heads of state to be immune for official acts
performed in the head of state's public capacity. See Watts, supra note 100, at 54; see also Re
Honecker, 80 I.L.R. 365 (F.R.G. Fed. Sup. Ct. (Second Criminal Chamber (1984))); Duke of Brunswick
v. King of Hanover, 2 H.L.C. 1 (1848).
123. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 29, at para. 61.
124. Id. at para. 58.
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Perhaps reflecting the functional concern that political negotiations should not
be threatened by national prosecutions and the belief that prosecutors in
international courts would be more sensitive to international political conditions,
the Court managed to state a strong limitation on the exercise of national universal
jurisdiction without directly addressing the issue. 125 At the very least, the Court
expressed concern that national courts may act opportunistically and that their
ability to prosecute ministers should be limited to prevent interference in
international political processes. 26 As noted, with regard to former ministers, the
decision does not differentiate between prosecutions in national courts and
international tribunals. 127 This facet of the decision comports with the functional
concerns outlined earlier-former heads of state no longer serve as "a
plenipotentiary of the state in its negotiations."'1
28
The ICJ opinion has immediate consequences. Its deference to international
tribunals effectively limits the use of judicial prosecutions of incumbent ministers
to those disputes where the international community has intervened to establish a
criminal tribunal. The decision could be read simply as defining different roles for
international tribunals and national courts in the context of international criminal
law by concentrating prosecutorial discretion in ongoing political conflicts while
permitting greater decentralization concerning former leaders.
While the decision seems formalistic and straightforward, it fails to crystallize
recent developments in the doctrine of head of state immunity. It overlooks
international instruments-not the customary international law that the Court
invoked-that arguably or explicitly forbid immunity for crimes under
international law. 129  To the extent that the judgment cuts against these
instruments, rather than interpreting them to apply only in international tribunals,
the Court has left an issue for future cases. Thus, the opinion may have injected
more confusion into the head of state immunity doctrine than is evident at first.
This lack of clarity, rather than limiting the costs of universal jurisdiction, may
well exacerbate them.
More immediately, Belgian courts have eagerly awaited the ICJ's decision in
125. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 29, at para. 58. The separate opinions discussed Belgium's
universal jurisdiction statute in detail. Nine of the justices would allow universal jurisdiction in some
form. President Guillaume expressed a strong distrust of national courts, however, positing that
international criminal courts have been developed in response to the deficiencies of national
proceedings. Id. (separate opinion of President Guillaume, at para 11). He found no justification for
exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia. Id. (separate opinion of President Guillaume, at para. 13).
Judge Koroma, by contrast, lamented the damage that this case may have done to national universal
jurisdiction. Id. (separate opinion of Judge Koroma at para. 5). He applauded Belgium's willingness to
prosecute international crimes and cautioned against interpreting the Judgment as a rejection of
universal jurisdiction. Id (separate opinion of Judge Koroma, at para. 6).
126. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 29, at para. 71.
127. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 29, at para. 59.
128. Wedgwood, supra note 107, at 841.
129. Id. (arguing that the Torture Convention was explicitly directed at officials and that it is
plausible to read the Convention to exclude immunity for sitting heads of state); see also, Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
art. 4 (allows for a head of state's criminal liability).
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order to determine how its universal jurisdiction statute will be received
internationally. The most notable of the ongoing universal jurisdiction cases in
Belgian courts is the prosecution of Ariel Sharon and co-defendants for their roles
in the incidents at Sabra and Shatilla. 130  The ICJ decision has obvious
consequences for the case against Sharon, an incumbent head of state. In a press
release issued shortly after the Congo decision, the private prosecutors in Sharon
expressed their intent to pursue their case against those defendants who have no
immunity and argued that the decision poses "no obstacle to the issuance of an




The ICJ case left a number of questions unanswered. While Belgium's
exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia provoked controversy, it is not clear
what further limitations the Court would seek to apply in a future case. 132 What is
the line between official and unofficial acts? How does the Court view universal
jurisdiction statutes? How would the Court treat national prosecutions of
incumbent ministers for torture and genocide, acts for which immunity may well
be prohibited? In the immediate aftermath of this case, the Belgian Foreign
Minister recognized that the law must be amended, but he insisted that "the basic
principles-the punishment of severe breaches of international humanitarian law-
remain applicable."' I3 3 Before the statute could be amended, however, Belgium's
highest court decided the Sharon case, holding that Sharon could face war crimes
charges in Belgium after he leaves office. 34 The Belgian high court thus adopted a
liberal interpretation of the ICJ's decision, respecting immunity for sitting heads of
state while finding that former heads of state can be prosecuted for certain acts
taken during their term of office.
135
Rather than backing away from its progressive approach to universal
130. See the Complaint against Ariel Sharon, BADIL RESOURCE CENTER, June 18, 2001, available
at httpJ/www.lawsociety.org/sharon/complaint.htm (last visited October 22, 2002).
131. Chibli Mallat, Luc Walleyn, and Michael Verhaeghe, Press Statement by the Lawyers
Representing the Victims of the Sabra and Shatilla Massacres, BADIL RESOURCE CENTER, Feb. 14,
2002. The prosecuting attorneys plan to make two arguments that the ICJ did not consider. First, the
decision only considered illegal the issuance of an international arrest warrant. In the Sharon case,
there is no warrant, only a criminal investigation. The Court's decision gave no indication that an
investigation alone is a violation of international law. Second, the warrant for Foreign Minister Yeroda
was not based on acts of genocide. The pleadings in the Sharon case, following the General
Assembly's characterization of the incidents at Sabra and Shatilla, allege genocide. The Genocide
Convention does not provide for immunity. Article IV states that "Persons committing genocide or any
of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals." ICJ jurisprudence has confirmed the
universal character of the convention. BADIL RESOURCE CENTER, Belgian Appeals Court Agrees to
New Hearing, Re-Opening of Arguments, in War Crimes Case Against Ariel Sharon and Other Israelis
and Lebanese, Mar. 7, 2002.
132. Douglass Cassel, World Court and Jurisdiction, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN, Feb. 21,
2002.
133. Id.
134. Belgium Rules Sharon Can Be Tried, BBC.CoM, Feb. 12, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
Il/hi/world/ middleeasti2754877.stm (last visited June 15, 2003).
135. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction in response to Congo v. Belgium, Belgium amended its universal
jurisdiction statute in April 2003, limiting its breadth while maintaining its
fundamental characteristics. Under the recent amendments, victims may file suits
directly only if they can establish a link between Belgium and the crime. The new
jurisdictional "nexus" requirement will be satisfied if the suspect is present in
Belgium, the crime occurred in Belgium, or the victim is Belgian or has lived in
Belgium for at least three years. 136  The amendments also authorize the
government to refer certain cases out of Belgium. 37 Finally, the amendments
harmonize the Belgian definitions of crimes with those in the ICC statute and
adopt the international law standard on sovereign immunity. 1
38
While the ICJ's ruling left a number of issues unresolved, it nevertheless has
served as a catalyst, causing Belgium to institute a set of legislative reforms that
should both minimize the costs of universal jurisdiction and serve as a model for
other states adopting universal jurisdiction statutes. The next significant challenge
to the Belgian statute may raise what is potentially the case's most consequential
effect-Belgium's explicit rejection of immunity for former ministers who
violated international human rights or humanitarian law while in office. No longer
permitting prosecutions of incumbent ministers in absentia, the amended statute
strikes a more appropriate balance between human rights concerns and minimizing
the costs of universal jurisdiction.
ii. The Special Challenge of Private Prosecutions
If extraterritoriality poses the danger of politicized prosecutions, one might
suppose that an independent prosecution, in addition to doctrines like head of state
immunity, would be an appropriate response. On the other hand, a prosecutorial
system that is not subject to adequate checks and the veto power of political actors
charged with foreign policy can lead to negative results. The risks of unrestrained
prosecutorial discretion are exacerbated in many civil law systems where private
parties can institute criminal proceedings. 3 9 When a state divests itself of the sole
authority to prosecute politically sensitive international cases, and where private
individuals who are not subject to adequate governmental control may institute
such cases, the consequences may be undesirable. The ICJ's recent decision may
well have been a response to the dangers of private prosecutors pursuing
international cases.
The typical response to such worries is faith in prosecutorial discretion. At
the international level, limited faith in prosecutors' judgment may be warranted. 140
136. Human Rights Watch, Belgium: Questions and Answers on the "Anti-Atrocity" Law, June
2003, available at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/belgium-qna.pdf (last visited June 15, 2003).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. II Part 2, ed. Andre Tunc. The Spanish
legal system, for example, provides for an accion popular, whereby the victim of a crime may institute
a proceeding and pursue the case. Likewise, Belgian law allows for universal jurisdiction cases brought
by parties civiles. Id. See notes 68, 69 & text.
140. Former ICTY Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour's indictment of Slobodan Milosevic suggests
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When prosecutors are part of the executive framework, their actions may be
adequately constrained by political actors so as not to upset political settlements
that would be more productive than a judicial proceeding. A similar review or
veto power is necessary to limit the potentially destructive consequences of private
prosecutions. States must develop standards to balance the competing interests.
Guidelines outlining the factors to be considered and requiring judicial review of
political discretion may be one response. 14 1 Just as universal jurisdiction is an
important tool in cases where negotiations are not forthcoming, are used as stalling
mechanisms, or simply send the wrong message to the combatants, private
prosecutions can also play an important role in international criminal law.
After the ICJ decision in Congo v. Belgium, the Belgian government amended
its universal jurisdiction statute to place a set of constraints on private prosecutors
requiring a "nexus" between Belgium and the alleged crime. 42 The amendments
also authorize courts to send certain pending cases to the accused's home state or
the state in which the accused is present if that state upholds fair trial rights and
actually pursues the case. 14 3 These amendments should minimize some of the
potential political risks that private prosecutors create, providing a check on
unrestrained prosecutorial discretion. If adequately constrained so as not to
jeopardize political solutions to international problems, private prosecutions may
serve an important function on the international level-prosecuting cases that
would otherwise receive little diplomatic or prosecutorial attention. With the rapid
development of universal jurisdiction, this subject deserves continuing
consideration. Creative solutions will be necessary to ensure that overly
aggressive private prosecutions do not lead to a rejection of universal jurisdiction
altogether.
B. "Bad States" and the Threat of Universal Jurisdiction
Advocates characterize universal jurisdiction as a tool with which those
responsible for heinous crimes can be prosecuted, deterring future mass crimes.
Exercise of universal jurisdiction has dangers, however, extending extraterritorial
adjudicative power to procedurally deficient and otherwise flawed judiciaries as
well as to those that respect the rule of law. 144
As universal jurisdiction becomes more common, some states may exercise it
as a political weapon. Of course, not all courts are equal. States refuse
extraditions to other states that are procedurally infirm, and a number of
that prosecutorial discretion may lead to adverse results. Evidence indicates that she indicted Milosevic
just when a political settlement was on the horizon, prolonging the conflict in the Balkans. See, e.g.,
Mirko Klarin, Arbour's Pre-Emptive Strike, MOJO WIRE, June 1, 1999, at
http://www.motherjones.com/total_coverage/kosovo/arbour.html (last visited October 22, 2002).
141. Broomhall, supra note 2, at 418.
142. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
144. Morris, supra note 2, at 354 ("In evaluating universal jurisdiction, careful consideration must
be given to whether it is wise to augment the power and extraterritorial reach of all the judiciaries of the
world, and to do so in a category of cases particularly prone to politicization.").
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organizations dedicate their efforts toward exposing unjust judicial systems. Thus,
it is not clear that exercise of universal jurisdiction by a "bad state" will be taken
seriously. Moreover, a minor public relations campaign could discount the
seriousness of an international criminal trial undertaken in a country like Iraq or
North Korea. Nonetheless, universal jurisdiction could become a tool of interstate
conflict.
In the final analysis, the question must be posed whether universal
jurisdiction's benefits outweigh its costs. 145 The potential for interstate conflict
arising from prosecutions under universal jurisdiction could be minimized by an
emphasis on uniform international standards. For a verdict to be legitimate, the
procedural and substantive law applied would have to meet international standards.
One might argue that this approach would open all prosecutions under universal
jurisdiction to challenge in other national courts, undermining the authority of any
single proceeding. An international mechanism could militate against this
possibility. For example, an international body like the United Nations could
institute a certification process, differentiating judiciaries that have adequate
procedural protections to undertake prosecutions under universal jurisdiction from
those that do not. Implementing an appellate system might also dampen the
possibility for politically vexatious prosecutions.
If universal jurisdiction is to become a vital component of the international
legal and political landscape, the possibility of the "bad state" prosecuting
defendants under universal jurisdiction must be anticipated. The alternative is not
only that universal jurisdiction may lose integrity, but that it could actually lead to
international conflict. While this article has largely assumed that universal
jurisdiction will continue to be a fact of international life, it must be fashioned in a
way that acknowledges the risks and can manage the possibility that "bad states"
will seek to manipulate this jurisdictional mechanism for opportunistic reasons.
C. The Tension between the ICC and Universal Jurisdiction
While this article has assumed that the International Criminal Court and
universal jurisdiction could complement each other,146 the two may be in tension.
The complementarity provision in Article 1 of the Rome Statute gives the ICC
jurisdiction only when national courts prove unable or unwilling to prosecute.'47
Some scholars have suggested that national prosecutions under universal
jurisdiction could prevent cases from going before the ICC, divesting the new
court of jurisdiction.148
145. Morris, supra note 2, at 359.
146. See infra discussion in Conclusion (suggesting that the ICC's jurisdiction could be expanded
to include appellate review of national prosecutions for international crimes).
147. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998).
148. Douglass Cassel, Empowering United States Courts to Hear Crimes within the Jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 421 (2001) (arguing that "the United States'
ability to prosecute is thus key to avoiding exercise of ICC jurisdiction over U.S. nationals or over other
cases where the Untied States has an interest ... ").
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Despite this tension, universal jurisdiction seems deeply consonant with the
aim of the ICC-achieving justice for international crimes. The ICC's limited
resources will be reserved for the most culpable offenders. Given that it will only
prosecute a small number of cases, universal jurisdiction will remain an
indispensable complement to it. Thus, it is not impossible to imagine an integrated
international system where national prosecutions will not be in conflict with
international courts. Rather, the ICC and national courts may engage in a
structured dialogue or even appellate review. In this fashion, national courts'
decisions would gain authority and have integrity. This optimistic vision will not
develop of its own accord, however. Measures will have to be taken to create the
institutional arrangements to ensure that the two do not develop at odds with each
other. The recent amendments to the Belgian universal jurisdiction statute take an
important first step in this direction. By harmonizing the Belgian definitions of
crimes with those in the ICC statute, the new law lays the groundwork for future
cooperation between national court exercise of universal jurisdiction and
prosecutions at the ICC. 
49
CONCLUSION
Universal jurisdiction remains a relatively novel basis for prosecution.
Nonetheless, the events of recent years indicate that national prosecutions for
international crimes will continue to increase. Vigorous prosecution in national
courts has the advantage over ad hoc tribunals of being a permanent mechanism
that can prosecute atrocities without great delay.' 50 Steps must be taken to ensure
that these proceedings have integrity and are carried out according to international
standards, however. If the peculiarities of national procedural rules and national
interpretations of international substantive law begin to disintegrate the
international characteristics of the crimes, the project as a whole could collapse.
Thus, transnational rules must introduce a measure of harmonization and
convergence across jurisdictions. This article concludes by proposing five
suggestions that may contribute to this harmonization and lend greater integrity to
national prosecutions for international crimes.
First, in the context of national prosecutions for international crimes, an
international treaty should provide for a formal judicial dialogue along the lines
developed in several African states. 15' The details of this dialogue, including the
weight to be accorded horizontal as opposed to vertical dialogues with
international criminal tribunals, will require careful attention. Instituting such a
formal conversation will ensure that national prosecutions do not diverge so much
as to delegitimize the project altogether.
Second, as a long-term program, the ICC's jurisdiction could be expanded to
149. Human Rights Watch, supra note 136.
150. Wexler, supra note 6, at 712.
151. See Andre Stemmet, The Influence of Recent Constitutional Developments in South Africa on
the Relationship Between International Law and Municipal Law, 33 INT'L LAW. 47 (1999) (explaining
the new role for international law as a basis for judicial decision-making).
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include appellate jurisdiction over cases arising from national courts on
jurisdictional, procedural, and interpretive issues of prosecution under international
law. 52 The International Law Commission ultimately rejected this proposal in its
1994 draft statute for an international criminal court as too intrusive of state
sovereignty. 153 Nonetheless, having such a supranational appellate body to
harmonize interpretations of international criminal law while leaving to national
tribunals the function of deciding cases on the merits would both give domestic
prosecutions greater integrity and ensure that international criminal law develops
in coherent fashion.
Third, the international community could begin negotiations to create a body
of procedural rules for domestic prosecutions of international crimes. The rules
could be based on the body of procedural rules already tested and modified in the
ICTY and ICTR. 154  The uniformity introduced into national prosecutions for
international crimes by these rules will give them more legitimacy.
Fourth, a formal international agreement on the punishments, or at least the
method of determining the punishment to be applied, would be a timely and useful
effort. Much of the chafing against national prosecutions for international crimes
could be resolved simply by instituting an international regime of punishments for
international crimes.
Finally, prosecutorial discretion, especially the ability of civil parties to bring
suit, must be adequately bounded. The recent amendments to the Belgian
universal jurisdiction statute constitute an import effort in this direction. The
emergence of an international criminal prosecutorial and defense bar, as well as a
group of judges with experience trying such cases, also may mitigate this problem
by selecting the cases most favorable to the development of international criminal
152. Wexler, supra note 6, at 720 (arguing that an international criminal court could unify and
construct a coherent body of international criminal law); Ninth Report on the Draft Code of Offenses
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/435 and Add.1 (1991), reprinted in
[19911 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 37, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 1) (Doudou Thiam,
Special Rapporteur) at 59 ("The court could also play a very important role in the unification of
international criminal law .... It could help to remove some uncertainties regarding terminology and
the definition of concepts, such as complicity and conspiracy and the attempt to commit such crimes,
whose content varies from one country to the next."); cf Report of the International Law Commission
on the work of its forty-fourth session, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. No. A/47/10 (1992),
reprinted in [1992] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1992/Add.I (Part 2) at 37
(concluding that the international criminal court should be a trial court rather than an appellate or
review body).
153. Report of the International Law Commission, 49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc.
A/49/10 (1994) at 70.
154. Meron, supra note 22, at 463 (arguing that the rules used in the ICTY and the ICTR should be
useful in all prosecutions under international law); Wexler, supra note 36, at 363-66 (arguing that
procedural rules employed in international business law could be adapted to international criminal
prosecutions); E. M. Wise, I.L.A. Committee on a Permanent International Criminal Court, Report on
General Rules of Law, December 27, 1996 draft, at 83 ("[T]here seems to be emerging broad agreement
that not only offense definitions and penalties, but also the general rules of liability and exoneration to
be applied by the court, cannot be left to national law, or otherwise permitted to vary from case to case,
but must be settled in advance.").
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law. 155 The development of judicial and attorney expertise will be necessary if
universal jurisdiction is to be practical. 56 Private party prosecutions must not be
allowed to undermine universal jurisdiction altogether.
While we may always feel ambiguous about prosecutions in domestic courts
for international crimes, especially for crimes committed in other parts of the
world, universal jurisdiction can be structured in order to provide considerable
international oversight. Because the crimes at issue are violations of universal
norms, it is essential that national prosecutions maintain an international character
and that there be formal mechanisms to prevent divergence from certain core
universal touchstones.
Harmonizing international criminal law will lead to a more coherent body of
law, will better protect defendants from deficient prosecutions, and will act as a
restraint on unjust exercise of extraterritoriality. If this body of law becomes more
developed through an integrated inter-jurisdictional system, local courts will have
the advantage of a strong set of international rules and precedents to draw on. This
project must pay careful attention to the costs inherent in universal jurisdiction.
Minimizing these costs is at least as important as expanding the power of national
courts to prosecute international crimes, and a balance must be struck between the
two. If done with requisite care, the development of a truly international and
integrated regime for enforcing international criminal law in domestic courts will
safeguard human rights, resulting in the greatest aggregate of justice and human
dignity.
155. Harvard Law Review, supra note 25, at 2002-03.
156. Expertise in national systems will mitigate the danger of peculiar interpretations of
international law in national courts. Wexler, supra note 6, at 710.
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THE FIRST U.N. SOCIAL FORUM: HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS
JOE W. (CHIP) PITTS 111
As he has had with a number of other United Nations and international
conferences, the author had the opportunity to attend the proceedings of the
inaugural U.N. Social Forum as an observer and non-governmental delegate.
The following article thus represents the author's impressions of events as he
observed them.
In the last few years a number of events have developed aiming at giving
NGOs, the poor and civil society in general a voice in globalization and poverty
reduction issues. The Davos World Economic Forum has opened its doors to at
least a selective representation of certain Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs); the "World Social Forum" counter-event to the World Economic Forum
has now met thrice in Porto Alegre, Brazil; and there was even a small "World
Civil Society" meeting which met in Geneva just before the U.N. Social Forum.
With all these and other proliferating events, it might be properly asked whether
another 'social forum' is needed, and if so, why.
The U.N. Social Forum was conceived over several years as a platform within
the U.N. system for the exchange of ideas and perhaps actions aimed at effectively
incorporating human rights, especially economic, social, and cultural rights into
policymaking, for the benefit of those members of the poor and vulnerable
segments of society whose voices are not usually heard within that system. In a
Working Paper submitted to the 2002 meeting of the U.N. Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, the Sub-Commission member from
Chile and the leading advocate for the Social Forum Mr. Josd Bengoa describes the
years of discussion aimed at creating a "new forum for debate within the United
Nations for analysis of the relationship between globalization and human rights, in
particular economic, social, and cultural rights, in a globalized world."' The Social
Forum complements the U.N.'s overall priorities of promoting and protecting
peace, stability, human rights, sustainable development, and poverty eradication,
including the specific anti-poverty priority that emerged from the Millennium
Summit.
In her five year service as High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. Mary
* The author is the former Chief Legal Officer of Nokia, Inc. ©2003 All Rights Reserved
I. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Social Forum: Report of the Chairman-
Rapporteur, Mr. Josd Bengoa, U.N. ESCOR, 44"' Sess., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc.,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/3.
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Robinson came to understand that poverty eradication is the most pressing human
rights issue facing the world. Poverty both affects, and is affected by, other human
rights violations. Ms. Robinson noted in her address to the Sub-Commission in
2001 that part of the motivation for the Social Forum was to contribute to ensuring
that globalization will be positive for the world's poor as well as the world's rich.
This basic objective has also been key to the thinking of Mr. Bengoa. He also
continually has stressed the importance of inclusiveness, not only from the
perspective of including (usually excluded) representatives of the poor in the
discussion, but also in terms of engaging non-state actors such as private enterprise
and international financial institutions (IFIs) in the dialogue. Bengoa is thus
sympathetic to ideas for global policy networks for policy change.
I. GLOBALIZATION AND THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR THE SOCIAL FORUM
Whether by globalization we mean increasing global economic exchange, or
increased global exchanges of all sorts, globalization has proceeded for millennia,
and has accelerated during the past 500 years. After World War II, however, with
the institution of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, economic growth
exploded. This growth, however, disproportionately benefited developed
industrial countries, as opposed to developing nations emerging from colonialism.
By the late 1990's, discontent with persistent poverty and perceived growing
inequality reached a fever pitch with demonstrations at Seattle, then Prague,
Genoa, and other cities against a global economic order that simply wasn't
working for many of the least well off in the world.
Consciousness of the new questions surrounding globalization resulted in a
1995 proposal by Norwegian Sub-Commission member Asbjom Eide to study
income distribution nationally and internationally. Mr. Bengoa was selected
Special Rapporteur, and completed his preliminary report on the subject the same
year, noting the links between income distribution and equality of opportunity in a
given society.2 His subsequent and final reports found increases in inequality and
poverty accompanying the late twentieth century globalization.3 Mr. Bengoa's
2. The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Provisional Report on the
Relationship between the Enjoyment of Human Rights, in Particular Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, and Income Distribution, prepared by Mr. Josd Bengoa, U.N. ESCOR, 47"h Sess., Provisional
Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1995/14.
3. See The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Provisional Report on the
Relationship between the Enjoyment of Human Rights, in Particular Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, and Income Distribution, prepared by Mr. Josd Bengoa, U.N. ESCOR, 48"' Sess., Provisional
Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/14; The realization of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Provisional Report on the Relationship between the Enjoyment of Human Rights, in Particular
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and Income Distribution, prepared by Mr. Josi Bengoa, U.N.
ESCOR, 49"' Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/9; and The Realization
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Relationship between the Enjoyment of Human Rights, in
Particular Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and Income Distribution, Poverty, Income
Distribution and Globalization: A Challenge for Human Rights, Addendum to the final report prepared
by Mr. Josi Bengoa, Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, 50" Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/8.
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methods of comparing national income between countries and households
anticipated the more recent work of World Bank economist Branko Milanovic 4,
who found that in the five year period between 1988 and 1993, global inequality
increased 5%, with the real incomes of the richest 20% increasing and the poorest
5% decreasing-a result comparable to the growth in inequality in the United
Kingdom during the Thatcher years or the United States during the Reagan years..
Even adjusting for lower prices in developing countries to focus on real purchasing
power, according to the Milanovic study almost 80% of the world would fall below
the poverty lines established in the United States and Western Europe. Moreover,
of the 83 million people added to the world each year, 82 million of them are
reportedly in developing countries as opposed to developed countries. This does
not augur well for reducing inequality. Neither does the fact that some regions,
such as Sub-Saharan Africa, are notably worse off than they were before the last
trade round. Nevertheless, the recommendations of the Copenhagen World
Summit in 1995 that developed countries dedicate .07% of their GNP for
developing countries have been implemented by only a handful of nations (notably
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands).6
Bengoa's report noted the association of persistent poverty with increasing
concentrations of wealth occurring simultaneously with globalization. Since his
report, the concentration has only increased. In a widely quoted World Health
Organization and U.N. Development Program comparison, the net worth of the
world's richest 358 people in 1997 was greater than the combined net worth of the
world's poorest 2.3 billion people, and by 1998, the gap had grown to the point
that the richest 200 individuals had a cumulative net worth surpassing the world's
poorest 2.5 billion people.7 As reiterated by the President of the World Bank, "[o]f
the world's 6 billion people, 2.8 billion live on less than $2 per day, and 1.2 billion
live on less than $1 a day".8 In other words, half the world's people live for a
whole year on less than what many would consider the cost of a single good suit or
dress, a plane ticket, or a couple of nights in a good hotel.
Bengoa sees these trends aggravated by the infamous 'race to the bottom': the
competition among developing countries to attract multinational corporations and
foreign investment through lax social and environmental regulations, or
deregulation, and what amounts to tolerance of human rights violations.
Economic, social, and cultural rights (ESC rights) have at their core the same
concerns regarding the right to life, to development of the human body, and to
individual dignity that underlie civil and political rights. "ESC" rights may also be
seen as a prerequisite to, and minimum condition for, the exercise of civil and
4. Branko Milanovic, True World Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993: First Calculations Based
on Household Surveys Alone, EcoNoMic JOURNAL, Jan. 2002.
5. In technical terms, the GINI coefficient (a common measure of inequality in which 0 means
everyone is equal and 100 means one person has all the income) increased during this period from 62.5
to 66.0.
6. Milanovic, supra note 4.
7. WHO & UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999 3 (Oxford University Press).
8. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000/2001: ATTACKING
POVERTY, at v (Oxford University Press).
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political rights. Globalization has focused attention on the minimum requirements
for both clusters of rights. Bengoa endorses reasonable labor and environmental
controls to foster 'virtuous' globalization (healthy for people in the countries
concerned) as opposed to 'perverse' globalization (exploitative and unhealthy for
those concerned). Presciently, Mr. Bengoa noted the link between growing social
inequity and social instability and threats to both human rights and world peace.
He viewed nondiscrimination in the sense of equal opportunity, both for countries
and for individuals within societies, as central to addressing these threats.
Bengoa's conclusion was that a Social Forum was needed to exchange
information and insights regarding these issues.
II. SUB-COMMISSION'S CREATION OF THE SOCIAL FORUM
The Sub-Commission had devoted a day of its proceedings in 2001 to
discussions on the purpose and effectiveness of such a Social Forum. During those
discussions topics floated for consideration included shaping globalization so that
it is more fair to the poor and vulnerable, the impact of international trade, and
protection of labor rights and the environment. In addition to many distinguished
members of the audience, including the Special Rapporteur for Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights Paul Hunt and the Special Rapporteur for Housing Miloon
Kothari, the Sub-Commission was assisted in selecting topics for the inaugural
Social Forum by an expert panel of speakers including Hina Jilani, UN Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders; George Abi Saab, a Member of the World Trade Organization's
Dispute Settlement Body; Andrew Clapham, a Professor at the Graduate Institute
of International Studies in Geneva; and Rubens Ricupero, Secretary-General of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
A major concern of the participants was to carve out a special, non-
duplicative niche for the Social Forum as opposed to other U.N. bodies and
mechanisms. The consensus was that the Social Forum's unique role could be to
give a voice within the U.N. to the poor and those otherwise excluded on these
issues. Ideally, the Social Forum could thus contribute to democratizing global
economic governance by encouraging prior consultation with and participation by
those affected by crucial decisions underlying globalization. Significantly, the
Sub-Commission invited not only NGOs in consultative status with the U.N., but
also other actors including governments, intergovernmental organizations, and
newly emerging actors (including business, but also and especially actors from the
South) to participate. 9 The mandate given this more public Social Forum was not
only to "exchange information on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural
rights and their relationship with the processes of globalization", but also to
"follow up on situations of poverty and destitution throughout the world".'0 In
other words, the Social Forum was envisioned from the outset as authorized not
only to provide a platform for talk, but also for action. Specific authorization was
9. U.N. SCHR, 22" mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2002/12 (2002).
10. Id.
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granted "to propose standards and initiatives of a juridical nature, guidelines and
other recommendations for consideration by the Commission on Human Rights,
the working groups on the right to development, the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the specialized agencies and other organs of the United
Nations system"." The Social Forum was also authorized to follow up on
agreements at major international events and discussions of issues related to its
mandate.
In order to begin with an appropriate and limited focus on a practical matter,
the Sub-Commission decided by resolution that the primary topic of the first U.N.
Social Forum would be "[t]he relationship between poverty reduction and the
realization of the right to food."'12 The appropriateness of this focus arguably
stems from the basic nature of the subsistence right to food as a core ESC right,
and one particularly susceptible to effective action through more sensible
governmental policies. It is appalling that in the twenty-first Century, when
humankind has learned how to produce adequate food and actually has abundant
food in the world, famines and starvation continue to occur as a result of ignorant,
irrational, and otherwise misguided decision-making. Food is also one of the least
controversial ESC rights, as everyone immediately understands its importance to
the right to life. It is also closely related to other rights, such as the right to water,
and a part of and prerequisite to rights such as the right to health, or the right to
education.
The discussion at the 2001 Sub-Commission also identified other themes for
possible future consideration by the Social Forum, including (1) the interaction
between civil and political and ESC rights; (2) the relationship between poverty,
extreme poverty and human rights in a globalized world; (3) the effect of
international trade, finance and economic policies on income distribution, and the
corresponding consequences on equality and non-discrimination at the national and
international levels; (4) the effect of international decisions on basic resources for
the population, and in particular those affecting enjoyment of the right to food, the
right to education, the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health, the right to adequate housing and the right to an adequate standard
of living; (5) the effect of the impact of international trade, finance and economic
policies on vulnerable groups, especially minorities, indigenous peoples, migrants,
refugees and internally displaced persons, women, children, older persons, people
living with HIV/AIDS, people living with disabilities and other social sectors
affected by such measures; (6) the impact of public and private, multilateral and
bilateral international development cooperation on the realization of economic,
social and cultural rights; (7) follow-up of agreements reached at world
conferences and international summits, particularly the Copenhagen World
Summit for Social Development, and by other international bodies, concerning the
link between economic, commercial and financial issues and the full realization of
human rights; and (8) the role of social and economic indicators and their role in
the realization of economic, social and cultural rights.
1I. U.N. SCHR, 22'" mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2002/12 (2002).
12. Id.
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III. ECOSOC VOTE THREATENS THE SOCIAL FORUM
In order to occur, the Social Forum depended on an affirmative vote of
approval from the U.N. Economic and Social Council for the Commission
(ECOSOC) on Human Rights' recommendation authorizing the Social Forum.'
3
As of the day before the event, this vote had not yet taken place. The United States
and certain other developed countries had never been too enthusiastic about
authorizing a meeting or creating another U.N. mechanism that, in their views,
could be at best an instrument for challenging the Northern-dominated global
economic agenda, and at worst could be simply a wasteful, duplicative, and
political forum for bashing developed countries and their interests. The NGO
Preparatory Event described below thus took place under the cloud of not knowing
whether the Social Forum would take place. While eventually the ECOSOC
approval came through, it was over opposition from the U.S., Australia, and Japan,
and with the European Union countries abstaining. The final vote was 33 favoring,
3 against, and 17 abstaining. While the Social Forum thus received eventual
approval, this approval did not come in time for the planned July 25, 2002 opening
day. So on that day, High Commissioner Mary Robinson regretfully announced
that the Social Forum would be delayed. (While she voiced a hope that informal
discussions could continue, enough governments protested proceeding in the
absence of ECOSOC approval that this became impossible). The first full day of
the Social Forum finally opened on July 26, but the planned second day had to be
postponed until Friday of the following week. The net result was that the Social
Forum, intended to serve as space for the voices of the poor, was hampered at the
outset by uncertainty and a serious meeting delay undoubtedly prohibiting many of
the poor who intended to participate from doing so.
IV. NGO PREPARATORY EVENT
A Preparatory NGO Meeting was held on 24 July, 2002, the day before the
first U.N. Social Forum was supposed to begin, hosted by the Conference of Non-
Governmental Organizations (CONGO) in Geneva, the U.N. NGO Liaison Service
(UN-NGLS) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Hamish
Jenkins of UN-NGLS served as Moderator, with Peter Prove of the CONGO's
Special Committee of NGOs on Human Rights and Sub-Commissioner Member
Josd Bengoa playing prominent roles. Mr. Bengoa described the history and
purpose of the Social Forum as sketched above. Citing the economic collapse of
Argentina and difficulties in Thailand and elsewhere, he said that were he to
conduct his study today the results would probably be even worse. His hope was
that the new spirit seen in Porto Alegre, and outside the walls of the U.N., could
infuse proceedings within the U.N. through the Social Forum. The focus on the
,new' economic, social, and cultural rights and the inclusion of new actors (the
poor, businesses, and IFls) in the dialogue presented possibilities of progress and
even some accountability through the Social Forum. The Social Forum could also
13. CHR 2002/106 of 22 Apr. 2002.
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achieve this end through proposing "juridical initiatives." Mr. Bengoa's comments
were followed by presentations on human rights and globalization, poverty
reduction, and the right to food. There were also working group meetings on
Trade and Food Security, Trade in Services, and Voluntary Guidelines for the
Right to Food, and key foundational documents were made available.
1. Globalization and Human Rights
Anne Christine Habbard from FIDH (Frdration Internationale des Ligues des
Droits de l'Homme) gave a provocative presentation on globalization and human
rights, suggesting that the two concepts were antagonistic. She traced the conflict
to contrasting bodies of law and alleged that international economic law served
private interests and the market, as opposed to the more universal public interests
served by human rights and regulation tempering the market. (On the other hand,
as she pointed out later, multinational corporations often have higher labor and
environmental standards than local companies, e.g. in Bangladesh or Indonesia).14
Her view of globalization was that rather than spreading global human norms like
those relating to human rights, it entrenched inequality and hypocritically claimed
that it favored equal rules for all while actually carving out exceptions (e.g.,
agriculture, textiles) for the U.S. and rich countries in the E.U. She cautioned that
developing countries like Malaysia, however, should not have lower standards for
human rights in the name of economic development. Globalization should serve
human rights, with international economic treaties and policies subordinated to the
primacy of human rights law. Making human rights justiciable, e.g., through an
additional protocol to the Economic, Social, Cultural Convention, would be a good
step toward this end.
Chien Yen Goh from Third World Network also highlighted the gap between
the neoliberal economic theory of globalization and the reality that the claimed
beneficial results often do not materialize. He rightly pointed out that mere
liberalization, or opening the economy to trade and investment, doesn't work if the
economic situation of the country is not right or if the conditions for success aren't
present. In fact, the exposure of vulnerable local factories to premature foreign
competition could be counterproductive, resulting in closed factories, more
poverty, and harm to rights including the right to work, to an adequate standard of
living, to health, and to education. He pointed to certain African and Asian nations
as examples of the devastation that could be wrought from unwise liberalization.
In short, international trade rules should accommodate the needs of developing
countries, in keeping with the human development goals of the global trade regime
as set forth in the GATT preamble. Despite the current trade round at Doha, Qatar
having been agreed to be a "Development Round", the developed countries do not
seem to be living up to their commitments. In the discussion that followed,
Hamish Jenkins pointed out that in institutionalizing unequal relationships, a
14. Not only higher labor and environmental standards, but also higher wages, can be brought by
multinational companies. See, e.g., Brian Aitken et al., Wages and Foreign Ownership: A Comparative
Study of Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States, 40 J. INT'L ECON. 345 (1996).
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formal principle of equal and nondiscriminatory trade rules could actually have a
discriminatory effect against developing countries.
2. Poverty Reduction Strategies
After this general discussion of globalization, trade, and human rights came a
panel discussing poverty and poverty reduction strategies. From the Thailand
Assembly of the Poor, Mr. Bamrung Kayotha and Dr. Suthy Prasartset cited
statistics and discussed how the government's agriculture liberalization
development strategy, from their perspective, actually had the effect of
disenfranchising and impoverishing small farmers. Their organization opposes the
inclusion of agriculture within the framework of the WTO. They also linked
liberalization of foreign investment laws to these conditions. M. Jean-Baptiste
Anoman Ogui6 from ATD Quart Monde, C6te d'Ivoire, discussed an innovative
program whereby he as a magistrate combined forces with a prison nurse to help
prisoners who lived in atrocious conditions (which had been aggravated by
privatization of the prisons) to help themselves by growing vegetables and
generally becoming more self-sufficient. After these initial steps built trust, the
prisoners moved on to create projects in the fields of literacy, health, and building
skills.
Mr. Alfredo Sfeir-Younis of the World Bank called for greater precision in
defining human rights aspects of poverty reduction, emphasized the primary
responsibility of national governments (as opposed to the IFIs) to alleviate poverty,
and endorsed the need for including civil society in the effort.
3. The Right to Food
Michael Windfuhr of Food First Information and Action Network led the
presentation and discussion on the right to food, in which he emphasized the
importance of a rights-based approach in the effort to build political will for policy
change. He argued that the nature of the right "as a right" means that economic or
other trade-offs are unacceptable, and that breaches of the minimum content
required are violations requiring redress and compensation. As a right to be
progressively fulfilled to the maximum extent of available resources (and with
corresponding legal obligations and compensation for any violation), the right to
food is integrally related to other rights (such as the right to water), and its content
is authoritatively defined by General Comment 12 of the Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (including the importance of access to land, credit, and
income or other resources to realize the right). Windfuhr thus drew an implicit
link between the right to food and a guaranteed minimum income for vulnerable
groups in society. In addition to implications for governmental and
intergovernmental policies, he pointed out the need for attention to the impact of
multinational corporate decisions. The Voluntary Guidelines called for by the
World Food Summit will provide guidance for all these varied actors, and the time
is now ripe for NGO input into that document in advance of a more formal drafting
conference in November 2002. He called for an even stronger Food &
Agricultural Organization Code of Conduct (versus the contemplated Voluntary
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Guidelines). The distinct poverty reduction papers he analogized more to a
'cookbook' informing practitioners how to proceed.
One of the afternoon's Working Groups gave input into these Voluntary
Guidelines. Some of the elements noted as missing from the current draft were
rights of specific groups like farmers, fishermen, and pastoralists; another missing
element identified was an emphasis on local production to assure access to food.
The other two Working Groups came up with recommendations to the Social
Forum on Trade and Food Security, and Trade in Services and Human Rights.
Many of these questions and recommendations15 were ultimately adopted in the
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Social Forum, so NGOs can take heart
that they had a significant influence on the process.
V. PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIAL FORUM 6
As noted above, due to the delayed and contentious ECOSOC approval, the
Social Forum did not actually open on Thursday, July 25, as planned, but only on
Friday, July 26, 2002. This meant that another date had to be found for the second
day of the event, which finally took place on Friday, August 2. A number of
members of the Sub-Commission attended at various times. In what follows, I
have not tried to comprehensively describe all the speeches and interactions, but
have tried to capture the main speakers and ideas discussed.
1. Opening by High Commissioner
High Commissioner Mary Robinson opened the Social Forum to great
applause, expressing high hopes that it will provide a forum within the U.N. for
new voices and new ideas for dealing with social issues including extreme poverty
and the impact of trade on minorities and other vulnerable groups, such as women,
indigenous peoples, older people, refugees, people with disabilities, and those
living with HIV/AIDS. She also announced the inaugural Social Forum's theme:
extreme poverty and the right to food (both of which she traced to Universal
Declaration Article 25's right to an adequate standard of living, which also informs
the U.N. Millennium Summit key development goals of eradicating extreme
poverty and hunger). The World Food Summit enhanced understanding of this
right and the fact that it is not a question of food supply, as there is enough food in
the world to feed the hungry, but a question of other issues blocking
implementation of the right. These issues include inattention to women's rights,
given the critical role women play both in economic development generally and in
food issues in particular. Among other obstacles she listed were insufficient public
and private investment, inadequate irrigation infrastructures, incomplete
implementation of the Doha "development" trade round in agricultural matters,
15. See Annex III to Report of the Chairman-Rapporteur, Josi Bengoa, U.N. ESCOR, 54d, Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/18, at 23.
16. This discussion draws on the author's notes of the proceedings as well as the Report of the
Chairman-Rapporteur, Josi Bengoa, id
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insensitivity to the environment (which forms the essential context for food
production), and an unethical globalization (which does not do enough to protect
the poor and promote economic opportunities). She thus called on the
Johannesburg World Summit for Sustainable Development, due to occur within a
month, to address food security, and called on the Social Forum to provide new
ideas and practical suggestions to implement the right to food.
2. Bengoa as Chair Welcomes NGO Input on Globalization and Human Rights
Mr. Bengoa, elected Chair of the Social Forum by acclamation, reiterated its
purpose of serving as a human rights forum within the U.N. for the poor: those "on
the receiving end of globalization". He referenced some of the prior studies and
work of Sub-Commission experts leading up to the event, including those by Mr.
AsbJorn Eide (on income distribution) and Mr. Leandro Despouy (on extreme
poverty). Then, noting the vital input of NGOs from the Preparatory Meeting, he
invited their representatives to present the outcomes of their deliberations.
Peter Prove of the Congress of NGOs expressed gratification that the "baby
had fmally been born" and welcomed the U.N.'s decision to look critically at
globalization's impact on human rights, including not only civil and political but
also economic, social, and cultural rights including the right to development. The
efforts within ECOSOC by those states hostile to these latter rights to block the
Social Forum were lamentable, but not surprising.
Mr. Bamrung Kayotha and Dr. Suthy Prasartset from the Thailand Assembly
of the Poor elaborated on how, from their perspective, globalization and state
development policies can actually hurt the people they are nominally supposed to
help. The financial speculation from liberalization of capital controls resulted in
the Asian crisis of 1997, which they view as having resulted in foreign capital
taking over parts of their country through long leaseholds (up to 99 years) and
large dam projects and waste treatment plants. Not having a longstanding interest
in or connection to the localities affected, these foreign actors (multinational
corporations and IFIs) have-without consulting those affected-removed and/or
destroyed the land, forest, marine resources and damaged the environment of
indigenous people, women, and the rural poor, violating their human rights in the
process. Mr. Kayotha and Dr. Prasartset thus view the World Bank, and
institutions like the Food and Agricultural Organization, as illegitimate, merely
creating jobs for bureaucrats in the name of fighting poverty. It is unclear how
Northern rhetoric about democracy and freedom will be reconciled with Southern
rhetoric about technology and exploiting resources for growth. Mr. Kayotha and
Dr. Prasartset hope the Social Forum will contribute to solving these problems. In
reaction, Ms. Robinson stated that such experiences explain the negative
perceptions of globalization, and agreed that the Social Forum should strive to
understand the issues and what to do about them.
3. Incorporating Human Rights Law and Policy Into Economic Decisions
Peter Prove pointed out that the development of such economic policies (in
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isolation from human rights policies) did not occur in a vacuum or as a result of
historical accident, but had elements of conscious deliberation. He thus raised the
question of how to promote coherence between economic and human rights law,
and infuse economic globalization with human rights values including dignity,
given the political unwillingness to do so. Though "nondiscrimination" is a
touchstone of each body of law, it means very different things in each context, and
these differences require more attention. "Good governance" should mean more
than mere accession to major trade and economic treaties; it should mean
implementation of human rights as well. Liberalization and privatization policies
sometimes negatively affect important rights, including the rights to water, health,
and education, as user fees and commercialization hinder access or encourage
discriminatory, "two-tier" systems with lower quality cheaper or free systems.
Agricultural subsidies in rich countries continue to hinder human-centered
development elsewhere. Human rights should instead be made a "friend of
development" in each country. To this end, quality analyses and worthwhile
reports like those from the High Commissioner on aspects of globalization and
human rights deserve support and further distribution, as do efforts like that of the
Sub-Commission's Working Group on Transnational Corporations to enhance
corporate accountability.
Ms. Robinson agreed that economic and financial decision makers (e.g., those
from trade ministries, the IMF, and the World Bank) need to understand and
respect the legal commitments contained in treaties concerning economic, social,
and cultural rights (like the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant itself as well
as the Convention on the Rights of the Child). She also agreed that
nondiscrimination is a much narrower principle in the economic sphere, and that
the Social Forum could encourage economic decision makers to adopt the broader,
human rights principle of nondiscrimination.
UNRISD Director Thandika Mkandawire also endorsed a rights-centered
approach, suggesting three basic criteria for evaluating globalization: does it favor
democratization? Development? Social equity? These touchstones, he argued,
should guide reform efforts. Democratic institutions furthering the right to food,
for example, are not only called for by the Rome Declaration; they are mandated
by human rights considerations. Autocrats can no longer violate some human
rights on the grounds that they are providing food (the "full belly fix"). Yet the
present reliance on less accountable international institutions for development is
often anti-democratic. Mobilizing resources for national as well as international
development policies is key. Finally, although social policies must meet
macroeconomic constraints, macroeconomic policies should also be constrained by
social equity, democratic, and development considerations.
4. Open Discussion: Rights and Goods/Needs
Mr. Bengoa then opened up the discussion. Some governments defended
their development policies in predictable and self-justificatory terms that were not
very enlightening. Understandably proud of Mr. Bengoa's role as a catalyst to and
Chair of the Social Forum, his home government Chile pointed out that civil and
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political rights were not necessarily in opposition to economic, social, and cultural
rights, but could form part of a virtuous circle. Overcoming the myth that
globalization is uncontrollable would require persuasively distinguishing between
the public goods at the heart of the latter sorts of rights, and the content of rights-
based approaches. Mr. Mkandawire of UNRISD reiterated that globalization was a
human construct as opposed to an unstoppable natural force, and resulted from the
cumulative effect of many economic and financial decisions regarding market
rules, property rights, and trade flows. Thus, changing the rules can create another
form of globalization.
The Chilean representative noted that none of these rights should simply be
subjected to the laws of the market and unhindered competition. Somewhat
ironically, Cuba's representative focused on civil and political rights, pointing out
that having economic resources to become literate, buy a TV or newspaper or to
pay for an ad in the same are important prerequisites to civil and political rights.
Mr. Mkandawire of UNRISD reiterated that the various types of rights are
mutually constitutive.
The Thai representative, somewhat in response to the Thailand Assembly of
the Poor, defended the good faith of its anti-poverty and development programs,
arguing that attempts at participation, including public hearings prior to major
projects, help to ensure effectiveness, transparency, and accountability. The
representative, however, urged that developing countries still need special help.
(The Assembly of the Poor representative later replied that the outcome of these
hearings was pre-determined and that they were more for show than for genuine
consultation with affected communities).
Peter Prove helpfully cautioned against thinking that the issues are reducible
to a North-South conflict, as poor people exist and need help in both hemispheres.
He urged the governmental representatives to bring their colleagues with economic
and financial portfolios to the Social Forum, instead of relying on silos of human
rights expertise for the Social Forum and economic expertise, e.g., for the IFI and
economic treaty deliberations.
5. Right to Food and Poverty Reduction
Biotechnology and genetically modified (GM) foods came up at several
points in the discussion, with NGO representative Pat Mooney taking the lead in
making the point that biotechnology is not necessarily the panacea promised by its
promoters, but that real risks are associated with some of the new technology, the
public goods from which traditional farmers are excluded from on "intellectual
property" grounds. He pointed to several studies showing that nutritional quality
has actually declined with efforts toward biofortification of foodstuffs (e.g., apples
and potatoes have declined as much as 50% in key nutrients). He cautioned
against the growing corporate control of the traditional agricultural sector (seen in,
e.g., increasing presence of GM maize in Mexico and Central America), and
highlighted the expected marketing in 2003 or 2004 of patented "Terminator"
seeds (that cannot be re-used by farmers after harvest) as examples of dangerous
trends. The dystopian picture he paints is a world in which a billion and a half
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people dependent on farmer-saved seeds would suddenly be at the mercy of
multinational corporations. The government of Cuba later noted that not all
biotechnology in agriculture is bad, pointing to its own use of some such
technologies in increasing yields; but Cuba urged asking whether the particular use
of technology in a given case is ethical, which seemed questionable in the case of
the transgenetic seeds creating dependencies and strengthening corporate
monopolies.
Jean-Baptiste Anoman Oguid of ATD Quart Monde essentially repeated his
presentation from the NGO Preparatory Event, providing through the prison
project an illuminating example of self-help that can expand into other spheres
through partnerships. Irma Yanni, of La Via Campesina peasants' organization,
lamented small farmers losing their land and thus their way of life to large
multinational corporations and landowners. Rights including the right to life, to
determine their own way of farming (including their own culturally preferred way
of growing food) and to associate with others, were among the many rights being
violated. She too expressed concern regarding GM technologies and IFI's
agricultural liberalization policies, and urged the international community to
guarantee food sovereignty and take agriculture completely out of the WTO.
Mirian Masaquiza, of the National Confederation of Black and Indigenous
Organizations in Ecuador, gave some impressive statistics on the persistence of
poverty and inequality in the face of globalization, especially in Ecuador. There,
she said, 80% of the rural populace and 50% of the urban populace are poor. The
policy of pegging the currency to the dollar, and the tremendous external debt, has
aggravated the situation. Like Ms. Yanni, Ms. Masaquiza advocated food
sovereignty, which she sees as threatened by transnational corporations and
neoliberal economic policies. She disfavored trade agreements, generalizing from
NAFTA to conclude that they were all instances of U.S. aggression reinforcing
powerful economic interests instead of including the vulnerable and the true public
interest. The latter could include investment, but would be more focused against
poverty.
Mr. Christophe Golay, assistant to the Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Food Mr. Jean Ziegler, reiterated that the problem of implementing the right to
food arose more from issues of food distribution than a lack of adequate
production. The world today produced enough to feed roughly double its current
population. He linked the issue to poverty, noting that if you do not have any
money, you typically do not eat, and if you do not have enough money, you do not
eat enough high-quality food. This in turn affects the right to education or the right
to work in a vicious circle, since it is hard to work or study without adequate food.
He pointed to the inequitable income structure in Brazil as an instance of the
problem; there, 2% of the population has 56% of the wealth. The Brazilian
Secretary of State for Social Affairs, Ms. Wanda Engel Andua, confirmed that
economic growth alone was valuable, but insufficient to address the issue of
extreme poverty, as revealed by Brazil's experience of persistent extreme poverty
despite its economic growth. Niger, another country visited by the Special
Rapporteur, is even worse. There, 4.2 million out of the country's populace of 11
million are hungry, with two thirds of the country being in absolute poverty. Both
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the inhospitable climate and external conditions, like unsustainable debt levels and
the legacy of misguided IMF policies, aggravate this situation.
Mr. Alfredo Sfeir-Younis of the World Bank welcomed the Social Forum as
one receiving input from a broader variety of stakeholders. He expressed a wish,
however, for a more meaningful, deeper, and sustained dialogue and debate than
that allowed by the abbreviated structure of this first Social Forum, and also called
for more empirical rigor in the discussions (pointing out some inaccuracies of
some statements regarding the World Bank's role). He pointed out that there are
no policies neutral to all groups (or else we would have no need for a Social Forum
like this). The centrality of poverty and the importance of addressing it are now
increasingly accepted. Poverty eradication has been included in the Millennium
Development goals and by the Bretton Woods institutions including the World
Bank. Other issues are more controversial (and he voiced some views at odds with
those of many of the participants, but which were important to hear though they
might not have been the most politically correct). Economics, though not a
favorite topic of many NGOs, has an important and potentially positive role to play
in globalization; non-economic policies can have negative effects. Some social
equity policies, he noted, can violate human rights (especially universality
principles). Representatives of the poor are telling the World Bank that it is not
just food production but purchasing power which is a big issue for them. Lack of
access to other resources - land, water, credit, inputs to agriculture like forests,
fertilizer and seeds - is a huge contributor to hunger, especially for women (who
do not receive the rights they are formally guaranteed). If there was one area to
prioritize, it would be the need for a gender perspective. While a focus on rural
food production is necessary, going beyond this to urban-rural linkages, and
broader economic development and wealth creation in both areas, would also help,
as would wider recognition (including poverty reduction strategies) of the right to
food as a public good, versus a private good.
Mr. Sfeir-Younis argued for a new paradigm of inclusive empowerment that
goes beyond current paradigms of economic growth or even sustainable
development. He also pointed out the interrelationship between the subjects of
discussion, between for example poverty and the creation of wealth, and between
the right to food and the need for access to energy resources (to cook food),
between patterns of consumption in the developed world (e.g., $200B in alcohol
consumed in rich countries) and low levels of overseas development assistance
(e.g., $8B in total agricultural assistance). Still, he stated that actually building
political will for getting the priorities right, and for example establishing the
primacy of human rights over economic law, or infusing economic law with
human rights values, would be a profound social change. Mr. Sfeir-Younis
suggested that the Social Forum should focus on these crucial issues of political
will, and noted that these are collective action problems requiring collective
solutions. On the other hand, however, he asserted that coherence between
economic and human rights policies will have to take place at the country level, as
he viewed it as unrealistic to expect such a change to take place at the international
level. He mentioned that the World Bank is open to dialogue on these issues,
urges considering the value for economic development of all the General
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Comments to the Economic, Social, and Cultural Covenant, and has in fact held a
seminar and had discussions with both NGO representatives and High
Commissioner Robinson on some of these topics. However, Mr. Sfeir-Younis
believes that organizations, like his own, without an explicit mandate to promote
human rights must receive guidance from society at large as to preferred policy
directions.
Michael Windfuhr of Food First Information and Action Network, responding
to a couple of Mr. Sfeir-Younis's points, later stated that it is important not to play
the game of which level has responsibility, as action is needed at all levels.
Regarding "empowerment", he welcomed the rhetoric, but asked how often it
occurs in reality. For example, the fisher folk affected by European Union policies
generally are not participating in the negotiations affecting them; likewise, mining
communities in Nigeria and other places have little input, though the World Bank
supports such mining. We do need a new development model, but the World Bank
itself has cut monies intended for rural development. To do so and say we are
looking for the political will is problematic at best. What some see as
protectionist, the poor and vulnerable often see as empowerment to continue their
lives and to provide for their sustenance.
Windfuhr emphasized the role of information regarding rights and human
rights education in empowerment. He also pointed out that many policies with
negative impacts on the poor, e.g., privatization, are also vulnerable to challenge
even on grounds of economic rationality. The policies of IFIs and other
organizations should not have a negative impact on the right to food, including the
quality of nutrition and food. The World Bank's market-based approach to land
reform is one approach, but is not endorsed by, e.g., his organization (Food First),
Via Campesina, or others. Overall, Windfuhr reiterated the importance of a rights-
based approach. After all, he says, who would argue that some measure of torture
is allowed if national security requires it? 17 Windfuhr clarified that if the rights are
violated, for example on utilitarian grounds, then the victims should be
compensated - a position he views as required under the law to the maximum
extent of available resources. Finally, he noted the importance of creating early
warning and action systems, not only for famines, but also for war and other
conflicts that impact the right to food.
Mr. Asbjom Eide of the Sub-Commission also urged the increased democratic
participation of real people, as opposed to faceless international institutions. He
welcomed the World Bank's new introspection on these issues, and noted the
increased criticism of traditional approaches from World Bank elites (like former
World Bank Chief Economist and Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz). The problem all
too often is that people are becoming impoverished in the very process of
attempting ongoing economic development, often with a "generational trap" of an
underfed woman giving birth to an underfed child who is unable to learn and will
17. He is apparently unfamiliar with the arguments of Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz
and others, who have called for "torture warrants" from judges when national security is threatened.
They argue that is the best way, e.g., in a "ticking bomb" situation, to get the information. See ALAN
M. DERSHOWITZ, SHOUTING FIRE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN A TURBULENT AGE 470 (2002).
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
continue to be poor in the next generation. Mr. Eide called for more attention not
only to the challenge of poverty reduction, but also to stopping the active
impoverishment of people which is so often rationalized as necessary on utilitarian
grounds although it violates their rights. Discrimination against various groups
(women, the indigenous, lower-caste groups), including within the household, also
plays a tremendously negative role in this regard. National strategies to approach
implementation and overcome such discrimination, with benchmarks toward
progressive realization, are important means of addressing the issues.
The interrelationship of civil and political with economic, social, and cultural
rights was also highlighted by examples of the justiciability of economic, social,
and cultural rights from South Africa and India. Ms. Charlotte McClain of the
South African Commission on Human Rights described how a vulnerable
community living in squalid conditions outside Capetown was evicted, but
received a court order from the highest court in South Africa (the Constitutional
Court) holding the eviction unlawful 18 and providing that the homeless parents and
children must be given the right to housing, as provided in the South African
Constitution. Similarly, Ms. Apama Bhat described a surprisingly successful case
she brought before the Indian Supreme Court' 9 which resulted in an order
enforcing the international human right to food by ordering the central government
to provide resources to the state government, thereby enabling the right to be
implemented. Continuing issues include ceilings on those able to take advantage
of the right, but the judicial recognition of the right is an important achievement.
In addition to access to the courts, Mr. Raj Kumar of Pax Romana also
emphasized the relevance of other civil and political rights, especially the right to
information (highlighted in Rio Principle 10), to the implementation of economic
rights like the right to food and the fight against poverty. Calling for greater
involvement of civil society in constructing the poverty reduction strategy papers,
he said that "human rights is the grammar of the dialogue", and lamented the fact
that key organizations like the United Nations Development Program were not
receptive to human rights language at the Bali preparatory conference for the
Johannesburg World Summit for Sustainable Development. Sub-Commission
member Florizelle O'Connor from Jamaica also endorsed a holistic approach to
human rights, viewing the right to food as being as fundamental a right as civil and
political rights. She also endorsed the cultural right to continue with organic
farming, if desired, instead of being forced to use chemical fertilizers at potentially
high nutritional cost.
18. Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom and Others, Case No CCT 11/00 (Con. Ct. S. Africa,
Oct. 4., 2000), available at http;//www.concourt.gov.za/judgments/2000/grootbooml.pdf (last visited
Jan. 17, 2002).
19. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India and Ors, Civil Petition No. 196 of 2001
(Sup. Ct. of India, Nov. 28, 2001), available at http://www.geocities.com/righttofood/orders/
nov28.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2003).
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6. Discussion of Draft Conclusions and Recommendations
The second day of the Social Forum, which took place on August 2, 2002 (a
week after the first day), focused on discussion of draft conclusions and
recommendations which Mr. Bengoa had prepared after the first day. Mr. Bengoa
explained that after the day's discussion, the ten members of the Sub-Commission
would discuss and finalize the document in private for the Sub-Commission's
consideration and adoption.
Many suggestions to strengthen the draft document and correct some errors
ensued. Ms. Terao, an alternative Sub-Commission member from Japan, made the
positive suggestion that the Social Forum concentrate on what was new in
globalization, which she noted had both positive and negative effects. She noted
the persistent problem arising from excessively narrow circles of social concern -
in which problems of our immediate neighbors receive our attention, but those
across oceans do not. Sub-Commission member Abdel Sattar, from Pakistan,
noted the links between bad governance, corruption, and inefficient or useless
projects (selected for their potential for kickbacks rather than for the public good).
He called for an international regime to return to developing countries the wealth
illicitly stashed away in developed country banks and tax havens, which he argued
would make a real contribution to poverty reduction in developing countries.
Other comments were not as helpful as these, and one was left wondering
whether commenting on the draft document represented the best use of time of
those gathered. Mr. Eide made the useful comment that the globalization most
people found objectionable (as creating losers as well as winners) was economic
globalization; he also urged the Social Forum not to lose sight of the particulars,
but to focus on what happens to specific human beings who are otherwise lost in
the process of globalization.
7. Conclusions of the Social Forum
The Social Forum affirmed its mandate as described above,20 emphasizing not
only the ultimate objective to share "knowledge and experiences" through an
interactive dialogue, but also "to suggest appropriate intervention by the concerned
stakeholders" and to contribute to major international conferences and collaborate
with other forums, like the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. 21 Among the
other major conclusions of the Social Forum were the following22:
a. Globalization and Human Rights
Economic globalization is human controlled and economic law and
policy should accord with human rights law and values.
20. See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
21. Report of the Chairman-Rapporteur, Josi Bengoa, supra note 15, at 14, 51.
22. Id. at 15 52-69.
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" Unregulated globalization produces losers as well as winners, so
measures must be taken to safeguard the rights of those who may
become poor or marginalized.
* Instead of taking into account poor, women, or indigenous peoples,
globalization often takes away their resources, thus violating their
rights.
* Liberalization of trade in services may negatively affect human
rights, including nondiscriminatory access to education, health, and
water.
" Liberalization of trade in agriculture may also have negative effects,
including increasing food import bills, declining local production,
undermining small farms and labor, and narrowing development
options.
" Women in particular are negatively affected, requiring a rights-based
gender perspective in economic policies.
* "Non-discrimination" in human rights and economic/trade law sound
the same, but have different meanings needing clarification, as equal
rules for unequal players may institutionalize discrimination against
the weak and violate human rights when what's needed is affirmative
action for the most vulnerable to ensure consistency with
international human rights law.
b. The Right to Food and Poverty Reduction
" Poverty reduction strategies require both preventing impoverishment
and urgently bringing the poor out of poverty.
" It is thus important to identify the poor, their locations, and the
causes of poverty (as in the background paper "Who Are the
Poor?").
* The nondiscriminatory participation and empowerment of the poor in
a rights-based approach to development is of central importance.
" Poverty is not only a cause, but also an effect of hunger and
malnutrition - affecting the ability of individuals to escape poverty
in what often becomes an inter-generational poverty trap.
" Respect for social, cultural, and traditional ways of gathering food,
and the spiritual as well as the physical well being of affected
peoples including the indigenous should be considered.
" All stakeholders should contribute to the World Food Summit's
Intergovernmental Working Group on voluntary guidelines for the
right to food, with the ultimate purpose being to reflect nutritional
well-being, and noting the NGO suggestions made at the Social
Forum.
* The Social Forum urges more consistency by states regarding
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positions taken at various human rights and development forums.
* General Comment 12 of the Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights authoritatively interprets the right to food and how to
achieve it, including the need for states to adopt an accountable,
participatory, and transparent national strategy, identification of
resources, framework legislation, benchmarks, and policies for
implementation.
* Justiciability of economic, social, and cultural rights was illustrated
by the South African and Indian cases; an independent judiciary,
independent human rights commissions, and a vibrant civil society
will strengthen these positive trends.
8. Recommendations of the Social Forum
The main Recommendations of the Social Forum were as follows 23:
a. Proposed Themes for 2003
The themes recommended for 2003 focused on the rural poor, i.e.,: (i) rural
poverty and rural poor communities, including the rights of landless peasants'
movements, pastoralists, and fishermen; (ii) the right to education in rural
communities, including the importance of capacity-building and training; (iii)
corruption and its impact on the rural poor; and (iv) the role of international
cooperation in peasant agriculture and rural communities.
b. Poverty Reduction and the Right to Food
The main recommendations of the Social Forum after considering the issues
pertaining to poverty reduction and the right to food were divided into national and
international aspects.
At the national level, the Social Forum recommended that:
* States should adopt a national strategy on the right to food in
accordance with General Comment 12, and also should take into
consideration other General Comments including 13 (right to
education) and 14 (right to health).
* States also should conform to the human rights principles of
nondiscrimination, accountability, transparency, and participation by
undertaking the following:
o Establish early warning systems regarding threats to
livelihood due to environmental degradation, production
changes, or market instability;
o Establish buffers to mitigate shocks and facilitate early
23. Report of the Chairman-Rapporteur, Josd Bengoa, supra note 15, at 170-80.
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
recovery;
o Avoid discrimination in giving support to farming
communities, and consider affirmative action if necessary;
o Avoid discrimination against women in particular, by
giving full access to resources (land, credit, natural
resources, technology, and the right of all pregnant and
breastfeeding mothers to food and health care);
o Protect rights of tenant farmers and promote effective land
reform and indigenous peoples' right to land;
o Facilitate market access for small farmers;
o Protect the rights of landless agricultural workers, including
the right to organize and unionize;
o Ensure conformity of private business activities with the
progressive realization of the right to food;
o Assist HIV/AIDS-affected communities.
At the international level, the Social Forum recommended that:
" International organizations, especially the IFIs, should incorporate
human rights norms, including the right to food, into their work,
activities and value systems with due respect to their respective
mandates;
* States should give more emphasis in national poverty reduction
strategies to the right to food and the urgent need for more
institutionalized participation by stakeholders including
representatives of the poor and civil society organizations;
* The High Commissioner for Human Rights' Guidelines to
incorporate human rights concerns into poverty reduction strategies
should be field-tested as soon as possible;
" Actions that reflect the interrelationship between human rights, for
example the right to food and the right to health, education and other
rights, should be undertaken on a priority basis for women and
young children;
* The High Commissioner for Human Rights' reports on intellectual
property, agriculture, and trade in services should all be formally
transmitted to the WTO General Council and the relevant WTO
committees and Director General;
* Human rights principles including nondiscrimination support
targeted and enforceable differential treatment and affirmative action
for developing countries, as opposed to mere 'best endeavor'
commitments for such treatment;
* States should takes steps (in existing as well as further international
agreements and overseas aid) to facilitate access to food and respect
for enjoyment of the right to food in other countries as well as their
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own;
Public funds should be made available through international
cooperation to strengthen agricultural research aimed at improving
productivity of small and marginal farmers.
VI. EVALUATION OF THE SOCIAL FORUM
It must be admitted that not all the high hopes for the first Social Forum were
achieved. This was in part attributable to the disrupting delay, but in part to the
planning for the event. Whether because of a preference for a relatively flexible
and "free" space for debate, or because of inadequate attention, the event could
have been planned to ensure more effective and higher quality debate,
participation, and outcomes. The comments of some governments (mainly from
the North) that the Social Forum did not hear the views of any poor people were
clearly inaccurate and unfair. But the nagging question of whether and how to
enhance quality remains.
The ultimate value of the Social Forum, if it continues its evolution into an
effective body, would consist largely in informing the decisions of those shaping
globalization with alternative perspectives relevant to concerns of the world's poor
and vulnerable groups. The importance of such alternative perspectives is not
sufficiently appreciated. With the fallout from IMF decisions now widely
recognized as contributing to recurring financial crises in Asia, Russia, and Latin
America, and from corporate scandals similarly focused on the agenda of a small
elite, the importance of taking broader and longer-term views into account in
decision-making cannot be so easily ignored. Whenever a system develops into
orthodoxy, as happened at the IMF and at now-failed corporations like Enron or
WorldCom, the quality of decisions suffers because it does not adequately consider
the full impact of those decisions on the ground. The shared goals of the U.N.
system and the Social Forum (promoting peace, stability, and human rights, and
eradicating poverty) would be better served by more democratic and participatory
input from affected groups of society, especially those most adversely affected.
Such views may be likened to early warning signals of stressed or weakened points
in the system, which if not properly processed by the system will erupt in flawed or
negative output. Decisional quality will thus be enhanced with broader input from
affected constituencies, allowing more comprehensive and accurate assessment of
risk and reward, of cost and benefit. In short, receiving views from those
constituencies will nurture a systemic strength that comes not from rigid
orthodoxy, but from resilience.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE SOCIAL FORUM SESSIONS
1. Procedural Matters
As stated in the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights intervention at this
year's Sub-Commission: the organizers of the Social Forum should "think boldly
about new structures and new approaches to conducting its meetings - and not drift
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into the same-old, customary modalities for holding UN-based human rights
meetings. ' 4
a. Participants
If the major purpose of the Social Forum is to give a voice to the voiceless, 25
then major attention should be given to ensuring the participation of such actors.
Many of the participants in the first Social Forum were, frankly, the same old
Geneva-based nongovernmental organizations and actors who participate in other
U.N. meetings. Not that they should be excluded, but examples of truly new
voices were so rare as to be almost nonexistent. A fair and objective process of
consultative outreach should be established, leading in cases of demonstrated
financial need to financial support and participation of representative actors from
unrepresented or underrepresented perspectives.
b. Documentation
While the inaugural Social Forum included some excellent background
materials 26, a more systematic approach to making such materials available would
be preferable. Each topic could be accompanied by a packet of basic, key
documentary materials (including a bibliography of common resources and
websites on the topic). Such materials would encourage common understandings
and usefully focus the debate. Since by its nature the Social Forum is delving into
new, cross-sectoral topics, the normal information sources may miss some of the
more valuable resources on the topic, making such documentary materials even
more valuable to the participants.
Mr. Sfeir-Younis of the World Bank was correct to yearn for a structure in
which deeper and more sustained dialogue about these issues could take place.
Availability and greater use of such formal preparatory documents setting forth
positions and data in advance of the meeting would help in this regard. The
participants could then review these prior to the meeting, narrow the issues in
dispute, and perhaps even refer open factual issues to other bodies to make the
actual meeting more productive.
While greater availability of such documentation on the Internet is a positive
trend that should be encouraged, the reality of continued limited access of most
poor people to the Internet means that other innovative methods for including the
poor in documentary dialogue should also be considered. A repeated and
important theme of the inaugural Social Forum was the vital importance to the
24. Press Release, Statement of the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, Item 4: Economic,
Social & Cultural Rights: Comments on the Social Forum (Aug. 6, 2002) (on file with author).
25. "[Tlhe Social Forum seeks to give special voice to new actors, including the poor and the
marginalized and their organizations, which have no space within the United Nations system." Report
of the Chairman-Rapporteur, Josd Bengoa, supra note 15, at 14 50.
26. See, e.g., the partial list of documents made available to participants in Report of the
Chairman-Rapporteur, Josi Bengoa, supra note 15, Annex 1, at 20.
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poor of information regarding their rights, and much more strenuous efforts to
enhance such access to information are required.
c. Preparation
During the discussions on the second day, Sub-Commission member Ms.
O'Connor made the good point that if the Social Forum is to be truly innovative
and useful, participants will have to do a better job of preparing presentations that
reveal the disconnect between the current international approaches and the actual
needs of villagers and the poor and vulnerable on the ground. She recommended,
for example, that an NGO from her region ideally would be familiar with World
Bank research and activities in the region, analyze the progress or lack thereof
made in local development of the affected community, and come prepared to
discuss ideas for improvement in actually meeting local needs. As she said:
I really challenge the NGOs that are here. Go back to your areas. Don't just look
at the UN treaties. Relate those to the day-to-day lives of the people. Come back
next year with best practices, worst practices, with words, ideas, with solid stuff.
That will allow all of us to come back with concrete ideas. To make dignity a
reality for more people all over the world.
d. Speakers
Mr. Bengoa and others commented on the usefulness to the Social Forum of
having a variety of speakers offering views not otherwise frequently heard within
the U.N. system. He appealed at the end of the Social Forum for a greater number
of governmental representatives, particularly those with social development
portfolios, to attend. It must be said, however, that the representatives of
governments who spoke inevitably had the least to say, usually repeating widely
known facts or dispensing state propoganda. Since the Social Forum is intended to
give a voice to those who do not have one elsewhere in the U.N. system, an even
more limited role for states (unless they have truly value added content or original
ideas to offer) would be preferable. On the other hand, the tendency of U.N.
forums toward ideological and sometimes misinformed rhetoric would make it
helpful, as several speakers including from the World Bank properly suggested, to
have a greater number of true experts available to inform the discussions. In an
intervention at the Sub-Commission, Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights
suggested:
For example, on some of the important technical subjects affecting this field,
perhaps a brief point-counterpoint debate could be held between recognized
experts on different sides of these issues. If informed in advance, NGO's and their
advisors could anticipate and prepare counterpoints to the views of experts. This
could be particularly beneficial in challenging with facts the views of the IFIs (the
World Bank, IMF, and WTO) who in some cases continue to adhere to discredited
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free-market economic orthodoxies that have not served the needs of the poor.
2 7
The stature of the Social Forum should enable it to attract the world's best
experts on various subjects. Amartya Sen or Joseph Stiglitz could debate Milton
Friedman on the causes and best approaches to solve world poverty, informed by
concrete testimony from actual poor people who have experienced the results of
IMF policies on the ground. In addition, the voice of the World Bank offered an
interesting and valuable counterpoint to some of the other voices heard, and it and
the other IFIs should be encouraged to play a continuing role if they are to be part
of the solutions. The same could be said for multinational businesses. While the
antipathy toward the corporate sector and economic globalization in general among
some of the speakers might make this seem unattractive, the shift of power to
businesses and other non-state actors means that they have greater responsibilities.
It would thus be wise to include their perspectives to further discussion and mutual
understanding and, again, make them part of the solution rather than part of the
problem. The participation of both "international financial and economic
institutions and development agencies" as well as "private sector entities" is thus
rightly contemplated in the Social Forum's conclusions 28.
e. Using New Information Technologies
Creative ways of interacting with participants should be considered, including
simultaneous web-casts, video-conferencing, and (as Minnesota Advocates, again,
suggested) "[p]erhaps idea-posters, audiotapes, and other alternative and/or
culturally-rich communicative approaches to expressing... ideas and concerns. 2 9
In some countries in poor regions, ranging from the savannahs of Africa to the
jungles of Peru, the internet is increasingly used by farmers and vulnerable
populations to "bridge the digital divide" and use information technologies to
educate, inform, and empower people. A major problem in such initiatives is
access to energy, as many of the poorest villages and regions do not have access to
reliable electricity. But for those who do, these new technologies can provide
information on more efficient irrigation, fertilizer, or soil replenishment
techniques, weather conditions, conservation methods, market and transport
conditions that can be useful both for rural and urban populations. During the first
day of the Social Forum, the government of Mexico suggested that perhaps the
best practices emerging from the Social Forum could be posted on the web to
leverage the lessons for the benefit of those unable to attend the event. While the
benefits of Internet communication will remain limited so long as access remains
limited, those benefits should be shared with those with access to such methods.
The Internet could also be a way of broadening the dialogue of the Social Forum to
other parties, and to extend it throughout the year, through chat room and
moderated or unmoderated discussion fora and listserves.
27. Press Release, Statement of the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, supra note 24.
28. See Report of the Chairman-Rapporteur, Josg Bengoa, supra note 15, at 14 50.
29. Press Release, Statement of the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, supra note 24.
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f. Interactive Methods
Since the Social Forum has also been conceived, from the outset, as a forum
to build bridges between actors who do not normally talk to each other, ways of
enhancing interactivity should be seriously considered.
One specific innovation used to good effect at the World Summit for
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in September of 2002 was the inclusion
of various interactive dialogues between and among representatives of 'major
groups' established over the years since the Rio Earth Summit a decade ago. The
discussion between and among these groups was moderated by the Secretary
General's Special Envoy, Jan Pronk (the former Development Minister of the
Netherlands).30 While much of the power of the resulting discussions came by
virtue of the forceful personality and knowledge of Mr. Pronk, the existence of
truly interactive dialogues within the U.N. system was both a refreshing change
from the staid and self-justifying rhetoric so often prevalent, and a genuinely
original means of advancing substantive ideas in difficult areas. Mr. Pronk, in the
manner of a strong television talk show host, would challenge indefensible
statements by representatives of civil society or business, or ask one U.N. agency
why they have not been cooperating with another agency with whom they shared
the podium. 31 Such well-informed moderators are rare indeed, and it takes a bit of
faith that they will guide the discussion in fair and profitable directions. But when
it works, it results in new insights and shared understandings and would be well
suited to addressing the issues confronted by the Social Forum. In fact, his
familiarity with the issues and his obvious skills would make Mr. Pronk an ideal
candidate to assist the Social Forum in some of its deliberations, if he could be
persuaded to do so.
Another interactive means that was suggested by Minnesota Advocates for
Human Rights was "impromptu, show-of-hand type straw votes on issues that arise
during the session," and this could also be valuable in some instances.
32
Still another creative suggestion from Minnesota Advocates is to literally
promote interactivity by making networking opportunities available to participants
either at dedicated breaks for that purpose, or informal receptions to do the same.
Circulating a voluntary contact list to facilitate contact during and after the Social
Forum, published and available before the last session, would be another means to
this end. Such emphasis on interactivity could help fulfill the vision of the Social
Forum as "the ultimate networking forum - connecting different actors and
institutions together, to integrate their policies, inform each other's views, and
incorporate human rights concerns into the social and development policy making
& programmatic functions in the UN and other institutions. 3 3
30. See Generally Johannesburg Summit 2002, Media Info.: Profiles, at
http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/media info/profilejpronk.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
31. Speaking Points of WSSD Special Envoy Mr. Jan Pronk, 08 February 2002, at
http://www.teriin.org/dsds2002/dayl/pronk (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
32. Press Release, Statement of the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, supra note 24.
33. Id.
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g. Guiding the Discussion
Discussion could also be enhanced with an understanding, and perhaps
vigorous action from the Chair or a moderator, against mere, fruitless repetition of
points made by previous speakers. In the first Social Forum, there was far too
much repetition of this sort, often for political reasons or simple grandstanding.
Future meetings of the Social Forum could break the mold of U.N. meetings by
more rigorously avoiding such traps, and focusing discussion on isolating and
resolving the most intractable issues.
h. Punctuality
It should be unnecessary to recommend that the sessions begin on time, but
unfortunately the meetings of the Social Forum in its inaugural year routinely
began late, making this recommendation worthwhile. One would think that
punctuality would have been seen as especially important given the delayed start of
the Social Forum, and the consequent disruption and diminished participation in
the proceedings. But, instead, tardiness was in fashion, in the worst tradition of
U.N. meetings. Future meetings of the Social Forum would be more productive
and respectful of the many participants traveling from distant lands if they would
start on time.
i. Relationship with Other Bodies
It would also be worthwhile if the Social Forum could formally refer inquiries
to other bodies of the U.N. system, or even outside of the U.N. system, for
productive follow up on the issues discussed. Also, it is within the Social Forum's
mandate "to propose standards and initiatives of a juridical nature, guidelines and
other recommendations for consideration by the Commission on Human Rights,
the working groups on the right to development, the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the specialized agencies and other organs of the United
Nations system." Thus, it should cultivate capabilities, resources, and approaches
that will enable it to do this in a high-quality fashion.
Among the many ways this could happen is for the Chair of the Social Forum
and the ten Sub-Commission members formally attending the Social Forum to act
as spokespeople for the Social Forum's recommendations, to the treaty bodies,
international conferences, both formal and informal meetings of other international
bodies, and other forums.
j. Organizational Structure
Although this is a delicate matter, since too much structure could defeat the
informal and creative exchange that marked the first Social Forum and should be
preserved in the future, Mr. Bengoa and others correctly stated at several points
that more organization could serve the purposes of the Forum. The search
continues for the correct balance between more formal panels and debates between
experts, and less formal interactive dialogues.
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2. Substantive Matters
a. Topics
In selecting the topics of the Social Forum, more thought should be given to
whether the issue is being adequately addressed in other fora, or whether the
unique "competitive advantage" envisioned for the Social Forum will be able to
make an original and value-added contribution to discussion and moving toward a
resolution of the problem. It is important that the Social Forum not become just
another U.N. talking shop. To this end, Ms. O'Connor's comments above about
the value of preparation also have a substantive point. As stated in the
Conclusions of Mr. Bengoa's report, "[t]he dialogue that takes place in the Social
Forum must be based on the expressed concerns of those who experience the
reality of social, economic, and cultural vulnerability."
34
From this perspective, the topics of the first Social Forum - globalization and
human rights, and poverty and the right to food - were appropriate. Future topics
should similarly focus on the most important global problems affecting vulnerable
populations, many of which similarly relate to subsistence rights and severe
situations. In addition to the right to food, the rights to water, health, education,
and housing all come to mind as urgent topics. The focus in 2003 on rural poverty
should provide useful insights, but the major problems pertaining to sustainable
urbanization are also becoming acute. Thus, I would advocate an approach of
selecting a specific right for each of the next few years, using discussion of that
right as a prism to shed light on the interrelationship with other rights in the many
varied contexts in which issues arise. I agree with those at the Social Forum who
noted that certain issues, like the impact of globalization, are likely to remain
cross-cutting underlying themes for the foreseeable future.
b. Metrics
Since the Social Forum's focus is on economic, social, and cultural rights, and
since these are recognized as progressively attainable within national resources, it
would be worthwhile for the Social Forum to adopt and use social metrics showing
the status of achievement of the relevant rights. Some of the existing metrics
would be of great use in this regard, for example the UNDP's Human
Development Index. But it would be worthwhile for the Social Forum to devote
some time to examining the appropriateness of the UNDP or other indices for
measuring human rights achievements, considering modifications that might be
appropriate and adopting and using uniform measures to evaluate national progress
on a regular basis. In an intervention at the Sub-Commission this year, Minnesota
Advocates for Human Rights suggested that this topic of metrics was so important
that the Social Forum could even devote all or part of its proceedings one year to
the topic, e.g., reviewing ways in which nations could measure and address issues
34. Report of the Chairman-Rapporteur, Josd Bengoa, supra note 15, at 14 50.
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pertaining to child mortality. Of course, such metrics could also be used to follow
up and evaluate the effect that the Social Forum and other activities and efforts
have on the underlying issues.35
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the first-ever U.N. Social Forum offers a potentially important,
if currently immature and unproven, forum for injecting much-needed critical
thinking and imagination into the discussion of how to resolve some of the world's
most pressing and difficult issues. For the effort to be successful, the Social Forum
must avoid capture by traditional special interests, on one hand, while seeking out
and giving a voice to unrepresented vulnerable interests, on the other. With proper
discipline and creativity, however, the effort could prove worthwhile indeed.
35. Press Release, Statement of the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, supra note 24.
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COMPARATIVE U.S. & EU APPROACHES TO
E-COMMERCE REGULATION:
JURISDICTION, ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS9 ELECTRONIC
SIGNATURES AND TAXATION
Christopher William Pappas *
INTRODUCTION
The beginning of the 21st century has brought with it explosive growth in a
new medium for trade, namely: e-commerce as made practicable through the
continued evolution of the Internet.' Because major businesses have entered the
realm of e-commerce, most firms believe that they must cater to the desires of the
consumer, and that means doing business online. Increasingly, consumers are
choosing to make purchases via the Internet and are skipping the trip to the store.
A modem consumer can purchase a compact disc, a couch, or a new car at four in
the morning without having to leave her house, deal with traffic and salespeople,
or even change out of her pajamas.4 Furthermore, a consumer is no longer
restricted to products available in one store, one town, or even one country because
the Internet transcends boundaries and is accessible from anywhere in the world.
MEASUREMENT OF E-COMMERCE
While it is difficult to accurately measure the impact of the Internet on
. Chris Pappas received his B.S. in Business Management from Millersville University of
Pennsylvania in 1997. He received his J.D. from the University of Denver College of Law in 2002,
where he was a staff member of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, was the senior
research associate for Dr. John T. Soma, and skied an average of twenty-five days per year. In 2002,
Mr. Pappas received his M.A. in International Business Transactions from the University of Denver
Graduate School of International Studies. The author would like to extend his sincere appreciation to
his family, friends, and of course to Heidi, for their unwavering confidence, support and love.
1. See Larry J. Guffey, What Advice Should You Consider Giving to Your Clients Regarding
Them?, 34 MD. B. 41, 43 (2001). See also William K. Slate II, Online Dispute Resolution: Click Here
to Settle Your Dispute, DISP. RESOL. J. 8, 12 (2002).
2. See Walmart.com, www.walmart.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2003). See also
GeneralMotors.com, www.gm.comlflashhomepage (last visited Feb. 10, 2003). See also
Safeway.com, www.safeway.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
3. See Dennis M. Kennedy, Key Legal Concerns in E-Commerce: The Law Comes to the New
Frontier, 18 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 17, 18-19 (2001).
4. See Yahoo! Shopping, www.shopping.yahoo.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
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commerce, some estimates report that at the end of 1999, there were nearly 260
million, and by mid 2002, over 580 million Internet users worldwide.5 By 2005,
that number is estimated to reach more than 765 million.6 The Internet has evolved
into a significant and accepted business medium through which consumers and
businesses come together in the buying and selling process. Department of
Commerce statistics conservatively estimate that e-commerce transactions totaled
seventeen billion dollars in the first three calendar quarters of the year 2000.7 Even
those estimates are much lower than individual company reports suggest.8
THESIS
Growth in the use of the Internet has forced businesses to become familiar
with, and understand the complexities of e-commerce. 9 Lawyers have played, and
will continue to play, a significant role in helping these businesses learn about
doing business online. For a lawyer to adequately represent her clients, she must,
therefore, understand the complicated legal ramifications of doing business
online.' Attorneys must understand and keep current with technology and
business as well as legal developments." This paper will analyze and compare the
approaches to the regulation of e-commerce taken by the two historically largest
and most developed economic markets of the world: the United States and
continental Western Europe (as represented by the European Union). Generally,
the European Union will be analyzed as one governmental body, although the
difficulties of this presumption will be investigated.
The primary goals of this paper are to compare the broad policies behind U.S.
and EU approaches to the regulation of e-commerce and the specific means of
regulation adopted for four of the main issues that modem lawyers are facing in
regards to e-commerce: (1) jurisdiction, choice of law, and consumer protection;
(2) electronic contracts; (3) electronic signatures; and (4) taxation of e-commerce.
This paper does not purport to serve as an exhaustive analysis of the issues
involved in e-commerce, but rather, aims to provide a general comparison of the
regulatory approach taken by two of the leading markets in the world today.
TYPES OF E-COMMERCE
Traditional commerce occurs without the use of the Internet.' 2 "Bricks and
5. See Yahoo! Shopping, supra note 4. See also John C. Beck, Get a Grip! Regulating
Cyberspace Won't Be Easy, Bus. L. TODAY, May/June 2001, at 14 [hereinafter Get a Grip.]. See also
Nua Internet Surveys, www.nua.ie/surveys/how-manyonline/world.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
6. See Beck, supra note 5, at 14.
7. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 19.
8. See id. at 19.
9. See generally Kennedy, supra note 3 (describing e-commerce law as one of the most focused
upon and important areas of law today).
10. See id.
11. See id. at 34.
12. See Francesco G. Mazzotta, A Guide to E-Commerce: Some Legal Issues Posed by E-
Commerce for American Businesses Engaged in Domestic and International Transactions, 24 SUFFOLK
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mortar businesses," called such in reference to the bricks and mortar that are used
to construct their businesses, have no Internet component. 13  There are few
businesses remaining, most small and locally focused, that can be classified as true
bricks and mortar businesses. Most firms have integrated e-commerce, defined for
purposes of this analysis as "any business transaction that occurs over, or is
enabled by, the Internet,"' 14 at some level of their operations. Some are traditional
companies that have incorporated the Internet into their business. American
Airlines and L.L. Bean are examples of traditional brick and mortar businesses that
are now classified as a "clicks and mortar" companies, because of their significant
Internet presence.' 5 Over the past few years, another category of business has
become recognized in the marketplace. "Clicks," more commonly referred to as
"Dot-corns" in reference to their website urls, are businesses that are only involved
in e-commerce on the Internet and do not have a physical retail presence.'
6
There are several ways in which the Internet is used as a platform for
commerce.' 7 E-commerce transactions between two businesses are referred to as
business-to-business e-commerce, or "B2B."' 8 Government contracting between a
business and a government falls under business-to-government e-commerce, or
"B2G.'"9 Transactions in which the government offers its services to consumers
through the Internet are designated government-to-consumer transactions, or
"G2C.,, 20  Lastly, the most familiar form of e-commerce takes place between
businesses and consumers. 2 This paper will focus on these business-to-consumer
transactions, referred to as "B2C.,,
22
Business-to-Consumer (B2C)
Many key issues that arise from B2C transactions have direct analogies to
traditional consumer transactions. Other issues are unique to e-commerce
transactions. Jurisdiction, an issue as old as law itself, has been brought to the
forefront once again as questions regarding appropriate jurisdiction arise with
every cross-border e-commerce transaction.23 Nations want to be able to ensure
the protection of local consumers and jurisdiction over e-commerce transactions is
essential to effecting this protection.24 Similarly, electronic signature issues are a
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 249, 273 (2001).
13. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 20.
14. Id. at 17.
15. Id. at 20.
16. See id.






23. See Carole Aciman & Diane Vo-Verde, Refining the Zippo Test: New Trends on Personal
Jurisdiction for Internet Activities, 19 THE COMPUTER & INTER.NET LAW., January 2002, at 16.
24. See Michael Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty For Internet
Jurisdiction, 661 PLI/PAT 561,575 (2001).
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new twist on a traditional area of law.25 Lastly, the topic that has perhaps the
greatest room for future evolution and adaptation is that of the taxation of B2C
26transactions.
THE UNITED STATES GENERALLY
The United States is a free-market, capitalist economy.27 This has become
even more apparent as the U.S. attempts, through its role as the world's economic
hegemon, to spread political and economic deregulation via treaties (both bilateral
and multilateral), and its role in, and arguably control over, international
organizations such as the United Nations, World Bank, and World Trade
Organization. 28 As a free-market economy, the U.S. subscribes, in principle, to a
hands-off, minimalist approach to the regulation of commerce. 29 The U.S. has
attempted to implement this laissez-faire philosophy in the area of e-commerce as
well. 30  The White House, under former President Bill Clinton, issued a
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce that purports to guide U.S. regulation
in accordance with this attitude.3'
US. Framework for Global Electronic Commerce
This Framework lists five principles that the U.S., and other nations, should
adhere to in attempting to regulate e-commerce: (1) "The private sector should
lead;",32 (2) "Governments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic
commerce;, 33 (3) Where governmental involvement is needed, its aim should be to
support and enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent, and simple legal
environment for commerce; '34 (4) Governments should recognize the unique
qualities of the Intemet; '35 and (5) "Electronic Commerce over the Internet should
be facilitated on a global basis. 36
25. See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, Understanding Electronic Contracting; UCITA, E-
Signature, Federal, State, and Foreign Regulations 2001, 649 PLI/PAT 15, 40 (2001).
26. See David E. Hardesty, Taxation of E-Commerce: Recent Developments, 618 PLI/PAT 177
(2000).
27. See generally BARRY EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1996) (providing a history of the international financial system
over the last 150 years).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 Hous. L. REv. 717, 718
(2001).
31. See THE WHITE HOUSE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (July 1,
1997), at http://www.ta.doc.gov/digeconomy/framewrk.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2003) [hereinafter
White House Framework].
32. id. at 2.
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The private sector should lead." The expansion of the Internet has been
primarily driven by the private sector.38 Regulatory policy should, as in the
traditional marketplace, allow the market to generate innovation, expanded
services, broader participation, and lower prices.39 As such, the government
should welcome private sector participation as a formal part of the policy making
process.40 The general goal of e-commerce regulation should be to encourage
industry self-regulation and support private sector organizations. 4'
Governments should avoid undue restrictions on e-commerce.42 By the time
government regulation is put into force, it is often outdated due to the continued
evolution of the technology driving the Internet and e-commerce. The resulting
unsuitable regulation is likely to hinder the essential evolution of business models
as they adapt to best utilize the Internet.43 As such, nations should refrain from
unnecessary, restrictive involvement or intervention in e-commerce.
Where government involvement is necessary, its aim should be to support and
enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent, and simple legal environment for e-
commerce.44 The twin aims of consumer protection and e-commerce facilitation
should be weighed.45  Consumer protection should be realized through a
predictable, contractual model.4 6 E-commerce will be best facilitated by regulation
designed to ensure competition, protect intellectual property and privacy, prevent
fraud, foster transparency, support commercial transactions, and facilitate dispute
resolution.47 Because transactions based on contracts can ensure predictability and
flexibility at the same time, this principle focuses on the appropriateness of the
48contractual model to the unique legal issues that arise from e-commerce.
The Framework for Global Electronic Commerce also recommends that
nations should recognize the unique qualities of the Internet. 49 Existing regulatory
schemes designed to regulate traditional technologies and transactions may not be
directly applicable to electronic commerce issues.50 Therefore, existing laws
should be adapted to reflect the complexities of e-commerce. 5' Where appropriate,
new regulation may be necessary to address new issues raised by e-commerce. A
recent example of this phenomenon at work is in the area of electronic signatures,
where lawmakers approved new legislation regulating the use of electronic
37. See White House Framework, supra note 31, at 2.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See White House Framework, supra note 31.
41. See id.
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signatures in commerce. 2
Lastly, electronic commerce should be facilitated on a global basis.53 While
the U.S. unquestionably desires to lead in the facilitation of e-commerce, it is
obvious that the evolution of the Internet, and electronic commerce specifically,
depends on international agreement.
54
THE EUROPEAN UNION GENERALLY
The European Union faces unique difficulties in regulating e-commerce. At
present, the EU is comprised of fifteen unique, sovereign, member states: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.55 EU policy must necessarily address the concerns of its individual
members, often resulting in an arduous process of negotiation and discussion
before agreement is reached.
In 2000, the EU attempted to construct a basic framework for the future
regulation of e-commerce. 56 This, along with other official initiatives and reports,
gives insight into the basic philosophy followed by the EU in the regulation of e-
commerce.5 7 While the U.S. is attempting to drive the international marketplace
into the Internet age, the EU approach appears to be more focused on growing the
internal marketplace while protecting member state sovereignty and the rights of
consumers.
5 8
A prime objective of the European Union in regulating e-commerce is to
establish an integrated European internal market with access as an important
component.5 9 The internal market in the U.S. is comprised of individual states that
52. See White House Framework, supra note 31, at 3. See also E-Sign discussion, infra p. 349.
53. See White House Framework, supra note 31, at 3.
54. See Neal H. Luna, Implications of Singapore's Income and Consumption Tax Policies on
International E-Commerce Transactions of Digitized Products, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 717, 737
(2001).
55. The European Union at a Glance, at http://europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2003)
[hereinafter European Union Website].
56. See Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter Directive on Electric
Commerce].
57. See Accelerating E-Commerce: EU Actions, at http://europa.eu.int/information-society/
eeurope/action_plan/stimulate/ecommerce/eu/targets_2000/index en.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
See also Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: E-
Commerce and Financial Services, COM(2001)yyy final at 2, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
intemalmarketlen/fmances/general/ecom en.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2003) [hereinafter E-Commerce
and Financial Services]; A European Initiative in Electronic Commerce: Communication to the
European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions, COM(97)157 at 4, at http://www.cordis.lu/esprit/src/ecomcom.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2003)
[hereinafter European Initiative].
58. See Accelerating E-Commerce: EU Actions, supra note 57; E-Commerce and Financial
Services, supra note 57, at 2, 15; European Initiative, supra note 57, at 1,4-5.
59. See E-Commerce and Financial Services, supra note 57, at 2, 15; European Initiative, supra
note 57, at 4, 7-9.
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are tightly joined in a federalist system.60  There are few roadblocks between
states. The EU is attempting, through regulation, to increase the cohesion in its
markets. 61 This is especially true in the area of e-commerce, where many of the
physical barriers to commerce are easily reduced to manageable degrees.62 To best
bring about the desired harmonious marketplace, the EU is placing special
emphasis on access to the Internet as an essential element to the stimulation of
economic growth and investment in e-commerce.63 Similarly, the EU Directives
guide regulation towards regional facilitation. 64 Current divergences in legislation
cause uncertainty and make e-commerce less attractive. 65 Regulations that effect
e-commerce should be coordinated in the same spirit as the EU Treaty with the
internal market as the first priority.
EU Directives
In respecting individual member state sovereignty, the EU Directives instruct
that the goal of e-commerce regulation should not be to harmonize criminal laws.66
Similarly, regulations concerning safety standards, labeling obligations, and
liability for goods should be left to individual nations.67 Some areas that act as
obstacles to e-commerce such as electronic contracts, however, are appropriate for
concerted regulation which should be coordinated through the EU.68
As mentioned above, the current primary focus of the EU is the unification of
its member states, not interaction or competition with other markets. 69 As such,
regulatory measures should be strictly kept to the minimum levels needed to
achieve the objective of proper functioning of e-commerce within the internal
market. 70  Regulation should be minimal, clear and simple, and predictable and
consistent. While the goal is different, the means chosen by the EU to accomplish
it are consistent with U.S. approaches to e-commerce regulation. Specifically,
there are parallel desires for a minimalistic, simple, and consistent scheme for e-
commerce transactions.
60. See Lynne K. Law, National Copyright Law v. Community Law: Which Law Is Controlling In
Intellectual Property Derivative Market Products?, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 333, 334-35 (1992).
61. See generally Accelerating E-Commerce, supra note 57 (providing an overview of steps taken
by the European Union to develop e-commerce).
62. See id.
63. See Accelerating E-Commerce, supra note 57; Directive on Electronic Commerce, supra note
56, at art. 2.
64. See Accelerating E-Commerce, supra note 57; Directive on Electronic Commerce, supra note
56, at art. 3.
65. See Accelerating E-Commerce, supra note 57; Directive on Electronic Commerce, supra note
56, at art. 5.
66. See Accelerating E-Commerce, supra note 57; Directive on Electronic Commerce, supra note
56, at art. 8.
67. See Directive on Electronic Commerce, supra note 56, at 21.
68. See id. at art. 6.
69. See id. at art. 58
70. See id. at art. 6.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND CON SUMER PROTECTION
In the debate concerning the appropriate approach to jurisdiction over e-
commerce transactions, two polar models have arisen.7' Jurisdiction can be based
on the country of origin of the product at issue.72 For obvious reasons, this
approach is preferred by businesses since it gives them certainty as to which laws
will apply to their transactions. Conversely, consumer group advocates suggest
another model where jurisdiction is based on a country of destination.73 This
approach would "allow consumers to easily know what rules apply.
74
U S. Approach
"At this point, the U.S. government has not taken a position on this issue."
75
However, the executive branch has acknowledged the necessity of international
76agreement. The Clinton administration, through a government working group,
reported its view on the future of e-commerce jurisdiction: "[The] global
community must address complex issues involving choice of law and jurisdiction -
how to decide where a virtual transaction takes place and what consumer
protection laws apply.,
77
While the legislative and executive branches have refused to legislate e-
commerce jurisdiction, U.S. courts have continued with business as usual. The
U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to adapt traditional jurisdiction approaches to e-
commerce transactions. 78  The basic premise of International Shoe governs
personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts. 79 The 'minimum contacts' test sets forth the
due process requirements that a defendant, not present in the forum, must meet in
order to be subjected to personal jurisdiction: "He [must] have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. ,go
Since International Shoe, however, the evolution of e-commerce has caused
the number of forums with which a business is likely to have contacts to increase
dramatically. 8' A company with an Internet presence has instant contacts with
71. See Elliot Maxwell, Electronic Commerce Policies for the Emerging Marketplace, 7 B.U. J.
Sci. & TECH. L. 195, 196 (2001).
72. See id. at 199.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See Maxwell, supra note 71 at 199.
76. See U.S. Government Working Group on Electronic Commerce, First Annual Report at 27
(11/98), at http://www.law.wayne.edu/litman/classes/cyber/1998/E-comm.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2002).
77. Nimmer, supra note 25, at 40.
78. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (expanding
"minimum contacts" test to apply to e-commerce). See generally Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326
U.S. 310 (1945) (discussing traditional, "minimum contacts" approach to jurisdictional analysis).
79. See Int'l Shoe Co., supra note 78, at 316.
80. Id.
81. See generally, Aciman & Vo-Verde, supra note 23.
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nearly every forum in the world. 2 Therefore, the question becomes: what level of
contacts between an e-commerce defendant and a possible forum will fulfill the
'minimum contacts' test? For e-commerce businesses without physical contacts in
a forum, their chances of being subject to jurisdiction increase with their electronic
presence: "[These companies are] more likely to be subject to jurisdiction in the
forum state if [their website is] interactive and there is a history of interaction with
residents of the state. 's
Zippo v. Zippo
The leading case dealing with e-commerce jurisdiction in the U.S. is Zippo
Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.84 In this case, the Western Pennsylvania District
Court expanded on the International Shoe 'minimum contacts test' by stating that
personal jurisdiction for e-comrnmerce companies should be dealt with on a 'sliding
scale' 8 5
At one end (justifying jurisdiction) is a company that 'clearly does business over
the Internet' such as 'entering into contracts with residents of a foreign
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files'
and, at the other end (not subject to jurisdiction), is a purely passive website 8 6
For companies in the middle of the scale, jurisdiction should be determined
by the "level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information
that occurs on [their] Web site. 87 Factors such as online contracting (found on




The application of traditional jurisdictional law to e-commerce transactions in
the European Union poses more difficult challenges than in the United States. The
European Union, as mentioned above, consists of 15 different sovereign nations. 8 9
Each government, while attempting to utilize the collective power of the EU, also
has a desire to ensure the autonomy of its government and courts as well as the
protection of its population. Attempts have been made, however, to converge
82. See Aciman & Vo-Verde, supra note 23, at 16.
83. Jeffrey P. Cunard & Jennifer B. Coplan, Developments in Internet and E-Commerce Law:
2001, 678 PLI/PAT 935, 1090 (2001).
84. Zippo Mfg. Co., supra note 78.
85. See id. at 1124.
86. Cunard & Coplan, supra note 83, at 1090.
87. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
88. See Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing
jurisdiction over defendant who entered into a clickwrap agreement with CompuServe via Internet).
89. See European Union Website, supra note 55.
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jurisdictional approaches and offer a more consistent system to jurisdiction within
the EU. 90 An amendment to the 1968 Brussels Convention, called Brussels I or the
Brussels Regulation, went into effect in March of 2002.91 Brussels I mandates that
"online sellers be subject to suit in all fifteen EU states when they sell over the
Internet. 92 It is intended to apply to consumer contracts that are concluded with
the use of an interactive website that is accessible in the State where the consumer
is domiciled.93 Courts will be authorized to exercise jurisdiction over a merchant
when he "pursues commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the
consumer's domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that Member
State..." 94 Unlike EU Directives, which place an obligation on each member state
to enact domestic legislation consistent with the Directives' provisions, treaties
generally become the law of the land upon their adoption by signatory countries
and are an historically recognized source of binding international law. 95 As a
result of the Brussels Regulation, e-commerce companies will have to comply with
the laws of each of the EU member states unless they can prevent consumers from
a given forum from utilizing their websites.96
Yahoo! Inc.
Even prior to the Brussels I amendments going into effect, EU member states
exercised jurisdiction over e-commerce companies without physical contacts in
their forum. 7 In Yahoo! Inc., the Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance exercised
jurisdiction over Yahoo! Inc., an e-commerce company incorporated and
physically located in the U.S. 98  The court ruled that its jurisdiction was
appropriate due to the harm suffered in France from the attempted sale of Nazi
paraphernalia through the Yahoo! Auction site. 99 The Paris Tribunal exercised
jurisdiction under Art. 46 of the Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile. °° The
French court based its final ruling, in part, on expert testimony concerning the
availability and practicality of Yahoo! using a 'blocking technology'.' 0' The
application of this type of technology, the court argued, would allow Yahoo! to
90. See Nicole Goldstein, Brussels I: A Race to the Top, 2 CHI. J. OF INT'L L. 521, 521-23 (2001).
91. See id. See also Alastair Breward, Structuring, Negotiating & Implementing Strategic
Alliances 2000, 1260 PLI/CORP. 391,423 (2001).
92. Goldstein, supra note 90, at 521.
93. See Wendy Kennett, ed., The Brussels I Regulation, 50 INT'L & COMP L.Q. 725, 729 (2001).
94. Council Regulation No. 44/2001, art. 15(l)(c), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 6.
95. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2(l)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M 679. See also David Rainford, European Harmony in the Digital Millennium,
18 E-COMMERCE L. & STRATEGY I (Sept, 2001).
96. See Goldstein, supra note 90, at 523.
97. See L.I.C.R.A. & U.E.J.F. c/ Yahoo! Inc. & Soci~td Yahoo France, T.G.I. Paris (May 22,
2000; Aug. 11, 2000; Nov. 20, 2000). See also Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1185-88 (2001) (quoting a certified translation of the French
court's decree and providing an overview of the case).
98. Yahoo!, supra note 97, at 1184-85.
99. See id.
100. See Cunard & Coplan, supra note 83, at 1098-1099.
101. Id. at 1099-1100.
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effectively block French nationals (or users based in the French territory) from
accessing the sites involved. 10 2 While there is still some debate in U.S. courts over
the enforceability of the French court's ruling in the U.S. and the practicality of
blocking technology, Yahoo! Inc. is illustrative of the problems that arise for
companies doing business via the Internet.'0 3
Distance Selling Directive
In addition to the Brussels I amendments, an EU directive has been utilized in
an attempt to protect consumers who purchase goods and services online.' 4 The
Distance Selling Directive was adopted on May 20, 1997 and was to be
implemented by June 4, 2000.105 This directive, originally aimed at pyramid
selling schemes, is only in force in ten of the fifteen member states including
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and
the UK.' 0 6 The Distance Selling Directive applies to most contracts where the
seller and consumer never meet face to face, including contracts that are formed
via the Internet. 0 7 Requirements imposed on companies engaging in electronic
transactions are intended to help to protect consumers. 0 8 This directive allows a
consumer to withdraw from a distance contract (including an electronic contract)
for up to 7 days after entering with some exceptions.10 9
FUTURE OF JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
The future of jurisdiction over e-commerce companies in the EU seems
muddled at best. With sovereign nations desiring to remain as such, it is unlikely
that they will submit to a scheme that reduces their ability to exercise jurisdiction
over companies offering potentially harmful products to local consumers. The
European Commission, for its part, envisions the future evolution of the EU
system: "[The] European Commission envisions setting up a system of alternative
dispute resolution procedures in each EU country, to which the commissioners
hope consumers will resort rather than using expensive court litigation
procedures.""°0
The result could be a more uniform dispute resolution system for all e-
commerce lawsuits within the EU. Consumers would be better prepared to bring
102. See Cunard & Coplan, supra note 83, at 1099-1100.
103. See id.
104. See generally Council Directive 97/7/EC of 20 May 1997 on the Protection of Consumers in
Respect of Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/policy/developments/dist-sell/distOl-en.pdf (last visited 3/1/03)
[hereinafter Distance Selling Directive].
105. See Mark Owen, International Ramifications of Doing Business On-line: Europe, 661
PLI/PAT 627, 657 (2001).
106. See id.
107. See id. See also Distance Selling Directive, supra note 104, at annex. 1.
108. See Distance Selling Directive, supra note 104, at art. 14
109. See id. at art. 6.
110. Goldstein, supra note 90, at 523.
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claims in their local forum. E-commerce businesses would be able to predict
where they could be summoned and make informed decisions regarding whether or
not to utilize blocking technology (such as that suggested in Yahoo!) to reduce
their likelihood of being hauled before a distant tribunal.
The future of jurisdiction on a global scale, within the next five years, will
likely result in an international agreement of some sort. A new multilateral treaty
orchestrated through the United Nations would help to converge jurisdiction
schemes regarding e-commerce. The Brussels Convention is an example of the
value of such an agreement. Consumer protection issues are of enough importance
that politicians will be forced to enter into such agreements in order to ensure the
safety of their constituents.
The future of e-commerce jurisdiction, within the next fifteen years, will
potentially see the evolution of a multinational forum for the resolution of e-
commerce disputes. While the issues of sovereignty and cultural relativism are
obvious stumbling blocks, as the Internet continues to evolve and offer the sale of
goods and services throughout the world without regard for international borders,
governments will likely recognize their inability to use domestic courts to
effectively resolve all e-commerce disputes. Assent to an international forum will
be seen as a necessary sacrifice of policy autonomy and regulatory and judicial
sovereignty in order to retain a competitive edge and an ability to protect one's
citizens in an increasingly globalized political economy.
ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS
One of the most significant legal issues in modem e-commerce is the ability
of businesses and consumers to form contracts without ever touching a pen or
shaking a hand."' "It is common practice for websites to require users to enter
into 'clickwrap' or online contracts by requiring the user to click on a box marked
'I agree' or to otherwise subject users to a website's 'Terms and Conditions of
Use."112
Electronic contracts can take the form of shrinkwrap agreements, clickthrough
agreements, and browsewrap agreements.'13 For each of these types of contract,
there are two principle issues." 4 The first concerns the consumer's acceptance or
lack thereof." 5 The second is the enforceability of the contract." 6 While each of
these issues is also significant in dealing with traditional paper-based contracts,
electronic contracts introduce some unique difficulties.
111. See Cunard & Coplan, supra note 83, at 1036.
112. Id.
113. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 25. See also Cunard & Coplan, supra note 83, at 1036.
114. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 25.
115. See id. at 25-26.
116. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 25-26.
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U.S. APPROACH TO ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS - GENERALLY
Shrinkwrap agreements are the type of 'electronic contract' most analogous to
traditional contracts."17 These contracts are generally placed in retail software
packaging." 8 They 'inform' the consumer of the rights and obligations that are
agreed upon with the consumer's acceptance." 9 The software purchaser generally
is not furnished with the shrinkwrap agreement until the packaging is opened and
acceptance is evidenced by beginning to use the software.'
20
U.S. courts have, in general, held these contracts to be binding.12' The
Seventh Circuit addressed the enforceability of shrinkwrap agreements in ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg 22 In this case, shrinkwrap agreements were determined to be
enforceable, except where the "terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to
contracts in general."'
' 23
Clickthrough agreements introduce different problems. 2 4 These contracts
appear on a computer screen as a consumer attempts to utilize a service or make a
purchase. 25 They are similar to paper contracts except they are not physically on
paper and acceptance is manifested by clicking on a symbol, generally the term "I
accept."1
26
U.S. courts have dealt with the acceptance and enforceability issues regarding
clickthrough agreements. 27  In Hotmail Corp. v. VanS Money Pie Inc., the
Northern District Court of California held that the defendant accepted Hotmail's
"Terms of Service" through a clickthrough agreement. 28 In a similar decision, the
Sixth Circuit ruled that a defendant had assented to jurisdiction through the
acceptance of a clickwrap agreement129 In In re Realnetworks, Inc., a court
dealing with an arbitration requirement that the contract at issue be written went
even further and ruled that the clickthrough agreement involved was of an "easily
printable and storable nature ... sufficient to render it 'written'." 30
While it is clear that shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements have generally
been held as valid contracts in U.S. courts, browsewrap agreements present unique
concerns.' 3' Browsewrap agreements "require less definite manifestations of user




121. See ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1449.
124. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 25-26.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 26.
127. See Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729, *17 (N.D. Cal.
April 16, 1998).
128. See Hotmail Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729, *17.
129. See Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263-1269 (6th Cir. 1996).
130. In re RealNetworks, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584, *8 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000).
131. See Cunard & Copland, supra note 83, at 1036, 1041-43.
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assent." 132  Contrary to clickthrough contracts, these types of agreements are
generally not binding.' 33 Unlike shrinkwrap agreements, they are often placed on
websites in places that are not obvious to the consumer and proving that the client
even saw the agreement is difficult. 34 In this fast-growing area of interstate and
international business sparked by the frictionless nature of e-commerce, it has
become clear that some national legislation is necessary. 135
UCC
In the U.S., most electronic contracts are governed by traditional contract
common law along with the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 136 Without any
standard statutory scheme for the regulation of electronic contracts, these
conventional and often inappropriate tools are used.
UCITA
One attempt to create a standard statutory system that is more adequately
suited to the unique issues that arise from virtual transactions is the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).137 UCITA, which originated as
a proposal for a new UCC Article 2 and was approved as a legislative model by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on July 29, 1999,
has only been adopted by two states, Maryland and Virginia. 3 8  UCITA was
authored with grand aspirations: "[UCITA was] designed to provide default rules,
interpretations, and guidelines for transactions involving 'computer information,'
including many, if not all, e-commerce transactions." 1
39
As such, its scope is limited to "computer information" transactions, which
are defined as agreements involving "information in electronic form which [are]
obtained from or through the use of a computer or... capable of being processed
by a computer."' 140 Under UCITA, much of the doubt as to the enforceability of
electronic contracts is removed. In dealing with these types of agreements, UCITA
mandates that they are generally enforceable if certain criteria are met.141 First,
132. Cunard & Copland, supra note 83, at 1041.
133. See Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 594-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
See also Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4553, (C.D. Cal. 2000),
injunction denied, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12987 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000), aff'd, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis
1454 (9 a Cir. Jan. 22, 2001); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
See also Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2000).
134. See Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 594-595.
135. See, e.g., BILL GATES, BUSINESS @ THE SPEED OF THOUGHT: SUCCEEDING IN THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY (2000).
136. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2001).
137. See Cunard & Coplan, supra note 83, 1045-1046.
138. See id. at 1046
139. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 27.
140. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, § 102(a)(10) (1999), available at
http://www.ucitaonline.com/ucita.html (last visited 2/13/03) [hereinafter UCITA].
141. See id. at §§ 112, 209. See also UCITA, supra note 140, Prefatory Note at 1-3.
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there must be "manifest assent."' 4 2 Assent can be evidenced by "intentionally
engag[ing] in conduct."'' 43 Finally, the assenting party must have been given an
"opportunity to review" the terms of the contract at issue.'" UCITA recognizes
the appropriateness of following industry standards and allowing for future
changes in e-commerce: "[A) party may meet its evidentiary burden by developing
'commercially reasonable' internal procedures to create a reproducible record of
terms, along with a record of user's response to those terms."'145 In addition,
UCITA applies to "computer information," which allows for its continued
application as future technologies adapt.
46
EU APPROACH TO ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS - GENERALLY
E-Commerce Directive
The EU has progressed in its regulation of electronic contracts and e-
commerce in general. The Electronic Commerce Directive (Directive 2000/3 I/EC)
(e-Commerce Directive) required that all EU members be in compliance with its
provisions by January 17, 2002.14' This directive "aims to bring some basic legal
clarity and harmony to EU e-commerce laws."'148  To accomplish this, the
Directive mandates its application to all consumer transactions. 49  The e-
Commerce Directive governs contract formalities not governed by the Electronic
Signatures Directive (discussed infra). 15  Upon acceptance of an electronic
contract, an acknowledgement of the order must be transmitted by electronic
means without undue delay.' 5' Users must be given the ability to view and check
all information prior to completing their order. 52
Another applicable directive that has been used to regulate electronic
contracts is the Distance Selling Directive (as mentioned above). 53 This directive
imposes several requirements on businesses forming electronic (and other
distance) contracts. 5 4 Article 4(1) mandates that consumers be given information
concerning the supplier, the goods or services being purchased, the price, and the
142. UCITA, supra note 140, at § 209(a).
143. Id. at § 112(a)(2).
144. See id. at § 112 (b).
145. Cunard & Coplan, supra note 83, at 1047 (emphasis added). See UCITA, supra note 140, at
§§ 102(a)(5), 108.
146. See UCITA, supra note 140, at § 103(a). See also Raymond T. Nimmer, Materials on
UCITA: What is It and Why is so Much Misrepresented About the Statute, 670 PLI/PAT 591, 594
(2001).
147. See Directive on Electronic Commerce, supra note 56, at art. 22.




152. See Breward, supra note 91, at 422.
153. See Distance Selling Directive, supra note 104.
154. See id.
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method of payment before the contract is made. 155  In addition, Article 4(2)
requires that all information be provided in a "clear and comprehensible
manner. .. with due regard... to the principles of good faith...,156 Confirmation
must be sent via durable medium to the consumer by the time of delivery. 57
Vastly pro-consumer (as mentioned above), the Distance Selling Directive permits
consumers to withdraw from distance contracts for up to 7 days after closing with
some exceptions for services, perishable goods, and custom made goods.' 58
FUTURE OF ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS
The future of electronic contracts will see an increased focus of legislation
dealing with enhancing the reliability and appeal of e-commerce. As governments
continue to see the advantages of a frictionless economy where purchases are made
with great speed and ease, they will begin to realize that electronic contracts hold
the key to the sustained growth of e-commerce. Legislative attention will be
focused on protecting consumers while attracting business to domestic firms with
the implementation of homogenized criteria for the formation of electronic
contracts. While not e-commerce specific legislation, the Distance Selling
Directive's 7-day cooling off period is the type of regulation that attracts
consumers. As nations see consumers fleeing to economies that offer more
protections like these, perhaps a regulatory 'race to the top' could result in
increased safeguards for consumers with less transactional friction.
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
US. Approach to Electronic Signatures
UCITA & UETA
One key concern pertaining to electronic contracts is the ability to assent to a
contract electronically. Electronic signatures "encourage confidence in e-
commerce as a means of trade" and ensure that on-line agreements are effective. 59
In the U.S., UCITA regulates electronic signatures. Given that UCITA has only
been adopted in two states to date, other legislation is necessary as well.
160
The federal Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) governs electronic
signatures, as well as other e-commerce transactions that are not covered by, or in
155. See Distance Selling Directive, supra note 104, at art. 4(1).
156. Id. at art. 4(2).
157. See Owen, supra note 105, at 658.
158. See id. at 658-659.
159. Owen, supra note 105, at 653.
160. This gap is at least partially filled via the Uniform Electronics Transactions Act. See Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act ('UETA'), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/
ueta99.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
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states that have not adopted, UCITA. 16 1 UETA allows for the formation of a
contract where an electronic signature can be attributed to a party "if it can be
shown in any manner, including use of a reliable security procedure, that it was the
act of that person."' 162 As of March, 2001, UETA is widely accepted, having been
adopted by the District of Columbia and some 36 states. 163 In 2000 and 2001, nine
other states introduced UETA legislation: Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont and Wisconsin.'64 UETA
differs from UCITA in that the former governs all electronic "transactions" and,
therefore, does not deal directly with the substantive issues involved with
electronic contracts.165 UCITA, as discussed above, does deal with the substantive
contractual issues involved in computer information. Furthermore, UETA only
applies if the parties agree to use electronic commerce with regard to the
transaction in question.166  UCITA automatically applies unless the parties
expressly opt.
E-Sign
Another piece of legislation also deals with electronic signatures. 167 The
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign) was signed
into law on June 30, 2000 and went into effect on October 1, 2000. 16 E-Sign
mandates that all electronic contracts relating to transactions in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce be given the same legal force as if they were
written: "A signature, contract, or other record may not be denied effect, validity or
enforceability solely because it is in electronic form."'
169
While E-Sign is an example of Congress' application of its broad powers
under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, it does not pre-empt state
laws (e.g., UCITA and UETA) that can modify, limit, or even supercede its
provisions.
161. See Cunard & Coplan, supra note 83, at 1049-1050.
162. Id. at 1049. UETA, supra note 160, at § 9.
163. The 36 states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia
and Wyoming. See Cunard & Coplan, supra note 83, at 1050.
164. See id.
165. See Nimmer, supra note 146, at 619.
166. See UETA, supra note 160, Prefatory Note at 2.
167. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001 et seq.
(2000) [hereinafter E-Sign].
168. See Cunard & Coplan, supra note 83, at 1051.
169. E-Sign, supra note 167, at § 7001(a)(1).
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EU APPROACH TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
Electronic Signatures Directive
The EU Electronic Signatures Directive (Directive 1999/93/EC) marks the
EU's approach to the regulation of electronic signatures. 70 The stated aim of this
directive is to "create a harmonised and appropriate legal framework for the use
and legal recognition of electronic signatures within the EU."'17 ' The Directive
requires that member states enact legislation that affords legal recognition to
"electronic signatures that are based on a 'qualified certificate"" so long as they
were "created by a 'secure-signature-creation device...,,,7 While a contract that
fulfills Article 5 is per se valid, other contracts are not necessarily invalid. 7 3 The
EU Directive deals with future technologies in the same way as UCITA (as
mentioned above). The EU Directive does not require a specific type of
technology, but allows for technological adaptation that fulfills the secure-
signature-creation requirement. 74  Certification Service Providers (CSPs) will
provide the service of fulfilling this requirement. In turn, "CSPs will be liable to
anyone who relies upon an issued certificate." 175
FUTURE OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
The future treatment of electronic signatures regulation is likely to continue
on the same track as current trends. That is, technology has taken the lead over
legislation further than legislation has restrained or guided technology. The EU
Electronic Signature Directive is an example of this relationship. The Directive
utilizes the technology available, while remaining flexible to accept future
technologies, to ensure that electronic contracts can be given the same evidentiary
standing as traditional contracts. Technologies such as secure-signature-creation
and the forethought to allow commercial CSPs to turn electronic contract
verification into an industry are signs of future legislation. The type of adaptation
that UCITA and the EU Directive explicitly allow for will provide room for future,
more secure, and reliable technologies. While the EU Directive allows for non-EU
CSPs to offer their services within the EU, there are no international agreements
for global acceptance of such electronic contract verification. A multilateral
convention or international consortium outlining standards for the global
recognition of CSPs would support e-commerce growth on a larger international
170. See EU Electronic Signatures Directive, 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and the
Council of the European Union (Dec. 13, 1999), available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/
sgadoc?smartapi!celexapi !prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=31999L0093&model=guichett
(last visited Jan. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Electronic Signatures Directive].
171. Owen, supra note 105, at 654.
172. Cunard & Coplan, supra note 83, at 1053. See Electronic Signatures Directive, supra note
170, at art. 5.
173. See Electronic Signatures Directive, supra note 170, at art. 5.
174. See Breward, supra note 9 1, at 422.
175. Owen, supra note 105, at 655.
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scale.
E-COMMERCE TAXATION
A consumer pays taxes when she purchases goods from a traditional retail
outlet. States can generally levy taxes on interstate activity if such taxes only have
an indirect burden on interstate commerce. 176 They can easily justify collecting
these taxes when the purchase was made within the governmental entity's
jurisdiction. But, what happens when a Colorado resident visiting New Mexico
purchases a good from Amazon.com? Furthermore, what are the tax consequences
when a consumer from London sitting in an a Japanese airport purchases a pair of
Italian shoes from a French company via a web-site that is hosted in Spain, and the
shoes are to be shipped from Portugal? There are several options available to
governments in assessing the appropriate tax regimes.
U.S. APPROACH TO E-COMMERCE TAXATION
ITFA and lTNA
Currently, the U.S. has in place a moratorium on new or discriminatory
Internet taxation. 177 The Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), which mandated a
three-year moratorium on new Internet taxes, was set to expire in October, 2001.178
Following the terrorist attacks on the U.S., Congress rushed to extend ITFA and
the Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act (ITNA) was passed in November of
2001.179 ITNA extended ITFA until November 1, 2003.180 While the federal
government has adopted a wait-and-see approach in regards to Internet taxation,
state governors have explicitly lobbied for the power to tax e-commerce
transactions. Forty-two governors had sent letters to Congress opposing ITNA or
its equivalent as of September, 2001.181 States fear that they will lose sales tax
revenues as consumers choose to purchase goods via the Internet and avoid paying
state sales taxes. 8 2 Currently, Internet transactions are taxed in the same manner
as catalog sales - based on physical presence. 1 3 This has motivated corporations
like Amazon.com to locate, and in some instances relocate, distribution centers to
states with small populations like Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada,
and North Dakota.'4 Many traditional companies with a physical presence in each
176. See, e.g., United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321,326 (1918).
177. See Cundard & Coplan, supra note 83, at 1069.
178. See Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 1 101(a) (1998).
179. See Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 107-75 (2001).
180. See id.
181. See P. Greg Gulick, The Internet's Impact on State Tax Systems, 33 UPB. LAW. 479, 495
(2001).
182. See Anita Horn, Internet Transaction Taxes: The Need for Jurisdictional Integration, 9
COMMLAW CONSPECTUs 29 (2001).
183. See generally Get a Grip!, supra note 5.
184. See id.
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state where they generate transactions are losing ground to low-overhead, non-tax-
burdened, e-commerce firms.' 8 5 "Governments can hardly expect bricks-and-
mortar companies to continue to pay taxes on the same sort of transactions that go
untaxed with e-commerce companies."'
'8 6
Quill v. North Dakota & the Uniform Act
The Supreme Court, in Quill v. North Dakota, reaffirmed its position on state
taxation: "[i]n the absence of some nexus of the vendor to the taxing state, no state
can compel collection of its sales tax by an out of state vendor without
authorization from Congress."'
8 7
While a state cannot compel out of state firms to collect its sales tax, vendors
can voluntarily do so.' 88 The Uniform Sales and Use Tax Administration Act
(Uniform Act) is an attempt to motivate out of state companies to collect state sales
tax.'8 9 One incentive proposed in the Uniform Act is the use of "certified service
providers" or "trusted third parties."' 90 Another incentive is that states would pay
to have these entities, which would automatically collect and remit appropriate
taxes, incorporated into a vendor's e-commerce system.' 9' A further proposed
enticement is to grant participating firms immunity from sales and use tax audits
arising prior to participation.1
92
Streamlined Sales Tax Project
An additional attempt by states to entice out of state vendors to collect sales
taxes for e-commerce transactions with in-state consumers is the Streamlined Sales
Tax Project (SSTP). 19 3 Over thirty states have agreed to join the SSTP, which
undertakes to simplify state sales tax systems and make it easier for e-commerce
companies to collect taxes through the use of available technology. 94 As with the
Uniform Act, states would pay for the implementation of tax-collection systems.'
95
185. See Geta Grip!, supra note 5, at 18.
186. Id.
187. Cunard & Coplan, supra note 83, at 1070 (emphasis added). See also Quill v. N. Dakota, 504
U.S. 298 (1992).
188. See Cunard & Coplan, supra note 83, at 1070 (emphasis added). See also Quill, supra note
187, at 298.




193. See Structure and Operating Rules, Streamlined Sales Tax Project, adopted March 30, 2000,
available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2003). See also Hardesty, supra
note 26, at 199.
194. See List of Participating States, Streamlined Sales Tax Project, adopted March 30, 2000,
available at http://www.geocities.com/streamlined2000/participatingstates.html (last visited Feb. 26,
2003).
195. See Multistate Tax Commission, Public-Private Sector Study of Cost of Collecting State and
Local Sales and Use Taxes, available at http://www.mtc.gov/XPYRSVS/Cost%2Oof*/o20Collection.pdf
(last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
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One SSTP proposal that could have a place in the solving of the international
taxation question is the use of a centralized registration system. Vendors would
register in each state, leaving states to allocate appropriate funds to each




While Quill bars states from requiring out of state vendors to collect sales and
use taxes without Congress' authorization, and it appears that the only options
discussed so far rely primarily on the generosity of e-commerce companies, there
is hope. After Quill, "Congress, is now free to decide whether, when, and to what
extent the States may" make such regulation. 97 Senator Dale Bumpers introduced
the Tax Fairness for Main Street Business Act of 1994 (the Bumpers' Bill): "[tjhe
Bumpers' Bill authorized the states to require interstate use tax collection,
protected affected companies against unreasonable compliance burdens and
insured that state governments distributed the appropriate amount of resulting
revenues to their local jurisdictions."'198
While Congress failed to pass the Bumpers' Bill, it is an example of possible
future legislation that would create a more level playing field.
EU APPROACH TO E-COMMERCE TAXATION
Taxation in the European Union introduces unique issues. With 15 different
nations, there are 15 different theories on the proper role of taxation in the political
economy. 199  For example, states such as France and Sweden are heavily
entrenched in a welfare state system requiring large amounts of funding which is
supplied in the form of taxation.200 Other nations are based on less welfarist
regimes. In Europe, a Value Added Taxation (VAT) scheme is the norm. 2° 1 At
nearly 25%, the tax rate is much higher than normal U.S. sales taxes, promising to
cause difficulty for any attempt at tax rate convergence.
196. See Hardesty, supra note 26.
197. Quill, supra note 187, at 318. See generally Tracey A. Kaye, Show Me the Money:
Congressional Limitations on State Tax Sovereignty, 35 HARV. J. ON LEG1S. 149, 174 (1998) (quoting
Congressional Power to Proscribe Certain State Taxes, State Taxation of Nonresidents' Pension
Income: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 99, 100, 102 (1993)).
198. Horn, supra note 182, at 44.
199. See European Union Website, supra note 55.
200. See THE ROBERT GORDON UNIVERSITY, AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL POLICY: THE
WELFARE STATE, available at http://www2.rgu.ac.uk/publicpolicy/introduction/wstate.htm (last visited
Jan. 2, 2003).
201. See Xuan-Thao Nyguyen, European E-Commerce Developments From A U.S. Perspective,
649 PLI/PAT 639, 656-59 (2001).
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Closing the Loophole
EU vendors of electronically delivered goods and services are required to
affirmatively collect VAT. 20 2  Until recently, non-EU companies, were not
required to register and collect this tax.20 3 Instead, business purchasers have been
required to 'self-assess' their tax burden while non-business buyers were not
required to pay VAT for electronically delivered goods and services at all.2° 4 The
result was similar to that of the Internet moratorium in the U.S. and, as in the U.S.,
many government officials and traditional firms have plead for a leveling of the
playing field. Under a new set of rules applicable to the European VAT system, a
revised comprehensive definition of services includes those delivered
electronically and, as such, many non-EU companies have begun to collect VAT,
as they will be required to do starting in July, 2003.205 The taxation of goods
delivered by traditional means are already "governed by the existing import
regime, under which VAT is collected when goods are imported into an EU
country from outside the EU. 206
FUTURE OF E-COMMERCE TAXATION
Nations have competed for direct investment and trade since before World
War I. Recent trends toward an increasingly globalized political economy have
increased awareness of the need to remain competitive in order to successfully
fend off capital flight. Nations have lowered environmental standards, labor
regulations, and taxation levels. A regulatory race-to-the-bottom is underway. As
with environmental and labor standards, taxation levels will need to be artificially
sustained through international agreement. "Countries must unify conflicting tax
laws to effectively tax e-commerce.,, 20 7 An international taxation consortium is
appropriate to ensure "international equity, efficiency, neutrality, international
acceptance, and simplicity."208 The initial stages of such a system will probably be
seen within the EU, or even between the U.S. and the EU, and will likely take the
form of a multilateral convention on taxation or international tax consortium to
collect and disperse taxes.
202. See Horn, supra note 182. See also Maxwell, supra note 71; Statement by Treasury Deputy
Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat, June 7, 2000, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
ls687.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
203. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Transforming The Internet Into A Taxable Forum: A Case Study In E-
Commerce Taxation, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1254-55 (2001).
204. See id.
205. See Cockfield, supra note 203. See also VAT ON BROADCASTING AND ELECTRONICALLY
SUPPLIED SERVICES - NEW UK RULES - PART 1, available at httpJ/www.ecommercetax.com/
doc/052503.htm (last visited June 18, 2003).
206. Cunard & Coplan, supra note 83, at 1071.
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TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 233, 245 (2000).
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THE FUTURE
Speculation on the future of e-commerce is difficult, and even more so,
foolish. Legislation that attempts to restrict its continued development is futile as
that very development will circumvent the regulation. Much more wisely,
regulation should allow and foster continued growth of e-commerce. As pertaining
to U.S. and EU regulation of electronic commerce, differing approaches have
emerged in some areas while surprisingly similar schemes have been the rule in
others. Both should work together to ensure that a regulatory race to the bottom
does not ensue. In forging future international arrangements, the U.S. and EU
should continue to weigh political autonomy and ideals of sovereignty with the
need to remain competitive and protect their citizens in an increasingly globalized
political economy. As such, jurisdictional, electronic contract, electronic
signature, and e-commerce taxation issues will be best dealt with in concert.
Multinational organizations like the United Nations are well suited to take on some
of these concerns, while newly-formed consortiums with specialized knowledge,
skill, and tools are more appropriate for technically complex issues, such as e-
contracts and taxation.

